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SUMMARY 
As the only internationally sanctioned means by which a fugitive 
offender may be returned from one state to another, extradition as a 
public international law process has received surprisingly little 
attention in South African legal literature. 
The major trends in European extradition law are identified and 
a parallel is drawn with South African extradition from 1652 to 
the present. 
Extradition has a dual basis : treaty and non-treaty. 
Traditionally South Africa preferred treaty-based extradition, 
but with the adoption of the Extradition Act in 1962 this base 
was broadened. In a detailed analysis of section 3(2) of the Act 
it is shown that extradition is here in fact an act of comity. 
This has not always been recognised by the authorities who have 
confusad section 3(2) comity with reciprocity. This may be 
ascribed to a basic misunderstanding of a reciprocal undertaking 
to extradite as an informally concluded treaty commitment. 
Most of South Africa's extradition treaties are inherited. State 
succession to bilateral treaties resulting from annexation and 
cession, devolution agreements, and dismemberment or secession is 
consequently traced through the various "successions in fact" 
occurring within South Africa from 1652-1961. Particularly within 
the South African courts, a misconception of the role of consent 
in succession has led to considerable confusion. An alternative 
approach to the succession process which emphasises the role of 
consent and gives due credit to succession as a separate 
international law phenomenon is proposed. Namibian succession to 
extradition treaties is addressed briefly. 
The termination of extradition treaties is examined and an 
assessment is made of the individual treaties appearing on the 
South African Treaty List culminating in a re-evaluation of 
states to which South Africa owes a duty to extradite and from which 
it may demand extradition as of right. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
As one of international law's oldest institutions, extradition has at 
some or other stage, affected virtually every nation in the world. 
Although the popularity of extradition treaties has waxed and waned 
through the course of history, the core perception that perpetrators 
of crime should not go unpunished, has remained. It is this basic 
sociological perception, coupled perhaps cynically, with the 
realisation that no nation wishes to be seen as a dumping-ground for 
"the worst that other countries have to export", (1) that has enabled 
the nations of the world to transcend considerations of self-interest 
and poli~ics and to make extradition a vital force for international 
cooperation. 
It is consequently surprising to find that in South African 
literature, extradition in its international perspective has received 
scant attention. On the other hand, a fair measure of information is 
available on extradition as a process of municipal law. (2) In these, 
largely procedural, discussions the international perspective is 
either ignored or glossed over. A question which must consequently 
arise is whether extradition is indeed a topic which falls to be 
considered within the perimeters of international law at all, or 
whether it should not be considered purely as part of a state's 
municipal dispensation. 
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There is no easy answer to this question; all the more so in a legal 
system such as the South African where the conclusion of a treaty or 
other international agreement, does not automatically imply municipal 
application.(3) For this reason, shortly after South Africa assumed 
Republican status in 1961, the legislature adopted the Extradition 
Act 1962 to give municipal effect to South Africa's extradition 
arrangements both past and future.(4} It is to this Act that one must 
consequently turn to ascertain the true nature and role of 
extradition in South African law. 
In assessing extradition in South African law a three-dimensional 
approach is required. The first phase of the examination covers the 
extradition agreement concluded between two or more sovereign states 
- South Africa and a foreign state/s. Although section 6(3)(e) of the 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983 confers on the 
State President the general power to conclude treaties, in the case 
of extradition, this is qualified by section 2 of the Extradition Act 
which specifically provides that the State President may conclude 
treaties for the surrender of suspected or convicted criminals. The 
fact that the Extradition Act prescribes certain requirements which 
such a treaty must satisfy, in no way detracts from the nature of the 
State President's action in concluding a treaty.CS) The State 
President is here entering into an international agreement binding in 
international law. This phase of extradition is governed solely by 
public international law. 
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The second phase of the process is where problems of municipal 
application are first encountered. If a foreign state requests 
extradition fr~m South Africa on the basis of the treaty concluded by 
the State President, a South African court will be powerless to 
consider the request unless the treaty has been translated into 
municipal terms. (6) For this purpose the Extradition Act 1962 was 
adopted and provides in section 2(3) what requirements must be met 
before a treaty will be of "force and effect". (7) All that the 
Extradition Act in fact does, is to clothe an international agreement 
concluded between two public international law subjects with 
municipal legitimacy. The application for extradition is then further 
dealt with by a combination of municipal and international law. The 
municipal branch of the extradition process is largely procedural and 
has, as p,ointed out above, received considerable attention in South 
African literature. The municipal phase of the proceedings closes 
with a magistrate's decision as to whether there is sufficient 
evidence to justify the extradition of the person requested. This 
brings one to the third phase of the process. 
Once the presiding officer has decided that the person whose 
extradition has been requested is in fact liable to be extradited, 
the Minister must be informed accordingly (the extraditee either 
'being held in custody or released on bail).(8) The actual question of 
whether or not the individual is to be extradited rests with the 
Minister. Two sections of the Act refer to the Minister's decision in 
this regard. In section 10(1) it is clear that in each and every case 
in which a foreign state (as opposed to an associated state) is 
5 
concerned, the decision to extradite falls to the Minister. (9) No 
mention is made of what considerations the Minister may take into 
account in reaching his decision and it must consequently be assumed 
that any matters which he regards as relevant, including for example, 
embarrassment to the South African government, could serve as the 
basis for his decision. 
More specific is section 15 which provides for the political offence 
exception to extradition. The Minister may order the release of any 
person detained under the Act if he is satisfied that the offence 
with which the person is charged is "of a political character" or 
that his extradition will not be requested. 
If one examines the actions of the Minister in terms of these two 
sections and attempts a classification, it is immediately clear that 
one is dealing with what is termed an "act of state". Wade (10) 
defines an act of state as "(A)n act of the executive as a matter of 
policy performed in the course of its relations with another state, 
including its relations with the subjects of that state ... ". Although 
it is not typically a function of the Minister of Justice to act in 
relations affecting foreign states, this task usually falling to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, there is no doubt that he forms part of 
the executive. The question then remaining is whether we are here 
dealing with "a matter of policy"? Again there can be little doubt 
that the decision of whether or not to extradite - either in terms of 
section 10(1) or section 15 - will involve policy considerations. In 
terms of section 10, South Africa could have an active policy of 
cooperation with a particular state, or of non-cooperation for that 
matter. Similarly under section 15 where the Minister is called upon 
to consider whether the crime charged is a political offence, he will 
again take policy considerations into account. Finally, one must 
consider whether the Minister's act is performed in the course of 
relations with another state. Yet again there can be little doubt. 
The extradition request emanates from a foreign state and is 
delivered to the South African Foreign Affairs Department through 
diplomatic channels. The decision to extradite or otherwise will also 
undoubtedly have international repercussions. All the more so when 
one considers that under section 15, before the Minister reaches his 
decision he must of necessity pass a subjective judgment on the 
policy, political situation and crime perception of the requesting 
state; a decision which could have far reaching consequences on the 
international plane. 
However, sight should not be lost of the fact that although the 
Minister is acting in terms of municipal legislation when deciding 
whether or not the extradition should be granted, there is a 
presumption of statutory interpretation which provides that in 
certain circumstances, legislation must be interpreted to give effect 
to the country's international obligations. (11) 
Furthermore, an extradition treaty must be read together with the 
Extradition Act. Consequently, were the treaty in terms of which 
extradition is being sought to lay down criteria which the Minister 
should consider, (12) or were a rule of customary international law 
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to impose an obligation on the Republic to grant extradition in the 
case of a certain type of offender, (13) the Minister's statutory 
discretion should ideally be exercised with due consideration to 
international law obligations aris1ng from the treaty or custom. 
From the above it is clear that the act of extradition is far from 
simple or clear· cut. To dismiss its intrinsically international 
character is to misunderstand its true nature; to disregard its 
municipal ramifications is to deny it practical application and 
relevance. It is consequently submitted that the time is ripe for an 
investigation of the international aspects of extradition in the 
South African perspective. However, before detail can be considered 
one must establish exactly what is meant by extradition. It is to 
this question that we shall now turn. 
2 EXTRADITION DEFINED 
There is certainly no dearth of definitions of the concept of 
extradition in either legal writings or reported cases. These vary 
both in comprehensiveness and in complexity. 
The Harvard Research publication on extradition tersely defines the 
concept as : 
"The formal surrender of a person by one State to 
another State for prosecution or punishment." (14) 
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The British Digest (15) expressly introduces into its definition the 
fact that a process is involved and that this follows upon a formal 
request. In a widely cited definition, a United States' court 
includes references to the place of the commission of the 
extraditable offence and the capacity of the courts of the country 
requesting surrender.(16) Both Stanbrook (17) and Halsbury (18) 
attempt some limitation of the extraditable crime by providing that 
only serious crimes can constitute the basis for extradition 
proceedings, while Bassiouni (19) introduces as the basis of the 
request, treaty, comity or reciprocity. 
Within the context of public international law, South African 
writings on extradition have, by and large, been restricted to a 
discussion of specific aspects of the process arising in cases 
before the courts, (20) or to a general discussion of the principles 
involved without specific definition of the term .(21) Writing on 
the South African Extradition Act, Sanders (22) defines the process 
in terms strongly reminiscent of the Harvard Research. (23) In his 
work on Criminal Procedure, Dugard (24) adopts the definition 
offered by Oppenheim stressing the jurisdictional aspect emerging 
from the place of commission of the extraditable offence. The most 
comprehensive of the South African definitions of extradition is 
that of Lansdown and Campbell who, again within the context of 
criminal procedure, (25) incorporate, albeit in somewhat general 
terms, the formal nature of the process, the seriousness of the 
offence, the basis of the application, and the place of commission. 
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From the above it can be seen that although each writer approaches 
extradition from his own perspective, stressing that particular 
aspect he finds of the greatest significance, there is little in 
principle to distinguish between the different definitions. Certain 
general characteristics inherent in extradition can therefore be 
abstracted from the definitions offered. 
* In general, extradition is not intended to be an 
isolated, once-and-for-all act by a single state, 
but is rather a series of acts "partly judicial and partly 
administrative". (26) 
* This series of acts can be initiated only through a 
formal request directed by one sovereign to another.· 
The inter-state request is one of the elements 
gua~anteeing extradition its position as an important 
tool in the field of international cooperation and its 
continuing importance above and beyond political 
expediency, in the regulation of international 
behaviour. (27) 
* The requesting state must establish a sufficient nexus 
between itself and the individual whose surrender is 
sought. This will be established through the 
jurisdictional approach followed by the respective 
states. (28) 
* The extradition process is reserved for serious 
criminal offences. (29) 
For the purposes of this thesis, a working definition of extradition 
within the South African context, which encompasses these elements 
can be formulated in the following terms : 
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"Extradition is a process,initiated by an adequately 
founded, formal request from one sovereign state to 
another, based on treaty, reciprocity or comity, by means of 
which an individual accused or convicted of the cpmmission 
of a serious criminal offence within the jurisdiction of the 
requesting state, is surrendered to competent courts in that 
state for trial or punishment." 
Unfortunately, definitions seldom provide all the solutions and, in 
fact, often raise more questions than they answer. The one 
postulated here is no exception. Questions immediately arising are 
on what basis do the request and subsequent surrender, or refusal to 
surrender rest? Is a state under an obligation recognised by and 
enforceable under international law, to surrender an individual to a 
requesting state? If so, is this an absolute duty, or is it rather a 
moral duty or imperfect obligation resting on comity or goodwill 
between nations? Lastly, is extradition really necessary and could a 
state not as effectively use other means to secure the return of the 
offender? 
Before considering extradition in its historical perspective it is 
consequently necessary to distinguish briefly between extradition 
and other methods used to secure the attendance of an accused 
fugitive at his trial. 
3 EXTRADITION DISTINGUISHED 
There are a number of processes which are either closely allied to 
extradition, or which states have resorted to when extradition has 
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for various reasons not been available to them. In this section 
these "processes" will be distinguished from the extradition 
process. 
3.1 Extradition and asylum 
The term "asylum" which means literally "freedom from seizure", (30) 
is defined as "The protection accorded by a state - in its territory 
or at some other place subject to certain of its organs - to an 
individual who comes to seek it". (31) The history of asylum is 
considerably older than that of extradition and applied first to 
protection accorded by ecclesiastic authorities to individuals 
caught up in the conflict between church and state, (32) and second, 
after the collapse of the dominant position of the church, to 
individuals in political conflict with the state. This led to the 
concept of political asylum (33) which still dominates the law of 
asylum. More recently, however, a new concept of humanitarian asylum 
has emerged which deals not so much with an individual seeking 
refuge from political persecution in the territory of some other 
state, as with mass movements of people displaced by war or economic 
necessity. (34) Ecclesiastic asylum has disappeared and humanitarian 
asylum (if it in fact is an established branch of the genre) does 
not really arise in the case of extradition.C35) we are consequently 
left with political asylum. 
Political asylum is generally approached under two heads. First, 
territorial asylum where an individual is granted protection from 
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the jurisdiction of the state from which he has fled within the 
territory of the state to which he has fled; and extra-territorial 
or diplomatic asylum where the individual seeks protection within 
the embassy (36) of some other state while remaining within the 
territory of the state from which he is fleeing. The essential 
difference between the two would appear to lie in the fact that in 
the case of territorial asylum the refugee uses the jurisdictional 
provisions of the state to which he has fled to shield him from the 
acts of his own state, while in the case of extra-territorial asylum 
he uses the jurisdictional limitations (grant of immunity for 
diplomatic premises, for example) of his own state to shield him. 
Needless to say, the latter is a far more hazardous enterprise! 
3.1.1 Territorial asylum 
The question arising is what is the relationship, if any, between 
territorial asylum and extradition? First it must be pointed out 
that uncertainty exists as to whether asylum is in fact an 
international law issue at all. (37) Although the basis of asylum 
is firmly rooted in international law, both historical and modern, 
(38) its practical application within a state is essentially 
municipal in that it is the state's immigration laws which will 
provide who may and may not be admitted to its territory. This is 
also true of South Africa where a final decision on asylum is in the 
discretion of the executive which exercises its options without 
~> 
.......___ 
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having to furnish reasons and without its decisions being 
justiciable by the courts. {39) 
At this point brief mention should be made of the principle of non 
refoulment in terms of which a state may not turn a refugee a_way at 
its borders or return him to a country where he will be persecuted. 
(40) Article 2 of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum (41) 
provides: 
"no one shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at 
the frontier, expulsion, compulsory return to any 
State where he may be subjected to persecution". 
Loosely comprehended, this principle would appear to grant a right 
to asyl~ {42) which will at the same time prohibit extradition. 
However, closer examination shows that this is not in fact the case'. 
The state of asylum is under an international obligation not to turn 
the asylum seeker away or return him to the country from whose 
persecution he is fleeing, but is not itself obliged to accommodate 
him on a permanent basis. Consequently, the mere acceptance of an 
asylum seeker within a state's territory need not necessarily 
preclude the possibility of extradition. In effect, however, this 
will generally be the case in that the prohibition on the return of 
the asylum seeker facing persecution - and consequently the 
necessity to negotiate his acceptance by a state other than his own 
- will in practice mean that he will not be extradited to his 
country of origin which will in most instances be the state 
requesting extradition. 
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Furthermore, should a state grant a fugitive asylum, this will 
necessarily preclude his extradition. (43) Conversely, however, the 
refusal of extradition cannot be equated with the grant of asylum. 
(44) An apparent tension exists between a valid extradition treaty 
between two states and the granting of asylum to a fugitive from one 
of them. The treaty is concluded specifically to facilitate a 
fugitive's return, while asylum is specifically aimed at frustrating 
such action. In most instances, however, this tension will prove 
illusory in that in general terms asylum is granted to political 
refugees and most, if not all, extradition treaties prohibit 
extradition in the case of a political offender. Consequently, 
although the practical assessment of the actions of the political 
refugee and the perpetrator of a political offence for which 
extradition will be excluded may differ, the result is essentially 
similar. 
In summary, therefore, there is close interaction between 
territorial asylum and extradition. If, however, one looks at the 
rationale behind the two institutions or processes, their basic 
difference emerges. Asylum is, in essence, homocentric ·in that it is 
directed at the protection of the individual. Extradition, on the 
other hand, is essentially sociocentric in that it is aimed at the 
protection of society and its norms. Although the procedures which 
have developed around extradition embody a strong element of 
individual protection, this is not the aim of the process as such. 
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3.1.2 Extraterritorial I diplomatic asylum 
The question of so-called "diplomatic" or extraterritorial asylum 
also evidences the basic difference in objective identified in the 
case of territorial asylum. However, the concept deserves separate 
mention if only because it has been something of a cause celebre 
within South Africa in recent years and has led to the term 
"extradition" being bandied about, particularly in the media. 
A basic difference between territorial and extraterritorial asylum 
often cited by authors, (45) is that the former is an affirmation of 
the sovereignty of the state granting asylum, while the latter is 
precisely a denial of such sovereignty. Bassiouni (46) denies the 
validity of this distinction, claiming that territorial asylum is 
extended to cover "embassies, legations, military bases, territorial 
enclaves, vessels and aircrafts (sic)". Grahl-Madsen, on the other 
hand, does not recognise the existence of diplomatic asylum outside 
of Latin America, (47) nor, officially, does the United States 
government although it may grant it in exceptional circumstances 
"for humanitarian reasons under conditions of urgency where the 
applicant's freedom or life were in danger". (48) 
This problem was forcibly brought home to South Africa during 1985 
when a Dutch national, Klaus De Jonge, sought refuge in The 
Netherlands embassy in Pretoria. De Jonge, who had close ties with 
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the then banned South African Communist Party and the military wing 
of the African National Congress, entered South Africa from Zimbabwe 
on 20 June 1985. He was seen to bury certain weapons which he had 
allegedly smuggled into the country. On 23 June 1985, he was 
arrested in terms of section 29 of the Internal Security Act. (49) 
In assisting the police with their investigations, De Jonge and four 
plain-clothes policemen paid a visit to the premises of the Dutch 
embassy in Pretoria. He took the opportunity of trying to enter the 
embassy premises. While half in and half out of the embassy 
waiting-room, he was dragged away by the members of the police. A 
diplomatic furore erupted which culminated in a Dutch demand for an 
apology and the return of De Jonge to the embassy on the ground that 
the immunity of the embassy had been violated by the South African 
police. (50) On 19 July 1985, De Jonge was returned to the embassy 
and began what was to become a marathon saga of "diplomatic asylum". 
(51) The media had a field-day, with references to De Jonge's 
"extradition" from the Netherlands to South Africa epitomised by a 
report in the capital's leading daily newspaper on 20 July 1985 that 
"The Netherlands does not extradite its nationals for prosecution in 
other countries. And in the embassy, Mr De Jonge is technically on 
Dutch soil." (52) 
This statement is a handy point of reference for a brief examination 
of the relationship between diplomatic asylum and extradition. As 
was seen above, extradition, like asylum, is essentially territorial. 
The requesting state requests the state in which the extraditee 
finds himself, to hand the suspect over to it. Can this happen in 
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the case of diplomatic asylum? The question resolves itself into an 
examination of where the extraditee is. That this seemingly simple 
question is subject to confusion, is clear from the report cited 
above where it is claimed that a state's embassy is "technically" 
part of its territory (it may be added that this approach was far 
from isolated in media reports on the De Jonge incident). For 
extradition to apply in the case of diplomatic asylum, this 
statement would need to be a true reflection of the position at 
international law. However, that this is clearly not so, is borne 
out by numerous cases. (53) The international law position is 
consequently that a state's embassy (or other premises) to which the 
concept of diplomatic asylum is applied, is in fact still part and 
parcel of the host state. That state has however voluntarily limited 
its exercise of sovereign power within such premises. We 
consequently find the anomalous position that were the host state to 
request extradition from the embassy it would in fact be requesting 
that an individual within its own state be delivered to it. It is 
clear from the definition of extradition proffered above, that this 
is not a situation in which the need for, or indeed the possibility 
of, extradition arises. The question of extradition should 
consequently not arise in the case of so-called "diplomatic asylum". 
From the above it is clear that although the concepts of territorial 
asylum and extradition may be closely inter-related, they are not 
mere corollaries of one another. The processes should be clearly 
separated and each case must be considered on its individual merits 
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to determine whether asylum has indeed precluded the possibility of 
extradition. If the existence of diplomatic or extraterritorial 
asylum is accepted as an international institution deserving a 
distinct existence - as opposed to a mere exercise in political 
expediency - it must be borne in mind that the bar to delivery is 
not territorial as in "normal" political asylum, and that 
extradition is not the appropriate route for the recovery of the 
fugitive. On the other hand, it must be conceded that the inability 
of the state seeking a fugitive to "get its man" is as absolute in 
the case of diplomatic as in the case of territorial asylum. 
3.2 Extradition and abduction/kidnapping 
We have Reen that through extradition there is a legally sanctioned 
and fully regulated process in public international and municipal 
law by which a fugitive sought by one sovereign state but present in 
the territory of another may be returned to the state seeking him 
for trial or punishment. However, it is also true that extradition 
does not always succeed. There may be any number of reasons for 
this : there may be no extradition arrangements between the states 
concerned; the costs involved may be prohibitive; the delays 
involved may be overwhelming; the nature of the crime may attract 
the political offence exception; etc. What, then, is the state 
seeking a fugitive to do; must it be satisfied to sit by and watch 
the fugitive escape justice? In an ideally regulated society, one 
could perhaps expect such a response; in the current international 
arena it is somewhat idealistic. One of the perennial criticisms of 
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international law is that when the system fails, states are left to 
resort to self-help to resolve their problems. (54) This is no less 
true when extradition breaks down. Faced with a failure of the 
extradition process, a number of states have simply taken matters 
into their own hands and abducted or kidnapped the individual 
sought. Abduction, which Shearer (55) defines.as "the removal of 
a person from the jurisdiction of one State to another by force, the 
threat of force or by fraud", is the very antithesis of extradition. 
While extradition is a legal process, abduction is by definition, 
extra-legal. It constitutes not only a gross violation of the human 
rights of the individual seized - rights which extradition is 
precisely intended to protect - but also a violation of the 
territorial sovereignty of the state of refuge and as such, should 
engage international liability for the perpetrator. Nevertheless, 
states resort to kidnapping with such frequency that Abramovsky has 
stated that "the US government has pursued an official policy of 
sponsoring extraterritorial abductions, thereby charting a dangerous 
course". ( 56) 
How is it that abduction, involving as it generally does, (57) a 
violation of international law, has become a viable alternative to 
extradition in the practice of states? The answer, it is submitted, 
lies in the municipal rule applied by most states when their 
jurisdiction to try the individual brought before them by unlawful 
means is questioned. Courts in virtually all jurisdictions apply the 
maxim male captus bene detentus in terms of which the court will not 
examine the manner in which the individual was brought within its 
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jurisdiction provided that his actual presence before the court is 
not wrongful. In other words, the court will look only whether the 
individual was arrested within its territory without considering the 
methods used to bring him within such jurisdiction. Space does not 
permit a detailed examination of male captus or kidnapping in 
general international law. (58) However, South Africa has had its 
share of these unfortunate cases and the position· in this country 
will be briefly considered. 
In one of the more celebrated cases, Dennis Higgs, a lecturer at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, wanted to face charges under the 
South African Suppression of Communism Act, fled to what was then 
Northern Rhodesia.(59) Some time later, Higgs disappeared from his 
flat in ~usaka to resurface at Zoo Lake, Johannesburg. It emerged 
that he had been kidnapped by South African agents and transported 
to within the jurisdiction of the South African courts. A diplomatic 
furore erupted which resulted in the return of Higgs to the British 
authorities. (60) Although - or perhaps because - the matter did not 
go to court, the male captus principle was not applied and 
international law was allowed to run its course. The return of Higgs 
was in accordance with the accepted principles of international law. 
Mr Nduli was not so lucky when, in what was until recently the 
standard reference to this situation in South African law, he was 
kidnapped from Swaziland by members of the South African police and 
brought across the border into South Africa where he was duly 
arrested. In Nduli and Another v Minister of Justice and others (61) 
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the Appellate Division held that Nduli could indeed be tried. On the 
question of South Africa's violation of international law, the court 
found that because the policemen in question had acted without 
authorisation, South Africa had committed no international wrong. 
From an international law perspective, the validity of this finding 
is, of course, questionable. (62) However, apart from violating 
Swaziland's sovereignty in general international law terms, the 
police actions also have special significance from the point of view 
of extradition. A valid and current extradition treaty existed 
between South Africa and Swaziland at that time, (63) and by 
electing to disregard this treaty - possibly suspecting that the 
political offence exception would be raised to bar Nduli's return -
and resorting to self-help, South Africa must be held to have 
breached the extradition treaty and violated international law in 
this regard too. Be that as it may, the position after Nduli was 
that the unauthorised abduction of a fugitive from the territory of 
another sovereign state neither incurred international liability nor 
barred the jurisdiction of municipal courts. From a practical point 
of view, abduction would consequently appear to have been a viable 
alternative to extradition. 
During 1991, however, things changed when one Ebrahim was brought 
before the Appellate Division. In s v Ebrahim (64) Ebrahim was 
abducted, again from Swaziland, but on the orders of the state - a 
point which enabled the court to distinguish between this case and 
Nduli. The court consequently acknowledged that there had been a 
violation of international law, although it did not consider 
~ 
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international law strictly relevant to its consideration of the 
facts and based its finding on South African common law. (65) Using 
the principle that the state must approach the court with clean 
hands, (66) the court found that a South African court will not have 
jurisdiction to try an individual who has been brought before it as 
a result of a state-authorised abduction from the sovereign 
territory of another state. The court consequently declined to apply 
the male captus bene detentus principle - an approach which is to be 
welcomed. 
In summary, therefore, it can be seen that abduction and extradition 
are mutually destructive. Not only is abduction a violation of the 
sovereignty of the state concerned, but where formal extradition 
arrangements exist between the two states it is also a breach of the 
extradition treaty which would allow the injured party a right to 
terminate the treaty.(67) The tacit sanctioning of the process of 
abduction by municipal courts through the application of the male 
captus principle is to be condemned. Fortunately, the South African 
courts would appear now to have rejected abduction - at least when 
it is sanctioned by the state. This will in all likelihood lead to a 
reduction in the incidence of the practice as-it can serve no 
purpose. 
3.3 Informal rendition 
Closely allied to abduction, is what is sometimes termed informal 
rendition.C68) This process also involves the forcible return of a 
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fugitive to the state seeking him, but his capture is performed with 
the assistance - or at least the knowledge - of the state in which 
he has sought refuge. There is consequently no violation of the 
sovereignty of the state of refuge, although there will still be a 
violation of a treaty if extradition between the states concerned is 
governed by treaty. Here too, however, the knowledge of the states 
would render international repercussions unlikely. Where abduction 
is a conscious and flagrant violation of an extradition treaty, 
informal rendition is a somewhat "gentler" circumvention of the 
extradition formalities. There is, of course, little to choose 
between the two from the point of view of the victim whose human 
rights are trampled upon in either event! 
By its nature, rendition is particularly suited to neighbouring 
states where contact between state officials is fairly regular. So 
for example, informal rendition between Mexico and the United 
States, (69) or Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, (70) 
is a fairly regular occurrence. 
Has South Africa attempted to evade the red-tape of extradition 
I 
proceedings in this way? Of course, precisely because these 
proceedings are "extra-legal" in the sense that they circumvent the 
formal processes agreed upon for the delivery of criminals, they are 
likely neither to be documented in any detail nor easily traced. 
However, it would appear that as regards the TBVC states which from 
the South African perspective are true foreign sovereign states, 
informal rendition is a fairly frequent occurrence.(71) The 
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practice, although perhaps expedient, should not be sanctioned. This 
was in fact acknowledged by the neighbouring states and resulted in 
the conclusion of the Multilateral Extradition Convention (72) which 
provides a simplified form of extradition along the lines of the 
British backing of warrants procedure. 
3.4 D~portation I disguised extradition 
While abduction and informal rendition are extra-legal processes 
which are clearly illegal, the same cannot be said of the last 
process which will be considered. Deportation is a perfectly valid 
process by means of which a state rids itself of unwanted elements 
which have entered its territory.(73) The essential difference 
between extradition and deportation lies in the fact that in the 
case of extradition.the aim of the extraditing state is to return 
the fugitive to the requesting state - his destination is 
consequently an essential element in the extradition process. In the 
case of deportation, however, the aim of the deporting state is 
merely to ensure that the unwanted alien leaves its territory - it 
is consequently non-directive as regards destination. It can of 
course happen that the result of deportation will in effect be to 
return the deportee to the state seeking his extradition. Where such 
a result is fortuitous it is essentially unobjectionable. (74) 
However, where the deporting state in fact acts in such a way that 
it ensures that the deportee is returned to a state which is seeking 
him, problems arise in that we are then dealing with a state's 
municipal law being used to effect an unauthorised result - in other 
............... __________________________ ___ 
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words we have a process of disguised extradition. (75) The state 
cannot extradite the individual concerned, for example because no 
extradition treaty exists between itself and the state seeking him, 
but it nonetheless wishes to cooperate with that state and ensure 
the fugitive's return. It consequently deports the individual to 
that state so ensuring his return. In effect an act of extradition 
has been performed without the individual having recourse to the 
normal protection available to him in the case of regular 
extradition - for example, the principle of speciality will not 
apply, nor will the political offence exception. 
The classic case of "disguised extradition" generally cited is 
Regina v Secretary of State for Home Affairs; Ex parte Duke of 
Chateau ~hierry. (76) The Duke, who was wanted by French military 
authorities on desertion charges, had sought refuge in England. As 
it was unlikely, due to either the political or military offence 
exceptions, that his extradition would be authorised, the British 
officials ordered that he be deported. While not specifying to which 
state he was to be deported, they did specify the ship on which he 
should leave. Conveniently, this ship happened to be berthing first 
in France. In effect, consequently, the Duke's return to France was 
ensured. The deportation order was challenged on the grounds that 
the authorities were not able to order deportation to a specific 
country, and that the Duke was a political refugee who would be 
tried for political offences in France. Although initially 
successful,(77) on appeal the deportation order was found to have 
been valid. (78) 
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Bassiouni (79) abstracts certain general principles from the 
judgment. First, deportation to a specific country may not be 
authorised in so many words. Second, the authorities may indeed 
stipulate the time, place and manner of deportation. In effect this 
means that extradition to a specific state may be achieved through 
the back door. Third, the political offence exception to extradition 
does not invalidate the deportation order. Fourth, the grounds on 
which a deportation order may be invalidated are limited almost 
exclusively, to a finding that the deportee is not an alien. 
However, in a more recent case which bears mention if only for its 
bizarre facts, the Appeal Court would appear to have held a wider 
view. In R v Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Soblen (80) 
Soblen W?S convicted of espionage in the United States. While on 
bail pending appeal he fled to Israel. Israel, however, refused to 
accept him and deported him to the United States on a flight to New 
York via London. While en route to London, Soblen stabbed himself a 
number of times. The result was his disembarkation in London and a 
sojourn in a British hospital. On his release from hospital the 
British ordered his deportation on a direct flight to New York as a 
result of his illegal entry into Britain. He challenged this order 
on the ground that it served the ulterior purpose of returning him 
to the United States to serve his sentence. Extradition would have 
been prohibited under the circumstances as espionage was not an 
extraditable crime in terms of the Anglo-American extradition treaty 
and his offence would in any event have qualified for exclusion 
under the political offence exception. 
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The court held that it could look behind the form of the deportation 
order to determine whether the motivation was anything other than 
purely to effect a deportation 
"If, therefore, the purpose of the Home Secretary in this 
case was to surrender the applicant as a fugitive criminal 
to the United States of America, because they had asked for 
him, then it would be unlawful: but if his purpose was to 
deport him to his own country because he considered his 
presence here to be not conducive to the common good, then 
his action was lawful ... ". (81) 
This more liberal approach was followed in R v Bow Street 
Magistrates, Ex parte Mackeson. (82) However, in R v Plymouth 
Magistrate's Court, Ex parte Driver (83) where the government had 
clearly_~cted in a highly irregular manner to assure the return of 
Driver from Turkey with whom no extradition arrangements existed, 
the court expressly held that Mackeson had been incorrectly decided 
and that "the court has no power to enquire into the circumstances 
in which a person is found in the jurisdiction for the purpose of 
refusing to try him." (84) The position in English law would 
consequently appear far from settled. 
In Southern Africa the leading case in point is that of Mackeson v 
Minister of Information, Immigration and Tourism (85) which involved 
a British subject in what was then Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. As 
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia was not recognised by Britain, it was not possible 
for Mackeson's extradition to be requested. Mackeson was taken to 
Salisbury Airport where he was placed (physically) on board a flight 
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to Johannesburg for a connecting flight to London. On landing in 
Johannesburg, Mackeson again refused to board the flight for London. 
The pilot also refused to have him as a passenger. He was returned 
to Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. At his subsequent hearing Mackeson indicated 
that he was willing to go to any country other than Britain. The 
court compared extradition and deportation and following the Soblen 
decision, was prepared to look at the motive behind the deportation. 
It found that this was in fact to serve the ulterior purpose of his 
illegal extradition to Britain. Accordingly, his release was 
ordered. 
Specifically within the South African context, two cases dealing 
directly with this point could be traced. In In re De Faria, (86) De 
Faria a ?ortuguese national wanted in Mocambique for questioning, 
entered South Africa illegally. His deportation was ordered but he 
applied to the court for an interdict preventing the deportation to 
Mocambique and requesting that he rather be deported to Brazil where 
he had family. Steyn J granted the interdict and allowed De Faria 
rather to fly to Brazil, the destination of his choice, where he was 
assured entry without formality on the basis of his Portuguese 
nationality. The court consequently prevented what would in effect 
have been the extradition of De Faria to Mocambique. 
Less happy is the picture presented by the second case. (87) Hisamo 
Gama, a Japanese national, was accused of murdering a compatriot on 
board the Japanese ship No 8 Tama Maru. The ship called at the Port 
Elizabeth harbour and Gama was arrested and after investigation, was 
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placed in temporary custody pending his delivery to Japan for 
trial.(88) 
There is no extradition treaty between Japan and South Africa. 
However, the Japanese authorities wished to secure Hisamo's return 
and consequently proposed sending two escorts to accompany him back 
to Japan for trial. The following communique was received by the 
South African authorities : "As no extradition treaty exists between 
the Republic and Japan, it will be appreciated if you will arrange 
for the urgent deportation of Mr Gama." (89) 
The South African authorities pointed out that deportation was at 
that stage impracticable as Gama did not qualify for deportation in 
terms of the Act. However, a solution suitable for all (except the 
luckless Gama) was mooted. It was proposed that a temporary 
residence permit, valid for ten days be issued to him. On expiry of 
this permit Gama would be a prohibited immigrant who could then 
validly be deported. This plan was set in motion when a residence 
permit valid until 15.10.1970 was issued by the Department of the 
Interior. The final outcome of the incident could not be traced,(90) 
but it is a striking example of the manipulation of municipal 
provisions to achieve a purpose for which they were not intended. At 
the same time it illustrates the importance of extradition 
arrangements being established between as many states as possible. 
In the latest incident found, Allan Heyl who escaped from custody 
and sought refuge in Britain in 1983 was deported from Britain and 
handed over to the South African Correctional Services. (91) 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Extradition would appear to be the only legally sanctioned means of 
ensuring the return of a fugitive offender, or suspected offender, 
from the jurisdiction of one state to that of another. It is a 
carefully balanced process which looks to the interests of both the 
states concerned and the individual sought. When states resort to 
extra-legal methods of delivery, they place themselves beyond the 
law. That this can be dangerous both for immediate international 
relations between the states and in that it may lay the states open 
to possible reciprocal action in the future, hardly bears mention. 
The effect that such extra-legal actions have on the individual is 
also unacceptable. Consequently, while extradition exists as an 
international institution, it is in the interests of all -
individual states; the international community as a whole; and the 
individual involved - that resort to "alternative" processes, 
effective though they may be in the short term, be rejected. 
Although such action is generally difficult to identify, where it is 
established it should be subject to the strongest censure both 
internationally and on the municipal plane. 
We have so far defined extradition and distinguished it from other 
processes having similar practical effect. However, an understanding 
of any process requires that it be placed within its historical 
..... 
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perspective. In the following Chapter, therefore, extradition will 
be examined in its historical context with particular emphasis on 
the history of extradition in South Africa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is impossible to deal with the history of extradition as a whole 
in any great depth within the confines of this thesis. It is 
consequently intended to give a brief survey of the development of 
extradition as a "general" practice in international law, indicating 
the principal streams in its evolution. An attempt will then be made 
to reflect these general developments in a more detailed examination 
of the history of extradition within the South.African context. 
2 EXTRADITION IN GENERAL 
The earliest recorded "extradition agreement" is generally accepted 
as being the provision for the surrender of one another's fugitive 
criminals embodied in the peace treaty concluded in 1279 BC between 
Ramases II of Egypt and Hattusili, the Hittite prince. (1) 
Records also exist of Roman requests for the surrender of Hannibal, 
first from the King of Syria, and later from the King of Bithynia, 
(2) while in 266 BC and 188 BC mention can be found of the 
extradition of individuals accused of violence against foreign 
ambassadors.(3) 
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Clarke lists various treaties concluded between the twelfth and 
seventeenth centuries but concludes that these "prove 
little ... and .•. relate to political offenders, who were given up, not 
as criminals but as enemies of the sovereign .•• " (4). This would 
indeed appear to have been the prevailing attitude, viz that 
extradition as it existed in early practice was no more than a 
limited form of cooperation between kindly disposed sovereigns in 
terms of which political offenders or enemies of the state were 
exchanged.(5) However, more recent research would appear to indicate 
that this assumption was somewhat premature. (6) Nonetheless, such 
cases as there are, are too isolated and the records too fragmentary 
to serve as the basis for a clear-cut pattern from which the 
existence of extradition as an orderly system of cooperation on the 
international plane can be deduced. For practical purposes, 
extradition as defined in the previous Chapter we experience it today 
must be seen as having its origins in the turmoil of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. 
As Shearer points out, before the eighteenth century fugitive 
criminals posed no appreciable threat to or problems for states, who 
tended to regard a criminal lost as a problem solved.< 7> However, 
during the eighteenth century the activities of highwaymen and 
vagabonds - persons who had of ten deserted from the armies of the 
I 
respective states - assumed alarming proportions. States soon 
perceived the advantage of coming to some agreement on the surrender 
of these criminals. Faced with a real threat, states began to 
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conclude treaties to protect themselves and their inhabitants. There 
had consequently already been a shift in emphasis from the 
pre-eighteenth century surrender of an individual so that he "may not 
involve his country, and to prevent reprisals" (8) to a broader based 
cooperation in the interests of the inhabitants of the state, and of 
the state as a separate entity. 
De Martens (9) lists some ninety treaties embodying extradition 
clauses concluded between 1718 and 1830. These may be classified into 
three distinct categories on the basis of the individual whose 
extradition is sought : twenty-eight of the treaties deal with the 
return of "military deserters", and the remainder are divided between 
"criminals" and "vagabonds". As pointed out above, the need for 
cooperation was first conceived in an organised sense as a result of 
the vast numbers of military deserters roaming Europe at the time. 
These deserters were however not sought solely for desertion from the 
army - an offence for which extradition is generally refused in 
modern times - but rather because, having lost their livelihood 
through desertion, they took to crime on the roads. The danger 
perceived was not the essentially political danger of deserting 
troops, but rather the criminal danger to the general populace of 
soldiers turned highwaymen and robbers. As Shearer indicates, (10) 
the terms deserter, vagabond and criminal were most probably 
synonymous at that stage. A further notable point characterising 
these treaties is that virtually all were concluded by contiguous 
states or close neighbours. This is further underlined by the fact 
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that seventeen of the treaties deal with frontier offences, providing 
for a form of hot pursuit. (11) 
It should be noted that for all practical purposes, neither Britain 
nor the United States of America had at this stage entered the 
extradition scene. (12) This Shearer ascribes to the fact that 
transport was then still primitive and fugitives from justice were 
restricted in their choice of refuge to nearby states - few, if any, 
being adventurous enough to take to the seas. (13) 
The eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth centuries can 
consequently be regarded as the period during which the need for 
fairly extensive inter-state cooperation in dealing with criminal 
behaviour was conceived as advantageous. These first steps in the 
formulation of a clearly coordinated system for the extradition of 
criminals were to a large extent based on the exigencies of the 
moment and were not directed at an overall or abstract desire for 
cooperation in the suppression of crime in general. Things were, 
however, set to change. 
The Industrial Revolution, spanning the latter half of the eighteenth 
and better part of the nineteenth centuries, led to the establishment 
of an extensive railway network and an improvement in marine 
transportation. Criminals were not long in realising that given the 
improved transport and communications systems, flight to foreign 
countries far from the long arm of the law, was no longer the 
daunting and hazardous undertaking of earlier times. The option of 
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flight to virtually any country was opened. (14) The international 
criminal took his first hasty steps - international extradition in 
the true sense could not but follow. 
It was France which, from the end of the eighteenth to the end of the 
nineteenth centuries, emerged as the clear leader in the evolution of 
the doctrine of extradition. It was the French mind which both 
conceived of and clearly articulated for the first time many of the 
principles which underlie modern extradition treaties. The principles 
of non-extradition of nationals, speciality, the political offence 
exception, prescriptive limitations to extradition crimes, and the 
application of extradition to both convicted and suspected criminals, 
stemmed from French treaty practice. (15) Although the French 
Revolution had resulted in the termination of many of France's treaty 
commitments, (16) by 1870 France had restored extradition relations 
with some twenty-eight nations. The French influence was to be felt 
throughout Europe and particularly in Britain. This in turn, as we 
shall see presently, was of considerable importance to South Africa. 
The Jay Treaty of 1794 marks the entry of Britain and the United 
States of America to the extradition arena of the modern era. 
Although not specifically aimed at extradition, the treaty provided 
in article 27 for the mutual surrender between Britain and the United 
States of persons charged with murder and forgery. (17) The Treaty of 
Amiens concluded in 1802 between Britain, France, Spain, and the 
Batavian Republic, (18) contained extradition provisions in article 
20 but a renewal of hostilities ensured that this treaty never came 
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into force. The Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842 concluded between 
Britain and the United States is generally regarded as the start of 
Britain's active treaty policy in the sphere of extradition. (19) 
Although similar in its provisions to the earlier Jay Treaty, the 
treaty of 1842 extended the crimes for which extradition could be 
sought. (20) A similar treaty was concluded with France in 1843. (21) 
However, from a position of hindsight, the most significant Briti.sh 
treaty of this period must be regarded as that concluded with France 
in 1852. The French influence is clear and marks the 
"europeanisation" of British treaty practice. Most of the modern 
extradition principles excluded from the Jay Treaty were, through 
French influence, included in this treaty. (22) Although the treaty 
was nev.er implemented because of the British parliament's reluctance 
to pass the legislation necessary to support the evidential 
requirements set in it,~ (23) and the immediate result was a British 
retreat to the 1842 model in the treaties concluded with Prussia and 
Denmark, (24) its influence emerged clearly when the Extradition Act 
of 1870 was drafted on the recommendations of the 1868 Select 
Committee on Extradition. (25) This Act set the pattern for 
subsequent British treaties; a pattern which holds true even today. 
Britain had entered an active phase in its treaty negotiations and 
between 1879 and 1910 extradition treaties were concluded with some 
thirty-four states. (26) As we shall see presently, many of the 
treaties concluded during this period were, and still are, of 
considerable significance for South Africa. 
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The nineteenth century can consequently be regarded as the period 
during which the extradition treaty as we know it today came into its 
own. More extradition treaties were concluded during t~is period than 
in either the preceding or subsequent eras. Not only had the aims of 
the states involved in extradition shifted from an almost total self 
interest to an embodiment of the growing realisation and expression 
of the prevention of crime as a socially desirable principle, but the 
scope of extradition had moved from the purely_physical aspects of 
man in his environment, to the protection of man's economic and 
material well-being. 
The twentieth century, too, has seen development in the law of 
extradition. As regards principle, however, this has not been as 
fundamental as that of the nineteenth century. Again, improvement in 
transport and communication and the coming of the computer age, have 
necessitated adaptations to the extradition process as criminals have 
become ever more astute in the use of technology to perpetrate their 
crimes, and of supersonic aircraft to evade the consequences of such 
crimes. 
Bassiouni, (27) in dividing the development of extradition into 
various phases, takes as his last stage 1948 to the present.C28) 1948 
marks the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (29) 
and the entry of the individual to be extradited into the forefront 
of extradition practice. No longer is the individual seen merely as a 
shuttle to be passed between countries at the will of the sovereign. 
The Human Rights movement has recognised certain inalienable rights 
.. 
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accruing to the individual of which extradition practice must take 
account. Since 1948 extradition practice has to an increasing extent 
recognised the need "for protecting the human rights of.persons 
and ... to have international due process of law regulate international 
relations". (30) 
Although the general attitude of states in the twentieth century 
would appear to be somewhat apathetic when it comes to the conclusion 
of specific extradition treaties with other individual states, (31) 
these more limited treaties would appear to be giving way to 
multipartite conventions and an increasing reliance on reciprocity as 
basis for extradition. (32) 
Developments in extradition law and practice have ever mirrored the 
condition of man at that specific time. Consequently we have seen 
that in its.early stages, extradition was largely a utilitarian 
process based on the self interest of states. As man became more 
criminalised, so too was the need for cooperation more keenly 
perceived. The needs of the twentieth century too, have given rise to 
the need for new trends in extradition. One thinks in particular here 
of the narcotics problem and of terrorism, both of which have 
proliferated during the twentieth century. Extradition has been 
expanded to meet these needs with the adoption of the narcotics 
provision by most countries in terms of which the concept of 
"extraditable crimes" was expanded to include narcotics offences. 
(33) Similarly, the international conventions for the control of 
hijacking and terrorism in general, include extradition 
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provisions.C34) 
The needs of the twentieth century have indeed raised challenges to 
the traditional concepts inherent in extradition, but extradition 
practice would appear, at least for the present, to be ready to meet 
these challenges and has proved surprisingly flexible in 
accommodating modern man's needs, aspirations and social condition. 
How South Africa has fared during the developments sketched above 
will now be considered. 
3 EXTRADITION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Early South African history can be divided into five distinct 
periods: 1652 - 1795 the Dutch East India period; 1795 - 1803 the 
First British Occupation; 1803 - 1806 the Batavian Period; 1806 -
1910 the Second British Occupation; and 1910 - 1961 the Union of 
South Africa.· Although considerable attention has been paid to the 
development of private and procedural law during the various stages 
of South Africa's history, relatively little has been said of the 
territory's position under international law. To examine the position 
(or probable position) with regard to extradition during the various 
stages of the territory's history, it is necessary to determine who 
enjoyed sovereign power during the various stages. In short, where 
did South African sovereignty vest?C35) An attempt will consequently 
be made in this section to determine who was responsible for the 
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territory's international relations during the various periods of its 
development. Once this has been determined, the sovereign's attitude 
to extradition will be identified. 
3.1 The Dutch East India period 1652 - 1795 
To understand who exercised sovereign power at the Cape during the 
supremacy of the Dutch East India Company, some attention will have 
to be paid to the position in the Netherlands during this period. 
By 1648 the loose association of states which had "ongemerk tot stand 
gekom" (36) had formally become the Republic of the United 
Netherlands. Within the structure of the Republic, the various 
territories retained absolute sovereignty over matters of internal 
concern. However, in matters of mutual concern responsibility was 
vested in the States General. This was a body made up of 
representatives of the sovereign regions comprising the Republic 
which was summoned to decide on matters of mutual interest. In terms 
of article 9 of the Treaty of Utrecht of 23 January 1579, the States 
General was responsible for the declaration of war and conclusion of 
peace, for the conclusion of treaties, and for the regulation of 
diplomatic relations. In short, within the Netherlands, the foreign 
relations function generally falling to the sovereign was in the 
hands of the States General. (37) In the words of Visagie, the States 
General was the "volkeregtelike soewerein". (38) 
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This sovereignty enjoyed by the States General extended not only over 
the specific regions comprising the Republic, but included the 
so-called "Generaliteitslande" (39) and - of particular relevance for 
present purposes - the Dutch East and West Indian Companies. 
"Die State-Generaal was dus, as volkeregtelike 
soewerein, die enigste bevoegte wetgewende orgaan vir 
die gebiede begrepe in die Oktrooie van die Oos- en Wes 
Indiese Kompanjee (insluitend die Kaap die Goeie Hoop)". 
(40) 
Consequently, when Van Riebeek landed at the Cape on 6 April 1652 
with instructions to establish a half-way provision post for the 
Dutch East India Company, he brought with him as sovereign power in 
the region, the States General of the Netherlands. In terms of the 
Charter, (41) the company was empowered to trade in the territory 
east of the Cape of Good Hope to the Straights of Magellan.(42) These 
powers included the authority to conclude treaties in the name of the 
States General with native chiefs and potentates.(43) They, however, 
fell short of providing which legal system was to apply. 
During the company rule at the Cape, some one hundred and forty 
years, powers relating to foreign affairs consequently fell under the 
States General. The company was specifically empowered to conclude 
treaties with local chiefs, and although it is certainly not 
inconceivable that company officials and local chiefs with whom they 
came into contact did indeed conclude some form of agreement for the 
surrender of criminals (one thinks here particularly of stock 
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thieves), no specific record of such agreements could be traced. The 
general approach of the States General towards extradition during 
this period is however illustrated by two cases cited by Clarke. In 
I 
the first, the States General handed over persons involved in the 
murder of Charles I, although they were not obliged by treaty to do 
so. (44) In the second, Burnet's case, a treaty had been concluded 
between the Dutch and the British. (45) Burnet was wanted by Britain 
to face charges relating to "violent writings" against the king. He 
was at the time in Holland where he was serving as secretary to the 
Prince of Orange. Burnet had, in anticipation of the claims against 
him, become naturalised in Holland, and when called upon to answer 
the charges, claimed Dutch protection as a naturalised subject. In 
refusing to surrender Burnet, the Dutch replied that "naturalisation 
(is) a sacred thing". (46) 
While these two cases do illustrate that the States General was 
indeed prepared to extradite if favourable circumstances existed, 
they do not take one much further as regards the actual position in 
the Cape during that period. They are, however, of interest in that 
they illustrate the conception of extradition prevalent in Europe at 
that stage, viz that it was reserved largely for crimes against the 
sovereign, here regicide and treason. That such considerations could 
in any way have prevailed at the primitive Cape settlement is 
virtually unthinkable. The entire basis upon which extradition in 
Europe was founded at that stage was thus lacking. Furthermore, the 
factors which had in Europe led to a broadening of the base for 
extradition during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, 
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were also irrelevant at the Cape. The territory had no closely 
neighbouring states between whom the need for surrender could be said 
to arise. Treaties or agreements which may indeed have existed 
between company officials and local chiefs, can hardly be equated 
with "high policy" extradition treaties existing in Europe. (47) 
On the other hand, the factors negativing the development of a 
coordinated extradition policy, and which had influenced such a 
policy in Britain and the United States, were even more cogent within 
the South African or Cape context. Distances were vast; communication 
·virtually non-existent; and transport and travel generally hazardous. 
The unpredictability and lack of communication between the "imported" 
white population and the indigenous locals, could indeed give full 
force to Shearer's summation that a criminal lost was a problem 
solved. (48) 
For all intents and purposes, therefore, South Africa has no 
"extradition history" during the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries. 
3.2 The First British Occupation 1795 - 1803 
The supremacy of the Dutch East India Company, and thus of the 
Netherlands, came to an end in the Cape in 1795 with the First 
British Occupation of the territory. Alarmed by French successes in 
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Europe and eager to protect its maritime supremacy and valuable trade 
routes, Britain revised its earlier evaluation of the Cape (49) and 
occupied the territory in 1795. (50) The British never intended the 
occupation to be permanent, and although technically sovereignty over 
the territory passed from Dutch to British hands, the effect on the 
inhabitants was slight. While as regards the applicable municipal law 
at the Cape the change was minimal, (51) as regards international law 
it was still less significant. 
As regards extradition, the salient factor to be considered at this 
period - apart from the essentially temporary view of the occupation 
held by Britain - was general British policy at the time. As we have 
seen above, Britain had not at this stage entered into extradition 
treaties to any great extent. Although it was during this period that 
Britain concluded both the Jay Treaty and the Treaty of Amiens, 
neither had any lasting effect on British extradition practice. (52) 
It was however during this period that international law, as applied 
by Britain and British courts, first gained a foothold in the South 
African legal system through the establishment of the Admiralty 
Courts in the Cape Colony. (53) As Booysen however indicates, (54) 
caution must be exercised before sweeping assumptions as to the 
application of international law in the general sense can be made 
from Admiralty or Prize Court decisions. 
In theory, therefore, the extradition agreements by which Britain was 
bound during this period could have been applied against a fugitive 
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from justice finding himself in the Cape. However, no record could be 
traced of actual extradition proceedings during this period and also 
no direct reference to extradition. One must consequent~y conclude 
that during the First British Occupation of the Cape, South Africa 
was - at least as regards extradition - no further advanced after the 
occupation than before. 
3.3 The Batavian Period 1803 - 1806 
By 1795 the government in the Netherlands had fallen and the Batavian 
Republic been established. (55) During the same period, the steady 
decline which the Dutch East India Company had been experiencing 
finally.culminated in the disbanding of the company. (56) 
Consequently when the Cape was handed back to the Dutch in 1803 (57) 
the sovereign authority over the region was no longer the States 
General or the Dutch East India Company, but the government of the 
Batavian Republic. On 1 March 1803, the Batavian governor of the Cape 
issued a proclamation expressly stating that the Cape would no longer 
be subject to the "Hoe Regering in Indie of enige hyandels liggaam", 
but would fall directly under the "opperbestuur van die Bataaf se 
Republiek". (58) 
Although the Batavian period indeed saw a few changes to the legal 
system at the Cape, in essence "die materiele reg (is) onaangeraak 
gelaat". (59) As regards international law, too, the impact must be 
seen as slight, or at best indirect. The nineteenth century 
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developments in European extradition were far reaching and, as was 
pointed out above, France was at the forefront of these developments. 
As the Netherlands had been overrun by France, it is to be expected 
that there was considerable French influence within the Batavian 
Republic. It is not inconceivable that these influences may indeed 
have filtered through to the Cape by means of the trained Batavian 
officials, steeped in European tradition, who dominated the political 
scene at the Cape during this period. (60) Their influence on the 
international law scene - and on extradition in particular - cannot 
be accurately determined as here too, no record of extradition 
proceedings or arrangements could be traced. The strongly 
individualistic European tradition set during this period could, 
together with subsequent British practice, offer some explanation of 
the fai+ly sophisticated extradition arrangements which the Boers 
later concluded. 
Thus far it can be seen that the sovereign authority at the Cape 
after the initial century and a half of Dutch dominance, passed 
rapidly first to the British and then back to the Dutch. During this 
period the Cape played virtually no role as regards extradition; 
although theoretically it was possible for a fugitive offender 
seeking refuge in the territory to have been extradited, first by the 
States General, then by the British and finally by the government of 
the Batavian Republic. No record of such extradition could however be 
traced. The possibility also exists that a purely "local" form of 
surrender between, in particular, the officers of the Dutch East 
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India Company and "local chiefs and potentates" may have occurred. 
However, here too, no documentary proof could be found. 
For all practical purposes, South African extradition history 
consequently starts with the Second British Occupation of the Cape in 
1806. 
3.4 The Second British Occupation : 1806 - 1910 
The history of extradition in South Africa has thus far been 
considered purely on a temporal plane. This was possible as until 
fairly well into the Second British Occupation, South Africa for all 
intents and purposes consisted only of the Cape of Good Hope. 
However, during the period 1836 - 1910 (61) South Africa's borders 
extended considerably. Four distinct areas emerged and as their 
constitutional status waxed and waned so did responsibility for their 
foreign relations and the authorities who could conclude treaties on 
their behalf and perform under these agreements. Consequently, for 
this stage of the examination the temporal phase will have to be 
abandoned and a regional approach adopted to cover the period 
starting with the Great Trek and culminating in the unification of 
the various regions as the Union of South Africa. The constitutional 
and international status of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the Orange 
Free State, and the Transvaal will thus be considered separately to 
determine their positions with regard to extradition during the 
various stages of their development. 
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3. 4. 1 The cape of Good Hope 
Batavian rule, like the First British Occupation, was short lived. 
With the resumption of hostilities with France, Britain realised that 
if it wished to retain its maritime superiority and protect important 
trade routes, a permanent presence at the Cape was required. (62) 
Consequently on 10 January 1806, Sir David Baird occupied the Cape of 
Good Hope for the British - this time with the intention of remaining 
permanently. (63) 
The question of who represented the Cape of Good Hope on the 
international plane from 1806 - 1910 presents few serious problems. 
As a British Colony, the Cape eventually acquired a measure of self 
government and finally representative and responsible government 
(64). This was, however, relevant only as regards municipal law as 
one of the characteristics of the British Colonial system was that a 
Colony was not entitled to adopt laws having extra-territorial 
effect. (65) Furthermore, as was pointed out in a recent case dealing 
with the status of Colonial possessions : 
"Colonies were not competent to sign treaties. They 
might be consulted about treaties affecting them. They 
might become involved in negotiations under the aegis 
of the Imperial authorities, but the ultimate control 
and responsibility in treaty matters rested with the 
Imperial government." (66) 
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Consequently, during this period Britain was the international 
sovereign for the Cape of Good Hope and it was the British sovereign 
who concluded treaties on behalf of the Cape. 
As was seen above, it was during this stage that Britain embarked 
upon its active extradition policy. (67) Many of the treaties 
concluded by Britain at this stage were made applicable to her 
colonies and dependencies, including the Cape of Good Hope. In this 
way South Africa was for the first time brought into the 
international extradition arena in any meaningful sense. 
Treaties with the following states concluded by Britain during the 
period to 1910, applied to the British "Colonies and foreign 
possessions". A number of standard clauses were used in these 
treaties extending the application of the provisions to such 
Colonies, and providing for the procedure to be followed. These are 
listed in the table below. The table is preceded by a brief summary 
of the relevant provisions. 
a) The stipulations of the present treaty apply to the 
Colonies and foreign possessions of the contracting 
parties. 
b) Requests for the surrender of a person accused or 
condemned who has taken refuge in a Colony or possession 
shall be made to the governor or chief authority of such 
Colony or foreign possession by the chief consular 
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officer of the other party residing in the Colony or 
possession. 
c) If the fugitive has escaped from a Colony or foreign 
possession of the party on whose behalf the request is 
made, the request shall be made by the governor or chief 
authority of such Colony or possession. 
d) Such requests may be disposed of, in accordance with the 
stipulations of the treaty, by the respective governors 
or chief authorities who, however, shall be free either 
to grant the extradition or to refer the matter to their 
own governments for decision. 
e) The right is however retained to make special provisions 
for surrender, corresponding as closely as possible to 
the provisions of the treaty. 
f) Requests for the surrender of fugitive criminals 
emanating from a Colony or foreign possession are 
governed by the rules laid down in the treaty. 
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TREATY DATE ARTICLE PROVISIONS FOOTNOTE 
Germany 1872 15 ab de f 68 
Brazil 1872 16 ab de 69 
Italy 1873 18 ab c d e 70 
Denmark 1873 13 ab c d e 71 
Sweden & Norway 1873 14 b c de 72 
Austria/Hungary 1873 17 ab de f 73 
Hayti 1874 15 ab de f 74 
France 1876 16 ab c d 75 
Spain 1878 10 ab c d 76 
Equator 1880 15 ab c d e 77 
Luxemburg 1880 14 ab de f 78 
Switzerland 1880 18 ab de f 79 
Salvador 1881 17 ab de f 80 
Uruguay 1884 10 ab de 81 
Mexico 1884 17 ab de f 82 
Russia 1886 18 ab de f 83 
Guatamala 1885 17 ab de f 84 
Colombia 1888 17 ab de f 85 
Argentina 1889 17 ab de f 86 
Monaco 1891 20 ab de f 87 
-
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TREATY DATE ARTICLE PROVISIONS FOOTNOTE 
Bolivia 1892 17 ab de f 88 
Portugal 1892 17 ab de f 89 
Liberia 1892 17 ab de f 90 
Romania 1893 17 ab de f 91 
Chile 1897 17 ab de f 92 
Netherlands 1898 18 ab d 93 
San Marino 1899 19 ab de f 94 
Servia/ 1900 17 ab de f 95 
Yugoslavia 
Belgium 1901 14 ab c de 96 
Peru 1904 17 ab de 97 
Cuba 1904 17 ab de f 98 
.. 
Nicaragua 1905 15 ab de f 99 
Panama 1906 18 ab de f 100 
Paraguay 1908 18 ab de f 101 
From the above provisions it is clear that Britain and its 
contracting partners intended that the treaties concluded by them 
should apply with full force to the various Colonial possessions, and 
thus to the Cape of Good Hope. The governor of the Cape Colony, a 
British official, both received and made requests for surrender and 
decided such requests as were received. 
Apart from the treaties listed in the table above, mention can also 
be made of treaties concluded by Britain where reference was made 
65 
only to "territory of her Britannic Majesty" and can consequently be 
taken to include Britain's Colonial possessions. (102) 
In addition to the British extradition treaties listed above which 
applied to the Cape by specific provision, mention must also be made 
of the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881. (103) As the many British 
possessions of the time were not "foreign" in the sense of being 
sovereign independent nations, the traditional extradition treaties 
concluded between Britain and foreign sovereign states were 
inappropriate to regulate extradition between these possessions. The 
extradition of fugitive offenders to and from these possessions was 
essentially movement within Britain as a "greater state" and was 
consequently arranged legislatively, first by a statute of 1843, 
(104) and subsequently by the Fugitive Offenders Act which repealed 
this legislation and provided, in detail, for such surrender. (105) 
As this Act was of considerable importance to South Africa, and in 
fact has been retained to an extent in the provisions of the present 
South African Act, (106) its principal provisions will be briefly 
considered. 
Part I (107) of the Act provided for the return of fugitives who, 
having committed an offence in one part of the Colonies, had taken 
refuge in another. (108) Special provision was made in section 3 for 
the apprehension of a fugitive under an endorsed warrant. This meant 
that where a warrant for the apprehension of an individual had been 
issued in one part of the Colonies, certain officials in another part 
where the fugitive had sought refuge, could, if satisfied that 
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the warrant had been issued by a competent authority, merely endorse 
the warrant which would then have full effect in the Colony in which 
refuge had been sought. Full provision was then made for the 
subsequent treatment of the of fender culminating in his surrender or 
release. (109) 
Part II of the Act dealt with the inter-colonial backing of warrants. 
This part of the Act applied only to "those groups of British 
possessions to which, by reason of their contiguity or otherwise, it 
may seem expedient to Her Majesty to apply the same". (110) The 
backing of warrants system is set out in section 13 which provides 
that where a warrant has been issued against a person in a possession 
to which this part of the Act applies, for an offence committed in 
that possession, and such a person is suspected of being in another 
possession of the same group, a magistrate in this latter possession 
who is satisfied that the warrant was issued by a person of competent 
authority, may endorse the warrant in his possession. The fugitive 
mentioned in the warrant may then be apprehended and brought before 
the magistrate in the endorsing possession. Again full provision is 
made for his eventual surrender or release. (111) 
Part III of the Act, inter alia, makes special provision for offences 
committed in two adjoining British possessions (112), while Part IV 
specifically empowers the legislature[s] of British possessions to 
enact laws carrying the Act into effect. (113) 
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It can consequently be seen that during the period 1806 - 1910 the 
extradition of fugitives from justice was well developed in the Cape 
of Good Hope. As it was a British possession, all British treaties 
applied with full force in the territory and provision was made 
through the backing of warrants, for the surrender of fugitives 
between the various British possessions which.did not qualify as 
independent states with whom the conclusion of treaties would have 
been technically possible. 
As the Cape of Good Hope was, even from the earliest times, a single 
settled community under a clear - albeit varied - authority, few 
problems exist in determining who was sovereign at any given time. In 
the rest of what is today the Republic of South Africa, however, 
matters were not so simple, due in no small measure to the manner in 
which these areas of the country were "tamed" and eventually settled. 
It is to these territories that attention will now be turned. 
3.4.2 Natal 
The history of Natal is almost as old as that of the Cape of Good 
Hope. Sent by the king of Portugal to find a suitable trade route to 
the East, Vasco da Gama "sailed along an undiscovered coast, which 
they named (from the day of exploration) Natal or Christmas".(114) Da 
Gama did not, however, disembark at that stage preferring to continue 
with his quest for the East. (115) 
From its discovery until fairly late in the seventeenth century Natal 
remained largely uninhabited by whites, although it would appear to 
have served as a haven for shipwrecked sailors, many of whom recorded 
their experiences in the region. Certain of these sailors in fact 
decided to settle and with the blessing of the local population, a 
small core of whites established themselves in Natal. (116) The 
intention of these settlers was certainly not to establish an 
independent state; their main interest lay in making a profit from 
hunting - notably for ivory. Although Simon van der Stel, the then 
governor of the Cape, was instructed by the Chamber XVII to purchase 
the bay of Natal and surrounding land, and apparently did so, (117) 
this acquisition would not appear to have been taken very seriously 
by either the Dutch or the natives. (118) Port Natal was nonetheless 
declared to be "subject to the government of the Cape of Good Hope 
and under the control of the High Indian Government in like manner as 
. 
all other Indian Governments and departments are" (119) and was 
included in the articles of capitulation of 1806 in terms of which 
the Cape was handed over to the British. (120) 
The period commencing in 1820 saw a considerable increase in the 
British population in the Cape. Many of the 1820 settlers were 
established on what was known as the eastern frontier. However, 
whether motivated by sheer adventurous spirit, or the inevitable 
profit motive, certain of these settlers found their way to Natal 
where they settled round Port Natal. Notable among these were 
Lieutenants Farewell and King and a Mr Flynn. The general confusion 
surrounding the acquisition of land in Natal during this period is 
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clearly apparent from the settlers' dealings with the Zulu chiefs. 
One consequently finds that the same tract of land was sold to 
different people at various stages. Thus, in 1824 Chaka, then King of 
the Zulu nation, made a grant of land to Farewell "extending fifty 
miles inland, and twenty-five miles along the coast, so as to include 
the harbour". (121) A few years later, however, Chaka granted King 
"The free and full.possession of my country near the sea coast and 
Port Natal ... with the islands in the Natal harbour ... together with 
free and exclusive trade of all my dominions .•• ". (122) 
The Zulu nation was positively inclined towards white settlement in 
Natal and as a consequence the number of settlers grew. These 
remained largely British nationals but would appear in all dealings 
with the. natives to have acted in a personal capacity and not as 
representatives of the Crown. Indeed, Britain was then, as later, 
reluctant to extend her influence in Southern Africa to include Natal 
as a Colony or formal dependancy. (123) Despite the fact that 
Farewell was regarded by the Zulu king as the "Chief" of the whites 
at the settlement, there can also be no question of an independent 
state having been established by the British settlers ; this was 
neither their nor the British government's intention. 
Dingaan who succeeded Chaka as the Zulu leader, was also prepared to 
allow white settlement. The settlers were clearly regarded by Dingaan 
as equals within their own territory as is evidenced by the "treaty" 
concluded between him as king of the Zulu and the British residents 
of Port Natal in 1835. (124) This agreement, which is fully 
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reproduced below, is the first independent agreement embodying what 
can loosely be regarded as extradition provisions which could be 
traced in South Africa. Concluded at Congella on 6 May 1835, the 
agreement reads 
"Dingaan, from this period, consents to waive all claim 
to the persons and property of every individual now 
residing at Port Natal, in consequence of their having 
deserted from him, and accords them his full pardon. He 
still, however, regards them as his subjects, liable to 
be sent for whenever he may think proper. 
The British residents at Port Natal, on their part, 
engage for the future never to receive or harbour any 
deserter from the Zulu country or any of its 
dependancies, and to use every endeavour to secure and 
return to the King every such individual endeavouring 
to ·find an asylum among them. 
Should a case arise in which this is found to be 
impracticable, immediate intelligence, stating the 
particulars of the circumstances is to be forwarded to 
Dingaan. 
Any infringement of this treaty on either ·part 
invalidates the whole". (125) 
With this agreement at hand, it is perhaps apposite to consider the 
status of nineteenth century "treaties" between indigenous rulers and 
foreign powers - more specifically between African rulers and the 
British government. A fresh appraisal of the problems and traditional 
attitudes surrounding such agreements was recently undertaken by John 
Mugambwa (126) and as this is an issue which will arise repeatedly in 
this section, his arguments deserve some attention. 
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As is clear from the Island of Palmas Arbitration case, (127) a 
treaty must be interpreted within its own time frame, and as emerged 
from the Anglo Iranian Oil case, (128) it must be seen against the 
historical context within which it was concluded. In the present 
instance we are consequently examining an agreement between arguably, 
the strongest indigenous ruler in Southern Africa at the time, and a 
handful of white settlers. 
Traditionally such agreements were denied internationally binding 
status on the grounds that the primitive, pagan and uncivilised 
indigenous ruler, was unable to comprehend the complexity of the act 
he was performing.(129) The agreement was indeed no more than a scrap 
of paper embodying, at most, a moral obligation violable at the will 
of the "civilised" European power. Westlake attempted a slightly more 
scientific approach in that he laid down certain criteria against 
which the indigenous society could be tested. (130) His three-tier 
test was heavily weighted in favour of the white settlers and 
premised treaty capacity on a certain measure of civilisation which 
was to be determined by the answers to three questions. First, were 
the white settlers able to enjoy the lifestyle they had enjoyed at 
"home"? Second, could the territory be adequately protected from 
claims made by competing European powers? Third, could the natives be 
maintained in the security and well-being they had enjoyed before the 
arrival of the settlers? Applying these criteria, he had no 
difficulty in rejecting the African tribes as uncivilised and 
consequently lacking in treaty capacity. In these terms, the 
"extradition" treaty cited above, was to all intents and purposes 
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meaningless. This view is further strengthened by the fact that at 
the Berlin/West Africa Conference at which the thirteen states most 
closely concerned in the so-called "scramble for Africa", made no 
mention of the consent of the indigenous rulers being required before 
their land could be parcelled off. Any acquisition of territory 
required only notification to the other signatory powers. (131) 
Mugambwa, however, is not convinced by these arguments. If the 
colonising states were secure in their convictions, and the 
indigenous rulers indeed lacked sovereignty, why the obsession with 
treaty-making during the scramble for Africa? (132) This process 
reached its zenith when in 1897 Major Macdonald, on the orders of the 
British Foreign Secretary, succeeded in getting no fewer than 
twenty-eight indigenous rulers to sign "treaty forms" in which they 
agreed not to conclude treaties with other foreign powers without the 
approval of the British government. If these chiefs enjoyed no 
sovereignty over their territories, one wonders why their sovereign 
authority was expressly recognised in the agreements concluded with 
Britain? 
The British legal advisors of the period, too, seem reasonably 
ambivalent on the question of the sovereignty of indigenous rulers. 
Particularly as regards Southern Africa, the Colonial Secretary 
stated in a question on the validity of certain treaties concluded 
with the indigenous ruler in Bechuanaland, that the chiefs were 
"completely independent. .. [and] ... competent to cede or delegate their 
sovereign authority ... ". (133) The advisors confirmed that rights 
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could be acquired by the British from the local rulers by way of 
treaty. 
Judicial opinion would also appear to support the sovereignty of 
indigenous rulers under certain conditions. (134) Most notable in 
this regard is the Masai case. (135) Here the court was called upon 
to decide on the enforceability against the Crown, of a treaty 
concluded with the leader of the Masai tribe. The judge held that as 
the Masai possessed an "entity of their own as a tribe" and were a 
"military people who could put up a force of some thousands of 
spearmen into the field", there could be no doubt that they and 
Britain could come to an agreement "in the nature of a treaty". 
Although it is not quite clear what is meant by an agreement in the 
nature of a treaty, a separate judgment delivered in the case 
clearly stated that the agreement between the Crown and the Masai 
"was a treaty". (136) 
Closer to home, in the Re Southern Rhodesia case, (137) Lobengula was 
recognised as "the king of the country", and no one was able to 
exercise jurisdiction in the territory without his permission. 
If the decisions of municipal tribunals are considered unconvincing 
on the international plane, one can turn to the Western Sahara case 
(138) which should dispel any remaining doubts. There the court held 
that : 
"Whatever differences of opinion there may have been 
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among jurists, the state practice of the relevant 
period indicates that the territories inhabited by 
tribes or people having a social and political 
organisation were not regarded as terra nullius. It 
shows that in the case of such territories the 
acquisition of sovereignty was not generally considered 
as affected unilaterally through "occupation" of terra 
nullius by· original title but through agreements 
concluded with local rulers". 
The conclusions to be drawn from the above are that it would be 
premature to classify all agreements between foreign powers and 
indigenous rulers or chiefs as unenforceable and indeed violable at 
the whim of the foreign power. Although this could indeed be the case 
with certain of these agreements, each should be considered on its 
merits, the capacity of both parties being tested. 
In applying these criteria to the agreement under consideration, it 
is ironic that the lack of capacity should lie not at the door of 
the "primitive" ruler Dingaan - indeed, although he would have been 
found wanting in terms of Westlake's arrogant and idealistic 
standards of "civilisation", he would certainly meet the requirements 
set in both the Masai and Western Sahara cases - but rather at that 
of the "civilised" white residents of Port Natal represented by 
Gardiner at the signing of the agreement. Although the white settlers 
in Natal wished to be placed under British protection and to bind the 
Crown through their agreements, the British government was at this 
stage unwilling to extend its influence, (139) and the agreement can 
be considered as no more than an undertaking between an indigenous 
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ruler, Dingaan, and a group of individuals who happened to be 
British. 
Having overcome the initial disappointment of having to reject the 
treaty status of South Africa's first "extradition treaty", we can 
see that the document nonetheless remains of some practical interest 
in that it reflects the prevailing attitude to and perceptions of 
extradition held by the inhabitants of Natal. 
In the first place, the agreement shows that extradition was not 
perceived as a reciprocal obligation. The obligation to surrender is 
undertaken only by the white settlers. This is perhaps understandable 
when one considers that there were no more than a handful of whites 
in the settlement and that for them escape to some other territory 
was impracticable, to say the least. The position is loosely 
analogous to that in pre-eighteenth century Europe sketched above. 
(140) Secondly, the agreement provides for extradition in one 
instance only - that of a military deserter. Again this harks back to 
early European arrangements (141) but in modern-day terms is the one 
category generally excluded from extradition. (142) Furthermore, 
modern conceptions of asylum, which interestingly enough is mentioned 
eo nomine, are also violated. (143) 
All this aside, the agreement does show that the concept of 
extradition was from an early date perceived by the inhabitants of 
the region to be an issue on which negotiation on the highest level -
albeit not international in the true sense - could and should take 
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place. It is interesting to note that the agreement did not hold for 
any length of time. When Dingaan issued a request in terms of the 
agreement for the return of a number of his subjects who had fled to 
the white settlement for protection, the British residents were 
deeply divided on whether or not to accede to his request. (144) 
Eventually a number of persons, including a woman and two children, 
were handed back to the Chief. This signalled the end of the 
agreement, however, as the white residents felt unable to sanction 
the delivery-up of women and children to certain death. (145) 
Despite various requests for the area inhabited by the British 
settlers to be recognised by Britain as a Colony, the British 
authorities were reluctant to extend their influence in Southern 
Africa. (146) At this stage a new element was introduced into the 
Natal scenario. From as early as 1834, rumblings of discontent had 
been mounting among the Afrikaner population at the Cape who felt 
constricted under what they perceived as the British yoke. This 
culminated in 1837 in, if not a mass exodus, at least a substantial 
departure of a number of leading Afrikaners and their families from 
the Cape in search of new territories free from British influence. A 
number of these Trekkers moved to Natal and settled among the British 
inhabitants. (147) 
Their intention in leaving had been to escape British domination and 
to be free to establish a state of their own, subject to their own 
laws. Notable among these Trekkers was Piet Retief who soon 
established himself as the leader in Natal. As such he set out to 
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negotiate a treaty with Dingaan which would allow the Trekkers to 
settle permanently and in peace with the black inhabitants of the 
region. (148) The attitude of the British at this stage was that "the 
pretension which they make to constitute a free and independent state 
is so extravagant, that I can hardly suppose it was seriously 
intended." (149) 
Negotiations with Dingaan were initiated and although he declared 
himself "almost inclined" to cede the territory to the Boers, he 
first required that cattle stolen from him be recaptured and returned 
to him by the Trekkers.(150) This was duly done, and after the murder 
of Retief and his men by the Zulus, a document ceding the territory 
to the Boers was found among their remains. 
As it is largely on this document the Boer claims to sovereignty over 
the Republic Natalia rest, the agreement is reproduced in full before 
the validity of these claims is considered. (151) 
11 Umgungundhlovu 4th February, 1838. 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THIS - - That whereas Piet Retief, 
Governor of the Dutch immigrant South Africans, has 
retaken my Cattle, which Sikonyela had stolen; which 
Cattle he, the said Retief, now deliver unto me : I, 
Dingaan, King of the Zulus, do hereby certify and 
declare that I thought fit to resign unto him, Retief, 
and his countrymen (on reward of the case hereabove 
mentioned) the Place called "Port Natal" together with 
all the land annexed, that is to say, from Tugela to the 
Umzimvubu River westward; and from the sea to the 
~orth, as far as the land may be useful and in my 
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possession. Which I did by this, and give unto them for 
their everlasting property." 
Although this agreement does not fit the mould discussed above in 
that no European power is involved, it being what could almost be 
termed an agreement between two indigenous leaders, it may 
nonetheless be tested against the criteria set as to the capacity of 
the parties. On the side of the Zulus, there can be little doubt that 
on the criteria discussed above, Dingaan was a leader of an organised 
tribal society, living under a strictly hierarchical system, subject 
to stringent discipline. Dingaan must therefore be regarded as the 
sovereign of the region who could freely transfer power to the Boers. 
The question arising, however, is to the capacity of Retief, as 
leader of the Boers. As was seen above, the earlier "treaty" could be 
flawed on the basis of the lack of capacity of the British residents 
to either represent or bind Britain which refused to acknowledge 
their existence as part of the British Empire. In the case of the 
Boers no such problem existed. As is clear from the wording of the 
document, in both his own and in Dingaan's perception, Retief was 
acting as the representative of an independent group of people. It is 
perhaps strange that in attempting to shake off the Colonial yoke, 
the Boers should have chosen to term their leader "governor", but the 
intention is clear. We are thus dealing with an agreement between a 
"king" on the one hand, and a self-styled independent leader on the 
other. 
This however, is merely one element to be taken into account. 
Although prima facie one may be dealing with a valid cession of land, 
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the acquisition of which could give rise to valid title, the crucial 
question is whether the land so acquired could indeed be regarded as 
a separate independent state. In other words, did the Republic 
Natalia in fact exist as an independent viable state capable of 
granting or refusing extradition requests and concluding treaties? 
The requirements for statehood as enunciated in the Montevideo 
Convention are well known and may briefly be summarised as a 
permanent population, living within a defined or definable territory, 
with a government of their own, which is capable of acting 
independently on the territory's behalf on the international plane. 
(152) The'element of recognition is often crucial, although its 
status as a separate requirement is not without controversy. (153) 
That the Boers intended their settlement to be permanent is clear 
from statements made by leaders at the time. (154) This is further 
borne out by the wording of the document, viz that the territory was 
to be given to the Boers as their "everlasting property". It is also 
clear that a form of government was established by the Boers. (155) 
Although this government was a largely local affair with little 
thought of external relations, the Trekkers did expressly declare 
themselves free from all British influence, and in concluding the 
agreement under discussion, they were, at least in their own 
perception, acting as independent sovereigns. (156) 
However, problems arise when one comes to consider the territorial 
basis for the Boers' claims for Natal as an independent republic. The 
80 
territory claimed by the Boers in terms of the treaty with Dingaan, 
had at various stages been annexed by the Dutch, ceded to the 
British, re-sold to the British residents (on various occasions!) and 
then finally given to the Boers. Although Britain had declared itself 
unwilling to regard Natal as a separate Colony, and made no effort to 
set up an administration in the territory, it had accepted cession 
from the Dutch and later in fact raised this acquisition to support 
its claim to title. (157) 
The Boers in turn based their claim to title on the treaty and on 
annexation following upon conquest. Although Du Plessis (158) sees 
this as sufficient to establish valid claim to territory, it is 
submitted that the position was at best uncertain, and in fact, given 
the British attitude to allegiance prevalent at that period, 
doubtful. ( 159) 
Similarly the question of recognition presents problems. Whether 
recognition is regarded as declaratory or constitutive of 
international capacity and thus sovereignty for present purposes, is 
largely irrelevant within the Natal context. In either event there 
cannot be said to have been any meaningful recognition of the 
Republic of Natalia. Two "acts of recognition", both indirect, could 
be traced. The first is the treaty with Dingaan cited above. Although 
it has been submitted that the Zulu nation was indeed sovereign at 
that stage, what status its recognition of Boer claims to 
independence would be accorded internationally - given the prevailing 
perceptions - must be regarded with circumspection. Furthermore, its 
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act of recognition is embodied in a document purporting to transfer 
territory to which the Zulu nation's title was, at least, suspect. 
The second is recognition embodied in a treaty with the Free State 
Republic concluded in 1840. (160) 
On the other hand, Britain, the only world power directly involved, 
expressly refused any form of recognition to the Boers as an 
independent state and even refused them an identity free from their 
allegiance to the Crown. (161) 
In summary, therefore, the Republic Natalia was, it is submitted, 
never an independent state capable of concluding or acting under 
extradition treaties w~th other independent nations. The only 
extradition agreement dating from this period, viz the agreement 
between Dingaan and the British residents of Port Natal, was not an 
international agreement in the true sense and was in any event 
abrogated by the residents before the Boer settlement of the area. It 
could consequently not have been "inherited" by the Boers even were 
its original validity not in question. In any event the myth of an 
independent Natalia was short lived. In 1844 the territory was 
finally formally annexed by Britain and took its place in the South 
African scene as a separate British colony. (162) 
As a British colony, British extradition laws would find full 
application in the territory and what was said of the extradition 
agreements applying at the Cape, applies with equal force to Natal 
(163). As in the case of the Cape Colony, the British treaties were 
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given municipal application within Natal by virtue of Law 6 of 1892. 
(164) 
Many of the Boers who had initially intended settling permanently in 
Natal found that they were no longer willing to do so after the 
British take-over. (165) They consequently moved on to join their 
fellows who had initially settled in the hinterland of what is today 
known as the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Although the 
histories of these two regions are interwoven, they will be 
considered separately in as far as this is practicable. 
3.4.3 The Orange Free State 
The territory classed as the Orange Free State was first inhabited on 
a permanent basis by emigre Breer farmers from both the Cape and 
Natal in 1839. (166) Although in settling here, too, the Boers had 
intended shaking off the British shackles and establishing a state of 
their own, they were in fact faced with much the same problems 
encountered by their compatriots in Natal. Here too, they were still 
regarded as British subjects owing allegiance to Britain but 
receiving little in the way of the benefits accruing to that status. 
(167) On 3 February 1848 the British governor in South Africa, Sir 
Harry Smith, proclaimed the territory as a British possession.(168) 
The Boers, however, still hankered after true independence and after 
numerous representations, eventually got round the conference table 
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with the British in 1854. (169) The result was the Bloemfontein 
Convention signed between Britain and the Orange River Sovereignty at 
Bloemfontein on 20 February 1854. Article 1 of the Convention 
provided that the inhabitants of the "Orange River Territory" were 
free of their allegiance to the British Crown and were for all 
intents and purposes ·"a free and independent people, and their 
government to be treated and considered, thenceforth as a free and 
independent Government." ( 170) Through this document the Orange . 
River Sovereignty had been transformed from a British dependency into 
the Orange Free State, a Boer Republic. (171) 
One need not look far for the effect of this action on extradition. 
Indeed, article 5 of the convention provides expressly that both 
governments would within their respective territories: 
"wederzijdsch do uiterste vermogen gebruiken, om kwaad 
voortekomen en de vrede te onderhouden door het 
opvangen en overleweren van alle crimineelen die 
ontsnapt zijn, of die vlugten de geregtigheid, aan 
beide zijden van den Oranje Rivier". (172) 
Although now an independent nation, responsible for its own foreign 
affairs, including extradition, the difficulties facing the state 
were far from past. The natives in the region, notably Moshesh, were 
restive. Eventually, through the mediation of Sir George Grey, a 
"treaty of peace" was concluded between Moshesh and the Volksraad. 
Here again, specific provision is made for extradition in that 
article 6 provides that "Basotho criminals" fleeing to the Free State 
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shall, on demand, be delivered to Moshesh, and all criminals fleeing 
from the Free State shall, on demand, be delivered to the Free state 
authorities. (173) That this peace treaty in fact did little to keep 
the peace is history. Interesting, however, is that article 6(2) was 
violated, and its violation was given as one of the "causes" of the 
war which ensued. 
Full reports of the relevant incidents do not appear to exist. 
However, from the fragmentary comments available it would appear that 
Phillip Venter, a venerable Free State resident, was murdered by two 
of Moshesh's tribesmen who then sought refuge in Moshesh's territory. 
When requested to surrender the murderers by a deputation sent from 
the President, Moshesh refused. Second and third deputations were 
sent, but all met with the same response. Finally Moshesh of~ered the 
traditional Basotho recompense in the form of cattle, an offer which 
the Free State authorities declined. (174) So too, reference can be 
found to the Basotho chief Paulus Mopeli refusing to give up the 
murderers of a child. (175) 
Matters came to a head on 9 June 1865 when the President issued a 
proclamation to the nation stating that the hour had arrived for the 
Free Staters to "take up arms for the vindication of our sovereign 
rights against the Basothos". (176) Among the reasons given for the 
declaration of war was "the murders of Venter and young Fourie". 
(177) The war that followed was short, peace negotiations being 
concluded on 3 April 1866. One of the terms of the Peace Treaty of 
Thaba Bosigo was that Moshesh would "deliver up to the state, on the 
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production of proper 'criminal warrants' all criminals from the state 
who had fled to His Country". (178) This treaty was, however, no more 
diligently observed than its predecessor and war again erupted in 
1867. Letters were exchanged between the Volksraad and the Cape 
governor. In one of these, reference is again found to what would 
appear to be an "extradition issue". It would appear that certain 
persons, Bush and Krijnauw, were murdered by the Basutho and that 
attempts to have the murderers extradited failed. Although the full 
facts surrounding the incidents are not available, the governor of 
the Cape, Wodehouse, refers to it in a letter to the Volksraad dated 
11 February 1868 in the following terms: 
"Ik bemerk uit uw brief, day gij onwillg zijt om de 
vijandelikheden te staken, voordat het grondgebied, dat 
beweerd word verowerd en afgestaan te zijn geweest, van 
de Basutu's zal zijn gezuiverd, en de moordenaars van 
Bush en Krijnauw ui tgelewerd zullen zijn". ( 179) 
Feeling that the Cape governor was siding with the Basutos against 
them, President Brand addressed a letter to the British Colonial 
Secretary in which he traced the entire history of the Free State 
Republic, and protested against the acceptance of Moshesh as a 
British subject and the annexation of his territory as British 
territory. (180) In May 1868 two representatives of the Volksraad 
travelled to England to state the Free State's case. The result of 
their meeting with the Colonial Secretary was the appointment of a 
commission to investigate the entire Basuto question. Almost 
inevitably, yet another convention, the Second Convention of Aliwal 
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North, was signed on 12 February 1869. In article 10 of this 
convention the parties (Britain and the Free State} agreed that "from 
both sides criminals will be delivered up", but the exact terms of 
the delivery were to be determined in a "special convention" between 
the Free State and Basutoland governments once the latter had been 
established. (181} 
This then was the position in the Free State Republic until it 
finally lost its independence to Britain in 1900 during the Second 
Anglo-Boer War. The territory was known as the Orange River Colony 
until it was united with the other South African territories in the 
greater British Union of South Africa. It is clear that for the major 
part of its early history there is little doubt as to the sovereign 
indepen~ence of the Orange Free State. As an independent state, it 
was also responsible for its own extradition grants and requests. 
Although there are few separate extradition agreements, virtually 
every one of the many peace treaties concluded by the state after 
1854 contains either a specific extradition provision or some or 
other reference to the practice. Indeed, extradition was perceived as 
so important, that the nation was prepared to take up arms in its 
defence! 
As was seen above, by 1854, the date of Free State independence, 
Britain had entered the extradition arena with full force and this 
must be seen as one of the factors influencing the importance 
attached to the practice in the independent state where British 
influence - as opposed to interference - was considerable. The 
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possibility must also be considered that the newly independent state 
succeeded to treaties concluded by Britain during its colonial 
period. However, as the question of state succession is canvassed 
fully in Chapter IV, no detailed discussion will be undertaken here. 
After the final annexation of the state by Britain in 1900, the 
territory was again a British Colony to which the treaties listed 
above (182) and the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881, applied with full 
force. (183) 
3.4.4 The South African Republic/Transvaal 
While in international law terms, the status of the Orange Free State 
was never seriously questioned, the same can certainly not be said of 
the sister Boer Republic established to the North. Although a good 
deal of literature exists on the constitutional development of the 
territory during the early years of its existence, attention will 
here only be given to the status of the territory as a subject of 
international law capable of acting independently on the 
international plane and consequently of concluding and performing 
under extradition agreements. (184) 
On leaving the Cape, the trekkers had declared their earnest desire 
and conviction that "[T]he English Government has nothing more to 
require of us and will allow us to govern ourselves without 
interference in future". (185) we have already seen, however, that 
this had proved to be no more than a pipe dream. The attitude of the 
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Convention. Hofmeyr (191) examines the proposition that former 
subjects of a state living outside of its borders and not enjoying 
its protection, nonetheless owe allegiance to the state. He concludes 
that although a state is entitled in international law, to control 
its subjects in terra nullius, (192) it must be in a position to do 
so effectively. He cites Westlake who, in discussing the position of 
the inhabitants of the Transvaal at this stage in its history, 
concluded that : 
"[I]f the emigrants were left to fight against the 
savage tribes without any support, and to battle the 
material difficulties attendant upon any new 
settlement, until such time as they had instituted 
(brought together) a government and conferred on it all 
that is necessary in the circumstances, for it to 
fuif il the functions of a state, then one could contend 
that, in justice, the old nationality no longer exists, 
and that the new state should be recognised as free and 
independent". (193) · 
If one were now to test British behaviour, as opposed to 
declarations, against these criteria and the general criteria for 
statehood identified above, (194) the status of the Transvaal, even 
prior to the Sand River Convention will emerge. 
One finds, in the first place, a considerable population which had 
every intention of remaining permanently in the territory. (195) 
Furthermore, the territory inhabited, if not fully and finally 
defined, was sufficiently circumscribed to fulfil the requirements 
for statehood. (196) Government, albeit of a somewhat rudimentary 
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form, had been established, (197) and while foreign affairs were not 
directly addressed in so many words, they were conducted 
independently as will emerge presently. Finally, applying Westlake's 
criterion of leaving the new settlers to sink or swim, it is clear 
that this was the prevailing British attitude. (198) 
Applying the declaratory approach to statehood (199) it is 
consequently clear that even before the conclusion of the Sand River 
Convention, the Transvaal - or the South African Republic as it had 
then styled itself - could be regarded as an independent state 
entitled to international legal personality and enjoying treaty 
capacity. 
If one were to follow the constitutive approach to statehood, any 
doubt which may have existed is resolved in the Transvaal's favour by 
the terms of the Sand River Convention. Indeed, in initiating 
negotiations with the Transvaal leadership, Britain in fact 
acknowledged, even before formal conclusion of the treaty, that she 
was negotiating with, at very least, a de facto regime imbued with 
international legal personality. (200) 
Article 1 of the Convention leaves no doubt as to the status of the 
parties or their intention. The Boers were guaranteed "het recht om 
hunnen eigen wetten, zonder eenige bemoeienis van den kant van Harer 
Majesteits Gouvernement". A clearer indication of British 
acknowledgment of Transvaal independence would be hard to imagine. 
The impression arising from the wording of the convention was 
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strengthened still further by subsequent British statements when 
preparing the treaty granting independence to the Orange Free State. 
Expressing the wish that the treaty should have binding authority as 
between two sovereigns, the British representative cited the Sand 
River Convention as an example to be emulated in achieving this goal. 
Consequently, whatever the position before the conclusion of the Sand 
River Convention, it is clear that after that date the Transvaal was 
a fully-fledged member of the international community. Although 
"Engeland was daarop aangewese om die eerste te wees om die erkenning 
te doen", (201) this was not the case for long. 
It has been claimed that during the first few years of its 
independence the South African Republic actively followed an 
isolationist policy. (202) This is, however, not entirely borne out 
by the facts. The Republic, while mistrustful of foreigners wishing 
to enter its borders, actively engaged in a policy of diplomatic and 
consular representation. Consequently one finds that in 1857 the 
country's first Honorary Consul in the Netherlands was 
appointed,(203) while in 1870 a Consul was appointed in Britain.(204) 
In 1875, a Treaty of Commerce and Friendship was concluded between 
Portugal and the South African Republic.(205) 
Specifically on the extradition front there would appear to have been 
little activity during this period. The only direct reference to 
extradition which could be found was embodied in the Sand River 
Convention itself where it was provided that : 
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"It is agreed, that so far as possible all criminals 
and other guilty parties who may fly from justice, 
either way across the Vaal River shall be mutually 
delivered up, if so required". (206) 
Although all appeared peaceful and stable in the South African 
Republic for a number of years, this changed when gold was discovered 
in the region in 1871. The realisation of the potential profits from 
the goldfields coincided with with a period of calm in Britain with 
the result that the British government had time in which to reassess 
her views on the value of Southern Africa. At the same time, the 
South African Republic was not without problems of its own; notably 
financial ruin. (207) All these factors converged, resulting in the 
formal annexation of the South African Republic by Sir Theophilus 
Shepstone for the British on 12 April 1877. (208) 
The question arising is how Britain, having acknowledged the 
independence of the Boers in the Sand River Convention, could now, by 
the stroke of a pen, revoke this status. (209) Heavy back-pedalling 
by British officials during this period was clearly aimed at denying 
Britain's original intention in concluding the convention. (210) The 
arguments are unconvincing and contrived and must have appeared even 
more so to the Boers involved in the situation. Consequently the 
Boers, who had not immediately taken up arms against the British as 
they believed the annexation was due to a misunderstanding, sent two 
deputations to Britain to negotiate for a restoration of their 
independence. These negotiations failed with the inevitable 
consequence. The South African Republic took up arms against Britain 
---
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in December 1880 (211) in an attempt to regain the independence of 
which they had been deprived. 
After a number of defeats at the hands of the Boers, culminating in 
the Battle of Majuba on 27 February 1881, Britain was ready to 
negotiate. The result was the Pretoria Convention signed at Pretoria 
on 3 August 1881. (212) The convention allowed the Boers 
self-government subject to the suzerainty of Britain. The Convention 
embodied a number of provisos, the most relevant of which for present 
purposes was article 2(c) which retained for Britain : 
"Het toezicht op buiten-landsche betrekkingen van 
genoemden Staat insluitend het aangaan van tractaten en 
het regeelen van het diplomatieke onderhandelingen met 
vre~mde Mogendheden, moetende zulke onderhandelingen 
gevoerd worder door middel van H.M.'s diplomatieke en 
consulaire ambtenaren buitelands". (213) 
Needless to say the Boers were far from satisfied with this 
convention which they regarded as a violation of both the 1852 Sand 
River Convention and the undertakings given by the British at the 
time of the cease-fire agreement. Although prepared to accept a 
certain measure of British supervision over their foreign relations, 
the Boers were opposed to the British conducting these relations for 
them, which was what the Convention provided in article 2(c). 
Deputations to Britain again fell on deaf ears and, reluctantly, the 
Boers ratified the Convention on 25 October 1881 - but only as a 
temporary measure and for a trial period. (214) After some two years 
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the Boers addressed a letter to the British government in which it 
was pointed out that the : 
"Convention in its entirety ... [was] ... a document which 
neither in origin, nor in tendency, nor in practical 
working, meets the requirements of the country". (215) 
Britain too, had realised this and the upshot was the London 
Conference (216) which resulted in the signature of the London 
Convention on 27 February 1884. 
In this Convention no mention is made of Britain's suzerainty over 
the South African Republic. As regards foreign affairs, the only 
apparent restriction placed on the Boers was that contained in 
article 4 which reads as follows : 
"De Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek zal geen verdrag of 
verbintenis aangaan met eenigen Staat of Natie, behalwe 
met den Oranje-Vrijstaat, noch met eenigen 
inboorlingen-stam ten oosten of ten westen van de 
Republiek, voordat het zal zijn goedgekeurd door Hare 
Majesteit de Koningin." 
Article 16 of the Convention specifically provided that extradition 
arrangements to provide for the mutual surrender of criminals - and 
also, interestingly, for the surrender of British military deserters 
- would be concluded separately at a later stage. (217) 
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It is perhaps apposite at this stage to stop for a moment and take 
stock of the variations in the status of the South African Republic 
during the period just sketched. 
It has been clearly established that even before the conclusion of 
the Sand River Convention in 1852, the Transvaal could validly have 
laid claim t9 the status of an independent state enjoying sovereignty 
and treaty-making capacity. This status was confirmed beyond doubt in 
the Sand River Convention - despite subsequent British attempts to 
deny this. Consequently from its inception until the First British 
Occupation in 1877, sovereignty and the foreign affairs function -
including extradition - fell to the government of the South African 
Republic. (218) 
The exact status of the territory after annexation in 1877, is 
somewhat problematic. Whether the annexation can in fact be said to 
have been completed is a moot point as both negotiations for the 
"resumption" of independence, and eventually also hostilities, 
continued between Britain and the Republic. (219) It can consequently 
be cogently argued that until the signature of the Pretoria 
Convention in 1881 the Boers retained a measure of international 
capacity, although traditionally this must be ascribed to the 
British. For present purposes, the Pretoria Convention settled the 
question of sovereignty in that both the preamble and article 2(c) 
clearly placed Britain at the helm as regards foreign relations and 
consequently treaty-making capacity. This position was maintained 
until the signature of the London Convention in 1884. 
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The question now arising is whether the London Convention signalled 
any change in the status quo. Views differ on the question, (220) but 
on a purely literal reading of the two Conventions, certain 
differences do in fact e.i:ierge. 
The Pretoria Convention clearly placed all foreign relations in the 
hands of the British. Both the conclusion of treaties and diplomatic 
negotiations were to be conducted by Britain. The London Convention, 
on the other hand, provides only that the conclusion of treaties will 
be subject to a British right of veto. In other words, the 
negotiations leading up to the signature of the treaty, and the 
signature itself, could be conducted independently by the South 
African Republic. (221) That even this provision was open to 
interpretation, is clear from state practice at that time. 
In the first place, the London Convention specifically empowered the 
Republic to conclude treaties with the Orange Free State free from 
British approval. As was established above, the Orange Free State was 
at this stage a sovereign nation, recognised as such by Britain and 
other powers. This in itself is indicative of a measure of 
international capacity for the Republic. Secondly, the method by 
which British approval or ratification of treaties concluded by the 
Republic was to be obtained - for example, the fact that ratification 
or approval could be assumed in the absence of cancellation or 
objection within six months - fits rather with a "rubber stamp" 
function than with true involvement in treaty policy. The nature of 
this approval is, however, dependent on the effect of the "approval" 
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provision on third parties entering into treaties with the South 
Africa Republic. 
Hofmeyr (222) claims that there was a positive duty on the Republic 
to ensure that third parties with which it was negotiating were aware 
of the limitation imposed by article 4 of the Convention. This was 
indeed fully satisfied in the treaty of 1885 concluded with 
Switzerland (223) and that of 1886 with Italy, (224) where the 
operation of the treaties was expressly subjected to British 
approval. However, in other instances the Republic was not as 
scrupulous. (225) 
Apart from the principle that British approval was required, the 
question pf exactly when this approval had to be requested is of 
some practical significance. Could the Republic, for example, simply 
not request approval and if and when challenged, answer that it still 
intended doing so? 
This very question arose in the case of an extradition treaty 
concluded between the Republic and Portugal in 1893. (226) After some 
two years no request for approval had been received by the British. 
On being taken to task, the Boers replied that they were awaiting 
Portuguese ratification before submitting the treaty to Britain. The 
British government responded that a treaty should be submitted before 
ratification. Similarly, the extradition treaty concluded between the 
Republic and the Netherlands on 9 November 1895, was submitted to 
Britain only after ratification and on the same day as it appeared in 
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the Netherlands Government Gazette. (227) As a result of these two 
treaties, Britain stipulated that the procedure laid down in article 
4 of the Convention was to be strictly applied. However, in an 
extradition treaty concluded with Natal (2281 authority was, 
according to the preamble, drawn from a Natal Act (6 of 1892) and a 
Transvaal Act (9 of 1887). No mention is made of the London 
Convention, indeed article 19 of the treaty provides specifically 
that the treaty shall take effect on publication in the Government 
Gazettes of the respective territories. The British attitude to 
article 4 of the Convention would consequently appear somewhat 
pragmatic. 
The Republic attempted to assert its independence from the 
restrictions of article 4 in one other respect, viz in the case of 
multilateral treaties to which Britain was a party. First, the 
Republic acceded to the World Postal Convention concluded in Vienna 
on 4 July 1891, the argument being that as Britain had already 
acceded to the agreement, its approval of the Republic's accession 
was unnecessary and article 4 did not apply. (229) Second, on 30 
November 1896, the Republic acceded to the Belgian Treaty for the 
Suppression of Slave Trade. (230) Finally, in 1896, Britain learned 
in a Swiss circular that the Republic had acceded to the 1864 Geneva 
Convention on the Treatment of Soldiers Wounded in the Field. (231) 
Analysing the specific accession provisions in these treaties, 
Hofmeyr (232) comes to the conclusion that it was not for the 
Republic to interpret these treaties. Article 4 of the London 
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Convention provides for mere factual British recognition of 
agreements concluded by the Republic; specific procedure - albeit 
somewhat loose and vague - is demanded and more specific provision 
made for tacit acceptance. A specific obligation imposed on a state 
in an agreement with another state, cannot be said to have been 
waived by a general invitation to all states to accede to a treaty. 
However, although Britain objected to the Republic's accession to the 
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latter two treaties, no objection was raised to its accession to the 
Postal Convention of 1891. (233) In so doing, Britain can be taken 
either to have ratified that specific act by the Republic, or at 
least, to have cast some doubt on the necessity of following the 
proviso procedures laid down in article 4 in cases such as the 
present. 
Be that as it may, it is clear that after the London Convention, the 
South Afr~an Republic was, as regards its treaty-making capacity, 
freer than it had been under the Pretoria Convention, although not 
as fully independent as it had been in terms of the Sand River 
Convention. 
Specifically as regards extradition, it is clear from the treaties 
mentioned above, that the practice was actively pursued in the South 
African Republic. Legislation, too, was enacted to deal with 
extradition during this period. The following laws may be mentioned 
in this regard. 
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Law 5 of 1871 adopted on 5 December 1871 was aimed at governing the 
extradition of fugitive criminals from "naburige staten". Article 1 
provided that extradition could be requested from states with whom 
the Republic had concluded "overeenkomsten" to that effect. Section 5 
of the Law specifically empowered the State President to conclude 
extradition treaties with foreign powers or states. (234) 
Law 1 of 1873 adopted on 28 February 1873 provided for the arrest and 
extradition of criminals specifically to the British colonies of the 
Cape of Good Hope and Natal. No mention is here made of the necessity 
of a treaty forming the basis for such extradition. 
Law 2 of 1881 adopted on 31 January 1881 was designed to simplify 
extradition between the Transvaal "Provincie" and the Independent 
Orange Free State. Again no treaty basis is mentioned. 
Law 14 of 1886 adopted on 1 February 1887, provided for the 
extradition of criminals to the Cape Colony, again on the basis of 
the Law and not on treaty. 
Law 9 of 1887 adopted on 1 June 1887, provided for "de algemene 
voorwaarden waarop, ten aanzien van uitlevering van misdaadigers, 
verdragen met vreemde staten of Kolonien kunnen warden gesloten". 
Section 1 specifically authorised the State President, acting on the 
advice of the Executive Council, to conclude extradition treaties. 
(235) It further provided in section 19 that all existing extradition 
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laws would remain operative until repealed by the State President by 
proclamation. 
As will be seen, these Laws cover the full period of the existence of 
the Transvaal Republic. To find some common factor in the varying 
bases of extradition in terms of the various Laws is somewhat 
problematic. The first two.laws date from the period after the Sand 
River Convention and are thus the laws of a sovereign independent 
state. In the first (1871), the basis for extradition lies in a 
treaty concluded with the state requesting surrender. In the second 
(1873) however, the extradition would appear to be purely on the 
basis of the Law itself. This was indeed confirmed in the case of In 
re Foy (236) where the Cape authorities requested the extradition of 
Foy to stand trial on a charge of murder. The court was called upon 
to consider certain formalities laid down in the law in assessing 
Fey's request for his release. Kotze CJ applied the law, with no 
reference to any treaty, in reaching his decision to reject the 
application. 
On the other hand, the necessity of treaty for the basis of 
extradition under Law 5 of 1871 was clearly illustrated in the case 
of Ex parte Lithauer (237) where the court refused to allow 
Lithauer's extradition to Grikwaland west on charges of fraud and 
perjury, as there had been no request from the Grikwaland West 
government for his extradition and no extradition treaty existed 
between the South African Republic and Grikwaland West. The Law 
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required both such a request and such a treaty and as neither 
existed, Lithauer's release was ordered. 
The next Law, 2 of 1881, falls within the period of Transvaal history 
after annexation by Shepstone but before the signature of the 
Pretoria Convention. As indicated above, this law refers to the 
Republic as a "province" and provides, apparently, for extradition on 
the basis of the Law itself. An interesting case arose in this 
regard, viz De Villiers,v Attorney General; Bands v Attorney 
General. ( 238) 
De Villiers was charged with theft, and Bands with a contravention of 
section 74 of Law 9 of 1878, both committed within the Orange Free 
State. Warrants for the arrest of the respective accused had been 
issued by the magistrates of Kroonstad and Boshoff. After they had 
fled to the Republic, the Free State President requested their return 
in writing from the government of the Republic. The Transvaal 
President then issued a fiat to the Attorney-General for their 
arrest. The Attorney-General issued warrants which were duly 
executed. Both appealed against their arrests on certain technical 
irregularities. Although it was on the grounds of these 
irregularities that the accused were eventually released, interesting 
arguments were raised on other points. 
For De Villiers it was argued that no extradition treaty existed 
between the Republic and the Orange Free State. (239) Furthermore, 
even if such a treaty were to exist, it would have no effect until 
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incorporated into the law of the territory as "Without the sanction 
of the Legislature" the government has no right "to deliver up a 
stranger accused of having committed a crime outside this state". 
(240) It was further argued that Law 1 of 1873 (see above) 
authorising extradition to the Cape and Natal, showed that without 
such legislation extradition was not possible. Although the existence 
of Law 2 of 1881 was conceded, it was claimed that in the absence of 
an extradition treaty between the two territories "the Law must be 
considered as having been annulled". 
Delivering judgment, Kotze CJ, pointed out that a treaty had indeed 
been concluded between the Republic and the Orange Free State in 
1880. He could however find no evidence that it had been ratified by 
the Free. State Volksraad. That this was fatal as far as Law 2 of 1881 
was concerned, he did not find convincing. 
"The entering into of the treaty may have been the 
reason why Law No 2 of 1881 was subsequently passed, 
but it does not follow that, because the Volksraad of 
the Free State did not ratify the treaty, this law has 
ceased to be of force. In the Law itself I find no such 
provision. It is distinctly provided that the law shall 
take effect from its publication in the Gazette. In 
February 1881 this law became of force ... This being so 
the simple question is, whether the provisions of Law 
No 2, 1881, have been complied with." (241) 
These requirements had in fact not been met and the warrants were set 
aside. The case had a sequel during August of the same year in Bands 
v Attorney-General (242) where Bands was discharged as the offence 
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with which he had been charged was not listed in Act 2 of 1881, as an 
offence for which extradition could be granted. 
The last two Laws (14 of 1886 and 9 of 1887) were enacted after the 
conclusion of the London Convention and thus at a time when the South 
African Republic was empowered to conduct its own foreign relations 
subject only to the British veto. The legislative basis for 
extradition adopted in Law 14 of 1886 is in line with the British 
backing of warrants system operative under the Fugitive Offenders Act 
of 1881. (243) Law 9 of 1887, on the other hand, harks back to the 
earli~r 1871 Law enacted during the currency of the Sand River 
Convention in that it again authorises the President to conclude 
extradition treaties. As the South African Republic had in any event 
been granted this power in terms of article 4 of the London 
Convention, the Law would appear to be largely tautologous in this 
respect. However, as in the case of the 1871 Law, in Attorney-General 
v Andreson (244) the absence of a treaty between the South African 
Republic and Portugal proved fatal to the application for Andreson's 
extradition to face fraud charges. It is interesting to note, 
however, that in this Law no mention is made of the restriction 
contained in article 4 of the Convention. As was shown above, 
extradition treaties were concluded with a number of states, and the 
provisions of article 4 were met in only two of the instances. 
To return to the classification of these Laws, the one point emerging 
is that the two Laws in which treaties are specifically mentioned as 
the basis for extradition and in which the State President is 
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specifically empowered to conclude extradition treaties, both deal 
with extradition in the "broader" sense. Law 9 of 1887 refers to 
"vreemde Staten", while Law 5 of 1871 refers to "naburige Staten". 
The Laws in which no treaty is mentioned involve only the Republic's 
sister states or Colonies. This would seem to imply that even at this 
stage, there was a difference in perception in that "real" foreign 
states, for example Portugal, deserved a different treatment to the 
areas which would eventually constitute a single South Africa. 
In the meantime, however, peace between the Boers and the British did 
not hold and the Second Anglo-Boer War broke out. For the Boers, 
however, it was a losing battle which culminated in the final 
annexation of the Republic by Britain in 1900 and eventually in peace 
through the Treaty of Vereeniging signed at Pretoria on 31 May 1902. 
From this period, what has been said of the British extradition 
provisions applying in the Cape, Natal and the Orange Free State 
applied to the Transvaal with equal force. Developments within the 
various British South African Colonies between the Treaty of 
Vereeniging in 1902 and the eventual Act of Union in 1910 are for 
present purposes largely irrelevant. Although the Colonies were 
assured of civil government and representative institutions leading 
to responsible government as soon as possible, as regards foreign 
affairs, treaty-making capacity and, in particular, extradition, the 
Colonies were firmly under the British government. 
It can consequently be seen that during the few brief years of 
independence enjoyed by the various South African Republics, 
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extradition had come the full circle. It started off as an 
essentially British affair, and ended as an essentially British 
affair. The necessity of considering the various territories 
separately ceased to exist with the South Africa Act of 1909 and the 
region can consequently once again be considered as a whole in what 
follows. 
3.5 Union of South Africa 1910 - 1961 
Although one would expect that with the adoption of the South Africa 
Act in 1909,(245) the position as regards the conduct of foreign 
affairs in general and extradition in particular, would be reasonably 
clear cut, this is not in fact the case. Technically the Union of 
South Africa was a dependent British Colony and as such was totally 
subordinate to Britain in the sphere of international relations.(246) 
In practice however, things were somewhat different during the 
fifty-year history of the Union. 
It is consequently necessary to trace the development of 
treaty-making capacity in the British Dominions to determine who was 
able to conclude extradition treaties for the Union of South Africa, 
at what stage this capacity was acquired, how it was acquired and 
what practical implications it held for the Union. Although, the 
sphere of foreign affairs is obviously the more important for present 
purposes, as will emerge presently, purely municipal provisions 
cannot be ignored. 
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Lord Durham's concept of responsible government (247) had found full 
effect in the four regions which were united by the South Africa 
Act. (248) Although having a measure of internal "sovereignty", the 
fact remained that the British parliament could legislate either for 
the empire as a whole or for a particular Colony, without the consent 
of that Colony, Colonial legislation could be overridden particularly 
in the case of repugnance, the British parliament retained the rights 
of veto, disallowance and reservation, and Colonial officials were 
appointed by the Crown. (249) In short, although the Colonies enjoyed 
a measure of self-government, this was on the municipal level only 
with no thought of the surrender of British sovereignty over "matters 
of the utmost importance" under which were included "issues of 
foreign relations and defence." (250) 
We have already seen that in the case of the Transvaal Republic, 
practice resulted in a de facto erosion of British control over 
treaty making. (251) This can be regarded as a microcosm of events in 
the Colonies as a whole. 
Cracks in Britain's absolute power were not long in coming. Lord 
Durham had earmarked three areas which would remain under British 
control. These were public lands, trade and navigation, and foreign 
relations. (252) Differences soon arose and by 1848 land control had 
been recognised as an aspect which of necessity would need to be 
regulated by the Colonies themselves. (253) Inevitably, control over 
finances and navigation also proved problematic with the result that 
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between 1849 and 1869 shipping and trade in general were considerably 
liberalised. (254) 
Conflicts between the Colonies and the Imperial government were 
inevitable in such a situation and in 1865 the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act was adopted to "remove doubts as to the validity of colonial 
laws". (255) In essence this "Charter of Colonial legislative 
power", (256) provided that no Colonial law would be invalid as being 
repugnant to British legislation unless it was clear that the British 
parliament had intended that legislation to apply within the Colony 
in question. Although this Act certainly led to a liberalisation of 
the position of the Colonies, they were still unable to adopt 
extra-territorial legislation or legislation conflicting with British 
enactments applicable to them, and all Colonial legislation had still 
to receive royal assent. 
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, a new phenomenon 
emerged - the so-called Imperial Conferences, the first of which was 
held in 1887 to mark Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee. (257) These 
conferences were aimed at bringing together the officials of the 
Colonies and the British government to discuss matters of mutual 
concern and to iron out problems which had arisen. It was through 
these conferences that the third of Durham's reservations, viz that 
of foreign relations, underwent its greatest development. 
We have already seen that as regards trade, the position of the 
Colonies had been considerably liberalised. As much of this was 
109 
conducted by means of treaty, the Colonies at an early stage had a 
measure of input in the negotiation of treaties, although the actual 
conclusion was still in British hands. Gradually, however, the 
Colonies continued to encroach upon this traditionally British 
preserve. So, as a result of the 1902 Imperial Conference, the 
"major" Colonies (258) were authorised to establish their own land 
forces. (259) At the 1907 conference, which was chaired by the 
British Prime Minister personally rather than by a subordinate 
minister, the distinction between Colonies and self-governing 
Dominions was introduced. It was also decided that the Dominions 
could enjoy separate representation at certain "non-political" 
international conferences. (260) The conference held in 1911 provided 
that the Dominions should be consulted in the instruction of British 
delegates to meetings of the Hague Conference and should also be 
allowed to consider the terms of conventions entered 
into. (261) 
However, perhaps the single most important event in the evolution of 
treaty-making capacity for the Dominions, was the First World War. 
The declaration of war and conclusion of peace were clearly matters 
of high policy falling within the exclusive purview of the British 
government. If the British government declared the Empire to be in a 
state of war, the Dominions were also at war - whether they liked it 
or not. Consequently, when Britain declared war on Germany in 1914, 
all the Dominions - without having been consulted - were also at war. 
Once the war had been declared, it had to be waged and to do this an 
Imperial War Cabinet was established. This Cabinet was made up of 
i 
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British and Dominion ministers acting on equal footing. (262) At the 
1917 Imperial War Conference it was realised that relations between 
the various members of the British Empire were in need of revision, 
and it was accepted in principle that once peace had returned, this 
would be done and would be based "upon a full recognition of the 
Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth". (263) 
When peace came in 1919, the Dominions signed the Treaty of 
Versailles as independent entities. (264) Furthermore, they also 
enjoyed independent membership of the League of Nations and signed 
treaties concluded under the auspices of the League as independent 
states. Du Plooy (265) consequently states that by 1920, the 
Dominions were "in the position of de facto, if not de iure sovereign 
states ... ". 
Another adjunct of independent statehood is, of course, the right of 
legation and this too was not long in coming. As early as 1920, 
Canada had - possibly because of her "special relationship" with the 
United States - been allowed to accredit a Minister to Washington. 
(266) The Irish Free State claimed a similar right in 1924. (267) 
Clearly some regulation was required. 
The 1926 Imperial Conference is generally acknowledged to be the most 
important of the conferences as regards the status of the 
Dominions. (268) In terms of the so-called Balfour Declaration, 
Dominion status was defined to mean that the Dominions were : 
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"autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in 
Status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of 
their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common 
allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the 
British Commonwealth of Nations". (269) 
Consequently, the 1926 Conference acknowledged that the Dominions 
could have interests separate from those of Britain or the Empire as 
a whole. Where an issue was the sole concern of a particular 
Dominion, that Dominion would be able to negotiate and conclude 
agreements independently, subject only to a duty to inform Britain 
and the other Dominions. In addition, it was agreed that no Dominion 
could 'bind any ~ther part of the Commonwealth without the express 
consent of that Dominion, and that the Dominions could negotiate 
independent diplomatic representation. (270) 
It can consequently be seen that at this stage in their development 
the Dominions had, almost imperceptibly, eroded British control over 
their foreign affairs. They had through practice and convention 
evolved an independent treaty-making capacity, an independent right 
of legation and eventually, acknowledgment from the Imperial 
Conference that they were indeed autonomous states within the British 
Commonwealth. 
There can be little doubt that although the member states of the 
Commonwealth had achieved a great measure of independence, the 
treaty-making power for these territories vested in the king. (271) 
By convention, these powers were exercised by the King on the advice 
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of his Ministers of State (272) which has led Du Plooy to aver that 
in fact treaty-making fell to the Cabinet to whom the royal 
prerogative had been transferred in this regard. (273) 
At this stage it is apposite to move away from the position of the 
Dominions in general, and to examine the position within the Union in 
greater detail. 
The only section of the South Africa Act (274) to deal directly with 
treaties is section 148(1) which provides that: 
"All rights and obligations under any conventions or 
agreements which are binding on any of the Colonies 
shall devolve upon the Union at its establishment." 
The general treaty-making power must be read into section 8 of the 
Act which embodied the Royal prerogative by providing that the 
executive government of the Union was vested in the King and 
administered by him or by the governor-general as his representative. 
(275) The governor-general enjoyed such powers as were delegated to 
him by the King. As the powers in fact transferred to the 
governor-general did not include the power to conclude treaties for 
the Union, this power must be taken to have remained with the King. 
(276) However, it is also clear that as the governor-general was 
appointed on the advice of the Union cabinet, and acted on the advice 
of the cabinet when acting as "Governor-general-in-council". This has 
led Du Plooy (277) to conclude that : 
"For all practical purposes therefore, as opposed to 
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the theoretical residence of treaty-making power, that 
power is exercised by the Cabinet who will of course, 
normally follow the advice of the Minister of External 
Affairs. In order to maintain the theoretical order of 
things, however, the treaty is made in the name of [the 
King] and [he] issues the Full Powers and causes the 
Instrument of Ratification to be deposited, when 
advised to do so by His Ministers in the Union". 
However, the question must arise whether the fact that the Dominions, 
and the Union of South Africa in particular, had arrogated to 
themselves an independent treaty-making capacity meant that they were 
indeed totally free of British constraint in the conduct of their 
foreign affairs. The view which is adopted in this regard will, as 
Wiechers points out, (278) depend largely on one's conception of law. 
The independence (or lack of it) of the Union can be based on three 
basic approaches. First is the argument that the independence of the 
Union - and consequently also its independent treaty-making capacity 
- can be ascribed to the adoption of the Statute of Westminster alone 
as before this date the British Parliament remained supreme within 
the Dominions. (279) Second, it is argued that the Dominions were 
independent even before the adoption of the Statute, their 
independence stemming from the evolutionary process outlined above. 
While Keith (280) sketched a third scenario in terms of which the 
possibility of British supremacy remained, even after the adoption of 
the Statute, in that the British parliament was free to repeal the 
Statute at any time. 
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At this stage it is apposite again to consider the fact that although 
treaty making capacity is an adjunct of sovereignty, the resultant 
treaties do not operate in the same sphere as general parliamentary 
legislation. Consequently, for an assessment of the "international 
status" of the Dominions, it is also crucial to consider the 
interaction between municipal law and public international law both 
within Britain and within the Union of South Africa. As was pointed 
out in the introduction, (281) treaties do not find automatic 
application within either British or South African law. Before a 
treaty can find municipal application a process of transformation is 
necessary to bring it within the South African municipal sphere. 
Consequently, while the Union might indeed, in terms of certain of 
the theories posited above, have been free to conclude treaties 
contrary to the wishes of the British government, the municipal 
application of these treaties could, while the resolutions of the 
Imperial Conference were no more than resolutions - ie while they did 
not enjoy the force of law - still be effectively blocked by the 
British parliament. In fact, in terms of Keith's thesis, (282) this 
could have been done even after the enactment of the Statute. 
As regards treaties, consequently, the Union was struggling under a 
double disability, first in the form of the formal requirement that 
treaties be concluded by the King, and second, in terms of the power 
of the British parliament to prevent any treaty of which it did not 
approve from acquiring the necessary municipal application. This 
latter point may indeed prove crucial in the case of extradition 
treaties. (283) 
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Realising that things needed to be regularised, the British 
parliament adopted the Statute of Westminster in 1931 (284) to give 
effect to the principles agreed upon at the Commonwealth Conferences 
between 1923 and 1930. 
The Statute provides in section 2 that the Colonial Laws Validity Act 
will no longer apply within the Dominions. Section 2(2) prov~des that 
no law made by the parliament of a Dominion after the commencement of 
the Act (285) will be void for repugnance with British common law or 
existing or future statutory law. It further expressly provides that 
the Dominion parliament may repeal any such legislation which is part 
of its law. Through this provision, therefore, the objection raised 
above in terms of which the British parliament would theoretically 
have been able to block the operation of a treaty concluded by the 
Dominion from coming into operation by disallowing the municipal 
legislation required to accord the treaty municipal application, was 
removed. 
Section 3 conferred the power to legislate extra-territorially on the 
Dominions, while section 4 provided that no British Act could be 
extended to the Dominions without expressly stating that the Dominion 
in question had requested and consented to its enactment. 
Can it safely be assumed that after 1931, the Union was indeed free 
to conclude treaties on its own behalf and to ensure their 
application? While it would indeed appear to be so, this was clearly 
not the feeling of the Union Parliament which, perhaps ex abundandi 
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cautela, felt that only through the adoption of the Status of the 
Union Act (286) would they at last be free of British constraint and 
independent in the true sense of the word. By the Status Act, the 
Statute of Westminster was incorporated into South Africa law thus 
rendering the possibility of future British repeal meaningless; the 
Union parliament was expressly recognised as the supreme legislature 
for the Union - thus ensuring that the Union parliament would now be 
in a position to give municipal effect to any international 
obligations which the Union might undertake; and the convention that 
the governor-general acted on the advice of the Union ministers was 
entrenched by statute. 
It is at this stage - and only at this stage - it is submitted, that 
one can truly speak of the Union of South Africa being an independent 
state within the broad Commonwealth of Nations and having a 
meaningful independent treaty-making capacity. 
In the section dealing with the Cape of Good Hope above, the 
pre-Union extradition treaties concluded by Britain and made 
applicable first to the Cape, and subsequently to the other Colonies, 
were listed. (287) It is now necessary to consider and classify those 
extradition treaties applicable within the Union of South Africa 
between 1910 and 1961 when republican status was achieved. 
It has already been pointed out that in terms of the South Africa Act 
all obligations under conventions and agreements binding on the 
Colonies, devolved upon the Union. (288) Consequently the treaties 
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identified in previous sections were of full force and effect within 
the Union of South Africa. This presents no problems when one is 
dealing with the agreements between Britain and foreign states which 
were made applicable to the Colonies. However, there are two 
situations which demand closer attention in this regard. 
The first is the status of treaties concluded independently with 
foreign sovereign states by either the Transvaal or Orange Free State 
during their respective brief periods of sovereignty. Although on 
annexation these treaties, too, would have fallen to the 
British (289) the question arises whether, if Britain already had 
treaty arrangements with such a state, the original British treaty or 
the "inherited" treaty between the now-British colony and the foreign 
state wo~ld apply. This question appears to be one of priority in 
cases of succession, and as succession to treaties in its various 
forms, constitutes a major part of the consideration of present-day 
South African extradition agreements undertaken in Chapter IV, no 
answer will be attempted at this stage. 
The second, too will merely be identified, and will be considered in 
greater depth in Chapter IV. It will be remembered that in article 4 
of the London Convention, the Transvaal was prohibited from 
concluding treaties with any state or nation, but that the the Orange 
Free State was expressly excluded from this prohibition. (290) It has 
also been established that at this stage the Orange Free State was 
acknowledged as a sovereign independent state. (291) We consequently 
find the somewhat anomalous position that in terms of section 148(1) 
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of the Union of South Africa Act, a treaty of extradition existing 
between two of the constituent parts of the Union - the Transvaal and 
the Orange Free State - devolved upon the Union as a whole. (292) 
Returning specifically to treaties concluded by or on behalf of South 
Afr~ca after Union, the following picture emerges. 
In the following instances treaties were concluded by Britain and 
made applicable to the Union. The pattern identified above will be 
followed here. (293) 
TREATY DATE ARTICLE PROVISIONS FOOTNOTE 
.. 
Greece 1910 18 ab de f 294 
Siam 1911 16 ab de f 295 
Czechos- 1924 17 & ab d f 296 
lovakia (1927) 18 
Finland 1924 17 & ab d f 297 
( 1925) 18 
In the case of the United States of America (298), and Israel, (299) 
treaties were concluded directly between the Union of South Africa 
and the foreign state concerned. 
A brief analysis of these treaties shows that they in fact bear out 
the development sketched above. The treaties concluded immediately 
after Union - ie those with Greece (1910) and Siam (1911) - were 
concluded by the British government in the regular way and made 
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applicable to the British territories, including the Union. However, 
in the case of the two treaties concluded in 1924, that is after the 
1923 Imperial Conference, (300) the need for the independent 
treaty-making powers of the Dominions which had been identified at 
that Conference and was to be concretised in the Statute of 
Westminster following upon the 1926 Imperial Conference, was in fact 
put into effect. Although the treaties with Czechosolovakia and 
Finland were concluded by Britain, their application to the Dominions 
- and the Union in particular - was specifically suspended and made 
dependent upon accession by the Union parliament. Finally, in the 
treaties with the United States of America (1952) and Israel (1960), 
the role of the British government is purely symbolic the treaties 
being concluded eo nomine between the foreign states and the Union of 
South Africa. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This, then, brings us to the end of the pre-republican development of 
extradition within South Africa. It has been seen that the general 
development of extradition within the "civilised nations" of the 
world is mirrored by parallel developments within what came to be the 
South African society. The problems which faced Europe and which 
either retarded or promoted extradition were mirrored in the South 
African society - albeit at a somewhat later stage. After a slow 
start, South Africa had by the time of its emergence as an 
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independent sovereign state an extensive and well developed network 
of extradition agreements. 
In 1961 the Union of South Africa opted for a republican form of 
government outside of the British Commonwealth. The state of 
extradition within the Republic from its inception to the present day 
will be considered in Chapter IV. However, the history of extradition 
has thus far been largely the history of extradition treaties and the 
question which of necessity arises is whether treaty is indeed the 
only basis on which extradition may rest. In the following Chapter 
certain of the questions raised at the outset of this thesis when 
the concept of extradition was defined - most notably the basis of 
extradition - will be considered. 
121 
ENDNOTES CHAPTER II 
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followed in this by Bassiouni (1974) Van der 
Heijden (1954) 12 n 1 lists a further treaty 
concluded between Ramases II and the Cheta leader, but 
fails to put a date to it. 
2 Clarke (1888) 17ff. It is interesting to note 
that neither application succeeded. In the case of 
Syria, Hannibal managed to escape before his surrender, 
while in the c~se of Bithynia, he chose a more 
permanent escape through suicide. See too, Stanbrook 
( 1980) xxvi. 
3 Clarke (1888) 18. He cites two Romans surrendered 
to.~he Apolliniate in 266 BC and two Carthaginians in 
188 BC. 
4 Clarke (1888) 22. 
5 See eg, Bassiouni (1974) 4; Shearer (1971) 5 and 
the writers he cites inn 3. 
6 See British Digest (1965) 445 where it is pointed out that 
"there were in fact many English extradition treaties 
between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries 
providing for the surrender of ordinary criminals". 
7 Shearer (1971) 7. 
8 See East India Company v Campbell 1 vers Senr 246. 
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9 De Martens (1801-26) and (1802-42) in Shearer (1971) 8. 
10 Shearer (1971) 9ff where he shows convincingly that 
the various terms are applied equally to criminals.in 
the conventional sense of the term and to military 
deserters. 
11 Shearer (1971) 10. In terms of these treaties, if a 
crime was committed within a certain distance of the 
state's border but on the territory of some other 
state, the offender could be pursued into that other 
state. An interesting corollary provision applied in 
South Africa by way of the jurisdictional provisions of 
the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 (44 & 45 Viet c 69) in 
terms of which the courts of a British territory enjoyed 
jurisdiction over crimes committed within 500 yards of the 
borders of their territory. 
·• 
12 Shearer (1971) sees 1794 (the Jay Treaty) as the date 
marking British and United States' entry into the 
extradition arena. He is supported in this by Bassiouni (1974) 
26; Stanbrook (1980) xxvi; and British Digest (1965) 445. 
Hartley Booth (1980) lvii, on the other hand, 
regards all pre-1842 treaties as ancient history and 
classifies the start of modern British extradition law 
as the conclusion of the webster-Ashburton treaty 
between Britain and the United States in 1842. See 
too, Clarke (1888) 123. 
13 Shearer (1971) 7ff. 
14 In Harvard Research 35ff, these developments and 
their relevance for extradition are fully evaluated. 
The scope of this thesis does not permit so detailed a 
treatment. 
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15 See Shearer (1971) 14 and particularly 17ff. 
16 Shearer (1971) 17-18. He indicates that in 1841, 
for example, France had extradition treaties with only 
Belgium, Sardinia, Spain and Switzerland but that this 
changed dramatically during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. 
17 See n 12 above. The Jay Treaty dealt with amity, 
commerce and navigation. Article 27 which provided for 
the mutual surrender of persons charged with murder and 
forgery was successfully invoked in 1799 in the case of 
Jonathan Robbins alias Thomas Nash who was handed over 
to Britain by the United States on charges of murder 
and eventually hanged - see Wharton's State Trials 
392-456; Clarke (1888) 37. In British Digest (1965) 454 
mention is also made of the extradition of Ryan and 
Pheps under this article of the treaty. On the other 
hand, the surrender of one Barnes was refused on the 
ground that highway robbery, the crime for which he was 
sought, fell outside the ambit of the treaty. The 
treaty contained a termination clause - article 28 -
and expired after twelve years. Although article 28 was 
re-enacted as article 21 of the treaty concluded in 
1807, it never came into operation. 
18 See British Digest (1965) 445. 
19 Clarke (1888) 123; British Digest (1965) 446; Shearer (1971) 
14. 
20 Article X of the treaty (the implementation of which 
was authorised in Britain by 6 & 7 Viet c 76) provides 
for extradition in the case of murder, assault with 
intent to murder, piracy, robbery, arson, forgery or 
the uttering of forged papers. Britain successfully 
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applied for the surrender of Christiana Cockram alias 
Gilmour for the murder of her husband. Later 
applications were not as successful - British Digest 
(1965) 446; Clarke (1888) 128. 
21 See British Digest (1965) 446 for a summary of the relevant 
provisions. 
22 Shearer (1971) 14 "(F)or the first time in British 
practice the exemption of political offenders, the 
non-extradition of nationals, the principle of 
speciality and the resolution to clarify requisitions 
were included ... French influence in the shaping of this 
treaty is obvious." The list of extradition crimes ,was 
considerably extended - see Clarke (1888) 132 - 3. 
23 Shearer (1971) 15. See too, British Digest (1965) 447; 
Clarke (1888) 134 - 5; and 1852 Hansard cxxii 192, 498 
and· 561. 
24 Shearer (1971) 15. 
25 33 & 34 Viet c 52. See British Digest (1965) 789 and Clarke 
(1888) iii for texts of the Act which remains - in amended form 
- the basis for extradition between Britain and foreign states 
even today. The Commonwealth, for as long as it may still 
continue to exist, does not fall under this Act, but rather 
under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1963 as amended. 
26 See 63-64 and 118 for a full tabulation of 
these treaties. 
27 See Bassiouni (1974) 4. 
28 The other phases are ancient times to the seventeenth 
century - a period of almost exclusive concern for 
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religious and political offenders; eighteenth and first 
half of the nineteenth century - treaty making 
concerned chiefly with military offenders, so 
characterising the condition of Europe during that . 
period; 1833 to present (which must be taken to mean 
pre-1948) - a period of collective concern in 
suppressing collective criminality; post-1948. 
29 Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res 217(III) 
of 10 December 1948, UN Doc a/811 (1948). 
30 Bassiouni (1974) 5. 
31 From a purely South African perspective this is 
illustrated by responses to the Republic's attempts to 
update extradition agreements during the 1970s. The 
following are some of the more directly relevant 
replies received. Britain declared it unlikely that 
extradition would receive attention "in the foreseeable 
future" - JF 9/11/2 (Britain) letter dd 27/6/1972; 
Switzerland expressly stated that it had no interest 
in negotiating a new treaty - JF 9/11/2 (Switzerland) 
letter dd 4/7/1979; Canada was considering no 
extradition negotiations at that time - JF 9/11/2 
(Canada) letters dd 23/5/1973 and 6/6/1973; Portugal 
and South Africa would appear to have been 
negotiating a new treaty between 1972 and 1974 but 
nothing came of the negotiations - JF 9/11/2 
(Portugal); Denmark renounced all her treaties as from 
1/5/1968 and does not appear to be in a hurry to 
replace these - JF 1/554/20/21; Austria too, was 
unwilling to consider a new treaty - JF 9/11/2 
(Oostenryk) letter dd 15/12/1976; Norway did not 
consider it expedient to conclude a new treaty with 
South Africa - JF 9/11/2 (Norway); while New Zealand 
felt that there was "no practical need for such a 
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treaty with South Africa" - JF 9/11/2 (New Zealand} 
letter dd 6/7/1976 - a further letter (JF 1/554/20/48), 
states that while New Zealand had no objection in 
principle to the conclusion of an extradition treqty,it 
was not a matter of urgency and South Africa would have 
to wait in line; France saw "no place" for a new treaty 
- JF 1/554/20/13 letters dd 11/5/1967 and 5/7/1968; 
although approaches were made to the Republic of 
Ireland as early as 1949 on the possibility of the 
conclusion of a treaty nothing came of the requests -
JF 1/554/20/12 letter dd 16/5/1949 following on the 
attempted extradition in the case of R v Lewis and 
Mason PM 115/1/32. 
In general it can consequently be seen that countries 
are not particularly anxious to conclude new treaties 
on extradition as these are not perceived as "matters 
of urgency". 
32 For a full discussion of the applicable multipartite 
treaties and reciprocity see Chapter III on the basis of 
extradition. 
33 See Bassiouni {1974) 14 n 45 and the sources cited 
there. 
34 See eg, article 16 of the Convention on Offences and 
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft in Flight {Tokyo 
Convention) 704 UNTS 219 which, while not providing for 
compulsory extradition, facilitates the process; and 
article 7 of the Convention for the Suppression of the 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft {Hague Convention) 860 
UNTS I- 12325, which provides for either extradition or 
municipal punishment. For a detailed and up to date 
assessment of the role of terrorism in international 
law generally and in extradition in particular see 
Bassiouni {1988); Mcwhinney {1987). 
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35 "Sovereignty" in the present context is used 
exclusively to refer to the authority to conduct 
foreign relations; in other words who was entitled to 
conclude and act under extradition treaties for th~ 
territory. It is acknowledged that this is a somewhat 
simplistic approach and for a full discussion of the 
incidence and ramifications of sovereignty with 
particular emphasis on the South African context 
reference may be had to Olivier (1986). 
36 Visagie (1969) 2. 
37 Visagie (1969) 9, although as he points out this was 
not always fully applied. See too, Wessels (1908) 
92-3 where the functions of the States General are 
discussed. Van Zyl (1979) states at 229 that "Die 
State Generaal se vernaamste funksies was die reeling 
van buitelandse sake ... ". 
·39 Visagie (1969) 8 and 13. See too, Wessels (1908) 
92. 
39 Visagie (1969) 6-14; Van Zyl (1979) 425. 
40 Visagie (1969) 13. 
41 The voe originally received its charter from the States 
General on 20 March 1602. The Charter was for a period 
of 21 years but was renewed repeatedly until it was 
eventually abolished on 1 March 1796 in terms of a 
Plakkaat of 24 December 1795. See Visagie (1969) at 24 
n 8 for details of the renewals, and see Van Zyl (1979) 425 
generally. 
42 See articles 34 and 35 of the Charter. 
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43 The so-called "Heeren Seventien" constituted the 
executive branch of the voe and it was through these 
seventeen directors that the voe acted. Treaties were 
thus concluded by the Heere Seventien on behalf of.the 
States General. See Van Zyl (1979) 425-6 for further 
refinements in this regard. 
44 Clarke (1888) 20. 
45 A treaty had been concluded between the British and the 
Dutch on 14 September 1662. Burnet's extradition was 
requested in 1687. See Clarke (1888) 21 ff. 
46 Clarke (1888) 21 ff. 
47 There are of course arguments which would accord the 
chiefs de facto international status. These are 
considered below in dealing with the first recorded 
South African "extradition treaty". However, it is 
submitted that particularly in the very early stages of 
~evelopment here under consideration, these arguments 
carry little weight. For a somewhat technical and 
formalistic distinction between "high policy" treaties 
and other inter-state agreements see Du Plooy 
( 1958) 43 ff. 
48 Shearer (1971) 7. 
49 For the various forces operating at the time see Van 
Jaarsveld (1971) 11ff. 
50 The Cape was occupied by Britain on 16 September 1795. 
See van Zyl (1979) 443. 
51 Visagie (1969) 91; Van Zyl (1979) 444. 
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52 See above. 
53 See Visagie (1969) 94 and Van Zyl (1979) 445. The 
Admiralty Courts with their international law basis 
were introduced into the Cape in 1797 and were to try 
cases "according to the civil law and the methods and 
rules of Admiralty" - Commission appointing a Court of 
Admiralty at the Cape of Good Hope 6 January 1697. 
54 Booysen (1973) 241. 
55 Visagie (1969) 98. 
56 With effect from 1 March 1796: Plakkaat of 24 December 
1795. 
57 In terms of the Treaty of Amiens 1802. 
58 Kaapse Plakkaatboek Vol VI 1803-6 cited by Visagie 
(1969) 99. 
59 Van Zyl (1979) 447. 
60 For the role of Governor De Mist see Visagie (1969) 
99ff and Van Zyl (1979) 446ff. 
61 The year 1836 marks the generally accepted start of 
the "Great Trek" during which the frontiers of the 
hinterland were extended. 1910 marks the date of Union. 
62 Van Jaarsveld (1971) 11ff. 
63 Scholtz (1967) 415; Cameron (1986) 79. 
64 See Kennedy (1935) 9-18. 
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65 Wiechers (1981) 124; Du Plooy (1958) 5. 
66 Jurisdiction over the Seabed and Subsoil of the 
Continental Shelf off Newfoundland Supreme Court of 
Canada 8 March 1984; 1984 ILM 288~ See too Botha (1984) 
194. 
67 See above at 47. 
68 Treaty between Great Britain and Germany for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at London 
14.5.1872; ratified at London 11.6.1872. 
69 Treaty between Great Britain and Brazil for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Rio de 
Janeiro 13.11.1872; ratified at Rio de Janeiro 
28.8.1873. 
70 Treaty between Great Britain and Italy for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Rome 
5.2.1873; ratified at Rome 18.3.1873 1873 63 BSP 
19-30. (Provisions not applicable to Malta.) 
71 Treaty between Great Bitain and Denmark for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Copenhagen 
31.3.1873; ratified at Copenhagen 26.4.1873 : 1873 63 
BSP 5-18. 
72 Treaty between Great Britain and Sweden and Norway for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Stockholm 26.6.1873; ratified at Stockholm 28.8.1873 
1873 63 ESP 175-179. 
73 Treaty between Great Britain and Austria/Hungary for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Vienna 3.12.1873; ratified at Vienna 10 .. 3.1874: 1873 
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63 BSP 213-218. 
74 Treaty between Great Britain and Hayti for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Port-au-Prince 7.12.1874; ratified at Port-au-Prince 
2.9.1875 : 1874 65 BSP 44-48. 
75 Treaty between Great Britain and France for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Paris 
14.8.1876; ratified at Paris 8.4.1878 : 1876 67 BSP 
5-19. Special provisions in article 16 of the treaty 
exclude its application from France's East Indian 
Possessions - see article 9 of the Anglo/French treaty 
of 7.3.1815. 
76 Treaty between Great Britain and Spain for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at London 
4.6.1878; ratified at London 21.11.1878 : 1878 69 BSP 
6-13. 
77 Treaty between Great Britain and the Republic of 
Equator for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 
signed at Quinto 20.9.1880; ratified at Quinto 
19.2.1886 : 1881 72 BSP 137-143. 
78 Treaty between Great Britain and Luxemburg for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Luxemburg 24.11.1880; ratified at Brussels 5.1.1881 
1880 71 BSP 45-53. 
79 Treaty between Great Britain and Switzerland for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Berne 
26.11.1880; ratified at Berne 15.3.1881 : 1880 71 BSP 
54-62. The relevant provision (art 18) was amended by a 
convention entered into between Great Britain and 
Switzerland in London on 29 June 1904. The periods 
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provided for colonial possessions in the original 
treaty were amended to 6 weeks under article 3 par 3 
(originally 30 days} and 3 months under article 8 
(originally 2 months} - 1904 97 BSP 92-3. 
80 Treaty between Great Britain and Salvador for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Paris 
23.6.1881; ratified at London 8.11.1882 : 1881 72 BSP 
13-19. 
81 Treaty between Great Britain and the Continental 
Republic of Uruguay for the Mutual Surrender of 
Fugitive Criminals signed at Montevideo 26.3.1884; 
ratified at Montevideo 13.12.1884 : 1883-4 75 BSP 
18-24. 
82 Treaty between Great Britain and Mexico for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Mexico 
7.9.1884; ratified at Mexico 22.1.1889 : 1885-6 77 BSP 
1253-1258. 
83 Treaty between Great Britain and the Emperor of all the 
Russias for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 
signed at London 24.11.1886; ratified at London 
2.2.1887. 
84 Treaty between Great Britain and Guatamala for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Guatamala 4.7.1885; ratified at Guatamala 6.9.1886 
1884-5 76 BSP 72-77. 
85 Treaty between Great Britain and Colombia for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Bogota 
27.10.1888; ratified at Bogota 21.8.1889. 
86 Treaty between Great Britain and the Argentine Republic 
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for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed 
at Beunos Aires 22.5.1889; ratified at Beunos Aires 
15.12.1893 : 1889-90 81 BSP 1305-1311. 
87 Treaty between Great Britain and Monaco for the 
Extradition of Criminals signed at Paris 17.12.1891; 
ratified at Paris 17.3.1892 : 1891-2 83 BSP 66-72. 
88 Treaty between Great Britain and Bolivia for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Lima 
22.2.1892; ratified at Lima 7.3.1898 : 1896 88 BSP 
27-33. 
89 Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Lisbon 
17.10.1892; ratified at Lisbon 13.11.1893 :1892-3 84 
BSP 83-88. (See the amending convention of 20.1.1932 
signed expressly "on behalf of South Africa" 1932 BSP 
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90 Treaty between Great Britain and Liberia for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at London 
31.1.1892; ratified at London 31.1.1894: 1892-3 84 BSP 
103-109. 
91 Treaty between Great Britain and Roumania for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Bucharest 21.3.1893; ratified at Bucharest 13.3.1894 
1893 85 BSP 69-75. 
92 Treaty between Great Britain and Chile for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Santiago 
26.1.1897; ratified at Santiago 14.4.1898 : 89 BFSP 
20-25. 
93 Treaty (replacing the treaty of 19.6.1874 see Clarke 
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(1888)) between Great Britain and the 
Netherlands for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive 
Criminals signed at London 26.9.1898; ratified at 
London 14.12.1898 : 90 BFSP 51-58. Special mention .is 
made of the various colonies and the period allowed for 
provisional arrest is extended to 60 days in the case 
of the colonies. 
94 Treaty between Great Britain and the Republic of San 
Marino for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitive Criminals 
signed at Florence 16.10.1899; ratified at Rome 
5.12.1899 : 91 BFSP 95-101. 
95 Treaty between Great Britain and Servia/Yugoslavia for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Belgrade 6.12.1900; ratified at Belgrade 13.3.1901 : 92 
BFSP 41-47. 
96 Treaty (replacing the treaty of 20.5.1876 :see Clarke 
(1888)) between Great Britain and Belgium for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Brussels 29.10.1901; ratified at Brussels 6.12.1901.In 
a convention signed at London on 5.3.1907 and ratified 
on 17.4.1907, the parties made special provisions for 
criminals arrested in the Dominions : 100 BFSP 472-473. 
97 Treaty between Great Britain and Peru for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Lima 
26.1.1904; ratified at Lima 30.11.1906 : 99 BFSP 
963-968. 
98 Treaty between Great Britain and Cuba for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Havana 
3.10.1904; ratified at Havana 10.1.1905 : 1904 97 BFSP 
26-31. 
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99 Treaty between Great Britain and Nicaragua for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Managua 19.4.1905; ratified at London 13.2.1906. 
100 Treaty between Great Britain and Panama for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Panama 
25.8.1906; ratified at Panama 15.4.1907. 
101 Treaty between Great Britain and Paraguay for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Asuncion 12.9.1908; ratified at Asuncion 30.1.1911 
102 BFSP 340-345. 
102 Treaty of Friendship between Her Majesty and Tonga 
signed at Nukualofa 29.11.1879; ratified at Nukualofa 
3.7.1882. Article iv of the treaty provides for the 
surrender of persons guilty of certain crimes. In a 
protocol dated 5.7.1882 extradition is made dependent 
on the procedure in the Acts applying within the 
dependencies. See too, the treaty with the United 
States of America signed at Washington 9.8.1842 and 
ratified at London 13.10.1842, where mention is made of 
the "territories of the other". 
103 44 & 45 Viet c 69 adopted on 27.8.1881. See British 
Digest (1965) section IX 768ff. 
104 For a discussion of whether formal treaties and 
inter-governmental arrangements can be concluded between members 
of the Commonwealth inter se see Du Plooy (1958) chapters VI and 
VII 68-104. 
105 6 & 7 Viet c 34 (1843). 
106 The backing of warrants concept has been retained in 
section 12 of the current South African Extradition Act 
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67 of 1962 with regard to "associated states". 
107 British Digest (1965) 768. 
108 Insofar as Part I is concerned, the Act applied 
automatically between the several parts of the British 
Dominions. 
109 See sections 5-10 of the Act. 
110 Part II section 12. For a full list of the possessions 
to which this part of the Act was made applicable, see 
British Digest (1965) 775. 
111 Part II sections 14-19. 
112 Section 20 provides that where a person is charged with 
the commission of an offence within 500 yards of a 
boundary common to two British possessions, he may be 
tried in either. See too, n 36 above. 
113 See Part IV section 32. 
114 Bird (1965) 23. De Gama sailed past the 
area on Christmas Day 1497 and somewhat Quixotically 
named it after the nativity. 
115 A detailed description of Natal was nonetheless sent to 
the King of Portugal. See Decades of Joao de Barros 
Royal' Typographical Office Lisbon (1778) 1st Decade Cap 
3 Bk iv reproduced in Bird (1965) 24. 
116 Bird (1965) reproduces a number of letters and reports 
in this regard, notably those of the survivors of the 
Johanna wrecked in 1683 (at 25) and the Stavenisse 1687 
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(at 27). The "local population" was made up of the 
indigenous tribes living in a strictly ordered social 
system which, although lacking written laws, "in their 
customs possess laws which meet every conceivable . 
crime" (at 118). Given the finding of the International 
Court of Justice in the Western Sahara case (1975 ICJ 
Rep) that "territory inhabited by tribes or people 
having a social or political organisation is not 
regarded as terra nullius" (at 39 par 80), the Zulu 
must be regarded as sovereigns at that stage. 
117 See Extracts of Despatch from the Chamber XVII to 
Commander Simon van der Stel and Council of 1689 (Bird 
(1965) 54),·for the Chamber's instructions and Van 
der Stell's response (Bird (1965) 55) to the effect that 
he had "solemnly purchased that bay with some 
surrounding land from the king and chief of these 
parts ... ". 
118 See comment by Bird (1965) at 4 (footnote). The 
king's .successor commented as follows on the land grant 
"My father ... is dead ... and as to what he agreed to, it 
was for himself : I have nothing to say to it." (Bird 
(1965)at60). 
119 Extract from a despatch from the directors of the Dutch 
East India Company to the Governor and Council of 
Policy at the Cape of Good Hope dated 23.12.1719, 
reproduced in Bird (1965) 257. 
120 See article 1 of the Articles of Capitulation 19.1.1806 
in Bird (1965) 257. 
121 See Bird (1965) 193 for a copy of the grant dated 
8.8.1824. See too, at 259 where Farewell reported his 
purchase of the land. 
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122 Bird (1965) 94 for a copy of the grant dated February 
1828. 
123 There are numerous references in Bird (1965) to 
Britain's reluctance to colonise Natal. See eg, the 
petition from the "householders" of Port Natal 
requesting that the territory be colonised (at 312) and 
the reply (at 315) where it is expressly stated that 
"Lord Glenelg states that Her Majesty's Government are 
so persuaded of the inexpediency of engaging in any 
scheme of colonization, or of acquiring further 
territory in South Africa, that he feels himself 
precluded from offering any encouragement to the 
project." 
124 See Bird (1965) 307 where the text of the treaty is 
reproduced. 
125 Emphasis added. 
126 Mugambwa (1987) 79-93. 
127 1928 AJIL 883. 
128 1953 ICJ Rep 3 105. 
129 Wheaton (1866) eg, talks of treaty-making capacity 
being limited to Christian Europeans; while Hall (1884) 
at 295 requires admission to the "European club" for 
such capacity. 
130 Westlake (1914) 143-5. This amounted to a 
three-tier test weighted heavily in the favour of the 
white settlers. The arrogance of the prevailing 
139 
attitude is, however, clear as the capacity of the black 
population is premised on the level of "civilization" the white 
population can enjoy in their territories. 
131 Mugambwa (1978) 81-2. 
132 Mugambwa (1978) 82. Of course a possible explanation 
could be that it was to serve merely as notification to the 
world at large. One then wonders, however, why a simple note 
between the European states concerned was not adopted. 
133 Mugambwa (1978) 85. The arguments raised with regard 
to British jurisdiction over "foreigners" will be considered in 
greater detail below in dealing with the Transvaal. 
134 Mugambwa (1978) 86ff. 
135 01 le Njogo and Others v The Attorney General 1913-14 
KLR 70, 89-91. 
136 Mugambwa (1978) 87. 
137 1918 AC 211 ff. 
138 1975 ICJ Rep 12 at 39. 
139 See n 123 above. 
140 See above n 7. The phrase "a criminal lost is a 
problem solved" must surely be seen as finding its 
fullest application in such a situation as the 
likelihood of individual white survival outside the 
perimeters of the white settlement was remote. 
141 See Shearer's classification of treaties concluded 
between 1718 and 1830 above. The difference in the case 
140 
of the Zulu, however, lies in the fact that political 
rather than criminal aspects were paramount. 
142 See eg, Bassiouni (1974) 400 ff. 
143 One thinks particularly of the principle of 
non-refoulment, see eg, Bassiouni (1974) 102; 
Grahl-Madsen (1980) 40ff. 
144 In a letter from the original white settlers to the 
Graham's Town Journal c April/June 1837 (reproduced in 
Bird (1965) 322) it was stated that "we are all agreed 
to reject the treaty as most cruel and utterly 
impracticable". 
145 Bird (1965) 323, where the delivery-up of a woman and 
her two infant daughters is recorded. 
146 See €g, extract from the minutes of the Executive 
Council meeting of 20.3.1837, Bird (1965) 315-6. 
147 See Du Plessis (1965) 117 and a letter in the Graham's Town 
Journal giving Retief's arrival date as 19.10.1837; Bird (1965) 
326. 
148 Du Plessis (1965) 19; Bird (1965) 326. 
149 Draft letter to the officer administering the 
government, Cape of Good Hope 29.10.1837 reproduced in 
Bird (1965) 327-8. 
150 Bird (1965) 361; Du Plessis (1965) 123. 
151 This text is taken from Bird (1965) 366. The somewhat 
quaint spelling of placenames and the names of 
individuals has been corrected. For a Dutch version of 
the agreement, see Hofstede (1876) 38. 
141 
152 See eg, Akehurst (1987) 53; Starke (1989) 95; Booysen 
(1989) 120. For a full discussion of the principles of 
the Montevideo Convention see the recent Bophuthatswana 
case of S v Banda and others cc63/88 (B) 1989 4 SA ,519 (Bop) in 
which the requirements for statehood are exhaustively 
discussed by the judge. 
153 For a discussion and comparison of the merits and 
demerits of the constitutive and declaratory theorie
1
s 
of recognition and their effects see s v Banda above and 
the authors cited inn 152. 
154 See Bird (1965) 389 where a statement by Andreas 
Wilhelmus Pretorius made in his capacity as "Chief 
Commandant of all the Burghers of the Right Worshipful 
Volksraad of the South African Society of Port Natal" 
is reproduced. See too, Du Plesis (1965) 218 ff. 
155 Du Plessis (1965) 162 - 184 where a detailed 
exposition of the government and government structures 
is given. 
156 See the reference in the treaty to Retief as "Governor 
of the Dutch immigrant South Africans". 
157 Through art 1 of the Articles of Capitulation 1806. 
158 Du Plessis (1965) Chapter VI. 
159 The British attitude in this regard is clearly spelled 
out in the Cape Proclamation of 2.12.1842 "They cannot 
by their removal from this colony to any other place 
whatever, divest themselves of the allegiance ... to the 
British Crown" - cited in Hofmeyr (1933) 2. 
160 See below for a full consideration of the treaties 
;.,.5;, 
3•o,', 
~ 
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concluded by the Free State. 
161 Seen 159 above. 
162 See Bird (1965) 394 for a copy of 
the relevant letters patent dated 31.5.1844. 
163 See 61-67 above. 
164 Bell (1905) 568. 
165 Hofstede (1876) 87 n 176 notes that on 
17.11.1844 when the first British Governor arrived in Natal, 
only a third of the original Boer "emigranten" remained, the 
other two-thirds having trekked to areas north and south of the 
Vaal River respectively. 
166 Collins (1907) 8. 
167 See generally Hofmeyr (1933) Chapter 1. 
168 Collins (1907) 7 and 8. Smith's proclamation 
annexing the territory to Britain was confirmed on 
20.6.1848 although it should be remembered that Sir 
Peregrine Maitland, Governor of the Cape, had 
informally assumed authority over the territory as 
early as 1845. The territory was named the Orange River 
Sovereignty. See too, Botha (1926) 2. 
169 The wish for independence was certainly not unanimous 
among the inhabitants of the Orange River Sovereignty 
as is evidenced by various letters in Collins (1907) 49ff. 
The motives of the British government in wishing to withdraw 
were, as always, largely economic. See too, Hofmeyr (1933) 9. 
170 Letters Patent of 30.1.1854. Collins (1907) 53ff for an 
i ........ __________________ .;.._ ______ ~~~ 
... 
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English text of the Convention. A text in Dutch may be 
found in Hofstede (1876) 106ff. 
171 See Hofmeyr (1933) 10 where he states that "Dit wor.d 
so algemeen erken dat die Oranje-Vrystaat vanaf 1854 en 
gedurende haar hele bestaan die status geniet het van 
'n "sovereign international state" dat dit onnodig is 
om verdere bewys aan te voer." 
172 Hofstede (1876) 107-8. See too, Collins (1907) 55 for 
the English equivalent. 
173 Signed at Aliwal North on 29.9.1858. See Collins (1907) 
145 for the text of the treaty. 
174 Collins (1907) 188ff. 
175 Collins (1907)° at 195ff. However, there is in this case 
no evidence of a formal request or deputation as in the previous 
case. On the whole, the facts would appear to engender a measure 
of suspicion on both sides! 
176 The text is reproduced in Collins (1907) 211. 
177 Collins (1907) 211. 
178 In article 6 of the treaty reproduced in Hofstede 
(1876) 192 and Collins (1907) 232. The term "criminal warrants" 
used here is reminiscent of the "backing of warrants" system in 
the Fugitive Offenders Act discussed above. 
179 Hofstede (1876) 213, emphasis supplied. Mention is 
first made of the Basuto's refusal to surrender the 
murderers at 203. At 215 Woodhouse pronounces himself 
unable to judge the issue as he was unacquainted with 
the facts - although he concedes that they must be 
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compelling if they are regarded as a hindrance to peace. 
180 Shrewdly, Moshesh had asked that he and his people be 
declared British subjects, thus bringing them under. the 
British umbrella. See Collins (1907) 248 and 253-9. 
Basutoland was formally annexed to Britain in March 
1868 and in 1871 became part of the Cape Colony. 
181 Collins (1907) 263-7 for the text of the Convention. 
The Convention was confirmed by the Volksraad on 5 May 
1869. 
182 See 61-67 above. 
183 See Bell (1905) 569. 
184 For present purposes use is made principally of the 
following works Botha (1926) ; Hofmeyr (1933); 
Garrett-Fisher (1900); and Nixon (1885) - a highly partisan 
account reflecting more radical British sentiment at the time. 
185 Nixon (1885) 17. 
186 Cape Proclamation of 12.12.1841 cited in Hofmeyr 
(1933) 1. 
187 Proclamation by Sir Perigrlne Maitland 21.8.1845 in 
Hofmeyr (1933) 2. 
188 Nixon (1885) 22ff, points out that the Transvaal 
originally consisted of four separate mini-states with 
their capitals at Lydenburg, Zoutpansberg, Utrecht and 
Potchefstroom. By 1860, however, they had united and as 
this distinction is irrelevant as regards extradition, 
it is not further pursued. See too, Garrett-Fisher 
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(1900} 137. 
189 As a result of his armed opposition to the British 
annexation of the Orange Free State, a price of two 
thousand pounds had been placed on Pretorius's head. 
This does not however appear to have concerned him 
unduly in his subsequent negotiations with the British. 
See Garrett-Fisher (1900} 134 ff. 
190 The text of the Convention which was concluded on 
17.1.1852 can be found in Botha (1926} 697ff Annexure 
1. 
191 Hofmeyr (1933} 3ff. 
192 Whether the territory was in fact terra nullius in 
present day terms is not considered here. See above for 
the position in Natal under the indigenous leaders. 
193 Westlake "L'Angleterre et La Republique Sud-Africaine" 
28 RDI 270 cited in Hofmeyr (1933} 3ff (translation}. 
194 See the authorities cited inn 152 above. 
195 See for the general mood of the Boers, Hofmeyr (1933} 
Chapter 1. 
196 A state's territory need not be finally determined 
before it can validly lay claim to statehood. The 
classic example is, of course, the state of Israel 
which was widely recognised in 1946 before its borders 
were finalised. Closer to home, are the Southern 
African states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and 
Venda which are conducting on-going territorial 
negotiations. For a full discussion of this aspect see 
S v Banda 1989 4 SA 519 (Bop}. 
146 
197 Botha (1926) 8-9 states baldly that on " ... 23 Mei 1849, 
was die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek as staat behoorlik 
ingerig met die goedkeuring van die Drie-en-Dertig 
Artikelen ... Hierdie artikels van staatsinrigting ... maak 
die ordening uit van 'n baie eenvoudige, maar behoorlik 
ingerigte samelewing". 
198 This is in contrast to Natal where Britain had 
maintained a military presence at Port Natal although 
not wishing to annex the territory formally. 
199 For a discussion of the various approaches to the role 
of recognition in the acquisition of statehood see S v 
Banda above, and the exhaustive list of authorities 
cited there. 
200 For a discussion of the position of de facto regimes 
see eg, Booysen (1989) 152. 
201 ·Botha (1926) 8 states "Die bestaan van die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek was reeds voor die tyd al 'n 
feit." See too, Hofmeyr (1933) 6. 
202 Hofmeyr (1933) 31. 
203 SAR Staatskoerant 636 26.4.1876. The Free State had 
appointed a consul to the Netherlands in 1854. 
204 SAR Staatskoerant 314 22.2.1870. 
205 Hofmeyr (1933) 30. 
206 Hofmeyr (1933) 29 n 4 and 5ff; Botha (1926) 4 where 
the text of this article of the Convention is 
reproduced. The Convention was confirmed by a 
Proclamation issued by General George Cathcart on 15 
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April 1852 - Blouboek no 1646 of 1853 at 37, 59 and 115. 
207 For a brief survey of the circumstances leading to the 
annexation see Botha (1926) 95ff. 
208 Botha (1926) 101. 
209 For a general discussion of the principles involved see 
Vorster (1974) 27ff. 
210 See Hofmeyr (1933) 6-7 where he cites Shepstone's 
proclamation (at 6) and Lord Derby's description of the 
Sand River Convention as a declaration by the Queen 
accepted by certain of her subjects, of conditions 
under which they could be allowed to manage their own 
affairs. How this could be reconciled with the terms of 
article 1 (see above) is something of a mystery. 
211 Botha (1926) 105. 
212 Hofmeyr (1933) 11; Botha (1926) 107. 
213 Hofmeyr (1933) 12; Botha (1926) 108. 
214 Botha (1926) 111-2. The Convention was ratified on 
25.10.1881. 
215 Reproduced in Hofmeyr (1933) 13. 
216 Negotiations began in London between Lord Derby, 
Minister of Colonies and the Boer deputation made up of 
Kruger, Smit and Du Toit on 28.9.83 - Botha (1926) 
113ff. 
217 See Botha (1926) Annexure C 704-12 for the Dutch text 
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of the treaty. 
218 An example of a treaty concluded during this period is 
the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the Sputh 
African Republic and Portugal signed on 11.12.1875. 
Although the treaty was not ratified, it is clear from 
correspondence cited by Hofmeyr (1933) 91ff, that 
after annexation and even after the Pretoria Convention 
1881, the treaty was still considered valid by the 
Portuguese. So too, the Treaty of Friendship and 
Commerce between the Transvaal and Belgium which came 
into operation on 19.8.1876. The treaty remained in 
force after the annexation, the Pretoria Convention 
and the London Convention - Hofmeyr (1933) 94. 
219 For the effect on one of the parties to a treaty of 
annexation by or incorporation into some other state, 
see Hofmeyr (1933) 92-3 where an analogy is drawn with 
the.brief "demise" of the Netherlands between 1810 and 
1813. 
220 Compare eg, the different approaches of Hofmeyr 
(1933) and Botha (1926). 
221 See Hofmeyr (1933) 99 where he cites a question in 
this regard directed to Britain by Belgium. The British 
reply was that the Republic could act independently, 
Britain having only a right of veto. 
222 Hofmeyr (1933) 100 ff. As bona fide agreements, he 
claims that not only is a party bound to comply with 
specific provisions of the treaty, but also to 
guarantee that all elements necessary to ensure that 
the "spirit" of the treaty can be met and to do nothing 
which could complicate or negate the application of the 
treaty. An analogous situation arises today 
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in the case of article 46 of the Vienna Treaty Convention which 
provides that a state may not invoke the fact that its 
consent to be bound by a treaty was expressed in 
violation of a rule of its internal law unless the 
violation was manifest and concerned a rule of 
fundamental importance. Although article 4 was not part of the 
Transvaal Constitution, were the criteria set in article 46 of 
the Vienna Convention to be applied to an article 4 situation, 
the consent would, it is submitted, be both manifest and of 
fundamental importance. 
223 Treaty concluded between the Transvaal and Switzerland 
6.11.1885; Hofmeyr (1933) 100. 
224 Treaty concluded between the Transvaal and Italy 
6.10.1886; Hofmeyr (1933) 100. 
225 The treaty concluded with France (10.7.1885) mentions 
only' "constitutional requirements", while that 
concluded with Germany (22.11.1885) makes no mention at 
all of the provision - Hofmeyr (1933) 101. 
226 Hofmeyr (1933) 101; Walker (1968) 467. It is 
' 
uncertain whether this treaty ever received British 
assent. In Attorney-General v Andreson 1897 Off Rep 287, the 
court found that no treaty existed between the Transvaal 
Republic and Portugal (at 289). It does consequently appear 
doubtful whether Britain in fact approved the treaty. 
227 Hofmeyr (1933) 102. However, Britain still ratified 
----
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this treaty. The treaty was presumably superseded after final 
annexation of the Transvaal by the Anglo/Netherlands extradition 
treaty of 1898 (seen 93 above). 
228 Traktaat veer de Wederkeerige uitlevering van 
Voortvluchtige Misdadigers van uit Natal en van uit de 
Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek signed at Pietermaritzburg 
18.11.1897 and Pretoria 20.11.1897 and operational from 
20. 11 . 1897. 
229 Hofmeyr (1933) 103. 
230 Hofmeyr (1933) 104. 
231 Hofmeyr (1933) 104. 
232 Hofmeyr (1933) 103ff. 
233 Hofmeyr (1933) 103 n3 citing Leyds Eerste 
Correspondensie 229. 
234 The President was in any event empowered by the 
Constitution to conclude treaties. See Introduction to 
Chapter I above in this regard. 
235 Again a power he already possessed. 
236 2 SAR 44 heard on 10-18.8.1885. 
237 1877-81 Kotze's Rep 38 heard on 25.4.1878. 
238 1 SAR 144 heard on 12-26.5.1884. 
239 This he concluded from a statement made to the 
Volksraad by the President of the Orange Free State 
that he had been unable to conclude such a treaty; 
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Government Gazette 6.6.1833 
240 At 145-6. 
241 At 147. 
242 1 SAR 157. 
243 See Cape Colony above. For an application in terms of 
this Act (14 of 1886) see J Goldberg v The State 2 Off Rep 
107. 
244 1897 Off Rep 287 heard on 4-10.9.1897. 
245 The South Africa Act 1909 (9 Edw 7 c 9) an Act to 
constitute the Union of South Africa, adopted by the 
British parliament 20 September 1909. 
246 See the recent Canadian advisory opinion Jurisdiction 
over the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf 
off Newfoundland Supreme Court of Canada 8 March 1984; 
1984 ILM 288; Botha (1984) 194, where the status of 
British possessions is discussed at length within the context of 
Newfoundland. 
247 The Durham Report (House of Commons Paper 3/1839) was 
the result of an investigation commissioned by the 
British government into uprisings in Canada during 
1837/8; see Keith (1912). The task fell to Lord Durham, the 
governor of Canada. He found that the root cause of the problems 
was the representative system in terms of which the executive 
had responsibility for government but no power to make the 
necessary laws, while the legislature enjoyed legislative power 
but no responsibility for government. He proposed a system of 
"responsible government" in terms of which the executive was 
responsible to the representatives of the Colonial populace, 
... 
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rather than to the British government. For a summary and 
evaluation of the report and its effect see Roberts-Wray (1966) 
248ff. 
248 The Cape of Good Hope was granted responsible 
government in 1872; Natal in 1893; the Transvaal in 1906 and the 
Orange Free State in 1907. Keith (1933) points out that in the 
case of the South African possessions the concept of responsible 
government assumed a new connotation in that the interests of 
the predominantly black population were "placed in the hands of 
the local European minorities" (at 4). 
249 See Du Plooy (1958) 5ff. See too, Wiechers 
(1967) 186; Keith (1933) n 274 3ff; and Roberts-Wray 
(1966) 248. 
250 Keith (1933) 5 n 274. 
251 See.in this regard nn 218 - 233 above and the 
accompanying text. 
252 See Roberts-Wray (1966) 250ff and Keith (1966) 5 n 274. 
253 Du Plooy (1958) 6; Roberts-Wray (1966) 250. 
254 Although colonial statesmen had been involved in the 
negotiation of bi-lateral trade agreements as early as 
1852, and Canada had negotiated a reciprocal'trade agreement 
with the United States in 1854, it was Canada's adoption of the 
so-called "Caley Tariff" in 1858 (Statutes of Canada 1858 22 
Viet C 76), in terms of which Canada raised her tariff against 
British imports, that spelled the end to absolute control over 
trade. Although Britain retained overall control, the individual 
Colonies were allowed to to deal with their coasting trade in 
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1869. See Keith (1933) 5-6; Roberts-Wray (1966) 250; and Du 
Plooy (1958) 5-6. 
255 Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 28 & 29 Viet c 63 . 
adopted on 29.6.1865 
256 Dicey (1948) xlix. 
257 Similar conferences were held in 1894 and 1897. In 1902 
it was suggested that the conferences should be held every four 
years and in 1907 it was formally resolved that the Colonial 
ministers would meet every four years under chairmanship of the 
British Prime Minister to discuss matters of mutual concern. Du 
Plooy (1958) 8 regards this conference as particularly 
significant for the development of an independent status for the 
Dominions as it was for the first time chaired by the British 
Prime Minister - thus lending greater prestige or weight to the 
·proceedings - and was referred to as a conference "between His 
Majesty's Government and the Governments of the self-governing 
Dominions beyond the seas". 
258 Olivier (1986) 242 - 243 distinguishes between the 
older Colonies which were after 1907 known as 
Dominions, and other British possessions. South Africa, together 
with Canada, Australia and New Zealand fell into the Dominion 
category. The position of Ireland was somewhat different in that 
it was not first a Colony but assumed Dominion status directly. 
259 See eg, Du Plooy (1958) 8. 
260 Du Plooy (1958) 8 mentions the Radio Telegraphic 
Conference of 1912 as an example. It will be remembered that the 
Transvaal Republic had in any event arrogated to itself the 
right to accede to treaties of this nature by acceding to the 
World Postal Convention 1891, the Belgian Treaty for the 
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Suppresion of Slave Trade of 1896, and the Geneva Convention on 
the Treatment of Soldiers Wounded in the Field of 1864. 
261 Keith (1933) 7. 
262 Although Britain retained the right to declare war, 
the various Dominions were accorded the right to decide the 
extent of their participation. Du Plooy (1958) 9; Keith (1933) 
9; Roberts-Wray (1966) 252; Olivier (1986) 243. 
263 Wiechers (1981) 117 citing Resolution IX Imperial War 
Conference 1917. 
264 Wiechers (1981) 117ff. Although in 1919 the 
Dominions took part in both the Treaty of Versailles 
and the creation of the League of Nations, Wiechers claims that 
they were not full parties. In the Treaty of Versailles a 
distinction is drawn between allied and associated powers on the 
one hand, and high contracting parties on the other. The British 
Empire is listed as one of the Powers without separate mention 
of the Dominions. The treaty was concluded between the allied 
heads of state and Germany rather than between Germany and the 
the individual states. As the King was head of state of the 
Dominions the treaty was signed on his behalf by British and 
Dominion ministers. In the case of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, although the Dominions are generally regarded as being 
independent members of the League, their names appear under that 
of the British Empire and not alphabetically as independent 
states - Olivier (1986) 243 n 195. 
265 Du Plooy (1958) 11. 
266 Du Plooy (1958) 11; Wiechers (1981) 119. 
267 Although Canada had been accorded the right to set up a 
legation in Washington, she had not in fact done so. 
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Ireland claimed a similar right in 1924 and was granted it; 
while the Union appointed a consul to Mocambique - Keith (1933) 
12 and 55; Roberts-Wray (1966) 253. 
268 Although it is generally agreed that the Imperial 
Conference of 1926 represents the high-point in the development 
of the status of the Dominions, it must be remembered that this 
conference was in fact the culmination of moves initiated at the 
earlier conferences, notably that of 1923. At the 1923 
conference particular attention was paid to the treaty-making 
capacity of the Dominions and it was decided that they would be 
able to conclude treaties on their own behalf with foreign 
powers but only after notification to the other members of the 
empire. Where a treaty would effect more than one Dominion, full 
consultation was required. See in general Wiechers (1981) 119 
-120; Roberts-Wray (1966) 252. 
269 Report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee 1926 
Imperial Conference par 1 - the so-called "Balfour 
Declaration"; Keith (1933) 13; Wiechers (1981) 
121. 
270 Du Plooy (1958) 12ff. 
271 Du Plooy (1958) 29. 
272 Du Plooy (1958). The three notable exceptions were 
India, Pakistan and Malaya the first two of which had 
Presidents of their own, while the latter had a "Royal Ruler". 
273 Du Plooy (1958) 30. 
274 9 Edw 7 c 9. 
275 This power was redefined more clearly in section 4 of 
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the Status of the Union Act 69 of 1934. See Du Plooy (1958) 34 -
5. 
276 Du Plooy (1958) 35 t.:.. 6, cites the 1937 Letters Patent & 
Royal Instructions in this regard. There is an 
exception in terms of the Royal Functions and Seals Act 70 of 
1934 in terms of which if the King is unable to sign a documertt 
requiring his signature, or awaiting his signature would cause 
undue delay, the Governor-General may sign on his behalf. 
277 Du Plooy (1958) 39. He notes an exception in this 
regard viz, the ratification of a peace treaty with the prior 
concurrence of parliament in terms of section 3(1) of the 
Treaties of Peace Act 20 of 1948. 
278 Wiechers (1981) 127ff. 
279 This would appear to be the prevailing view - see eg, 
Nd1wana v Hofmeyr 1.937 AD 229 and Harris v Minister of 
the Interior 1952 2 SA 428 (A). 
280 Keith (1933) 38 states that "the mere fact that 
the Imperial Parliament can remove restrictions implies 
that it can at will reimpose them." 
281 See Chapter I Introduction. 
282 See n 280 above. 
283 Sees v Schwing 1989 3 SA 567 (T). 
284 The Statute of Westminster 1931 (22 Geo V C 4): An Act 
to give effect to certain resolutions passed by 
Imperial Conferences held in the years 1926 and 1930. 
285 11 December 1931. 
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286 Status of the Union Act 69 of 1934. 
287 At 63-64 above. 
288 Section 148 (1) South Africa Act (9 Edw 7 C 9). 
289 See Bell (1905) 566ff. 
290 At 94 above. 
291 At 83 above. 
292 In Chapter IV attention will be paid to the position of 
the independent southern African states of 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda which have concluded 
both bi- and multilateral extradition arrangements with one 
another and with South Africa. If the popular press is to be 
believed(!), the possibility exists of certain or all of these 
states again amalgamating with the "new South Africa". If this 
were to happen one would be faced with a situation closely 
analogous to that arising between the Union and the old Boer 
Republics. 
293 See 61-62 above for the content of the various 
provisions. 
294 Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom and 
Greece concluded at Athens 24.9.1910; ratified at Athens 
30.12.1911. 
295 Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom and Siam 
concluded at Bankok 4.3.1911; ratified at London 
1.8.1911. 
296 Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals between the 
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United Kingdom and Czechoslovakia concluded at London 
11.11.1924. This treaty represents an important departure in 
that it provided in article 17, that it would not apply in 
certain of Britain's Dominions - including the Union of South 
Africa - unless "notice to that effect shall have been given on 
behalf of the government of such Dominion". Provision was also 
made for the independent termination of the treaty by the 
Dominions. The treaty was, however, extended to the Union of 
South Africa as from 12.6.1927; see GN 26 Government Gazette of 
6.1.1928. 
297 Treaty between Finland and the United Kingdom .for the 
Extradition of Criminals concluded at London 30.5.1924. 
This treaty also contained the clause identified in the previous 
footnote suspending the operation of the treaty in the Union -
see article 17. Again, the treaty was made applicable to the 
Union by agreement between the governments of Finland and the 
Union - article V GN 1677 Government Gazette 29.9.1925. 
298 Extradition Treaty between the Union of South Africa 
and the United States of America concluded at Washington 
18.12.1947; ratified at Washington 1.3.1951 - see GN 91 
Government Gazette 20.4.1951. 
299 Extradition Treaty between the Union of South Africa 
and the State of Israel concluded at Pretoria 18.9.1959; 
ratified at Pretoria 7.1.1960 - see GN R14 Government Gazette 
6362 5.2.1960. 
300 See above n 268. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Having defined extradition, and placed it in its historical 
perspective both internationally and from the South African point of 
view, the time has now come to return to the questions posed above, 
and notably to the question of the basis of extradition. Is there a 
duty on states to extradite a fugitive criminal if requested to do 
so? If there is such a duty, on what does it rest ? Is it a legally 
enforceable duty attracting sanction for its breach; or is it no more 
than a moral obligation : that which a state "should" do? 
The polemic sur~ounding the so-called "duty" to extradite is 
certainly not new. Although many contemporary authors have tended to 
dismiss the question as merely "academic" in that the majority of 
countries today regulate extradition by treaty, (1) this approach in 
fact begs the question. A number of countries, among them South 
Africa, (2) either in their practice or specifically in their 
municipal legislation, allow for extradition in the absence of treaty 
arrangements. In these instances the basis upon which the extradition 
is effected remains crucial. 
In considering the duty to extradite a distinction must consequently 
be drawn, first of all, between extradition based on treaty and 
extradition in the absence of treaty provisions. 
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2 EXTRADITION BASED ON TREATY PROVISIONS 
That a state is sovereign within its own territory hardly bears 
repeating. As a natural adjunct to this sovereignty is the absolute 
discretion which a state enjoys, at least in theory, to admit whom it 
pleases within its borders.(3) Furthermore, having admitted an 
individual the state may protect that individual in any way it deems 
necessary or expedient. (4) However, sovereignty cannot today be 
regarded as the absolute concept it was during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. States may, and all states have, limited their 
sovereignty by agreement or treaty. 
In the Vienna Treaty Convention (5) a treaty is defined as 
" ... an international agreement concluded between States 
in written form and governed by international law 
(6) ... [which is] ... binding on the parties to it and 
must be performed in good faith". (7) 
Consequently, by concluding a treaty a state voluntarily undertakes 
an enforceable international obligation to act in accordance with the 
provisions of the agreement. Where, therefore, a state has concluded 
a extradition treaty with some other state, it has to the extent of 
and subject to the provisions embodied in that treaty, limited its 
sovereign right to admit whom it pleases to its territory, and to 
protect individuals within its territory in the manner it deems 
appropriate.CB) 
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Although traditionally the extradition treaty is perceived as a 
bilateral arrangement between two states, the tendency among states 
to conclude such agreements would appear to be on the wane.(9) This 
does not however, mean that the extradition of fugitive criminals 
faces a similar fate. Apart from multilateral extradition 
arrangements which have been common for a number of years,(10) the 
modern trend would appear to be towards the conclusion of 
multilateral conventions, not necessarily aimed specifically at 
extradition, but embodying provisions allowing for the inter-state 
surrender of persons contravening the terms of the convention.(11) 
These alternative forms of treaty will be considered presently once 
the more traditional bilateral treaty has been examined. 
2.1 Extradition by bilateral treaty 
Treaty as the source of the obligation to extradite has been so 
strongly perceived that in the United States of America, for example, 
a court has declared : 
"The modern view and the one maintained in this country 
is that the state is under no obligation to surrender 
fugitives accused of crime unless it has contracted to 
do so".(12) 
In British practice too, one encounters this reluctance to extradite 
in the absence of treaty commitment. Despite a few earlier 
pronouncements to the contrary,(13) by 1839 it was clear that the 
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Crown was reluctant to surrender in the absence of treaty provisions. 
During that year, when faced with a request to surrender one Lett to 
the United States of America, the Queen's Advocate declared that : 
" ... [A]s there is no treaty ... between Great Britain and 
the United States of America, for the delivery up of 
persons ... this country (Britain) has not, by the law of 
Nations or otherwise, a right to insist upon the 
delivery up of Mr. Lett".(14) 
The British position was again clearly illustrated when the slaves on 
the Creole rebelled, and having murdered a passenger, forced the crew 
to take them to the Bahamas. The Law Officers stated that : 
"It is the practice of some states to deliver up 
persons charged with crimes, who have taken refuge or 
been found within their Dominions, on demand of the 
Government of which the alleged criminals are subjects, 
but such practice does not universally or even 
generally prevail, nor is there any rule of the Law of 
Nations rendering it imperative on an Independent State 
to give up-persons residing or taking refuge within its 
territory".(15) 
Clearer still, is the case of James Thornley a British subject 
resident in Russia who, having committed fraud and forgery, fled St 
Petersburg for Paris where he was arrested pending his extradition to 
Russia. In hearing the application, the Law Officers refused to 
acknowledge "even an imperfect obligation by international law" to 
surrender in the absence of treaty cornrnitment.(16) 
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South African courts have also on occasion, refused to extradite in 
the absence of a treaty. In Ex parte Lithauer,(11) Isaac Lithauer had 
been arrested in Pretoria under a warrant issued by the Resident 
Magistrate of Kimberley, Grikwaland West. He had allegedly committed 
fraud and forgery. The warrant had been countersigned by the 
attorney-general of the Transvaal. Asked to judge on the validity of 
the arrest, the court found that two requirements had to be met for 
the arrest to be valid: firstly an application from the government of 
Grikwaland West to the government of the Transvaal; and secondly, the 
existence of an extradition treaty between the Transvaal and 
Grikwaland West. Ordinance 5 of 1871 made both requirements 
peremptory and as neither had been met, the arrest was set aside.(18) 
In yet another case - Andreson v Attorney General (19)_ Arthur 
Andresen was employed by a company in Lorence Marques, the then 
capital of Mocambique. He was arrested there by the Portuguese 
government on charges of abuse of trust but was released on bail and 
journeyed to South Africa. The surety withdrew his guarantee and the 
bail lapsed. At the request of the Portuguese government, Andresen 
was arrested and detained in Pretoria pending his extradition. Esser 
J granted an application for Andreson's immediate release on the 
ground that no extradition agreement existed between Portugal and the 
South African Republic at that stage. The attorney-general appealed 
claiming that in the absence of treaty provisions, the government had 
an inherent right to grant extradition. 
Delivering the majority judgment,(20) Kotze CJ found that 
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"It is .•. clear that ..• the extradition of offenders can 
only take place by means of treaty ... The law of the 
land and the practice under it, rre therefore against 
the request of the Attorney-General. Consequently, in 
the absence of an extradition treaty, the respondent 
must be released from custody." 
Although from South Africa's point of view,the position has changed 
since the enactment of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962, South African 
applications for extradition continue to come up against the absence 
of treaty provisions, particularly in the case of Commonwealth 
countries. 
So, for example, when in 1965 South Africa requested the extradition 
of Thomas Clements Usher from Canada for securing money under false 
pretences, one of the reasons given for the refusal to extradite was 
the absence of treaty arrangements.(21) Similarly, William Edward 
Spencer Lewis, wanted in South Africa to face charges for theft and 
fraud amounting to some R72 000, could not be extradited from 
Australia as no treaty existed between the countries.(22) 
The Republic of Ireland, too, in the case of R v Lewis and Mason, 
refused to extradite Mason as no extradition treaty existea,(23) 
while in the case of Lionel Stander alias S Lyons, (24) where Stander 
was wanted in South Africa for theft of trust monies totalling some 
R49 000, proceedings for extradition were not instituted as on advice 
it was felt that in the absence of an extradition treaty between 
South Africa and Eire, there was no way in which his extradition 
could be contrived.(25) 
l . 
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The system for the backing of warrants which applied between the 
Union of South Africa and the countries of the British Commonwealth 
fell away when the Union became a Republic and left the Commonwealth 
in 1961.(26) The following is a random selection of the many cases 
which arose in this regard. 
Mabatu Enoch Zulu participated in the murder of Chief Gqobosa and 
then fled to Maseru, Basutoland. As there was no treaty operative 
between the two territories, his extradition was refused.(27) So too, 
one James Lefule, who had been sentenced in Basutoland to twelve 
years' hard labour, was wanted in Paarl for escaping from custody. In 
reply to a request made to the British embassy for his surrender, it 
was stated that: 
"The Department [of Foreign Affairs] will be aware that 
an agreement for extradition between the Republic of 
South Africa and the High Commission Territories is at 
present being negotiated but that in the meantime 
applications for the removal of persons from the High 
Commission Territories cannot be considered".(28) 
Similar problems arose with the dissolution of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland as appears from the cases of John George 
Fraser Lang,(29) Dennis Higgs, (30) and others.(31) 
Bilateral treaty provisions consequently appear to retain their 
position as the mainstay of extradition policy although they are not 
the sole source of a duty to extradite. The ideal, mooted by the 
majority of writers on extradition, of a "common law of extradition" 
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(32) based on a universal and unified extradition practice among all 
nations, is acknowledged by these writers as belonging to the future. 
However, steps towards its realisation have been taken through the 
• 
conclusion of multilateral regional arrangements which bring a number 
of nations together with a single policy governing the surrender of 
fugitive criminals. Discussing "regional extradition arrangements", 
Shearer,(33) distinguishes two types of arrangement ; the 
multilateral extradition convention, and similarly structured 
reciprocating national legislation employed jointly for the surrender 
of fugitives. To this classification must be added a third variant, 
viz the multilateral international convention covering a topic other 
than extradition but either explicitly or by necessary implication 
incorporating some extradition provision. South Africa's position as 
regards these various forms of treaty commitment requires closer 
attention. 
2.2 Multilateral extradition conventions 
The multilateral extradition convention is an agreement between a 
number of states which can either institute extradition obligations 
for the first time, or can replace or supplement bilateral treaties 
existing between the states concerned. (34) Although South America 
must be regarded as the continent most active in the conclusion of 
such conventions, (35) the best-known must surely be the European 
Convention on Extradition signed in Paris on 11 December 1957. (36) 
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If one examines the typical situation giving rise to a multilateral 
convention, certain characteristics can be identified. Traditionally 
multilateral conventions are concluded, first and foremost, between 
neighbouring states or states within close proximity to one another. 
Secondly, states party to such a convention generally share a basic 
ideology and general philosophy of government which makes for cordial 
cooperation in the suppression of jointly perceived criminal 
activity. Thirdly, a measure of economic cohesion generally exists 
between the states involved. 
Transposing these requirements onto the South African situation has 
interesting consequences. First, the proximity characteristic means 
that were South Africa to be party to such a convention, the obvious 
partners would include the so-called "Front Line States" of Zimbabwe, 
Mocambique, Angola, Zambia and Namibia, to name only the most 
obvious. Although South Africa has through the Southern African 
Customs Union with the so-called BLS countries, (37) shown that 
cooperation is indeed possible; cooperation and ideology cannot 
realistically be separated where national survival is not at stake. 
This raises the second characteristic identified above, and the one 
which must be regarded as crucial as far as a multilateral 
extradition arrangement is concerned. In a field where a state's 
perception of crime and criminal behaviour is of paramount importance 
for any form of meaningful cooperation, agreement based on such 
perceptions must of necessity be still-born in a community where 
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South African policies have to date been universally condemned and 
even classed as crimina1.C38) 
The third characteristic - economic cohesion - appears at first 
glance more positive. Mention has already been made of cooperation 
between South Africa and the BLS countries on this plane, and current 
realities with the rest of Africa too, would appear to support this 
requirement.(39) However, cooperation born of necessity is one thing; 
ideological cooperation another altogether. Furthermore, when it is 
borne in mind that one of the most dynamic of the African inter-state 
arrangements has as its primary aim the abolition of South Africa's 
dominant economic position in the continent, this characteristic too, 
cannot be said to hold positive prospects for success.(40) 
Consequently, although South Africa is ideally placed geographically 
to function as a party to a multilateral extradition arrangement, and 
the necessary economic nexus would appear to exist and already have 
generated a measure of cooperation, the traditionally hostile 
relations between South Africa and her neighbours is still a real 
inhibiting factor. 
In recent times, cooperation between South Africa and her 
traditionally hostile neighbours has shown some improvement, (41) and 
there have indeed been indications that specifically in the field of 
extradition, there is a realisation on the part of these states of 
the need for some form of cooperation.C42) Nonetheless, although the 
climate for African cooperation must at present be regarded as more 
172 
propitious than it has been for a number of decades, it is too soon 
and negotiations are far too precarious for any definite prediction 
of any form of meaningful joint action in the form of a multilateral 
convention in the often contentious field of extradition. 
As was seen in Chapter II, and will be considered in greater detail 
in Chapter IV, many of the extradition treaties which South Africa 
regards as binding were inherited through succession from the British 
during the Colonial era. Had Britain been a party to a multilateral 
extradition convention before the emergence of the Republic of South 
Africa as a Republic in 1961, the possibility would now exist of 
South Africa being (or regarding herself as being) party to such an 
arrangement. However, as the British government has ever followed a 
bilateral preference when dealing with extradition, this possibility 
too is excluded for South Africa.(43) At this stage, consequently, 
South Africa is not, and cannot in the foreseeable future 
realistically be regarded, as a party to a multilateral convention on 
extradition which would be recognised as such by the international 
community as a whole. 
The latter part of the previous paragraph was emphasised for a 
specific purpose as within the South African context, the position is 
not so simple. In terms of current South African policy, the 
independent national states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and 
Venda have been created.(44) Although the sovereign independence of 
these states is recognised by no member of the international 
community, (45) as regards both their own and South African 
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perceptions they must, for the time being, be regarded as fully 
independent sovereign states.(46) 
If the characteristics of the multilateral extradition convention are 
again briefly considered it will immediately be clear that all three 
of the most striking are satisfied. The TBVC-states are in fact 
totally surrounded by South African territory : their considerable 
borders consequently providing ideal "escape routes" for fugitives 
from justice; they and the Republic share political ideologies to a 
large extent;C47) and finally, they are virtually wholly dependent on 
South Africa for their economic needs. From the theoretical point of 
view consequently, there would appear to be much to commend the 
conclusion of a multilateral extradition arrangement between South 
Africa and these states.(48) 
This has indeed occurred between South Africa and the states of 
Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda with the conclusion of the 
Multilateral Convention on Extradition 1986.(49) This convention, 
aimed at facilitating the delivery up of criminals between the three 
states along the lines of the old British backing of warrants system, 
replaces the individual extradition treaties formerly operative 
between the Republic and these states.(50) It is notable, however, 
that the Republic of Transkei declined to be party to the Convention, 
preferring to maintain extradition procedures on the bilateral level 
in terms of the existing treaty.(51) 
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From the above it is clear that as regards multilateral treaties as a 
basis for extradition, South Africa is at present poorly placed. 
Although an attempt has been made to involve Southern Africa, this 
has fallen on deaf ears to a large extent, the Republic not even 
being able to muster unanimous support from the unrecognised "states" 
which it has itself created. The question of the need for a 
convention of this type with these "states" must of necessity arise. 
Is there not some other form of cooperation which would better serve 
the South African needs in this regard. One thinks here immediately 
of what Shearer (52) and Bassiouni (53) regard as the alternative 
form of inter-regional cooperation, viz reciprocating national 
legislation governing extradition. 
2.3 Regional arrangements employing municipal law 
In concluding such an agreement, the states involved do not enter 
into a formal extradition convention as discussed in the previous 
section. Rather, they agree via their national legislatures to follow 
common rules and procedures to deal with the extradition of fugitive 
criminals finding themselves in the territory of one of the 
participating states. Shearer (54) points out that the principal 
advantage of the system is a simplified procedure for extradition 
essentially a reduction in the "red tape" surrounding and often 
smothering extradition applications. Furthermore, an agreement of 
this type requiring for its amendment merely an ordinary act of the 
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parliaments of the states concerned, can more easily keep abreast of 
modern needs. 
The best-known, and certainly the most relevant of this type of 
arrangement from South Africa's point of view, is the Commonwealth 
Scheme to which South Africa was a party until her departure from the 
Commonwealth of Nations in 1961. A detailed discussion of this scheme 
is not called for at this stage. What is important, however, is the 
Inter-Colonial Backing of Warrants system which prevailed under the 
Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881.(55) In terms of Part II of this Act, 
a warrant issued in one part of the Dominions could, simply by being 
endorsed in another, result in the person sought being arrested in 
the Colony where he found himself and returned to the scene of his 
alleged o~fence without his having to be tried. Once returned he 
would stand trial for the offence charged.(56) 
Although South Africa made free use of the system in its dealings 
with fellow African Commonwealth states,(57) once the Republic left 
the Commonwealth, the continued existence of the scheme was 
threatened.(58) The importance with which its continued application 
was viewed is, however, illustrated by the provision incorporated 
into the South African Extradition Act 67 of 1962, perpetuating a 
type of backing of warrants system; and by the inclusion of a backing 
of warrants system within the Convention on Extradition with 
Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda above.(59) 
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In the Extradition Act one consequently finds the distinction drawn 
between a foreign state on the one hand, and an associated state on 
the other. In terms of section 6, an associated state is an African 
state with which the Republic has agreed, on a reciprocal basis, that 
warrants issued in that country will be endorsed for execution in the 
Republic and vice versa. This distinction is carried further by the 
provisions of section 12 in terms of which a South African magistrate 
before whom a person suspected of having committed an extraditable 
offence in an associated state is brought, shall, where he finds the 
person so before him liable to be surrendered, order his surrender 
subject to a fifteen day period allowed for appeal. 
This system would appear to meet the need for a simplified 
extradition process identified in the previous section. The proof 
required in dealing with cases originating in an associated state is 
considerably lighter than for cases involving foreign states,(60) 
and the decision to extradite is made by the presiding magistrate and 
not by the Minister of Justice as is the case with a foreign 
state.C61) 
South Africa has, however, made very little use of this backing of 
warrants system in its post-Republican dealings with fellow African 
states. Apart from the provisions of the Convention on Extradition 
between South Africa and Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda, in fact 
only two states would at present appear to qualify as associated 
states within the definition of the Act.(62) Thus in S v Eliasov,(63) 
involving a treaty between South Africa and Rhodesia (as it then 
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was), the court in dismissing the appeal against an order for 
Eliasov's surrender in terms of section 12 of the Act, stated that 
"An associated state is defined in sec.1 of the Act as 
any foreign state in respect of which sec.6 applies and 
sec.6 in terms, applies in respect of any foreign State 
in Africa which has concluded an extradition agreement 
with the Republic which provides for endorsement for 
execution of warrants of arrest on a reciprocal basis. 
Article 9 of the extradition agreement .•• between the 
Republic and Rhodesia ... contains such a provision". 
(64) 
However, from such information as is currently available, it would 
appear that Zimbabwe, as the successor to Rhodesia in this instance, 
no longer regards itself bound by this treaty.(65) 
The cases of S v Bull (66) and s v Devoy (67) dealt with extradition 
between South Africa and Malawi (the Nyasaland component of the 
former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland). In Bull it was stated 
that : 
"The warrant was duly endorsed for execution under and 
by virtue of the provisions of art.9 of the agreement 
and sec. 6 of the Extradition Act, Malawi being a 
foreign State in Africa and thus an associated state 
within the meaning of sec.1 of the Act";(68) 
while in Devoy it was similarly stated that 
"Malawi is an 'associated State' within the meanings of 
secs. 1 and 6 of the Act".(69) 
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In its extradition dealings with other states which could qualify as 
associated states within the definition of the Act, South Africa has 
traditionally followed the conventional bilateral treaty mould.(70) 
While this is regrettable, it is for the political reasons postulated 
above understandable in the case of internationally recognised 
African states. This mould was broken in the case of Bophuthatswana, 
Ciskei and Venda where the South African authorities expressly 
included an internal backing of warrant system. However, given the 
international attitude towards these states, this deviation from the 
general practice must be regarded as being of limited significance. 
From the above it can be seen, that although South African law allows 
for the use of concordant municipal arrangements, in practice the 
system is under-utilised. In fact, within the current South African 
context, the Republic is party to only one such arrangement.C71) 
There remains one type of treaty by which a state may undertake an 
obligation to extradite, viz the multilateral treaty dealing with an 
issue other than extradition but embodying within its provisions an 
extradition clause. This type of agreement will now be considered 
more closely. 
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2.4 Multilateral conventions embodying extradition 
provisions 
Through the years a number of issues have arisen which the 
international community has clearly felt are of sufficient importance 
to require specific regulation. The resulting conventions generally 
deal with crimes of a ~versal nature in the sense that they affect 
the well being of nations as a whole or may continue in effect across 
national boundaries. They are concerned with criminal action 
potentially harmful to a large number of persons rather than the 
traditional extradition offence, for example fraud, where generally 
only a small number of persons is affected. 
One conse~ently finds, for example, the White Slave Traffic 
Conventions of 1910 and 1921 which provided that states should do all 
possible to extradite persons guilty of offences specified in the 
Convention;C72) the Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting 
Currency of 1929;(73} and the Convention for the Suppression of 
Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs of 1936.(74} What all these 
Conventions have in common is that through their provisions they 
widen the scope of existing extradition treaties by including the 
offences emerging from the Conventions within the crime definition of 
existing treaties. Although South Africa was not an independent party 
to these treaties in its own right, it was, as part of the British 
Empire, subject to Britain's membership.(75) 
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In recent years international attention has come to focus more 
closely on international terrorism and its effects - epitomised by 
aircraft hi-jacking - and on the international suppression of the 
drug trade.<76) A general abhorrence of terrorism has led to the 
adoption of a series of conventions aimed at controlling the 
phenomenon and ensuring that hi-jackers will not escape punishinent. 
These conventions serve as a good illustration of the multilateral 
agreement not aimed specifically at extradition, but embodying 
extradition provisions within its wider ambit. The most notable in 
this regard are the Tokyo Convention on Of fences and Certain Other 
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft in Flight of 1963;(77) the Hague 
Convention on the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 
1970;(78) and the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts agai_nst the Safety of Civil Aviation of 1971. (79) 
As in the case of Britain and other jurisdictions where treaties do 
not find automatic application as part of the municipal law of the 
land, in South Africa a process of transformation is required before 
a treaty may be applied municipally.(80) Consequently, in 1972 the 
Civil Aviation Offences Act was adopted by the legislature to give 
effect to these three conventions.(81) In 1974 the section of the Act 
dealing with extradition was amended to extend the courts' 
jurisdiction over certain aircraft for the purposes of the 
Extradition Act 67 of 1962.(82) 
The Extradition Act itself was also amended in 1974 by the insertion 
of section 2(5) which provides that an offence indicated in a 
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multilateral international convention to which the Republic is a 
party, shall be deemed to be an offence specified in any extradition 
agreement between the Republic and any other state party to such a 
convention.(83) 
That these Conventions have a potentially profound effect on South 
Africa's position with regard to other convention countries can be 
illustrated by the following hypothetical situation. As has already 
been seen above and will be discussed more fully below, Britain will 
not extradite in the absence of a treaty.(84) As South Africa has 
entered into no extradition arrangements with Britain, a South 
African offender may seek refuge in Britain with impunity. However, 
so seriously does Britain regard her obligations under the Hague and 
Montreal.Conventions, that if the individual involved were shown to 
have "unlawfully, by the use of force or by threats of any kind, 
seize[d] the aircraft or exercise[d] control of it", (85) he could 
indeed be extradited to a country with whom Britain had no bilateral 
extradition treaty.(86) 
It can consequently be seen that South Africa is indeed party to 
multilateral conventions dealing with problems not related to 
extradition, but from which a duty to extradite arises and is 
accepted. 
Thus far the traditional or non-problematic forms of treaty as a 
source of obligation to extradite have been considered. It has been 
seen that the obligation to extradite based on treaty can arise from 
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a specific bilateral treaty; from a multilateral extradition 
convention; from a regional arrangement; or from a multilateral 
convention not directly related to extradition as such. South Africa, 
with her multifaceted basis for extradition indeed utilises all these 
sources of obligation. However, given the overwhelming support for 
treaty as the prime - if not the sole - source of the obligation to 
extradite, it is hardly surprising that the terms treaty and 
extradition have become virtually synonymous in general usage. The 
problem remains, however, that if a criminal from one state flees to 
another state with whom the former has no extradition agreement, the 
interests of both states, as well as those of fairness and justice, 
demand that he should not go unpunished. The general attitude of 
states can perhaps best be reflected in the words of a United States' 
court wh~ch, when considering the extradition of a terrorist who had 
sought refuge in United States' territory, declared : 
"The law is not so utterly absurd ... We have enough of 
our own domestic criminal violence with which to 
contend without importing and harbouring with open arms 
the worst that other countries have to export".(87) 
Consequently, where no treaty provisions exist the question of 
whether a fugitive criminal may, or indeed must, be returned to his 
country of origin remains as relevant in the latter half of the 
twentieth century as it was in the era preceding the proliferation of 
extradition agreements. 
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3 EXTRADITION IN THE ABSENCE OF A TREATY 
3. 1 A duty to extradite 
Most modern writers on extradition ascribe the duty to extradite in 
the absence of treaty provisions, in the first instance to Hugo de 
Groot (88) who stated that : 
"But since states are not accustomed to permit another 
state to enter their territory armed for the sake of 
exacting punishment, nor is that expedient; it follows 
that the city where [the fugitive] abides ... ought to do 
one of two things - either itself being called upon, it 
should punish the guilty man, or it should leave him to 
be dealt with by the party who makes the demand; for 
this is what is meant by 'giving him up', so often 
spoken of in history".(89) 
As a source of binding legal obligation, this text cannot be 
considered particularly convincing. Grotius here speaks not of what a 
state must do, but rather of what it ought to do; not that the state 
must punish or deliver, but rather that it should do so. The 
impression created is of a directory or moral guideline performed on 
considerations of expediency, rather than a peremptory duty resting 
on a legal obligation. 
Vattel is more emphatic in his assertion that "Assassins, 
incendiaries and robbers [are] seized everywhere at the desire of the 
sovereign in whose territories the crime was committed, and are 
delivered up to his justice".(90) Other sources generally cited in 
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support of these views are Heineccius, Burlemanqui, Rutherford, 
Schmelzing and Kent.(91) 
As indicated above, British practice recognises no duty to extradite 
in the absence of a treaty although it must be conceded that early 
authority exists for the contrary view. So in the fifteenth century 
Brown case,(92) a Dutch captain fishing for herring off the coast of 
Scotland but wit~in what were regarded as Scottish waters, arrested 
Brown, a messenger of James I, and bore him off to Holland. James I 
demanded that the captain "be remanded unto himself here to receive 
as to justice shall pertain." The Crown Counsel, although 
acknowledging the existence of contrary views, declared that: 
"there are good authorities that if a subject of one 
.. 
State commits a heinous crime within the territory of 
another state ... the subject so offending ought to be 
remitted to the place where the crime was committed". 
(93) 
In subsequent cases practice tended to vary but in the case of the 
Schooner Fairy(94) the crew was surrendered on charges of murder, 
while in Re Joseph Fisher (95) the Canadian court approved the Kent 
dictum (96) in Re Washburn to the effect that the Jay Treaty was 
merely declaratory of customary international law. Here too, however, 
there can be little question of an absolute duty to surrender as 
extradition by the requested state was regarded as being in 
fulfilment of a "social compact which directs that the rights of 
nations as well as of individuals shall be respected and a good 
understanding maintained between them".(97) 
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The question of a duty to extradite without treaty provisions has, as 
indicated earlier, also arisen within the South African jurisdiction. 
Although the majority decision in the Andresen case (98) rejected 
such a duty, Ameshoff J delivered a dissenting judgment. He found 
that the first question to be answered was "[W]hat is the general 
principle of law which governs the present case?".(99) Here he 
referred to an opinion by one Prof. Hamaker of Utrecht delivered in 
1885. There are two possible ways of looking at extradition. In terms 
of the one, extradition constitutes an act of assistance by one state 
to another in the exercise of the latter's jurisdiction. In terms of 
the other, extradition is an "act of criminal procedure, so that in 
the interests of civilized society, that which we consider to be a 
crime and deserving of punishment should not escape being punished". 
(100) Extradition is then based on a tacit agreement between 
civilised states to deal with crime in a certain way. 
In assessing the first approach, Hamaker made the somewhat sweeping 
statement that : 
"[A]lmost all the States of the civilized world deliver 
up criminals to nearly all other countries ... Extradition has 
become a fixed rule, and no State, which values the respect and 
friendship of the other members of the great Republic of States, 
will violate this rule".(101) 
From this Ameshof f J drew the rather surprising conclusion that 
"In accordance with this practice, the most 
authoritative writers of the present day - criminalists 
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as well as professors of international law - have 
adopted in the science an obligation to extradite, 
which, even independently of treaty, should rest on 
every civilized state towards all others ... 11 .(102) 
He continued that the duty to extradite does not depend on an 
obligation to legal assistance bordering on favour, but on a general 
human interest which is involved whenever the suppression of crime is 
concerned. This is a "universal concern which all states are equally 
bound to protect" and which would be "precisely violated by a refusal 
to extradite".(103) The theories on which the majority based their 
views he regarded as "antiquated". 
As pointed out earlier, the majority judgment was based on two 
principal considerations : first, the fact that the "laws of the 
South African Republic provide for extradition on the basis of a 
treaty";(104) and second, that the court felt itself bound by 
precedent.(105) That neither of these considerations can be regarded 
as antiquated, hardly bears mention. Without again entering into the 
question of whether public international law is part of the law of 
South Africa, (106) there can be no doubt that in the event of a 
conflict between South African municipal legislation and customary 
public international law, the former will prevail.(107) Furthermore, 
the doctrine of stare decisis is firmly established in South African 
law and it too, will exclude the application of public international 
law in the case of conflict.(108) Based as they are on a nebulous 
level of civilisation which must of necessity be judged subjectively 
by the presiding official concerned, Ameshoff's views cannot be 
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supported. The inescapable conclusion from the cases is that a duty 
to extradite in the absence of a treaty has never been recognised as 
an absolute and binding legal obligation. 
3.2 A right to extradite 
The fact that states are not under an obligation to extradite where 
no treaty exists does not, of course, mean that states may not 
extradite if they so elect. Although certain statements in early 
British authorities do perhaps suggest this, notably that of Lord 
Coke : 
" ... divided kingdoms under several kings are 
sanctuaries for servants, or subjects flying from one 
kingdom to another, and upon demand made by them are 
not by the laws and liberties of the kingdoms to be 
delivered", (109) 
it is clearly accepted that states may, except where expressly 
prohibited by their municipal legislation or practice, deliver up a 
fugitive from justice to a country which requests his delivery but 
with whom no extradition treaty exists. 
Even Britain has on occasion requested extradition under such 
circumstances, although generally in very cautious terms. (110) 
In State (Duggan) v Tapley (111) it was held that "There was no rule 
of international law which forbade extradition in the absence of a 
treaty of extradition"; while in Re Tribble (112) it was still more 
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clearly stated that "Although there is no extradition treaty with the 
Republic of Panama, this fact need not impede the submission of an 
extradition request .•. ". 
The majority of states would appear to be prepared both to request 
extradition and to consider requests for extradition from other 
states in the absence of treaty commitment. When such proceedings are 
encountered, the delivery up or refusal is generally based on what is 
loosely termed "the rules of public international law uniformly 
accepted by both states", (113) the "uniform practice of 
nations",(114) or "universally accepted principle".(115) Although 
these phrases are difficult to define with any measure of precision, 
within the context of extradition they would appear generally to 
refer to extradition based on comity between nations, or on the 
principles of reciprocity. 
3.3 Comity as a basis for extradition without treaty 
Although comity between nations can be said to lie at the heart of 
international cooperation, in the sphere of extradition it means 
little more than that the requested state will receive and consider 
requests for extradition from other states.(116) As such, it provides 
at best a somewhat precarious basis on which to build international 
relations of a lasting nature. 
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In Fiocconi and Kella v Attorney General of the United States,(111) 
the United States requested the extradition of the appellants from 
Italy to face narcotics charges. The offences were not among those 
listed as extraditable in the treaty operative between the two 
states, but Italy nonetheless delivered the criminals to the United 
States. It was found that Italy had granted the extradition "as a 
matter of comity". Such clear reference to comity as an independent 
basis for the grant of extradition is, however, rare. 
The reason for this limited reliance on comity as a basis for 
extradition must be sought in the nature of the concept of comity 
itself. Within the law of extradition, the basis of comity is the 
unfettered discretion of the requested state either to grant or 
refuse the extradition request. In the case of comity the position of 
the individual refuge seeker is consequently almost wholly dependent 
on the goodwill of the sovereign within whose territory he seeks 
refuge. It is for the executive to decide whether or not it will 
grant extradition and in making this decision it is largely free from 
constraint of any kind. A general feeling of goodwill between nations 
and not a concern for the individual involved, appears to be the 
determining factor. 
The idea of a sovereign with unfettered power over those within his 
territory has however been eroded by the conception of the individual 
as a being with certain inalienable rights and freedoms. As the 
international community's concern for human rights and individual 
freedoms blossomed into the full-scale and all-pervading doctrine it 
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is today, so the realisation among the nations of the world that 
individuals finding themselves within the territory of a foreign 
state enjoyed certain basic rights, grew. While within the framework 
of international law as a whole the protection of the rights of the 
alien has remained largely uncodified, (118) in the extradition 
sphere, the ideal of an asylum-seeker entitled to certain minimum 
rights vis a vis other states has found concrete expression in 
municipal legislation prescribing certain procedures to be followed 
and certain requirements to be met when a state is faced with a 
request for extradition. The absolute discretion enjoyed by 
sovereigns in former times in deciding whether or not to extradite, 
has been circumscribed by domestic legislation. The rights of the 
individual to a fair trial, against arbitrary prosecution, and to 
protection of, for example, political beliefs and religious 
convictions have consequently superseded the absolute rights of the 
sovereign. Although within most jurisdictions the sovereign retains a 
discretion as to the surrender of the individual, this discretion is 
circumscribed and can only be exercised within the bounds of the 
interests of the individua1.C119) It is within the state's municipal 
sphere that these limitations are defined and extradition based on 
comity can consequently today be regarded as acceptance by the state 
of the possibility of extraditing without treaty provisions through 
use of its municipal law. The "right" to extradite may be clearly 
enunciated in the relevant municipal provisions, or it may be 
inferred from the absence of a prohibition on extradition without 
treaty. ( 1 2 0 ) 
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Although slightly premature at this stage, a preliminary distinction 
must be drawn between comity on the one hand, and what Rezek (121) 
terms the "standard form" of reciprocity on the other. Although in 
both instances the municipal law of the requested state is made 
available to the requesting state in the interests of ensuring the 
punishment of the suspected offender, the difference lies in the fact 
that in the case of comity there is no question of an on-going 
relationship of mutual surrender developing between the parties. In 
the case of comity, the extradition is not granted on the 
understanding or in the expectation of a similar counter-performance 
at some future stage. It is rather to be regarded as a one-off 
concession to the requesting state which does not give rise to a duty 
of counter-performance. It is an act of courtesy performed by one 
state towards another in the broad interests of justice. 
The question now arising is whether South African extradition law has 
recognised comity as a basis for extradition and whether this has in 
fact been used in practice. As will emerge presently,(122) the 
concept was foreign to pre-republican South African extradition. 
Following the British practice, South Africa extradited only in the 
presence of a treaty obligation to do so.(123) However, with the 
promulgation of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962, a fairly radical 
departure from this practice was adopted in our law. 
Section 3(2) of the Extradition Act provides that 
"Any person accused or convicted of an offence 
-
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contemplated by sub-section (2) of section two and 
committed within the jurisdiction of a foreign state 
not a party to an extradition agreement shall be liable 
to be surrendered to such foreign state, if the State 
President has consented in writing to his being so 
surrendered." 
It is clear from the wording of this section that reciprocity is not 
demanded. In section 2 of the Act, an extradition agreement is 
defined as an agreement concluded by the State President with any · 
foreign state providing for the surrender of fugitives on a 
reciprocal basis. Without this reciprocal undertaking, there can be 
no extradition treaty in the defined sense of the term, and 
conversely, where such an undertaking exists, one will be dealing 
with an extradition treaty. Consequently, as section 3(2) of the Act 
has its basis in neither treaty nor reciprocity, and as the basis of 
extradition has been established as treaty, reciprocity or comity, 
this basis must in the present instance be sought in comity.(124) As 
section 3(2) does not in fact authorise the State President to order 
the extradition of the person sought, but merely classifies him as a 
"person liable to be surrendered", it avoids the pitfalls inherent in 
comity and allows the individual full protection of the law. He is 
merely brought within the ambit of the Act and the hearing follows 
its normal course.(125) It should further be borne in mind that 
section 3(2) is regarded by the executive as an exceptional measure 
and not as a viable alternative to the conclusion of bilateral 
extradition treaties.(126) It is, however, a measure which has been 
applied on a number of occasions (127) and through its application, a 
193 
formalised strain of comity can be seen to have become fairly firmly 
established in our law. 
It is submitted that the formalised ad hoc extradition arrangements 
involving South Africa which have been concluded or mooted in recent 
times would qualify as extradition based on comity. Particularly 
relevant in this regard is the ad hoc arrangement between South 
Africa and Australia for the extradition of Mr Gert Rademeyer, a 
former employee of the electricity giant ESCOM, to face fraud charges 
totalling some R11 million.C128) Although this agreement was not 
available for analysis, it would appear to have been an agreement 
between the respective governments providing only for the surrender 
of Rademeyer and envisaging no on-going reciprocal relationship.(129) 
From what has been said above, this would best qualify as an act of 
comity on the part of the Austialian government. Zimbabwe, too, has 
raised the possibility of "some arrangement" being made in the future 
also on an ad hoc basis.(130) 
Brief mention has already been made of reciprocity in indicating how 
this differs from comity. However, as one of the most universally 
accepted bases for extradition in the absence of an express 
extradition treaty, the concept of reciprocity must be examined more 
closely. 
3.4 Reciprocity as a basis for extradition 
Rezek, discussing reciprocity as an independent source of obligation, 
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distinguishes between the standard form of reciprocity and certain 
variants.(131) In its standard form reciprocity involves the 
requesting state asking the host state to "open the doors of its 
internal extradition law to the actual case stated in the 
requisition".(132) It undertakes to do likewise should a request be 
received from the host state. 
There are few instances of extradition in the absence of a treaty 
where some or other reference to reciprocity is not found. Although 
formerly reciprocity would appear to have been regarded as something 
in the nature of a stop-gap, to fill lacunae in extradition treaties, 
frequent recourse to it in recent times has led to voices being 
raised for the recognition of reciprocity as a basis for extradition 
independent of comity or treaty. It is consequently necessary to 
examine what exactly is meant by reciprocity in the extradition 
sphere and whether it can in fact be regarded as a source of 
obligation independent of treaty. In this "pure" form reciprocity is 
thus based entirely on the municipal legislation of the respective 
states. Instead of treaty provisions being consulted in the 
extradition of a fugitive, this is achieved by the municipal 
legislation of the requested state being used as if it constituted 
treaty provisions, subject to similar treatment by the requesting 
state should the occasion arise. 
This immediately calls to mind the third variant identified above in 
considering extradition based on treaty, viz regional arrangements 
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employing municipal law. The two can, however, be distinguished in 
that the reciprocal agreement, unlike the municipal scheme, does not 
involve a conscious attempt between the two states to bring their 
municipal extradition provisions into line with one another. It is a 
pragmatic, rather than a concerted or conscious form of cooperation 
with each state retaining its autonomy with regard to the exact form 
of its own municipal regulation of extradition. 
Rezek further identifies three variant forms of reciprocity. 
First, there is the case where the two states agree merely to 
consider future requests for extradition. As pointed out by 
RezekC133}, this is largely meaningless as it amounts to no more than 
"the minimum of comity due by every state to other members of the 
internat.ional community." Second, there is the undertaking to grant 
reciprocity on the basis of the principle of mutatis mutandis; in 
other words, together with its request for surrender, the requesting 
state undertakes that should identical circumstances arise in the 
case of the requested state, it would also surrender the individual 
concerned. The limited application of this approach is clearly 
illustrated by the somewhat bizarre example raised in the case of Re 
Wagner. (134} In this case Israel had requested Brazil to surrender 
Wagner, a Nazi war criminal. As no treaty existed between the two 
states, Israel offered reciprocity but only on a mutatis mutandis 
basis. As pointed out in the case, this would mean that were a Nazi 
war criminal to settle in Israel, and were Brazil to request his 
surrender, the request would be favourably considered! 
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The most important of the variant forms identified by Rezek is where 
the offer of reciprocity is made subject to certain additional 
conditions.(135) The request is consequently no longer merely that 
the host state consider extradition on the basis of its municipal 
legislation, but that in addition to such legislation, it also 
consider special conditions laid down in the request for extradition. 
This is best illustrated by an example. 
During 1974 the Barton brothers, Alexander and Thomas, fled from 
Australia to Brazil after the failure of certain companies.(136) When 
Australia wished to request their extradition from Brazil to face 
charges in New South Wales, it found itself up against a problem. 
Like its British predecessor,(137) the Australian Extradition 
(Foreign.States) Act 1966, provided for extradition on the basis of 
treaty only.(138) Brazil, on the other hand, allows extradition on 
the basis of treaty or on an undertaking to grant reciprocal 
treatment.(139) The former did not exist and the latter was 
effectively excluded by the Australian legislation. After a somewhat 
curious offer of reciprocity based on deportation which failed to 
have any effect,C140) Australia enacted the Extradition (Foreign 
States) Act 1974. In terms of this Act the Governor-General is 
empowered to give assurances of reciprocity "Subject to limitations, 
conditions, exceptions or qualifications" embodied in regulations 
issued by him bringing the Act into operation between Australia and 
the foreign state concerned.(141) Regulations were accordingly passed 
bringing the Act into operation between Australia and Brazil subject 
to three qualifications which may be briefly summarised as : a 
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minimum sentence of one year's imprisonment required for extraditable 
offences; no death penalty to be imposed; and no extradition to a 
third state without prior Australian consent.<142) 
Examining this more closely it is clear that we are not dealing with 
"pure" reciprocity as sketched at the outset. The request for and 
subsequent undertaking to grant extradition is to be determined not 
by the municipal law of Australia and Brazil alone, but rather by 
that municipal legislation read together with and supplemented or 
amended by limitations imposed in the offer of reciprocity. It is 
consequently hardly surprising that Rezek acknowledges that one is 
here concerned with "treaty elements ... being added" to the reciprocal 
undertaking.(143) 
However, the question arising is whether Rezek's view that we are 
concerned here with no more than the addition of certain elements to 
an independent reciprocal agreement and that "[t]he relationship 
existing between the two states under the reciprocity system is not 
to be assimilated to a bi-lateral treaty of indefinite 
duration",(144) can be supported. 
He bases his view on article 2 of the Vienna Treaty Convention,(145) 
and more notably on the requirement in that article that a treaty be 
"in written form". While it is freely conceded that extradition 
treaties are par excellence treaties generally embodied in written 
form, this is certainly not an absolute requirement for the 
conclusion of an extradition treaty, or any other treaty. In fact, as 
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is clear from article 3 of the Convention, the requirement of writing 
laid down in article 2 "shall not affect the legal force of such 
[unwritten] agreements".(146) The general rules applica~le to the 
conclusion of international agreements, viz consent between two or 
more public international law subjects; the creation of obligations; 
and the subjection of these obligations to public international law 
(147), must consequently be seen to apply with equal force to the 
conclusion of an extradition treaty. While writing is necessary for 
the formal registration of the treaty with the Secretariat of the 
United Nations and for the enforcement of the treaty before the 
International Court of Justice, this aspect is of less importance 
within the realm of extradition. It is indeed difficult to conceive 
of an extradition treaty being brought to the international court 
since, as we have seen, within most if not all, extradition 
agreements the states concerned retain a discretion - albeit limited 
- in the eventual decision to surrender. On the basis of writing 
alone one can consequently not distinguish clearly between a treaty 
and a reciprocal undertaking to extradite. 
Rezek's argument further rests on the assumption that the reciprocal 
agreement need not be in writing. While this is - as in the case of a 
treaty - correct in the sense that writing is not an absolute 
requirement for validity, the courts would appear to demand some 
tangible proof of negotiations between the two states concerned to 
ensure reciprocal treatment. As certain courts demand that this be a 
fact which can be objectively determined, it would appear that a 
written exchange of some or other kind - be it exchange of notes, 
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telegrams, or whatever - is in fact required. Thus in the case of In 
re Kozil (148) it was found that as no extradition treaty existed 
between Brazil and Argentina, the application by Brazil would have to 
be considered on the basis of reciprocity. However, it was held that 
as there was no proof of diplomatic exchange between the parties as 
regards the conditions of reciprocity, the request had to be denied. 
Consequently, although reciprocity does not demand the formal 
negotiation and signature of a treaty dealing specifically with 
extradition, some concrete exchange evidencing the consensus of the 
parties as well as the content of that consensus is as necessary in 
the case of reciprocity as it is in the case of treaty. 
In addition Rezek maintains that the exchange of notes between two 
states c~nnot be construed as a treaty as it does not require an 
immediate answer.(149) Furthermore, until such time as the requested 
state itself requests the surrender of a fugitive from the requesting 
state "there is ... a relationship where obligations are unilateral, 
and can remain so indefinitely". On the other hand, "just one 
requisition made in the reverse direction is enough to perfect the 
reciprocal bond, so that thereafter both parties have duties to each 
.other".(150) This reasoning can perhaps be better illustrated by an 
example. 
for example, requests State B - with whom it has no 
n treaty - to extradite a fugitive offender to A, at the 
same time ~dertaking that should B at some future stage request 
\ 
\ 
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extradition from A, this will be granted. Without any formal reply B 
extradites the offender to A. 
In terms of Rezek's hypothesis no binding mutual obligations exist 
between A and B until such time as B in its turn requests extradition 
from A and the request is acceded to. Rezek's reasoning must be 
regarded as suspect on this point. The existence of an obligation 
does not depend for its validity on the fulfilment of the obligation. 
To borrow an example from the private law sphere: there is little 
doubt that a mutual duty of support exists between parent and child. 
The fact that in most western societies the child is seldom if ever 
- called upon to fulfil this obligation and in fact support its 
parents, in no way detracts from an enforceable obligation to do so 
if and when the need arises or a demand is made. A made B an offer 
which the latter accepted through its conduct. Consensus exists 
between the parties. The object of the consensus is the extradition 
of fugitive criminals which falls within and is governed by 
principles of international law - albeit in the instant case through 
the application of specific municipal provisions embodied in the 
states' respective domestic extradition legislation. 
The position was more correctly stated in the case of In re Zahabian. 
(151) Zahabian, an Iranian national resident in Switzerland, was 
wanted by Iran to face charges of fraudulent bankruptcy and obtaining 
credit by false pretences. No extradition treaty existed between the 
two countries but Iran offered reciprocity in the event of Zahabian's 
extradition. The court found that : 
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"The effect of a declaration of reciprocity, as of a 
treaty, is to make extradition obligatory in the cases 
referred to in the declaration. However, such a 
declaration creates international obligations only 
when it is formulated in concordant manner by the two 
States who wish to establish reciprocal 
obligations ..• Only if extradition is granted and 
made subject to reciprocity, and if the reciprocity 
offered by the Iranian government is thus accepted, 
will the declaration of reciprocity between 
Switzerland and Iran become effective and create 
binding treaty obligations for the two states in the 
future".(152) 
It is consequently submitted that reciprocity cannot be regarded as 
a truly independent source of obligation to surrender. It should 
rather be seen as a loosely structured and informal means of treaty 
conclusion. The offer of reciprocity coupled to the request for 
extradition, once acted upon, gives rise to "binding treaty 
obligations" for both parties involved and can consequently - subject 
always to the intention of the parties - not be regarded as anything 
other than an internationally binding treaty. 
There are a number of advantages inherent in a system based on 
reciprocity and certain of these are particularly relevant to a state 
finding itself in the unfortunate international situation which South 
Africa has occupied for the past few years. 
As pointed out above, not all states regard the conclusion of 
extradition treaties as a matter of pressing urgency. Official 
records show that negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty are 
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time consuming and often, even after many years, fruitless.(153) The 
offer of reciprocity and the surrender or refusal to surrender 
arising from it are in essence matters designed to meet the immediate 
and often pressing needs of a specific, urgent situation. Faced with 
an actual situation states would of necessity be more inclined to cut 
through the "red tape" and inordinate delays often smothering treaty 
negotiations, and come to a swift and satisfactory solution focussing 
on the essentials involved. While this indeed holds the potential of 
prejudicing the individual refuge seeker in that his intrinsic human 
right to live where he wishes, to liberty, etcetera might be impinged 
upon, there is in fact a safeguard built into the system. This is 
that the content of the agreement to grant reciprocity is to be found 
principally in the municipal legislation of the states concerned. 
This means that the refuge seeker has at his disposal the full 
process of the criminal and procedural law of the state in which he 
chose to seek refuge. He is consequently assured of a fair hearing at 
which certain basics must be proved, for example, the competence of 
the court which will be hearing his case, whether there is a prima 
facie case for him to answer, evaluation of the nature of his 
offence, etcetera. The pitfalls of the traditional comity approach to 
extradition are thus avoided and the individual is accorded full 
recognition and protection of his rights. 
From the South African point of view, reciprocity should be seen as 
an attractive alternative to the formal bilateral extradition treaty 
largely because of the lack of publicity surrounding the proceedings. 
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With South Africa's international isolation at this stage still a 
reality, many states, either from moral conviction or from 
considerations of political expediency, are reluctant to be seen to 
be dealing with the Republic. International law and politics being so 
closely allied, any system by which international cooperation can be 
promoted while a measure of anonymity is maintained, should be 
exploited to the full. The fact that registration of reciprocal 
agreements is not possible is, from the current South African 
perspective, an advantage rather than a drawback.(154) 
This notwithstanding, the official position of the South African 
executive would at present appear to be against the use of 
reciprocity to any great extent. The attitude of the government 
appears clearly from the case of Mario Guassardo. (155) 
Guassardo was a director of the Boerebank Beperk. In 1962 the bank 
was placed under provisional and subsequently under final 
liquidation. Guassardo's personal estate was sequestrated and a 
Johannesburg magistrate issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of 
theft and fraud amounting to some R500 ooo.(156) It was established 
that Guassardo was then living in Brazil. Although there was no 
extradition treaty operative between South Africa and Brazil, Brazil 
was prepared to extradite if South Africa furnished an assurance of 
reciprocal treatment in suitable cases. 
When approached on the matter, the South African authorities set out 
their views on assurances of reciprocity in the following terms.<157) 
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South Africa could give no absolute assurance of reciprocity for 
three main reasons 
(a) When the occasion arose South Africa might not be 
willing to extradite and the fact that a definite 
assurance had been given could place the government in 
an awkward position as regards what is, and should 
remain, an essentially discretionary act. 
(b) Were the assurance to be given it would mean that the 
extradition would have to take place under section 3(2) 
of the Act.(158) It was felt that section 3(2) was 
intended for exceptional cases only and that it should 
not be the norm upon which extradition is based. 
(c) It was the ideal of the South African government to 
conclude as many bilateral extradition treaties as 
possible. It would be contrary to this aim were section 
3(2) to be used here. 
Although South Africa was not averse to reciprocal treatment in 
principle, it was stressed that the government was not prepared to 
give any definite or absolute assurance of reciprocity. (159) This 
was reiterated in 1974 when in the case of Franz Podezin (160) it was 
again stressed in response to an extradition request from the Federal 
Republic of Germany, that no general undertaking of reciprocity could 
be guaranteed in terms of section 3(2) of the Act. 
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How realistic is the approach adopted by South Africa as reflected in 
these statements? Taking the first statement, the logic is somewhat 
suspect. Why should a difference exist between the consequences of an 
undertaking to extradite in terms of a treaty (which the authorities 
are eager to conclude) and those arising as a result of an 
undertaking to act reciprocally which is, as has been shown, no more 
than an informally concluded treaty? In both instances the government 
may be unwilling to extradite in a particular instance. In the case 
of a formal bilateral treaty the grounds on which extradition can be 
refused may indeed be spelled out. The major ground will generally be 
the so-called' political offence exception. As was shown in the 
Australian Barton brothers case, however, certain riders can indeed 
be added to the reciprocal agreement and provided these are within 
the normal confines of what is encountered in extradition treaties 
generally, no objections are likely to arise. The "political offence" 
exception, for example, will, it is submitted, apply here with equal 
force. In short, the mere fact of agreeing to reciprocal behaviour 
need not place unrealistic limitations on the discretionary nature of 
the state's decision to extradite or otherwise. 
As to the second objection, it was shown above that the section 3(2) 
procedure in terms of which the State President certifies the person 
sought as a person who may be subject to extradition proceedings, is 
in fact more closely related to comity than to reciprocity. Indeed if 
the true nature of reciprocal undertakings is recognised, section 
3(2) will not come into the picture at all. The fact that in the 
minds of the authorities concerned, the distinction between 
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reciprocity and section 3(2) of the Extradition Act has become 
blurred should not paralyse the state through the dogged adherence to 
an unwarrantedly narrow approach to the granting of undertakings of 
reciproc:j.ty. 
In the third instance, the key word is undoubtedly "ideal". It is 
understandable that the state would prefer a specific extradition 
treaty, signed and sealed, as apart from evidencing a measure of 
international recognition, this is also simpler from the point of 
view of proof. However, given South Africa's international isolation 
(at least for the present), opportunities for cooperation must be 
seized where they arise. If the result achieved informally is no less 
effective than the result achieved through formalised negotiation, 
the former should not be rejected solely for the sake of what is in 
essence an outdated conception of the institution of extradition. 
The current form of reciprocity which the Republic is prepared to 
offer, is largely meaningless and cannot lead to any meaningful 
development in extradition within the Republic. 
3.5 Other possible bases for extradition 
A further basis for extradition raised by Bedi (161) requires some 
consideration. He lists "morality" as a possible independent 
basis.(162) Law is premised on the "external authority of society" 
and carries a legal penalty. Morality, on the other hand, relies for 
implementation on "conl:icience, or other social institutions not 
identified with the state".(163) This is for Bedi "moral law". One 
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must, however, question whether we are in fact here dealing with an 
independent source of obligation. 
In the first place, it may be questioned whether any useful purpose 
is served by introducing a term such as "moral law" - indeed it may 
be asked whether linking morality and law in this way is not in fact 
a misleading exercise in semantics. As Bedi points out, the crucial 
distinction between what is traditionally termed "law" on the one 
hand, and what is termed "morality" on the other, is to be found in 
the basis and measure of enforcement. He at no point denies that in 
considering the practical application of extradition one is dealing 
with a legal rather than a moral question. Does the introduction of 
the term "moral" in this context change the legal nature of the 
process; or is the highly subjective issue of a commonly perceived 
morality made any more concrete or enforceable by the addition of the 
term "law"? This would not appear to be the case. 
On the basis of what has been said in the preceding pages, it is 
submitted that the introduction of morality as an independent basis 
for extradition is at best unhelpful. Morality as understood by Bedi 
is, it is submitted, in fact not a "new" or independent basis on 
which extradition may rest. If one considers phrases such as 
"universally accepted principle";(164) and "uniform practice of 
nations" (165) it will appear that we are in fact dealing with the 
familiar concepts of comity or reciprocity which, as recognised bases 
for extradition, have already developed a reasonably fixed meaning 
within the confines of extradition. Indeed in the Haya de la Torra 
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case (166) which Bedi cites as support for the moral basis of 
extradition, we encounter a clear distinction between rights and 
duties, and what Bedi terms "courtesy and good neighbourliness". 
Courtesy and good neighbourliness are in fact nothing more than, in 
the former case, the most basic form of reciprocity, (167) and in the 
case of the latter, the generally perceived nature of comity. 
It is submitted that the desire to elevate morality to the status of 
a separate basis for extradition is at best confusing. It stems from 
a falsely universalised, and highly idealised perception of the 
international community's response to criminal behaviour. While this 
may be an ideal towards which the international community should 
strive, in the present state of international relations, it is 
neither a. recognisably separate, nor a legally enforceable, basis 
upon which extradition may be premised, as is indeed borne out by the 
numerous instances in which extradition is refused on purely 
"technical" grounds (168). 
One further possibility remains to be examined, particularly in view 
of the practice of extraditing in terms of section 3(2) of the 
Extradition Act 67 of 1962 identified above. (169) This is the 
question whether,in terms of this section, the possibility exists 
that a customary rule of public international law may be said to have 
developed which could bind the Republic to extradite in the future 
and consequently constitute a basis independent of treaty, comity or 
reciprocity. 
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Custom as a source of a binding public international law obligation 
is enunciated in article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. This section provides that in deciding disputes "in 
accordance with international law", the Court shall apply : 
"international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law;". 
From this definition, it is generally accepted that custom stands on 
two pillars. First there must be a general practice; and second this 
practice must be accepted as law. 
It falls outside the present scope to examine custom and its origin 
in any great detail. However, within present confines it is worth 
noting t.~e following. The number of states involved in the 
development of a customary rule is not crucial.(170) Furthermore, 
although the concept of custom generally demands repeated action, 
even a single act may be sufficient to establish a customary 
obligation.C171) Applying this to the situation arising in tefms of 
section 3(2) of the Extradition Act one finds the following. 
As regards the first "leg" of customary rule development, 
it is clear from the Esser, Gebhart, and Kraul 
cases,(172) that the willingness of the South African authorities to 
extradite on the basis of section 3(2), particularly in dealings with 
Germany, may give rise to the impression that there is a practice 
or at least a propensity - for South Africa to extradite in the 
absence of treaty commitment to do so. The question now arising, is 
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whether this propensity can be seen ·as something more - something 
upon which states may come to rely as a matter of right. In other 
words, has South Africa created a customary rule of public 
international law with which she must comply and on which a foreign 
state may rely as of right? 
Even if a repeated practice, or usage, were able to develop with 
regard to extradition in terms of section 3(2) of the South African 
Extradition Act, this would not constitute a binding customary rule 
unless it was followed by the state because it felt under a legal 
obligation to do so - the so-called opinio iuris sive 
necessitatis-requirement. That there is certainly no place for the 
development of such a conviction on the part of the South African 
authorities is abundantly clear from the Case of Mario Guassardo 
(173) where it was clearly stated in a letter from the state legal 
advisors that section 3(2) was "intended for exceptional cases only 
and that it should not become the norm upon which extradition is 
based" . ( 1 7 4 ) 
It can consequently be seen that in South African law as it is 
presently interpreted, custom as a basis upon which extradition can 
be sought or granted, is unlikely to play a meaningful role. 
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4 LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT OR DUTY TO EXTRADITE 
We have established that states may have a self-imposed duty to 
extradite originating from treaties they have concluded or to which 
they have become party. We have also established that failing the 
existence of such a duty, states may (depending on their municipal 
dispensations) also retain a right to extradite in the absence of a 
treaty commitment to do so. Although, strictly speaking, this thesis 
is limited to the history, basis and current status of the right or 
duty as such, it would be incomplete without some mention of possible 
limitations to which the right or duty may be subject. Unfortunately, 
space allows no more than a brief identification of these 
limitations, together with an indication (for reference purposes) of 
where they may be found in the treaties to which South Africa is 
party. 
In broad terms the limitations on the right or duty to extradite may 
be classified into limitations relating to the person of the 
extraditee, and limitations relating to the crime for which 
extradition is sought. 
4.1 Limitations relating to the person of the extraditee 
Under this head we may classify the nationality of the extraditee; 
humanitarian considerations; and his current position within the 
state of refuge. 
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4.1.1 Nationality 
The question of the exclusion of the extradition of a state's own 
nationals has a long history. (175) In Britain, the 1878 Royal 
Commission detailed to examine all aspects of extradition, came up 
with four reasons in favour of the refusal to extradite own 
nationals. These were that a subject should not be withdrawn from his 
natural judges; that subjects were entitled to the protection of 
their states' laws; that foreign states' laws were not above 
suspicion; and that a subject would be unduly disadvantaged if he 
were to be tried in foreign territory. (176) These reasons were not 
found particularly convincing by the British authorities, who despite 
their generally xenophobic tendencies, elected to follow a policy 
allowing·the extradition of their nationals. (177) It was argued that 
a person finding himself in foreign territory is entitled to the 
protection of the laws of that territory but should in return respect 
those laws. South Africa, with its strong British extradition 
tradition, has adopted a similar position. This does not, however, 
mean that either Britain or South Africa will in all instances 
extradite its own nationals. The determining factor is the provision 
made in the treaty governing extradition. The point of departure in 
both states is, however, that there is no principle objection to the 
extradition of their own nationals. 
As regards South Africa, we consequently find Sanders stating that 
"in the absence of a compelling treaty provision to the contrary" 
extradition of own nationals is allowed. (178) The issue arose 
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specifically for decision ins v Pirzenthal. (179) Here Pirzenthal, a 
South African citizen by birth, was serving a sentence in Beira, 
Mocambique for fraud. He escaped from custody and fled to the 
Republic. Boshoff J, delivering judgment on an appeal from a 
magistrate's finding that Pirzenthal be extradited to Mocambique, 
discussed the role Pirzenthal's South African nationality had on his 
extradition. The relevant treaty (180) provided in article 3 that : 
"the contracting parties shall not in any case or under 
any pretext be compelled to surrender their own 
subjects or citizens whether by birth or by 
naturalisation, provided that the naturalisation took 
place previous to the commission of the crime or 
offence giving rise to the application for 
extradition." (181) 
The court found that the executive had a discretion in deciding 
whether or not to extradite its nationals and dismissed the appeal. 
The passage cited above justifies a number of inferences. First, 
there is no difference in the treatment accorded persons who are 
citizens by birth and those who have been naturalised before the 
commission of the extraditable offence. However, where naturalisation 
takes place only after the commission of the offence, nationality 
will not exclude extradition. Second, whether or not the state will 
refuse extradition on the ground of nationality will depend on the 
wording of any prohibition which may exist in the specific treaty. In 
this regard, the treaty may expressly authorise extradition of 
nationals; may allow a discretion; or may prohibit it in absolute 
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terms. The decision in this regard will consequently depend on the 
provisions of the treaty. The position with regard to South Africa's 
treaties is set out in the table below. 
4.1.2 Humanitarian considerations 
Although no South African treaty contains a clause which prohibits 
extradition on humanitarian grounds, the state's inherent discretion 
in granting extradition will cover such an instance. Under this head 
is included the ill health of the person sought, or the fact that a 
considerable period has elapsed and the harm resulting from 
prosecution would outweigh possible advantages.(182) 
In the Case of Mannie Becker, (183) Becker, a Johannesburg attorney 
appropriated some R25 000 from his trust accounts and fled to Israel. 
Some seven years after these events the South African authorities 
requested Becker's extradition from Israel. In considering the 
request the Israeli authoriti~s specifically took account of the fact 
that some seven years had elapsed before the request for Becker's 
return had been made. Furthermore, Becker had become a "model" 
citizen in Israel and had repaid R15 000 of the money owed. In the 
result : 
"The Israeli Minister of Justice has reached the 
conclusion that it would not be equitable to continue 
with proceedings aimed at uprooting Becker in order to 
stand trial in South Africa for offences committed over 
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ten years ago." (184) 
The Israeli authorities were however, at pains to point out that the 
outcome of the application should not be seen as setting a precedent 
or establishing a line of future conduct. It was based solely on the 
specific considerations in Becker's case. 
4.1.3 The current position of the extraditee 
The position in which the extraditee finds himself when the request 
for his extradition is received, may also limit the duty of the 
requested state to deliver him - or at least the time at which that 
duty must be performed. So for example, if the extraditee is awaiting 
trial in the state of refuge on an offence other than that for which 
his extradition is sought, or if he is serving a prison sentence, his 
extradition will generally not take place. What occurs in such a case 
is that the extradition hearing continues and a finding is made, but 
the actual delivery up is suspended pending the outcome of his trial 
or the completion of his sentence. The extradition then takes place 
along normal lines. 
So for example, in the Case of Nkosinathi Sikhondo Transkei requested 
South Africa to extradite Sikhondo who had been sentenced to two 
years' imprisonment for possession of stolen property. On enquiry it 
was ascertained that he was in prison at King William's Town in South 
Africa serving a sentence for theft of a motor vehicle. The Transkei 
authorities were informed that he would be available for extradition 
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on completion of his sentence in South Africa. He was released on 
27.1.1983 and handed over to Transkei on the same day.(185) A similar 
result was achieved in the Case of Bangile Hontoti who was also 
requested by Transkei but was at the time serving a gaol sentence in 
South Africa. The Transkei authorities were informed that he would be 
available for extradition on 21.9.1982 after completion of his South 
African sentence. (186) 
That things also work the other way round, is illustrated by South 
Africa's request to the United States in the Case of Frans Jacob Smit 
Theron.(181) Theron was wanted in South Africa to face charges under 
the Insolvency Act and for fraud totalling some R300 000. The United 
States authorities, while willing to extradite Theron, indicated that 
there we~e charges pending against him in the United States and that 
his extradition could only be considered after these had been 
answered and any sentence served. He has since been returned. (188) 
The incidence of this provision in South Africa's extradition 
treaties appears in the table below. 
4.2 Limitations relating to the nature of the crime for 
which extradition is sought 
Under this head are included political offences; fiscal offences; 
military offences; and offences which attract the death penalty. 
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4.2.1 Political offences 
The best known of the instances in which extradition will not be 
granted is the so-called "political offence exception" in terms of 
which an extraditee will not be returned to the requesting state if 
the offence with which he is charged is political. The evolution of 
this exception and exactly what should be understood under 
"political", has been the subject of many thorough studies and cannot 
be considered here.(189) Suffice to say that at this stage the 
political offence exception has transcended the bounds of optional 
clauses in a treaty and assumed the status a general and essential 
principle of extradition.C190) The political offence exception is 
embodied in the South African Extradition Act (191) and appears in 
all extradition treaties to which South Africa is a party. 
It is however, notable that the exception has not been defined in 
either treaty or municipal legislation with the result that its 
precise meaning is generally left to the courts to determine.(192) 
This allows a measure of flexibility, the concept being extended or 
restricted to meet the political vicissitudes of the day. This also 
means that to some extent the political offence exception is seen by 
extraditees as a "last hope" and some attempt will generally be made 
to give the offence for which extradition is sought a political 
colour. That this is generally unsuccessful appears from South 
African case records where no successful appeal to the political 
offence exception to block extradition could be found. 
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In one of the few extradition cases to address the problem directly, 
Ex parte Rolff and Others, (193) the extradition of the accused was 
sought to face charges of murder and theft. One of the claims raised 
to prevent their extradition to German South West Africa was that 
their offences had been of a political nature. De Villiers CJ 
rejected this claim finding that : 
" •.. they acted the part of marauders, and not that of 
patriots fighting for the independence of their 
country ... [their actions] were wanton acts of violence 
committed, not against officials of the State, but 
against peaceful and harmless citizens, and without any 
apparent political object in view." (194) 
In S v Devoy (195) it was also argued, "though faintly" to use the 
court's words, that the crime for which extradition was sought 
(theft of copper wire!) fell under the political offence exception in 
that the wire had been removed from Zambia in violation of of Zambian 
law and United Nations' sanctions and that Devoy was likely to be 
punished for this. The court had little difficulty in rejecting this 
tenuous link to the accepted meaning of political offence. 
Most recently, in S v Graham (196) it was alleged that some vague 
CIA plot existed against Graham which would render him liable to 
political persecution should he be returned to the United States to 
face theft charges. The magistrate before whom the case was heard 
rejected the contention and it was not pursued on appeal to the 
Supreme Court. 
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4.2.2 Fiscal offences 
Fiscal offences are offences against the internal revenue, customs 
and excise and exchange control laws of a state. As such, they are 
generally not regarded as suitable for extradition by the state to 
whom the request is addressed. In the words of a leading British case 
on the matter : "No country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of 
another". (197) This harsh approach would appear to have been 
tempered somewhat in recent times, (198) and should perhaps in the 
light of the numerous double taxation agreements concluded between 
the nations of the world be regarded as something of an anachronism. 
4.2.3 Military offences 
As a general rule, an individual accused of a purely military offence 
would not be extradited.(199) In In re Girardin {200) Argentina 
wished to request the extradition of Girardin from Uruguay for 
having violated a law requiring him to undergo compulsory military 
training. The court refused to sanction the request as the offence 
was purely military. 
A problem may well arise in the case ·-of so-called "draft-dodgers" who 
for political reasons refuse to serve in the armed forces of their 
country and seek asylum in a friendly state. Bassiouni {201) mentions 
the example of American draft-dodgers fleeing to Canada and Sweden 
during the height of the Vietnam War, but of course South Africa 
experienced a similar phenomenon with draftees fleeing to various 
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European countries, notably the Netherlands, rather than serving in 
the South African Defence Force under the apartheid system. However, 
no specific cases of the extradition of such individuals having been 
sought by South Africa could be traced. In such a case there is, of 
course, a conflict between the military and political offence 
exceptions and interaction between the principles of political asylum 
and extradition. (202) In any event, the individual would not be 
extradited. 
4.2.4 Offences attracting the death penalty 
States which have abolished capital punishment are often unwilling to 
extradite to states where an accused may be sentenced to death for 
the crime for which he is extradited. Consequently, when faced with 
such a request the state will either refuse to extradite or will 
extradite on condition that the death penalty will not be imposed or 
will be commuted to life imprisonment in the event of 
conviction.(203) 
As one of the few Western countries where the death penalty is still 
fairly frequently imposed, South Africa will be subject to this 
exception. Although not common, a specific exclusion in the case of 
the death penalty is found in certain of South Africa's extradition 
treaties.(204) No specific cases where extradition was refused on 
this ground could be traced. 
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4.2.5 Miscellaneous limitations 
Apart from the few limitations mentioned above, there are a number of 
others which are not discussed as they are felt to be either out of 
date, for example religious and press offences (205); or because they 
are largely technical relating to the prosecution of the offence, for 
example prescription of the offence; (206) double criminality; (207) 
double jeopardy or ne bis in idem; (208);etc. However, where relevant 
these will be included in the table below for reference purposes. 
4.3 Universal offences for which extradition may not be 
refused despite apparent exceptions 
One final point must be considered in the context of limitations on 
the right or duty to extradite and this is whether there are any 
crimes which are by their nature so universally condemned that a duty 
rests on a state to extradite the criminal involved irrespective of 
the existence of a treaty and irrespective of the provisions in an 
existing treaty allowing for the political offence exception. In 
other words, are there instances in which the duty to extradite is 
absolute? 
The problem in such an instance remains finding a basis on which to 
hang such an absolute duty. (209) Although there are a number of 
Conventions which expressly exclude certain behaviour from the 
political offence exception and consequently create a type of 
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absolute duty to extradite (210), they are not binding on 
non-signatories. Bassiouni lists aggression, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, piracy, hijacking, slavery, counterfeiting, kidnapping of 
internationally protected persons, international trade in narcotics, 
and racial discrimination as international crimes involving an 
absolute duty to extradite. (211) However, it is submitted that 
international criminal law has not yet developed into a universally 
accepted and sufficiently binding whole for it to be said that states 
are prepared to surrender their sovereignty to the extent necessary 
to support an absolute duty to extradite. 
4.4 TABLE OF LIMITATIONS AS OCCURRING IN BILATERAL TREATIES 
TO·WHICH SOUTH AFRICA IS A PARTY 
The table below reflects the article in each treaty where the 
limitations on the right or duty to extradite corresponding to the 
letter in the "key" below are to be found. 
KEY TO TABLE 
a Non-extradition of own nationals. 
b Acquisition of nationality after the commission of the 
offence for which extradition is sought is no bar to 
extradition. 
223 
c No extradition for political offence 
d No extradition for an offence carrying the death 
penalty. 
e No extradition for military offences. 
f Extradition for fiscal offences allowed only if the 
parties have so agreed. 
g No extradition if the offence for which extradition is 
sought has been tried, or punished or is under trial in 
the state of refuge. 
h If the extraditee is in detention or under trial in 
the state of refuge for a crime other than that for 
which extradition is sought, his extradition shall be 
deferred until the law has taken its course. 
i No extradition if the crime for which extradition is sought 
has prescribed under the law of the state of refuge. 
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Treaty a b c d e f g h i Note 
Germany 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 212 
Italy 3 4 5 - - - .8 7 6 213 
Denmark 1 - 7 - - - - 10 9 214 
Sweden & 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 215 
Norway 
Austria/ 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 216 
Hungary 
Hyati 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 217 
France 2 - 5 - - - 11 - 13 218 
Spain 1 - 4 - - - 12 14 12 219 
Equator 
- 7 8 - - - - 12 10 220 
Luxemburg 1 - 5 - - - 3 3 4 221 
Switzerland 1 
- 11 - - - 13 14 12 222 
Salvador 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 223 
Uruguay 1 - 5 - - - 11 13 11 224 
Mexico 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 225 
Guatamala 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 226 
Colombia 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 227 
Argentina 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 228 
' 
Monaco 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 229 
Bolivia 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 230 
Portugal 3 3 6 2 - - 4 4 5 231 
Liberia 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 232 
Roumania 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 233 
Chile 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 234 
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Treaty a b c d e f g h i Note 
Netherlands 3 
-
6 - - - 4 4 5 235 
San Marino 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 236 
Servi a/ 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 237 
Yugoslavia 
Belgium 1 
-
7 - - - - 11 9 238 
Peru 3 
-
6 - - - 4 4 5 239 
Cuba 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 240 
Nicaragua 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 241 
Panama 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 242 
Paraguay 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 243 
Greece 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 244 
Siam 3 - 5 - - - 4 4 - 245 
Czechos- 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 246 
lovakia 
Finland 3 - 6 - - - 4 4 5 247 
USA - - 6 - - - 4 4 5 248 
Swaziland - - 3 6 4 5 7 8 9 249 
Botawana - - 3 6 4 5 7 8 9 250 
Malawi 3 - 4 6 5 - 8 7 9 251 
Israel 2 2 - - - - 4 4 4 252 
Transkei 
- - 3 5 4 - 8 7 9 253 
BVC states - - 3 5 4 - 8 7 9 254 
Multi 
Taiwan 3 4 5 6 8 255 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this Chapter it has been seen that the basis of extradition can be 
divided into two broad categories : extradition based on treaty; and 
extradition in the absence of treaty provisions. 
It has been established that a duty to extradite arises only in the 
context of a treaty commitment to do so. However, the term "treaty 
commitment" must be understood to include an offer of reciprocity 
duly made by one state and acted upon by the other state which then 
gives rise to a binding treaty commitment. It has been submitted 
that because of a misconception of the true nature of reciprocity, 
the distinction between the extradition of an individual under 
section 3(2) of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962 - which is an act of 
comity, albeit of a special nature - and the treaty obligations 
arising from reciprocity, has become blurred. This has led to an 
unwarrantedly narrow approach to the granting of undertakings of 
reciprocity by the South African authorities. 
Reciprocity aside, it has been established that a duty to extradite 
can arise from bilateral treaty arrangements; multilateral 
extradition conventions; regional arrangements; and multilateral 
conventions not dealing directly with extradition. The Republic has, 
at various stages, made use of all these bases. Of these, bilateral 
treaties constitute the basis most favoured by the authorities. 
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As regards extradition in the absence of a treaty, it emerged that 
despite well-established arguments to the contrary, states are under 
no obligation to extradite in the absence of a treaty. However, this 
does not mean that they are not free to do so. Although both comity 
and reciprocity were discussed under this head, this was done solely 
on traditional grounds as it was established that reciprocity is in 
fact a treaty commitment to extradite. 
It was established that South Africa in fact fairly often utilises 
comity as a basis for extradition through an application of the 
provisions of section 3(2) of the Extradition Act. This is, however, 
not the classical form of comity where all was dependent on the 
discretion of the head of state. Although the application of section 
3(2) is in fact dependent on the written consent of the State 
President, this consent does no more than bring the individual whose 
extradition is sought, within the ambit of the Act after which the 
normal extradition process runs its course. The possibility of a 
customary rule of public international law between South Africa and 
another state developing around the provisions of section 3(2) is 
also considered ; as is the theory of morality forming the basis of 
extradition. Both of the latter options are rejected. 
Certain limitations on the right or duty to extradite are identified 
and tabulated. 
In conclusion it would appear that as regards the basis on which 
extradition can take place, South Africa has well and truly broken 
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free of her Colonial past. The country has a hybrid and vibrant 
extradition policy embracing virtually all the recognised bases for 
extradition. 
Having defined extradition, attempted to place the South African 
situation in historical perspective, and determined the basis on 
which the institution rests, the following Chapter will be devoted to 
a consideration of the acquisition of treaty rights and obligations. 
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 111 
See Shearer (1971) 22-3. 
2 See section 3(2) of the South African Extradition Act 67 of 
1962 which expressly provides that the State President may 
consent to the extradition of a person to a state with whom 
the Republic does not have an extradition treaty. 
Norway, too, for example, would appear to follow a similar 
system - JF 9/11/2 (Norway). 
3 Starke ( 1989) 348; Musgrove v Chun Teeong Toy 1891 AC 
272; Fong Yue Ting v US 1893 149 US 698. 
4 Subject, of course, to the minimum standards required by 
international law for the protection of aliens within the 
territory of a state. See Booysen (1989) 112 ff, and 
Bedi (1966) 27ff. 
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 in Brownlie 
(1975) 233. The treaty came into operation in January 
1980 with British ratification. Although South Africa is not 
a party to the Convention, it is generally accepted that the 
provisions of the Convention represent a codification of 
existing rules of customary public international law. The 
Republic would appear to follow its provisions in practice; 
--
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Booysen (1989) 34 n 11. 
6 Article 2. Although, generally speaking, a treaty need not 
be reduced to writing (Booysen (1989) 28ff), extradition 
treaties are by their very nature likely to be written 
agreements. 
7 Article 26. Good faith is particularly important in the 
field of extradition where terms such as the "comity of 
nations" are frequently encountered. 
8 Treaty must here be given a wide interpretation to include 
agreements based on reciprocity - see below. 
9 South Africa would appear to be one of the few states which 
is today actively pursuing a policy for the conclusion of 
bilateral extradition treaties with as many states as 
possible. The response to approaches for the conclusion of 
such treaties has been largely apathetic and reflects the 
importance attached to such agreements by many states. So 
eg, when approached by South Africa to conclude a new 
extradition treaty France replied that there was "no place 
for the conclusion of a new,treaty" - Letter from French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 5.7.1968 JF 1/554/20/13. 
New Zealand replied that although there was no objection in 
principle to the conclusion of such a treaty, it was not 
regarded as a matter of urgency and South Africa would have 
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to wait in line. The line would appear to be a lengthy one 
as no treaty has to date been concluded! - JF 
1/554/20/48. In a letter dated 27.6.1972 JF 9/11/2 
(Britain)), the South African authorities were informed that 
there was no likelihood of a treaty with Britain being 
concluded in the near future. Sw~tzerland ( JF 9/11/2 
(Switzerland) letter dated 4.7.1979); Austria ( JF 9/11/2 
(Austria) letter dated 15.12.1976); and Canada ( JF 9/11/2 
(Canada) letters dated 23.5.1973 and 6.6.1973) were also not 
prepared to enter into new bilateral extradition agreements. 
10 See Shearer (1971) 22; Bassiouni (1974) 19. The most 
commonly cited agreements of this type are the Arab League 
Extradition Agreement of 14.9.1952 operative since 
23.8.1954; the Benelux Extradition Convention of 27.6.1962; 
the Scheme relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders 
within the Commonwealth of 1966; the European Extradition 
Convention in force since 18.4.1960; the Inter-American 
Conventions which include the Montevideo Convention (1889), 
the Mexico Convention (1902), the Bolivarian Convention 
(1911), the Bustamante Code (1928) and the Second Montevideo 
Convention (1933); the Nordic States Scheme of 1962; and the 
Organisation Communale Africaine et Malgache Convention of 
1961. 
11 One thinks here, in particular of conventions concluded to 
control the new breed of international crimes such as 
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terrorism and drug offences. As example, one may cite the 
Convention for the Suppression of Crimes on Board Aircraft 
in Flight of 1968 to which South Africa is a party. The 
Convention provides that member states will punish or 
extradite offenders. Specifically as regards terrorism, see 
Bassiouni (1975); Mcwhinney (1987); Bassiouni (1988). 
12 Green et al v United States 154 Fed 401, 410 (CCA 5th 1907). 
See too, Factor v Laubenheimer 290 US 276 287 (1933); 
Williams v Rogers 57 ILR 315. 
13 See "Extradition in the absence of a treaty" below. 
14 Br.~ ti sh Digest ( 1965) 455. 
15 British Digest (1965) 456. 
16 British Digest (1965) 460. Although initially the British 
authorities appeared to expect that Thornley would be 
released as they claimed that France should not detain a 
British subject when no extradition treaty existed between 
them and Russia. When they discovered that he had been 
naturalised in Russia, they dropped their demands for his 
release but their opinion remained clear. For further 
examples see Morgenstern (1949) 328ff and McNair (1951) 
172ff. 
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17 1878 SALR 38 heard on 25.4.1878. 
18 At 39. 
19 Attorney-General v Andreson 1897 Off Rep 287. The judgment of 
Esser J against which the appeal is noted is summarised at 
289. 
20 Andreson above at 289. Morice J concurred in Kotze J's 
judgment. A dissenting judgment was delivered by Ameshoff J 
and is discussed below. 
21 As no extradition treaty existed between Canada and South 
Af~ica, Part II of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1887 (backing 
of warrants - see below) would have had to have been 
utilised to effect Usher's extradition. However, as this 
part of the Act had never come into operation in Canada, 
this was impossible. Furthermore, Usher had acquired 
Canadian citizenship and was thus not open to deportation. 
"It would appear •.. that there is no means under Canadian law 
whereby Mr Usher could be returned to South Africa" 
communication from the Canadian Under Secretary for State 
Affairs dated 29.7.1965 - JF 1/554/20/49. 
22 Lewis was wanted to stand trial on eight charges of fraud 
and one of theft. A warrant for his arrest had been issued 
in Johannesburg on 30.9.1964 - JF 1/554/20/47. 
---
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the Fugitive Offenders Act did not aply to it. In any event, 
it was in conflict with article 50(1) of the Irish 
Constitution. In a letter dated 16.5.1949 it was suggested 
that the conclusion of a treaty be considered - JF 
554/20/12. Nothing appears to have come of this. 
24 Marshall Square ROM 282/2/62 - JF 1/554/20/12. 
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of .. a treaty of extradition". 
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1/554/20 (Misc). 
28 Note 295 of 29.5.1964 - JF 1/554/20 (Misc). 
29 Lang was wanted to face charges of theft of trust funds 
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7.7.64). The warrant for his arrest was certified on 
16.7.1964. In reply the Lusaka Assistant Commissioner CID 
stated on 15.8.1964 that "I am directed to say that as there 
are at present no arrangements for extradition between 
Northern Rhodesia and the Republic ... no action to detain 
Lang is practicable." - JF 1/554/20/46. 
30 When South Africa requested the return of Higgs, a former 
lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand who had fled 
to Lusaka, the British ambassador replied that "The 
government of Northern Rhodesia have indeed expressed 
serious doubts as to whether the necessary legal steps have 
in·fact been taken to make the extradition treaty 
operative ... " - JF 1/554/20/46. Higgs was not extradited. 
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succession to treaties which is considered in Chapter IV. 
32 See eg, Shearer (1971) 51-2; Bassiouni (1974) 47ff 
Van der Heijden (1954) 29-30; and Bedi (1966) 53, 
although he terms this "morality" - see below. 
33 Shearer (1971) 51ff. See too, Bassiouni (1974) 19. 
34 Shearer (1971) 51. 
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(1977) 1 ff. 
38 For a review of the resolutions adopted by the United 
Nations evidencing the generally hostile attitude of the 
international community see Botha (CJ). The rhetoric 
culminated in the adoption of the International Convention 
for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
GA Res 3068 of 1973 on 30.11.1973, operative from 
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Booysen (1976) at 56. See too "Dakar call for trial of 
Apartheid" lead story in The Pretoria News 10.7.1987. Since 
the watershed speech delivered by the South African state 
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extent, and changes have occurred, no final solutions have 
yet been reached. 
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Republic. See Thomas (1977) n 37. 
40 Again the events of 1990 would appear to have softened 
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Zimbabwean Minister of Home Affairs, Simbi Mubako, stated 
that although there was no extradition treaty between 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, "the situation will arise in 
future when irrespective of political differences Zimbabwe 
and South Africa would be able to exchange common 
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appear to be a move towards the reincorporation of the 
"independent states" within the Republic. However, at this 
stage these entities must be judged from the South African 
perspective and be regarded as sovereign independent states. 
Inpeed it should be noted that at the opening of the CODESA 
negotiations for a Democratic South Africa on 20.12.1991, the 
President of Bophuthatswana, Lucas Mangope, declared himself 
unable to sign the Declaration of Intent as he could not agree 
unconditionally to the reincorporation of his country into 
South Africa: SABC - TV live coverage 20.12.1991. 
47 Although generally regarded as no more than extensions of 
the South African government (see GUR Corporation v Trust 
Bank of Africa above) relations between the Republic and 
these states have not always been cordial. In 1978 Transkei 
in fact broke off diplomatic relations with Pretoria - a 
breach which has subsequently been mended. 
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48 A disadvantage of such agreements is that they often omit 
procedural requirements - se~ the criticism of the European 
Extradition Convention on this score in Council of Europe 
(1970). It is interesting to note further that at the 
Commonwealth Council meeting in 1966 held to review the 
provisions of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 governing 
extradition within the Commonwealth, the delegates rejected 
the adoption of a multilateral convention opting rather for 
a retention of the backing of warrants system - Shearer 
(1971) 55. 
49 See Convention on Extradition concluded between the 
' 
Republics of South Africa, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda, 
Government Gazette 10586/1987 23.1.1987. 
50 See article 13 of the Convention - "Reciprocal endorsement 
of warrants of arrest". 
51 Agreement of Extradition between the Republic of Transkei 
and the Republic of South Africa concluded at Pretoria 
24.4.1987 - Transkei Government Gazette Vol 12 8.6.87. New 
treaties were also concluded with Bophuthatswana : Agreement 
on Extradition between the Government of the Republic of 
Bophuthatswana and the Government of the Republic of 
Transkei concluded at Mankwe 27.9.1989 - Transkei 
Government Gazette Vol 14 Sp 66 1.11.1989; and Venda 
Agreement of Extradition between the Government of the 
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Republic of Venda and the Government of the Republic of 
Transkei concluded at Mankwe 26.9.1989 Venda Government 
Gazette 24 16.2.1990. 
52 Shearer (1971) 51 ff. 
53 Bassiouni (1974) 19 ff. 
54 Shearer (1971) 51; see too, Bassiouni (1974) 19. 
55 44 & 45 Viet c 69. 
56 See eg, Stanbrook (1980) 37 ff. 
57 See the cases referred to in nn 27-30 above. 
58 See letter from Lusaka Assistant Commissioner dated 
15.8.1964 in which it was stated that no extradition 
arrangements had existed between South Africa and Northern 
Rhodesia since South Africa's departure from the 
Commonwealth JF 1/554/20/46. See too, the 
Lusakan response to South Africa's request for the 
extradition of Higgs JF 1/554/20/46 and n 30 above. 
59 Section 6 of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962, and article 13 
of the Extradition Convention. 
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60 Section 10 of the Act which deals with offences committed in 
a foreign state other than an associated state, demands 
sufficient reason for putting the person on trial in the 
Republic had the offence been committed here. Section 11 on 
the other hand, dealing with associated states, does not 
require this degree of proof. 
61 The person found to be extraditable is referred to prison 
pending the decision of the Minister in the case of foreign 
states; in the case of an associated state the decision is 
taken by the magistrate. See Lansdown and Campbell (1982) 52 
and Sanders 158 par 206. 
62 Radesich (1984) 279. 
63 1967 4 SA 583; see too, 1965 2 SA 770 (T). 
64 At 592 per Botha JA. 
65 See the statement by the Zimbabwean Minister of Home Affairs 
n 42 above. 
66 1967 2 SA 636 (T). 
67 1971 3 SA 899 (A) and 1971 1 SA 359 (N). 
68 At 640 per Boshoff J. 
--
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69 At 909 per Ogilvie-Thompson CJ. 
70 See eg, the treaty with Swaziland and the case of S v 
Bagattini and Others 1975 4 SA 252 at 256 where it was 
stated that "It was common cause before us that Swaziland is 
a "foreign state" but not an associated state in terms of 
the definition in sec. 1". 
71 As Zimbabwe no longer considers herself bound by the 
Rhodesian treaty with South Africa - see above - only the 
treaty with Malawi would appear to fit the mould. 
72 Article 5 of the 1910 White Slave Traffic Convention 103 
BFSP 244 and article 4 of the 1921 Supplementary White Slave 
Traffic Convention 9 LNTS 415. 
73 Article 10 of the 1929 International Convention for the 
Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency 112 LNTS 371. 
74 Article 9 of the 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the 
Illegal Traffic in Dangerous Drugs 198 LNTS 299. 
75 See Chapter II. Note however that the Transvaal Republic 
indeed acceded to certain treaties independently. 
76 See Mcwhinney (1987) and Bassiouni (1975) and (1988) 
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and the Convention for the Suppression of Illegal 
Traffic in Drugs. 
77 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts committed on 
Board Aircraft concluded on 14.9.1963 entered into force 
4.12.1969. Although article 16 (2) of the Convention states 
clearly that no obligation to extradite is created, article 
16(1) provides that an offence comnunitted in terms of the 
Convention will, for purposes of extradition, be regarded as 
having been committed both where it occurred and in the 
territory of the registering state. The Convention was 
incorporated into South African municipal law by means of 
the Civil Aviation Offences Act 10 of 1972 (as amended). 
78 Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft concluded 16.12.1970 entered into force 14.10.1971. 
In terms of article 7 "The Contracting State in the 
territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if 
it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception 
whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in 
its territory, to submit the case to its competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution". Article 8 
provides that any offence under the Convention is deemed to 
be an offence in terms of the extradition treaties of the 
contracting states. Those states which allow extradition 
only on treaty, may in terms of article 8(2) regard the 
Convention as a sufficient basis for extradition. This 
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the Civil Aviation Offences Act 10 of 1972. 
79 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation concluded 23.9.1971 entered into 
force 26.1.1973. In article 7 of this Convention too the 
duty either to extradite or prosecute is established. The 
Convention was incorporated into South African law by the 
Civil Aviation Offences Act 10 of 1972. 
80 See for example, Pan American World Airways Incorporated v 
SA Fire and Accident Insurance 1965 3 SA 150 (A). 
81 Long title to Act 10 of 1972 as amended by section 5 of Act 
63 of 1978. 
82 As amended by section 19(b) of Act 29 of 1974. 
83 As amended by section 15 of Act 29 of 1974. 
84 See introduction above and "Extradition in the absence of a 
treaty" below. See too, Hartley Booth (1980) lii; 
Stanbrook (1980) xxv. 
85 Section 1 of the British Hi-jacking Act 1971 c 70. 
86 This possibility exists only under the Hague and Montreal 
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Conventions. In the case of the Tokyo Convention Act 1967, 
Britain will extradite only to a country with whom it has 
operative bilateral treaty arrangements. See nn 77 - 79 
above and Stanbrook (1980) 81ff. 
87 See Eain v Wilkes 1982 ILM 342 and Botha (1982) 174. 
88 See eg, Shearer (1971) 23; and Bedi (1966) 29. 
89 Bk ii c 21 s 4. The original reads 
"Cum vero non soleant civitates permittere ut civitas altera 
armata intra fines suos poenae expetendae nomine veniat, neque 
id·expediat, sequitur ut civitas apud quem degit qui culpae est 
compertus, alterum facere debeat, aut ut ipsa interpellata pro 
merito puniat nocentem, aut ut eum permittat arbitrio 
interpellantis. hoc enim illud est dedere, quod in historiis 
saepissime occurrit." 
90 Vattel (1959) Bk ii s 76. 
91 Shearer (1971) 24; Bassiowii (1974) 7 
and 54 n 13 both of whom rely on Wheaton (1866) 188. 
92 British Digest (1965) 453. 
93 British Digest (1965) 453. Unfortunately, who the "good 
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authorities" were is not mentioned. 
94 British Digest (1965) 454. 
95 1827 1 Stuart 245. 
96 In the case of Re Washburn (1819) 4 Johnson 106 where 
Chancellor Kent declared obiter that the Jay Treaty was 
merely declaratory of customary public international law and 
that any person held in the United States on a theft charge 
in Canada, could not be released on a request for habeas 
corpus; Clarke (1888) 454. 
97 C19rke (1888) 454. See too R v Arton (no 1) 1896 
1 QB 108 at 111 wher~ it was stated that "it is part of the 
comity of nations that one State should afford to another 
every assistance towards bringing persons guilty of such 
crimes to justice". 
98 Attorney General v Andreson 1897 Off Rep 287. 
99 At 292. 
100 At 292. 
101 At 293. 
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102 At 293 (emphasis added). 
103 At 294. 
104 See the majority judgment at 290. These laws were considered 
in Chapter II. 
105 At 291. 
106 There has been a somewhat heated debate among certain 
academics on this point. See eg, Sanders (1977) 369 and 
(1978) 198, as opposed to Booysen (1975) 315. Dugard 
(1971) 13 follows the golden mean. Although the decision of 
the Appellate Division in Nduli and Another v Minister of 
Justice and Others 1978 SA 893 (A) was hailed by some as 
settling the issue (see Sanders (1978) 198), it in 
fact fell far short of the mark - see Botha (1978) 170. For 
the latest contributions on this topic, see Devine (1987-88) 
119; Schaffer (1983); Dugard (1989); Booysen (1990-91) and S 
v Ebrahim 1991 2 SA 553 (A). 
107 This was finally expressly stated by a South African court 
in Inter Science Research and Development Services (Pty) Ltd 
v Republica Popular de Mocambique 1980 2 SA 111 (T), a 
judgment which was followed in the same year by Kaffraria 
Property Co (Pty) Ltd v Government of the Republic of Zambia 
1980 2 SA 709 (E); Carpenter (1980) 125. A recent 
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decision illustrating this point is Binga v 
Administrator-General SWA and Others 1984 3 SA 949 {SWA). 
108 See Booysen {1989) 77 ff; and Cheng Chi Cheung v 
R 1939 AC 160 at 168 where Lord Atkin declared that rules of 
customary international law would be applied "so far as 
[they are] not inconsistent with rules ... finally declared by 
their tribunals". 
109 British Digest (1965) 454. 
11 0 A number of instances are cited. in British Digest ( 1965) 
462, notably the extradition of one Nielsen to Scotland from 
New York on forgery charges in 1825, and the case of Holmes 
v Jennison {1839) 14 Pet 540, while France was also 
apparently approached in 1822. This practice is, however, no 
longer followed and has not been for a considerable period 
as is clear from the 1866 Report to the Select Committee, 
where it is stated that : "No; we never act under any 
circumstances where there is not a treaty ... we never act at 
all in the way of making a demand upon a foreign 
government ... ". 
111 Eire Supreme Court 12 December 1950 1951 
ILR 336. 
112 Venezuela Federal Court 26 May 1953 in 20 
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ILR 366. See too, Factor v Laubenheimer 290 US 276 at 287 
(1933) where it is clearly stated that a country may "if 
agreeable to its own constitution and laws, voluntary (sic) 
exercise the power to surrender a fugitive from justice ... ". 
113 In re Vilca 1931-2 Annual Digest 293 decided by the Chilean 
court on 15.5.1929. See too Extradition : Germany & 
Czechosolvakia 1919-22 Annual Disgest 259; In re Beytia 
(Chilean Supreme Court) 1919-22 Annual Digest 261. 
114 In re Lepage 1931-2 Annual Digest 294. 
115 In re Nikoloff 1933-4 Annual Digest 351. 
116 Starke (1989) 20 states that the rules of comity are "for 
the most part rules of goodwill and civility, founded on the 
moral right of each state to receive courtesy from others". 
Akehurst (1987) 50 n 1 somewhat cynically describes 
comity as "a wonderful word to use when one wants ... to 
eliminate clarity of thought." 
117 464 F 2d 475 (2nd Cir 1972). See too R v Arton 1896 1 QB 108. 
118 Although there are any number of treaties granting 
aliens certain rights, there is to date no codified general 
standard of treatment which may be enforced against states; 
largely because most states would regard this as 
251 
unacceptable interference with their sovereign rights. See 
generally Booysen (1989) 168 ff. 
119 See eg, Bassiouni (1974) 2 ff. 
120 For example, the South African Extradition Act specifically 
empowers extradition in the absence of a treaty in section 
3(2), while article 1, para 1 of the Swiss Federal Law of 22 
January 1892 concerning Extradition, empowers the Federal 
Council to grant extradition to states with whom no 
extradition treaty has been concluded and "in exceptional 
cases even without reserving the right of reciprocal 
treatment" N v Public Prosecutor of the Canton of Aargau 
Swiss Cour de Cassation 20.5.1953 in 1953 ILR 363. 
France, on the other hand, appears to demand neither 
reciprocity nor formal arrangement - see letter from the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 5.7.1968 - JF 
1/554/20/13. 
121 Rezek (1981) 173. 
122 See below. 
123 See Stanbrook (1980) xxv for British practice. 
124 As will emerge presently, the government legal advisors 
would appear to hold a different view. 
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125 As provided in paricular by sections 9, 10, 13 and 14 of the 
Extradition Act 67 of 1962. See Lansdown and Campbell at 40 who 
support this interpretation. 
126 See eg, the Case of Mario Guassardo letter dated 23.7.64 on 
JF 1/554/20/4. 
127 Notably in dealings with what was the Federal Republic of 
Germany. See the Case of Franz Joseph Esser case 8/1356/81 
heard in the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court on 27.1.1982 -
JF 9/11/3-1; the case of Hans Dieter Gebhardt heard in 
the Windhoek Magistrate's Court 15.12.1980 - JF 9/11/3; and 
the Case of Franz Joseph Kraul case 08/00784/817 heard in 
the Johannesburg Magistrate's court 17.6.1981 - JF 9/11/3. 
In all three instances the accused were extradited to 
Germany despite the absence of a current treaty between 
South Africa and the Federal Republic. In the case of 
Norway, too, contrary to the approach adopted in the 
Guassardo case above, it was in fact suggested that section 
3(2) be utilised in preference to the negotiation of a new 
treaty - JF 9/11/2 (Norway). 
128 The amounts, which Rademeyer claimed were due to him as 
commission had been placed in various overseas accounts 
after which he and his family had "moved" to Australia where 
he had taken out Australian nationality. The case was heard 
from 20.5.1985 and Rademeyer was returned to South Africa 
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in July 1985. 
129 See "Extradition hearing starts" Pretoria News 20.5.1985 
at 1 where it is stated that "Australian officials drew up 
an extradition agreement with South Africa to handle the 
case, but it prohibits extradition if it would be 
politically motivated". As far as could be established, this 
was not an extradition treaty but merely an agreement to 
cover the specific Rademeyer case - as is borne out by the 
wording of the report which makes no mention of a treaty and 
restricts it to the specific case. 
130 See comments on the Anstee case in n 42 above. 
131 Rezek (1981) 173. 
132 Rezek (1981) 173. 
133 Rezek (1981) 175. 
134 14 ILR 305 .. 
135 Rezek (1981) 173. 
136 For details of the case - and the analogous British case 
concerning the notorious Great Train Robber Robert Briggs 
who had also been in Australia and Brazil - see Shearer 
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(1975) 116. 
137 Sections 2, 4 and 5 of the United Kingdom Extradition Acts 
1870 - 1935 and R v Wilson 1887 3 QED 42. 
138 Section 10 Australia Extradition (Foreign States) Act 1966 
-1973 (Cth). 
139 Art 114 of Decree Law 66.689 11.6.1970 provides that 
extradition may be granted on request from a state which 
invokes "a convention or treaty signed with Brazil and, in 
the absence of it, the existence of reciprocity of 
treatment". 
140 The Australian authorities attempted to by-pass their 
statutory block by offering to use deportation procedures 
were Brazil to request extradition at some future date. They 
stated that " ... there are deportation procedures under the 
Migration Act which, with the approval of Ministers, could 
be applied in the event of a fugitive being sought by Brazil 
from Australia." - Shearer (1975) 116. This "offer" was 
squarely rejected by the Australian courts in Barton v 
Commonwealth of Australia 1974 3 ALR 70 at 91 and 48 ALJR 
161 at 171 where it was held that "the powers conferred by 
the Migration Act can be exercised only for the purposes 
authorized by that Act". See too, Ex parte Duke of Chateau 
Thierry 1917 1 KB 552 where a more subtle form of 
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the same procedure was used and Stanbrook (1980) xxvii. 
This issue is discussed more fully in Chapter I above. 
141 Section 10(4) of the Australian Extradition (Foreign States) 
Act 1966. 
142 Statutory Rule 130 of 1974 - see Shearer (1975) 117. 
143 Rezek (1981) 173. 
144 Rezek (1981) 176. 
145 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties operational as 
from 1980 see n 5 above. 
146 Article 3 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
147 Booysen (1989) 33 and the writers he cites inn 7. See too, 
the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, where the 
Permanent Court expressly recognised the validity and 
binding force of an oral undertaking : 1933 PCIJ Ser A/B 53 
at 71. 
148 40 ILR 211 case of Camara Federal de la Capital 
(Penal Chamber) heard on 26.5.1964. 
149 Rezek (1981) 177. 
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150 Rezek (1981) 177. 
151 In re Zahabian (Switzerland Federal Tribunal) 32 ILR 290. 
152 At 290-291. 
153 Seen 9 above and in particular the New Zealand response to 
South African approaches. 
154 South Africa has in any event not registered her treaties 
with the Secretariate for a number of years. 
155 Application for extradition addressed by South Africa to 
Brazil - JF 1/554/20/4. 
156 Marshall Square ROM 143/4/62. 
157 The views of the government legal advisors were sought in a 
letter dated 23.7.1964; they replied in letter 42/37 dated 
19.8.1964 - JF 1/554/20/4. 
158 As pointed out above, this is not in fact the case. 
159 This is in fact no more than the minimun form of reciprocity 
identified by Rezek (1981) above. What the authorities are 
in fact doing by adopting this restrictive approach is 
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Britain in their dealings with Brazil (in the Barton 
Brothers and Briggs cases respectively - seen 140 above). 
160 The Case of Franz Podezin - JF 9/11/2. 
161 Bedi (1966) 53 
162 Bedi (1966) 53. 
163 Bedi (1966) 53 and the authorities cited at n 137. 
164 Seen 133 above. 
165 See n 132 above. 
166 Haya de la Torre case 1951 ICJ Rep and Bedi (1966) at 55. 
167 See above where reciprocity and comity are discussed. 
168 See eg, in the case of South Africa in particular, the 
extradition of Frans Jacob Smit Theron wanted to stand trial 
in South Africa for fraud totalling some R300 000 and 
contravention of the Insolvency Act. Despite the United 
States apparently having no objection in principle to the 
extradition of Theron, technical problems surrounding the 
formalities attendant upon the request caused delays of 
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169 See 191-193 above. 
170 The determining factor is the attitude of the affected 
states - see North Sea Continental Shelf cases 1969 ICJ Rep. 
171 Here, too, the particulars of a specific case will have to 
be examined - see the Asylum case 1950 ICJ Rep. As Wallace 
(1986) puts it at 10 "For instance, a state which is able 
to cite two examples of state practice to support its 
contention that the practice is law, will be in a better 
position than a state which can cite no such examples." 
172 Case 8/1356/81 (Johannesburg Magistrate's Court) - JF 
9/11/3-1; case heard in Windhoek Magistrate's Court 
15.12.1980 - JF 9/11/3; case 08/00784/817 (Johannesburg 
Magistrate's Court) - JF 9/11/3 respectively. 
173 JF 1/554/20/4 - extradition request from Brazil. 
174 Letter 42/37 dated 19.8.1964 JF 1/554/20/4. 
175 For a full discussion of the historical development from 
Greek and Roman times, see Shearer (1971) 95ff. 
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176 Report of the Royal Commission on Extradition 1878 Vol 24 
Parliamentary Papers 907-917. 
177 Shearer (1971) 97ff. So strongly did the British perceive 
this matter that in the Anglo-Swiss Extradition Treaty of 
1880 (71 BFSP 54) provision is made for the non extradition 
of Swiss nationals to Britain while British nationals may 
still be extradited to Switzerland - Shearer (1971) 99. 
178 Sanders par 184 at 152. 
179 1969 2 SA 224 (T). 
180 Anglo I Portuguese Extradition Treaty of 1892 as amended by 
Convention 20.1.1932. 
181 At 224 of the judgment. 
182 Bedi (1966) 207. 
183 JF 9/11/3 (Israel). 
184 Letter from the Director General Foreign Affairs and 
Information dd 22.1.1982 - JF 9/11/3 (Israel). 
185 JF 9/11/3-1 (Transkei). 
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5.8.1982. 
187 JF 9/11/3 (United States of America). 
188 JF 9/11/3 (United States of America). See too, Rand Daily 
Mail 9.7.1983 "Theron to be Extradited" and Rand Daily Mail 
21.7.1983 "SA exile arrested in US". He was extradited to South 
Africa on 23.6.1988 - Beeld 27.6.1988. 
189 See for a discussion of the political offence, Van den 
Wijngaert (1980); Bassiouni (1974) 370ff; Shearer (1971) 
166ff; Bedi (1966) 179ff; and Van der Heijden (1954) 79ff. 
Fo~ the South African approach, see Trichardt & Cilliers 
(1989-90) 69 particularly from 91. See too, Barrie (1969) 
and Radesich (1984). 
190 Trichardt & Cilliers (1989-90) at 75. 
191 Article 15 Act 67 of 1962. 
192 Trichardt & Cilliers (1989-90) come to the conclusion that 
South Africa will in all probability follow the 
interpretation of the British courts. 
193 1909 SC 433. 
194 At 437 and 439 of the judgment. 
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195 1971 1 SA 359 at 363. 
196 Case no 1500/86 TPD 23.10.1986 (unreported). 
197 Holman et al v Johnson 98 ER 1120 and Ivey v Lalland 42 
Mississippi Law Reports 444 for an American equivalent. 
198 Bedi (1966) 198; Van der Heijden (1954) 92. 
199 Van der Heijden (1954) 91; Bedi (1966) 196; Bassiouni (1974) 
429. The offence must not be a crime under the normal penal 
law of the land and must also not be classifiable as a cri~e 
against the laws of war. 
200 1933-34 Annual Digest 357. See too Ex parte Duke of Chateau 
Thierry 1917 1 KB 552. 
201 Bassiouni (1974) 429. 
202 For a full discussion of these aspects see Tate (1968) 337. 
203 For a general discussion see Bedi (1966) 193 and Bassiouni 
(1974) 459. 
204 The fact that this provision is fairly uncommon must be 
ascribed to the fact that the majority of South Africa's 
treaties are old and were inherited from Britain where the 
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205 For a general discussion see Bedi (1966) 203-209; Van der 
Heijden (1954) 93 and 94. 
206 For a general discussion see Bassiouni (1974) 443; Bedi 
(1966) 165; and Van der Heijden (1954) 56. 
207 See Bedi (1966) 178; Bassiouni (1974) 322; and Shearer 
(1971) 137. 
208 See Van der Heijden (1954) 60; Bassiouni (1974) 452; and 
Bedi (1966) 171. 
209 See Bassiouni (1974) 416ff. 
210 Many of these conventions provide that the individual should 
either be extradited or punished locally. A sympathetic 
state could consequently undertake to punish the accused and 
then merely let things slide with few real repercussions. 
211 Bassiouni (1974) 420-1. 
212 Treaty between Great Britain and Germany for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at London 
14.5.1872; ratified at London 11.6.1872. 
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213 Treaty between Great Britain and Italy for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Rome 
5.2.1873; ratified at Rome 18.3.1873 1873 63 BSP 
19-30. (Provisions not applicable to Malta.) 
214 Treaty between Great Bitain and Denmark for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Copenhagen 
31.3.1873; ratified at Copenhagen 26.4.1873 : 1873 63 
BSP 5-18. 
215 Treaty between Great Britain and Sweden and Norway for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Stockholm 26.6.1873; ratified at Stockholm 28.8.1873 
1873 63 BSP 175-179. 
216 Treaty between Great Britain and Austria/Hungary for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Vienna 3.12.1873; ratified at Vienna 10.3.1874 : 1873 
63 BSP 213-218. 
217 Treaty between Great Britain and Hayti for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Port-au-Prince 7.12.1874; ratified at Port-au-Prince 
2.9.1875 : 1874 65 BSP 44-48. 
218 Treaty between Great Britain and France for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Paris 
264 
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5-19. Special provisions in article 16 of the treaty 
exclude its application from France's East Indian 
Possessions see article 9 of the Anglo/French treaty 
of 7.3.1815. 
219 Treaty between Great Britain and Spain for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at London 
4.6.1878; ratified at London 21.11.1878 : 1878 69 BSP 
6-13. 
220 Treaty between Great Britain and the Republic of 
Equator for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 
sigped at Quinto 20.9.1880; ratified at Quinto 
19.2.1886 : 1881 72 BSP 137-143. 
221 Treaty between Great Britain and Luxemburg for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Luxemburg 24.11.1880; ratified at Brussels 5.1.1881 
1880 71 BSP 45-53. 
222 Treaty between Great Britain and Switzerland for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Berne 
26.11.1880; ratified at Berne 15.3.1881 : 1880 71 BSP 
54-62. The relevant provision (art 18) was amended by a 
convention entered into between Great Britain and 
Switzerland in London on 29 June 1904. The periods 
265 
provided for colonial possessions in the original 
treaty were amended to 6 weeks under article 3 par 3 
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223 Treaty between Great Britain and Salvador for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Paris 
23.6.1881; ratified at London 8.11.1882 : 1881 72 BSP 
13-19. 
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Republic of Uruguay for the Mutual Surrender of 
Fugitive Criminals signed at Montevideo 26.3.1884; 
ratified at Montevideo 13.12.1884 : 1883-4 75 BSP 
18-24. 
225 Treaty between Great Britain and Mexico for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Mexico 
7.9.1884; ratified at Mexico 22.1.1889 : 1885-6 77 BSP 
1253-1258. 
226 Treaty between Great Britain and Guatamala for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Guatamala 4.7.1885; ratified at Guatamala 6.9.1886 
1884-5 76 BSP 72-77. 
227 Treaty between Great Britain and Colombia for the 
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Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Bogota 
27.10.1888; ratified at Bogota 21.8.1889. 
228 Treaty between Great Britain and the Argentine Republic 
for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed 
at Beunos Aires 22.5.1889; ratified at Beunos Aires 
15.12.1893 : 1889-90 81 BSP 1305-1311. 
229 Treaty between Great Britain and Monaco for the 
Extradition of Criminals signed at Paris 17.12.1891; 
ratified at Paris 17.3.1892 : 1891-2 83 BSP 66-72. 
230 Treaty between Great Britain and Bolivia for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Lima 
22.2.1892; ratified at Lima 7.3.1898 
27-33. 
1896 88 BSP 
231 Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Lisbon 
17.10.1892; ratified at Lisbon 13.11.1893 : 1892-3 84 
BSP 83-88. (See the amending convention of 20.1.1932 
signed expressly "on behalf of South Africa" 1932 BSP 
135.) 
232 Treaty between Great Britain and Liberia for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at London 
31.1.1892; ratified at London 31.1.1894 : 1892-3 84 BSP 
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103-109. 
233 Treaty between Great Britain and Roumania for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Bucharest 21.3.1893; ratified at Bucharest 13.3.1894 
1893 85 ESP 69-75. 
234 Treaty between Great Britain and Chile for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Santiago 
26.1.1897; ratified at Santiago 14.4.1898 : 89 BFSP 
20-25. 
235 Treaty (repalcing the treaty of 19.6.1874 : see Clarke 
(1888) cxlvii) between Great Britain and the 
Netherlands for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive 
Criminals signed at London 26.9.1898; ratified at 
London 14.12.1898 : 90 BFSP 51-58. Special mention is 
made of the various colonies and the period allowed for 
provisional arrest is extended to 60 days in the case 
of the colonies. 
236 Treaty between Great Britain and the Republic of San 
Marino for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitive Criminals 
signed at Florence 16.10.1899; ratified at Rome 
5.12.1899 : 91 BFSP 95-101. 
237 Treaty between Great Britain and Servia/Yugoslavia for 
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the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Belgrade 6.12.1900; ratified at Belgrade 13.3.1901 : 92 
BFSP 41-47. 
238 Treaty (replacing the treaty of 20.5.1876 :see Clarke 
(1888) xlii) between Great Britain and Belgium for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Brussels 29.10.1901; ratified at Brussels 6.12.1901.In 
a convention signed at London on 5.3.1907 and ratified 
on 17.4.1907, the parties made special provisions for 
criminals arrested in the Dominions : 100 BFSP 472-473. 
239 Treaty between Great Britain and Peru for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Lima 
26.1.1904; ratified at Lima 30.11.1906: 99 BFSP 
963-968. 
240 Treaty between Great Britain and Cuba for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Havana 
3.10.1904; ratified at Havana 10.1.1905 
26-31 . 
1904 97 BFSP 
241 Treaty between Great Britain and Nicaragua for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Managua 19.4.1905; ratified at London 13.2.1906. 
242 Treaty between Great Britain and Panama for the Mutual 
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Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Panama 
25.8.1906; ratified at Panama 15.4.1907. 
243 Treaty between Great Britain and Paraguay for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Asuncion 12.9.1908; ratified at Asuncion 30.1.1911 
102 BFSP 340-345. 
244 Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom and Greece 
concluded at Athens 24.9.1910; ratified at Athens 
30.12.1911. 
245 Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom and Siam 
concluded at Bankok 4.3.1911; ratified at London 1 .8.1911. 
246 Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals between the United 
Kingdom and Czechoslovakia concluded at London 
11.11.1924. This treaty represents an important departure in 
that it provided in article 17, that it would not apply in 
certain of Britain's dominions - including the Union of 
South Africa - unless "notice to that effect shall have been 
given on behalf of the government of such Dominion". 
Provision was also made for the independent termination of 
the treaty by the Dominions. The treaty was, however, 
extended to the Union of South Africa as from 1t.6.1927; see 
GN 26 Government Gazette of 6.1.1928. 
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247 Treaty between Finland and the United Kingdom for the 
Extradition of Criminals concluded at London 30.5.1924. This 
treaty also contained the clause identified in the previous 
footnote suspending the operation of the treaty in the Union 
- see article 17. Again, the treaty was made applicable to 
the Union by agreement between the governments of Finland 
and the Union - article v GN 1677 Government Gazette 
29.9.1925. 
248 Extradition Treaty between the Union of South Africa and the 
United States of America concluded at Washington 18.12.1947; 
ratified at Washington 1.3.1951 - see GN 91 Government 
Gazette 20.4.1951. 
249 Extradition Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of South Africa and the Government of the Kingdom of 
Swaziland concluded at Cape Town and Mbabane 4 & 5 .9.1968 -
see Government Gazette 2179 4.10.1968. 
250 Extradition Treaty between the Republic of South Africa and 
the Republic of Botswana concluded at Cape Town 7.2.1969 
ratified at Cape Town 8.4.1969 - see GN R 118/1969 
Government Gazette 2379 2.5.1969. 
251 Extradition Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of Malawi and the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
concluded at Pretoria 25.2.1972 ratified at Pretoria 
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10.3.1972 - see Government Gazette 3424 24.3.1972. 
252 Extradition Treaty between the Union of South Africa and the 
State of Israel concluded at Pretoria 18.9.1959; ratified at 
Pretoria 7.1.1960 - see GN R14 Government Gazette 6362 
5.2.1960. 
253 Agreement of Extradition between the Government of the 
Republic of Transkei and the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa concluded at Pretoria 24.4.1987 - see 
Government Gazette (Transkei) vol 12 8.6.1987. 
254 Convention on Extradition entered into between the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and the 
Governments of the Republics of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and 
Venda 28.1.1988 - see Pree 1/1988 Government Gazette (Venda) 
Vol 19 5.2.1988. 
255 Treaty of Extradition between the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and the government of the Republic of China 
concluded at Taipei 30.12.1987 Government Gazette 11316 
24.5.1988. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous Chapter the basis upon which a request for 
extradition or a decision to extradite may rest was examined in some 
detail. It was determined that, particularly in the case of South 
Africa, treaty must be regarded as the most important basis for both 
requests for and grants of extradition. However, how South Africa 
came to acquire the treaty rights and obligations she currently 
enjoys - or claims to enjoy - must be examined more closely. 
In assessing how a state acquires treaty rights and obligations, a 
preliminary distinction may be drawn between acquisition by original 
means - where the state itself is an original party to the 
conclusion of a treaty - and derivative acquisition - where the 
state party to a treaty acquires its rights and duties under the 
treaty from some other state which was an original party. In dealing 
with extradition, this distinction is crucial in the case of the 
Republic of South Africa since, as has been shown above, the vast 
majority of the extradition agreements which the Republic regards as 
binding, are in fact derived from Britain, the erstwhile mother 
country. 
2 ACQUISITION BY ORIGINAL MEANS 
In determining how a state acquires original rights and duties under 
a treaty the natural starting point is the Vienna Treaty 
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Convention.(1) Article 2(1)(b) of the Convention is not particularly 
helpful in defining the various terms used to denote acceptance of 
treaty commitments providing merely that "ratification", 
"acceptance", "approval" and "accession" mean "the international act 
so named". The conclusion and entry into force of treaties are, 
however, dealt with in detail in Part II of the Convention. 
Article 6 provides that every state has the capacity to conclude 
treaties.(2) Article 11 provides that this capacity may find its 
concrete expression either by: 
"signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any 
other means if so agreed". 
Each of these means is dealt with separately in articles 12 to 15. 
In essence the common characteristics emerging from these provisions 
are that the treaty should provide for the particular method of 
consent; or that it may be established from other evidence that the 
party states intended the particular method of consent to apply. The 
intentions of the parties consequently emerges as the cardinal 
determinant.(3) 
In all these instances, save one, it is further clear that we are 
concerned with an original method of acquisition. The one possible 
exception, given the definition attached to the term "original 
acquisition" above, which requires some explanation is accession. 
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When a state expresses its desire to be bound by a treaty through 
accession, the acceding state is of course not an original party in 
the sense mentioned above. Article 15 of the Treaty Convention 
provides that in such a case consent to be bound may be expressed by 
accession - or joining the treaty - if the treaty provides for this 
possibility; the negotiating states were agreed that consent could 
be so expressed; or the parties subsequently agreed that consent 
could be so expressed. In this instance, consequently, we find that 
although the acceding state is not an original party to the treaty, 
the rights and obligations accruing to it under the treaty are 
original in the sense that they are not rights deriving from some 
other state or international organisation. The state derives its 
right to consent to the treaty from the agreement of the other 
states ~nvolved, but does not derive the actual rights and duties 
inherent in the treaty from these other states - these rights accrue 
to it in original form. Accession, too, can consequently be regarded 
as an original acquisition of rights and duties. It should however 
be noted that within the traditional bilateral extradition mould, 
accession is generally of limited importance being restricted as it 
is to multilateral treaties - or to treaties which after the 
accession become multilatera1.(4) 
Within the evolution of the treaty-making capacity of the Union of 
South Africa, however, accession did have a role to play in the case 
of extradition. It will be remembered that after the 1926 Imperial 
Conference (5) the British policy was that treaties it concluded 
would no longer be directly applicable in the Dominions. The 
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Dominion governments would be given the option of acceding to such 
treaties. This was indeed put into practice in the extradition 
treaties concluded by Britain with Czechoslovakia (6) and Finland 
(7) in 1924. The Union acceded to the Finnish treaty in 1925 and to 
the Czech treaty in 1927.(8) 
These two treaties apart, within the South African context,(9) 
original acquisition of extradition treaty rights and obligations 
can be classified into two main groups viz, those concluded by the 
Union of South Africa after its creation in 1910; and those 
concluded by the Republic of South Africa after independence and 
departure from the "British fold" in 1961. 
Two treaties fall within this first grouping, viz the Extradition 
Treaty between the Union of South Africa and the United States of 
America concluded at Washington on 18 December 1947,(10) and the 
Extradition Treaty between the Union of South Africa and the State 
of Israel concluded at Pretoria on 18 September 1947.(11) 
There are a number of treaties within the second grouping, ie 
treaties concluded by the Republic of South Africa after 
1961. In the case of these treaties, the State President's power to 
bind the Republic internationally is, as was pointed out 
earlier,(12) derived from his prerogative to conduct the state's 
foreign relations as embodied in the Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Acts 32 of 1961 and 61 of 1983 read together with 
section 2 of the Extradition Act 67 of 1962. 
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The following extradition treaties concluded between the Republic of 
South Africa and the states listed below fall within this category 
( 13) : 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland;(14) Southern Rhodesia;C15) 
Swaziland;(16) Botswana;C17) Malawi;(18) Israel;(19) Transkei; (20) 
Bophuthatswana;C21) Venda;C22) Ciskei;C23) Multilateral Extradition 
Convention - Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda;C24) Republic of 
China. (25) 
3 ACQUISITION BY DERIVATIVE MEANS SUCCESSION 
3.1 General 
In this section we consider what is, from the South African 
perspective on extradition, the most important means for the 
acquisition of treaty rights and obligations. The extradition rights 
and duties which the present-day Republic of South Africa enjoys are 
derived, by and large, not directly from a treaty concluded between 
the Republic and a foreign state, but were acquired by the Republic 
from Britain, the original party to the treaty and the erstwhile 
South African "mother state". The question is consequently one of 
succession. 
In modern international law, state succession is an extremely wide 
and nebulous concept dependent on many and varied factors. (26) 
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Dealing with the general theories of succession Poulose (27) states 
that: 
"Succession is said to take place in international law, when 
a change of territorial sovereignty leads to the devolution 
of any rights and obligations of one state or government on 
another". 
This definition is useful in that it highlights one of the essential 
considerations in dealing with succession, viz that the question 
will arise only when there has been some or other change in the 
sovereignty of an international law entity. However, Poulose's 
contention that this change of territorial sovereignty - which may 
occur in various ways - of itself "leads to" a devolution of rights 
and obligations, may be misleading to the extent that it implies 
that succession is an automatic adjunct of a change of sovereignty. 
In fact, change in sovereignty does no more than create the 
circumstances under which the question of succession arises; it does 
not in itself automatically result in succession. Succession 
remains, as shall be seen, a conscious act by the states involved. 
Within the parameters of extradition in general, and the South 
African perspective in particular, a consideration of the question 
of succession may be considerably narrowed. In the first place, it 
was determined in the preceding Chapter that there is no general 
international law duty to extradite.(28) Particularly in the case of 
South Africa, the duty to extradite rests firmly on the basis of a 
treaty commitment to which the state regards itself as bound. For 
extradition purposes, consequently, the question of succession is 
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limited to succession to treaties. Furthermore, even this 
delimitation is too wide for present purposes since it was shown 
above (29) that during the relevant period Britain, which 
constitutes the principal predecessor state for South African 
questions of succession, was not party to multilateral extradition 
conventions and there is therefore no question of the Republic 
succeeding to multilateral agreements in this regard. Consequently, 
from the extradition point of view, succession may be approached 
solely from the perspective of succession to bilateral treaties. 
3.2 Theories of succession 
Although it has become customary for any examination of state 
success~on to be prefaced by the statement that there is little or 
no consensus among either international law writers or state 
practice with regard to the topic,(30) this no longer necessarily 
reflects the true position. The year 1978 saw a codification of 
contemporary thinking on state succession to treaties through the 
adoption of the Vienna Succession Convention.C31) In this convention 
succession is defined as : 
"the replacement of one state by another in the 
responsibility for the international relations of 
territory. 11 (32) 
The Succession Convention may indeed by regarded as a handy source 
of reference when considering problems of succession. However, a 
number of factors militate against its provisions being accorded 
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undue weight. First, the Convention is not, as in the case of the 
Vienna Treaty Convention, a codification of customary public 
international law, being rather a codification of new trends, 
particularly among the younger nations of the world. Second, the 
Succession Convention does not enjoy the general recognition 
accorded the Treaty Convention even before it came into operation, 
and is in any event, itself not yet in operation.C33) 
Specifically from the South African perspective, two factors 
negative undue reliance on the Succession Convention and its 
provisions when considering state succession. First, South Africa is 
not a party to the Convention; and second - specifically as regards 
extradition - most of the Republic's succession problems arose 
before the adoption of the Convention. In this regard special note 
should be taken of article 7 which expressly provides that : 
" ... the Convention applies only in respect of a succession 
of States which has occurred after the entry into force of 
the Convention ... ". (34) 
Consequently, in assessing the succession of South Africa to British 
extradition treaties, the Succession Convention must be read 
together with the general theories of succession developed through 
the years. 
Traditionally, three theories on state succession to treaties are 
postulated.(35) These theories vary from what Menon (36) terms the 
"traditional view" in terms of which a state starts its existence 
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with a clean slate bound by none of the treaties concluded by its 
predecessor; through what O'Connell,(37) somewhat picturesquely, 
terms the "pick and choose" approach in terms of which a state may 
unilaterally elect which of its predecessor's treaties it chooses 
to regard as binding and which not; to the theory of universal 
succession where all the rights and duties of the predecessor state 
devolve upon the successor. (38) However, any attempt to find a 
universal working definition of these theories is doomed from the 
outset. Each emphasises an aspect of particular relevance to the 
states concerned within a particular political time-frame - with 
emphasis generally falling on the interests of the "new" state - and 
each holds its own disadvantages. 
The cle~n slate or tabula rasa theory, for example, holds 
considerable attraction for the newly independent colonial countries 
particularly on the African continent, as it stresses the principles 
of self-determination and the importance of their newly-won 
sovereign independence. It however has the inherent drawback that a 
legal hiatus ensues which, given the traumatic adjustments to 
independence, can result in a highly unsatisfactory period of 
uncertainty which can last a number of years. This is particularly 
true in the case of extrad_i tion, which is generally not regarded as 
a matter of pressing urgency to a new state intent upon balancing 
its books! (39) In modern practice, few states have indeed opted for 
this approach, Israel being a notable exception.C40) However, that 
the idea of a clean beginning in fact holds considerable sway in 
contemporary international relations is clear from article 16 of the 
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Succession Convention (41) which embodies the traditional tabula 
rasa principle. 
The "pick and choose" approach holds the obvious drawback that the 
will of third states which originally contracted with the 
predecessor state is almost wholly negated in that by .its unilateral 
decision, the successor seeks to involve the third states in a 
treaty relationship which was not necessarily envisaged when the 
original treaty was concluded. So high a premium is placed on the 
sovereign independence of the "new" state, that sight is often lost 
first, of the equally valid sovereign independence of the third 
state, and second, of the essentially consensual nature of a treaty 
commitment. 
The universal succession theory too, holds obvious drawbacks in that 
it negates the sovereign independence of the new state. Very few of 
the emergent African states would have been prepared to accept all 
treaties concluded by the predecessor state which was generally 
perceived as an alien oppressor. 
What is consequently needed is a theory which will ameliorate the 
excessively one-sided effect of the "pick and choose" approach, 
while at the same time modifying the effects of universal 
succession. This was found in the theory generally referred to as 
provisional succession. This approach eliminates the legal vacuum 
arising from the tabula rasa, the arbitrary consequences of the 
unilateral declaration, and the threat to new-found sovereignty of 
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universal succession. A state electing to follow this option will 
generally agree to be bound by the predecessor's treaty commitments 
for a period during which it retains the right to review all treaty 
commitments and either accept or reject them after negotiation with 
the other party concerned. The successor state is consequently not 
faced with a legal vacuum and has time in which to consider its 
interests. The rest of the international community too, is better 
able to gauge where they stand. A notable example of such an 
approach is Malawi's "Declaration Relating to Treaty Obligations" 
issued by that country on its attainment of independence.(42) This 
declaration provides in material part : 
"As regards bilateral treaties validly concluded by the 
Government of the United Kingdom or by the Government of the 
former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on behalf of 
the former Nyasaland Protectorate, or validly applied or 
extended by either of the said Governments to [such] 
territory .•. the Government of Malawi is willing to continue 
to apply within its territory, on a basis of reciprocity, 
the terms of all such treaties for a period of eighteen 
months from the date of independence ... unless abrogated or 
modified earlier by mutual consent. At the expiry of that 
period, the Government of Malawi will regard such of these 
treaties which could not by the application of the rules of 
customary international law be regarded as otherwise 
surviving, as having terminated." 
The question of the status of treaties during this "limbo" period 
arose in the case of Molefi v Principal Legal Advisor.(43) In this 
case the question on appeal before the Privy Council was whether 
Molefi, a member of the banned Pan African Congress who was as a 
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consequence subject to persecution in his mother country South 
Africa and fled to Lesotho, was a refugee deserving of protection 
under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Re~ugees. The 
Convention had been extended to Basutoland (as Lesotho then was) on 
9 February 1961.(44) On Lesotho's independence a declaration in 
terms identical to that of Malawi, was submitted by Lesotho to the 
United Nations setting out the new government's attitude towards 
treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, concluded by Britain its 
predecessor.C45) In it Lesotho declared that in the case of 
multilateral treaties, each would be reviewed individually. However, 
during the interim period : 
" ... any party to a multilateral treaty which has, prior to 
independence been applied or extended to the country 
formerly known as Basutoland, may, on a basis of 
reciprocity, rely as against Lesotho on the terms of such 
treaty". 
Whether this was to be regarded as an accession to the treaty, was, 
the court held, to be determined from an interpretation of the 
letter itself.(46) The declarations made, were made on the 
understanding that Lesotho was a fully independent state and wished 
to maintain legal continuity with regard to treaty relations between 
itself and the states with which the former Basutoland had 
relations.(47) The court consequently had little difficulty in 
deciding that the Refugee Convention was of full force during this 
interim period. 
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Identifying the applicable theories is one thing; actually applying 
these theories to a concrete case is another altogether. 
Consideration of the practical application of succession demands a 
two-pronged enquiry. First, the nature of the treaty involved in the 
succession must be considered to determine whether or not it is 
susceptible to succession. Second, the nature of the act giving rise 
to the succession must be considered to determine whether or not the 
successor state is capable of succeeding to the treaty commitments. 
3.3 Characterising extradition treaties 
As regards the first question, ie the type of treaty involved, 
reference is often encountered to "personal treaties", "real 
treaties", "economic treaties", "judicial treaties", "political 
treaties", "dispositive treaties", etc. The issue to be determined 
is consequently under which of these heads the extradition treaty 
can be classed. This demands an examination of the nature of an 
extradition treaty. 
That there is certainly no unanimity on the nature of an extradition 
treaty, or on its suitability for purposes of succession, is clear 
from the writers. So, for example, O'Connell (48) classes an 
extradition treaty as judicial, equating it with the enforcement of 
foreign judgments. Discussing the possibility of articles of 
accession being deposited so ensuring a successor's membership of a 
treaty, he further states that : 
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"This expedient is unavailable in the case of, say, 
extradition treaties, and the practice of maintaining these 
has recently become so widespread as to be almost 
universal. 11 (49) 
A different view is taken by Starke (50) who states that extradition 
treaties do not pass to a successor state "unless some strong 
consideration requires this" as it would be unreasonable to bind a 
successor to·apply the predecessor's conception of criminal 
behaviour and its specific municipal law procedure which may differ 
from that of the successor. Hoijer,(51) classifies extradition as 
falling within the class of "political" treaties and consequently 
lapsing with a change of sovereignty. 
Bassiourti (52) on the other hand, claims that doubts surround the 
effect of state succession on extradition treaties; a view shared by 
Shearer.(53) Neither of these writers, however, would appear to 
consider the nature of the extradition treaty as of particular 
importance. 
The question of whether, in principle, an extradition treaty is 
suitable for succession must consequently depend on the perception 
one has of the nature of the treaty. The extradition treaty, like 
any treaty, is essentially a consensual, contractual agreement. The 
treaty can only be characterised on the basis of what the parties 
consented to when they concluded the treaty. The cardinal issue is 
consequently the aim or intention of the parties in concluding the 
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treaty - and in this regard the intention of both the original 
contracting parties and that of the successor must be borne in mind. 
As was seen above, various classifications of treaties are made when 
questions of succession arise. On analysis, however, two broad 
categories may be identified. These are treaties which may be 
classed as "personal" and treaties which may be classed as "real or 
dispositive". 
A dispositive treaty is a treaty which impresses upon a territory a 
status which is intended to be permanent and exists independently of 
the personality of the state which is at that time sovereign over 
the territory.(54) As was claimed in the Free Zones of Upper Savoy 
case (5~) such a treaty creates or transfers a real right - a right 
relating to territory which will apply against all states. So too in 
the Right of Passage over Indian Territory case,(56) the 
International Court confirmed that successor states are bound by 
territorial provisions arising from dispositive treaties. O'Connell 
(57) asserts that a dispositive treaty is a conveyance rather than 
an agreement. The maxims nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest 
quam ipse haberet and res transit suo onere will apply to this type 
of treaty with the result that it will "run with the land". 
Consequently, a change in sovereignty over territory subject to a 
dispositive treaty will result in the automatic succession of the 
new state to the dispositive treaty obligations. Included within 
this classification are, for example, border treaties,(58) or 
treaties instituting servitudes.C59) 
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A personal treaty, on the other hand, is a treaty which can be said 
to attach to the person of the state. These treaties do not limit 
the sovereignty of the state, as dispositive treaties can be seen to 
do, and depend for their viability on the continued existence of the 
state as a contracting party to the original treaty.(60) Notable 
among such treaties would be a treaty of friendship and cooperation 
which would depend for its existence on the relationship between the 
states concerned. Such treaties, it is generally agreed, do not 
necessarily survive changes in the sovereignty of the state 
parties, and indeed cannot survive the disappearance of one of the 
parties.(61) 
What therefore, is the essential difference between what is classed 
as a pe~sonal treaty and what is classed as a dispositive treaty and 
on what basis are they accorded different classification? The 
determining factor can be either the intention of the parties or the 
nature of the treaty. Hurst,(62) writing on the effect of war on 
treaties, notes that whether or not a treaty will be abrogated by 
war, 
"is to be found in the intention of the parties at the time 
when they concluded the treaty, rather than in the nature of 
the treaty which they concluded." 
Replying to this, McNair (63) comments correctly that it is all much 
of a muchness in that whether one uses either intention or nature as 
the criterion, the same result will be achieved in most instances 
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"for the nature of the treaty is clearly the best evidence 
of the intention of the parties". 
In dealing with both the history and the basis of extradition some 
attention was paid to the intention with which the parties concluded 
extradition treaties. It was seen that the motive of personal 
vengeance or the maintenance of a specific state system, which 
initially served as the basis for extradition - and which could 
truly be classed as a personal transaction in the interests of and 
attaching to the specific "prince" concerned - has long since 
disappeared. On the other hand, the ideal situation in which an 
extradition agreement is concluded with the intention of waging a 
universal war on a commonly perceived conception of crime in the 
interests of an harmonious and universally accepted world public 
order, has not yet dawned. A present-day extradition treaty can 
consequently be seen as no longer entirely personal, nor yet 
dispositive. It is rather a hybrid slotting in somewhere between the 
two. 
O'Connell's classification of an extradition treaty as "judicial" 
(64) would appear sound. The aim of the parties in concluding the 
treaty is to ensure that the perpetrator of a crime committed within 
their respective territories will be brought to justice before their 
courts. The states are agreeing that they will help one another to 
bring their judicial processes to fruition. Consequently, slotting 
into the states' judicial system, an extradition treaty is to an 
extent distanced from the day to day political existence of the 
state. In this sense the extradition treaty may be regarded as the 
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international leg of a state's judicial process. To class an 
extradition treaty as "political", and consequently not suited to 
succession is, it is submitted, neither an accurate evaluation of 
the intention or aims of the parties, nor a true reflection of the 
nature of the treaty. Although political factors may on occasion 
come into play, they will of necessity be subordinate to the aims of 
the parties when the conclusion of an extradition treaty is 
considered. Political factors may prevent a party from concluding·an 
extradition treaty with a particular state but will seldom, if ever, 
be the direct aim or intention of the parties in concluding the 
treaty although they may affect the willingness of a particular 
state - because of its perception of the political milieu in the 
other state - either to conclude the treaty in the first place, to 
act in terms of it, or to agree to succession in respect of such a 
treaty. 
In answer to the question "Can extradition treaties be succeeded 
to?" there would appear to be no inherent characteristic in an 
extradition treaty which would bar succession by one state to an 
extradition treaty concluded by another. Similarly, however, there 
would also appear to be no inherent characteristic which would 
render succession to extradition arrangements an automatic adjunct 
of change in sovereignty. Succession may consequently be a 
theoretical possibility, but may in practice be frustrated by the 
will of the third party involved. Unfortunately, when and how the 
theory and the practice of succession will coincide and result in a 
successful succession cannot be determined on the basis of a handy 
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formula. The succession must be judged in each case by a reasoned 
and realistic interpretation of the treaty concerned, together with 
an examination of the process by which the need for succession 
arose. 
3.4 Characterisation of the act giving rise 
to succession 
Mervyn Jones (65) distinguishes between what he terms "succession 
in fact" and "succession in law". Succession in fact occurs when 
"one state follows another in possession of territory".(66) This 
consequently requires an evaluation of the factual process by which 
one sovereign replaces another as the controlling authority over 
certain ~erritory. This factual situation may be followed by 
succession in law which is "the juridical substitution in such 
circumstances of the successor state for its predecessor".(67) The 
problem, for Jones, is succinctly, and correctly, defined in the 
statement that : 
The practical issue is how far is a successor in fact 
bound ... in law under ... treaties of his predecessor?" (68) 
This can be established by the consideration of certain questions 
involving the nature of the treaty in issue, the predecessor state, 
the successor state, and other parties to the original treaty. One 
may consequently ask whether the nature of the treaty allows of 
succession (as was done in the previous section); whether the 
predecessor state - or the successor - will still be in a position, 
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factually, to act under the treaty; whether action under the treaty 
will fit in with the new state's conception of itself and its role 
in the international community; and - important in the case of South 
Africa - whether the other party to the original treaty will be 
prepared to maintain the treaty commitments it undertook with the 
predecessor state? 
Although there are a number of stereotyped situations which are 
traditionally considered in assessing succession in fact,(69) within 
the South African context it would be counterproductive and 
confusing to consider each of these in detail. O'Connell (70) points 
out that like so many branches of public international law, "trends" 
in the law of succession are in fact reflections of the political 
ideology. prevalent in the milieu in which they occurred. 
Consequently, from the South African perspective, three "successions 
in fact" will be considered - each reflecting the political 
realities of the period during which they occurred and during which 
the question of succession arose and must be judged. 
These factual situations are, first, annexation and cession which 
should be seen as covering the early - and varied - acts 
transferring sovereignty over South African territory. Second, and 
most important from the extradition point of view, is the unique 
system which developed around succession within the British 
Commonwealth which will encompass the formation of the Union of 
South Africa in 1910 and the emergence of the Republic of South 
Africa in 1961. Lastly, attention will have to be paid to 
294 
dismemberment or partition which should be seen as covering the 
partial realisation of the South African government's "Bantustan" or 
"Homelands" policy which led to the establishment of the independent 
states of Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda in the 1970s. 
At this stage no more will be attempted than the identification of a 
possible overall or general approach with regard to succession to 
treaties in each of these situations. This will be further refined 
by an examination of state practice with regard to extradition 
treaties. In the final section, the principles established will be 
applied to the specific question of South African succession to 
extradition treaties. 
3. 4. 1 . ·Annexation and cession 
Annexation may be defined as the acquisition of sovereignty over the 
territory of some other state as a result of military conquest.C71) 
Cession, on the other hand, is defined as "the transfer of 
sovereignty over State territory by the owner State to another 
State".(72) Although we are dealing with two distinct concepts, each 
with its own requirements, the two may coincide in that a cession of 
territory often follows on the subjugation of a certain territory 
after the cessation of hostilities in a conflict situation. In such 
an instance, one is dealing with what may be classified as forced 
cession or disguised annexation. 
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In contemporary thinking, annexation - in all its forms - is no 
longer regarded as a valid form of succession in fact.(73) In so far 
as the Succession Convention 1978 embodies modern thinking on 
' 
succession, it is interesting to note that the Convention contains 
no provision with regard to the succession of states in the case of 
annexation. In fact, annexation and those instances of cession which 
may be regarded as disguised annexation, are expressly excluded by 
the provisions of the Convention where it is stated that: 
"The present Convention applies only to the effects of a 
succession of States occurring in conformity with 
international law and, in particular, the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations".(74) 
However, in view of what Akehurst (75) terms "inter-temporal law", 
the question of succession to treaties must be considered in the 
light of the law prevailing at the time when the question arose. 
When the South African issues involving succession in fact resulting 
from annexation and cession arose, these were still considered valid 
means by which the balance of sovereignty over territory could be 
shifted. It is consequently necessary to determine whether any 
general rules governing succession in law following upon such 
successions in fact can be abstracted from the practice of states at 
that time. 
When the effect of cession and annexation on sovereignty over 
territory is examined, it will be seen that there is in fact little 
to choose between the two as in both instances the territory in 
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question ceases to exist as an identifiable international law 
subject which can exercise international functions, including 
performance in terms of an existing treaty. (76) 
It is generally agreed that on annexation, treaties existing between 
the annexed state and· third states cease to exist.(77) Two possible 
exceptions exist in the form of what were termed "dispositive 
treaties" above; and an independent treaty obligation resting on the 
·annexing state to maintain the treaty. The reason for the 
termination of these treaties is self-evident. A treaty depends for 
its performance on the existence of the parties. If one of the 
parties ceases to exist - is annexed by or ceded to another state 
and so loses its independent international identity - it is no 
longer in a position to perform in terms of the treaty which then 
fails. 
Examples supporting this point of view abound. When France conquered 
and annexed Algiers in 1830, the British had to consider the status 
of treaties existing between themselves and Algiers. Responding to 
a query, the King's Advocate advised that the conquest of Algiers by 
France had the effect that British treaties "ceased to be 
operative".(78) In 1885 Burma was conquered by Britain and in 
response to a request on the status of treaties between Burma and 
other states the Law Officers replied that if the Crown were to 
extinguish the independent existence of Burma - as it was entitled 
to do - "all treaties which the King [of Burma] or his predecessors 
may have made with foreign Powers will thereupon cease to 
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exist".(79) Similarly, French annexation of Madagasgar in 1896 
resulted in the termination of the region's treaties with 
Britain.CBO) 
The American view in this regard was expressed on the occasion of 
its annexation of Hawaii in 1898. After citing various examples, it 
was stated that the treaties ceased to exist. However, "The treaty 
of annexation does not abrogate these [treaties] it is the fact of 
Hawaii ... ceasing to exist as an independent contractant that 
extinguishes these contracts".(81) 
On the annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan adopted a similar approach 
stating that "Treaties hitherto concluded by Corea (sic) with 
foreign.Powers ceasing to be operative, Japan's existing treaties 
will, so far as practicable, be applied to Corea (sic)". (82) The 
annexation of Austria by Germany in 1938 resulted, from both the 
British and United States' perceptions, in the termination of 
treaties with Austria and the automatic application of German 
treaties to the territory.(83) 
It would consequently appear that with the possible exception of 
dispositive treaties, if the question of succession arises as a 
result of the annexation or cession of a territory performed while 
such actions had not yet been outlawed by public international law, 
the treaties of the territory which is annexed or ceded will 
terminate automatically and the treaties of the annexing power or of 
the cessionary, as the case may be, will find automatic application 
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in the annexed or ceded territory. In effect this means that 
extradition treaties which, as was established above are not 
dispositive, will cease to exist and be replaced by the treaties of 
the "new" sovereign. 
3.4.2 Independence within the Commonwealth : succession through 
devolution a~eements 
Independence and succession to treaties during the mid-twentieth 
century has shown that the questions surrounding succession in fact 
in the case of annexation, cession, union, or whatever other means 
was used to achieve a shift in sovereignty, which had seemed so 
important during the period of imperial expansionism, became largely 
academic as the emphasis in questions relating to such succession 
swung towards the drive for independence among the former Colonial 
territories.(84) The days of a single, readily identifiable act 
which could be classed as giving rise to succession in fact, gave 
way to a gradual process of evolution through which the colonies 
insidiously arrogated to themselves the status of successor states. 
Foremost in this process were what are termed the "old Dominions" 
of the British Empire among whose number was the Union of South 
Africa. O'Connell (85) has termed this process "succession by 
evolution". 
Certain writers have claimed that, at least in the case of the old 
Dominions, the question of succession to the treaties of the mother 
state does not arise as there has been no change in the 
299 
international identity of the new state. The gradual evolution of 
the former colony and its acquisition of treaty-making capacity and 
an independent international personality has resulted in no 
disturbance of the international status quo on the actual act of 
independence being performed. The question of succession does not 
arise - or more accurately does not arise at that point.C86) 
While such an approach indeed may explain the acquisition of 
treaty-making capacity by the dependency, and consequently the 
dependency's capacity to enter into a devolution agreement with the 
mother state, it does not provide an adequate answer to how the 
mother state and the dependency - through their devolution or 
inheritance agreement - bind third states which were the original 
parties.to the treaty with the mother state which is purportedly 
succeeded to. In virtually every instance of independence of the 
former British Dominions and Colonies within the Commonwealth some 
specific provision has been made for the devolution of treaty rights 
and obligations either by means of British legislation or an 
agreement between the government of Britain and the government of 
the newly independent state.(87) This devolution agreement may be 
defined as an agreement entered into between a mother state and its 
former dependency on the latter's formal break with the mother 
state, in terms of which the rights and duties arising from treaties 
concluded by the mother state on behalf of the dependency, either 
directly or with the mother state acting in a supervisory capacity, 
are transferred to and assumed by the dependency. The question to be 
answered is consequently how two states (the mother state and the 
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former dependency) may through their agreement bind third states who 
are not party to the devolution agreement. 
O'Connell (88) states that: 
"Until very recently it was taken for granted that at least 
the the primary effect of these [devolution agreements] was 
to secure between the signatories a complete assignment of 
all treaties which, upon construction, were susceptible of 
devolution". 
However, the problem immediately arising is the perennial one of the 
nature of a treaty and the fact that it is essentially res inter 
alios acta as regards third parties and cannot without more ado bind 
third parties. Can two states by mutual agreement, bind a third 
which may be unwilling to contract with the "new11 state? Clearly, 
this traditional approach is in need of re-evaluation. 
The question now arising is how these devolution agreements should 
be classified. An initial distinction must be drawn between three 
possible legal constructions to explain the process by which one 
state may replace another in a treaty relationship. These are 
novation, assignment and vicarious performance. An hypothetical 
extradition treaty concluded between France and Britain - as the 
original parties - and South Africa - as the successor state - will 
be used by way of illustration. 
Novation (89) is a process whereby France and Britain having 
concluded a treaty, then agree that South Africa should replace 
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Britain in the agreement. South Africa also agrees to this 
arrangement. If this is transposed to the typical devolution 
agreement, the difference will immediately be seen. In the typical 
scenario for a novation of treaty rights and obligations the 
agreement is between the original parties to the treaty (France and 
Britain). In the devolution agreement the agreement is between one 
of the original parties (Britain) and the successor state (South 
Africa). The active cooperation of France - the other original· 
party - which then becomes the "third state/party" to the agreement, 
does not feature at all within the terms of the agreement. Its role 
is at best indirect or assumed. 
Assignment,(90) on the other hand, occurs where France and Britain 
are parties to a treaty. Without France's consent, Britain transfers 
ts to transfer her rights in terms of the treaty to South 
Africa. his is certainly more closely related to what in fact 
occurs i the typical devolution agreement. However, as MannC91) 
points o t, assignment is not feasible in the case of extradition 
treaties. McNair further points out that there is no authority for 
the prop sition that a state may unilaterally assign rights under a 
treaty without the consent of the other party to the treaty.(92) 
In the case of vicarious performance,(93) we again have the position 
where a treaty exists between France and Britain. Britain, again 
without French consent, arranges with South Africa that she will 
perform Britain's obligations under the treaty. This would also not 
appear feasible in the case of extradition treaties where the treaty 
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is intended to create an on-going relationship of cooperation 
between the states concerned and not a one-off act which can in 
essence be performed by any state. (94) 
It would consequently appear that none of the traditional processes 
used for the transfer of existing treaty rights really fits the 
devolution agreement mould of the British Commonwealth. The crucial 
element emerging would appear to be that a state cannot be bound 
without its consent. The question now arising is how this consent 
may be achieved within the context of the typical devolution 
agreement. 
Given the principles identified above, the effect of a devolution 
agreement cannot be simply to bind third states to treaty 
commitments to which they did not originally agree. 
The document must consequently serve some other function. 
At first glance the devolution agreement appears to be solely a 
statement by Britain on the one hand, and the successor state, South 
Africa in our example, on the other, to the effect that the 
successor state will assume responsibility for treaties which 
applied to it at the date of independence. Consequently, it is an 
agreement involving only these two parties. Closer examination, 
however, shows that it in fact has a dual character. Because Britain 
is also a party to the agreement, it is in fact sending a message of 
its own to third states with whom it originally contracted. The 
tenor of this notification is that as far as Britain is concerned, 
the treaty operative between itself and the third states will in 
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future no longer apply to Britain insofar as the territory of the 
newly independent state is concerned. The example set out above may 
better illustrate the point. 
Britain and France conclude an extradition treaty in terms of which 
they undertake to deliver up to one another persons found in their 
respective territories who have committed offence X in the territory 
of the requesting state. At the time of conclusion of the treaty the 
Union of South Africa formed part of British territory and the 
application of the treaty was specifically extended to the Union. 
Consequently, were a criminal to commit offence X in Paris and flee 
to Cape Town, the French government could secure his extradition by 
approaching the British authorities. However, on South Africa 
attainiAg Republican status in 1961, Britain and the newly formed 
Republic agreed that performance in terms of the extradition treaty 
falls to the South African government. Were France now to request 
the British government to extradite the same criminal hiding in Cape 
Town, the British government would be unable to comply as a result 
of its inability to act within the territory of another sovereign 
state.(95) The devolution agreement is consequently not only a 
notification by the successor state (South Africa) that it is 
willing and able to comply with the extradition treaty, but also a 
notification by the predecessor state (Britain) to the other party 
to the original treaty (France) of the predecessor's withdrawal from 
the treaty to the extent that it applied within the territory of the 
newly independent state. 
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The crucial issue in the case of a devolution agreement is 
consequently not so much the path followed to achieve the succession 
in fact, as the other state's reaction to the emergence of the new 
state. It is this reaction which will determine whether succession 
in law can and will follow upon the succession in fact which has 
taken place. In assessing the third state's reactions to the 
devolution agreement and the purported succession, three 
possibilities should be considered. 
First, the third state may expressly accept the devolution 
agreement and agree to be bound by it. Second, the third state may 
through its actions, indicate that it accepts the devolution 
agreement. Third, and most problematic, the third state may do 
nothing.at all. The question then arising is whether its lack of 
objection may be construed as tacit consent. In the international 
fora, the standard reference to tacit consent is the majority 
judgment in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention case (96) 
in which it was decided that failure to object to an incompatible 
reservation, could be construed as tacit consent. Applied to 
devolution agreements, this would mean that provided that the third 
state was aware of the devolution agreement, its failure to object 
would be construed as tacit consent. In the result, the devolution 
agreement would first, absolve the predecessor state from any 
obligations with regard to the successor's territory owed by it to 
the third state in terms of the original treaty, and second, bind 
the third and successor states to perform in terms of the treaty. 
The third state could then well, after a number of years, be 
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estopped from claiming that it did not wish to be bound by the 
devolution agreement. 
Although this is termed a novation by O'Connell, (97) such a 
classification is possible only through a creative process of 
interpretation which tends to stretch the facts of the devolution 
agreement somewhat. To use the example above, one would have to 
construe the agreement between Britain and South Africa as also 
constitut~ng an agreement between Britain and France to which South 
Africa acquiesced - a situation clearly not borne out by the facts. 
The question now arising is whether-this process can be explained in 
any other way. The first requirement for all three of the 
possibilities considered below, is that the third state must agree 
to the devolution in one of the three ways identified above. 
First it may be considered whether the arrangements governing 
accession to a treaty provided in the Vienna Treaty Convention could 
apply to this situation. In this regard article 15 (c) may find 
application through a somewhat tortuous construction. This article 
provides that a state may be bound to a treaty by accession if "all 
the parties have subsequently agreed that such consent may be 
expressed by that state by means of accession". The use of the term 
subsequently is significant in this regard. By agreeing to the 
devolution agreement France, in the example above, has met this 
requirement. South Africa then accedes to the original treaty 
between Britain and France. The treaty consequently becomes a tri-
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or multi-lateral agreement. This situation is however of very brief 
duration as in concluding the devolution agreement, Britain is also 
putting third states on notice that it will no longer be in a 
position to perform in terms of the treaty as regards South African 
territory. By accepting this, France is in fact agreeing to the 
termination of the treaty provisions between itself and Britain as 
regards the territory of the successor state. Britain then withdraws 
from the treaty again rendering it a bilateral treaty between France 
and South Africa. 
Accession as a possible explanation of the devolution process was 
touched upon, although it was neither analysed nor discussed in any 
detail, in the case of Lansana v Reginem.(98) There, commenting on 
whether .Sierra Leone had succeeded to an extradition treaty 
concluded between Britain and Liberia, the judge stated that 
"This treaty was binding between Liberia and Sierra Leone in 
1961 and the continuity was kept up by a well-known form of 
accession recognised by international law, the mutual 
exchange of letters published in PN 191 of 1961 11 .(99) 
This exchange of letters contained an undertaking by Sierra Leone 
"to be bound by the obligations created by all treaties entered into 
between Great Britain and a foreign country, so far as they applied 
to Sierra Leone when it was under the sovereignty of Great 
Britain .•. 11 .(100) 
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A second possibility which may be considered is a construction 
relying on the provisions of article 31 of the Treaty Convention 
which governs the interpretation of treaties. Treaties are to be 
interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
of the terms used in their context and in the light of the object 
and purpose of the treaty.(101) In terms of article 31(3), together 
with the context, the interpreter may consider 
"(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of 
its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation." 
Once the third state has agreed to respect the devolution agreement 
- in other words, has agreed that succession will take place - the 
devolution agreement will fall within the provisions of (a) above, 
while where its consent is tacit or assumed it could fall within the 
"subsequent practice" of (b) above. The original treaty between the 
predecessor state and the third party would then be interpreted in 
the light of the devolution agreement as a subsequent agreement and 
Britain could no longer be held responsible for performance within 
South African territory. 
However, by far the simplest construction to explain the operation 
of the devolution agreement is that the agreement should be regarded 
as an invitation by the successor (new) state, to third party states 
to conclude a treaty with it, the terms of which are identical to 
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those of the treaty concluded with the predecessor. Through 
acceptance, either expressly, through conduct, or tacitly through 
lack of objection, a new treaty comes into being between the two 
states. In the example above, the agreement between Britain and 
South Africa is, first, an invitation by South Africa to France to 
conclude an extradition treaty having the same tenor as the treaty 
existing between Britain and France. At the same time, the agreement 
is a notification by Britain to France that as regards the territory 
of South Africa, it will no longer act in terms of the original 
treaty. By accepting both the invitation to contract and the 
notification to terminate, France, to all intents and purposes, is 
bound to performance as against South Africa, and Britain is 
released from the obligation to perform as regards the territory now 
constituting the new state. 
This approach was discussed in the Jamaican case R v Director of 
Public Prosecutions : Ex parte Schwartz (102) where the court in 
considering a devolution between Britain and Jamaica concluded after 
the latter's independence in 1965 and the effect of that agreement 
on the United States I United Kingdom extradition treaty of 1931, 
held as follows : 
"Even if the devolution agreement amounts to no more than an 
offer to treat then the requisition by the United States 
must certainly be an of fer which was accepted and acted upon 
by the appropriate Minister of our [the Jamaican] 
government when, acting under the provisions of the 
Extradition Acts, he forwarded his warrant to the resident 
magistrate to proceed with the extradition proceedings". 
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This issue is also addressed in the Succession Convention where 
the conclusions reached above are in fact confirmed. Article 8 
provides : 
"The obligations or rights of a predecessor State under 
treaties in force in respect of a territory at the date of a 
succession of States do not become the obligations or rights 
of the successor State towards other States parties to 
those treaties by reason only of the fact that the 
predecessor State and the successor State have concluded an 
agreement providing that such obligations or rights shall 
devolve upon the successor State" (emphasis added). 
Similarly in Part III, dealing with newly independent states, 
article 16 provides that a newly independent state is not bound to 
maintain the predecessor's treaties or to become party to a treaty 
merely because the treaty was in force in respect of the territory 
at the date of independence. In the case of bi-lateral treaties, 
article 24 provides that their continued application between the 
successor and third states rests either on express consent, or on 
conduct which can be seen as constituting tacit consent. The mere 
fact of agreement between the predecessor and third states will not 
bring the treaty into operation between the successor and the 
third state.(103) 
The conclusion to be reached is consequently that a devolution 
agreement does not automatically result in the passing of rights and 
obligations in terms of a treaty between the predecessor and third 
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states. The acid test is the consent of the third party concerned, 
and each case must be judged on its own facts. 
However, consent within this context requires closer examination. In 
dealing with treaties generally, the term consent is normally taken 
to mean consent to enter into a treaty commitment; in other words, 
consent to conclude a treaty. This fits in with the theory that a 
devolution agreement is an "offer" to third parties identified 
above. It also fits with the views, raised right at the start of 
this section (104) that the formerly dependent state has through a 
process of evolution, acquired international legal personality and 
that the question of succession does not really arise as the "new" 
state is in fact not new at all but is bound by the mother state's 
treaties with third states through the evolutionary development of 
its international status. The devolution agreement is then merely a 
rubber stamp confirming the completion of the evolutionary process. 
Although both these approaches are initially attractive, the 
question arises whether they satisfactorily explain the process 
involved in the devolution structure. In a country such as South 
Africa, where treaties require incorporation to find municipal 
application, such an approach indeed gives rise to considerable 
problems. For example, if the devolution agreement is seen as an 
offer to conclude a new treaty, albeit in identical terms, that 
treaty would haye no municipal application within the Republic until 
such time as it had been re-promulgated by the State President in 
the Government Gazette. Indeed, as will be shown presently, this 
311 
approach was adopted - incorrectly it will be submitted - by certain 
South African courts.(105) The result of this is that succession is 
not actually in issue, but rather the capacity to conclude a new 
treaty. What then is the role of consent when dealing with 
succession based on a devolution agreement? 
Sight should not be lost of the fact that what we term consent of 
the parties, is no more than the outward manifestation of their 
intention at that time. When a party "consents" to be bound by a 
devolution agreement within the confines of succession to treaty 
commitments, his intention is not to conclude a treaty, but rather 
to succeed to an existing treaty. The intention of the parties, as 
outwardly manifested in their consent is to effect a succession to 
existin~ treaty rights and obligations. The consent is consequently 
no more than a mechanism through which the principles governing 
succession are set in motion. To use Jones's (106) terminology : 
succession in fact having taken place, the consent of the parties 
opens the way for succession in law to be considered. The consent is 
no more than evidence which may be used to explain whether or not 
the parties intended this succession in law to take place. 
The question whether succession in fact will be followed by 
succession in law in the case of devolution or inheritance 
agreements is succinctly summarised by Lester (107) where he states 
that : 
"There have indeed been cases where a treaty was regarded as 
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remaining in force by tacit consent of one contracting party 
and a state successor to the other party ..• and such an 
explanation of the United Kingdom inheritance agreements 
seems plausible provided that they constitute an 
offer .•. capable of acceptance .•• Certainly, it is difficult 
to accept the view that they 'remove the question [of 
succession to treaties] beyond all doubt'". 
3.4.3 Dismemberment and secession 
The third act achieving succession in fact and raising the question 
of succession in law which needs to be considered relates to those 
cases which Jones (108) describes as "A new state or a 
number of new states spring[ing] out of an 'old' one". He 
distinguishes between a new state or number of states formed by 
secession from the mother country, and states formed by the 
dismemberment of an existing state or union of states. 
As regards secession, the general tendency would appear to be away 
from the automatic application of the treaties of the mother state 
to the new territory. Examples most often cited are the United 
States of America and Great Britain; (109) Colombia and Panama;C110) 
Russia and Finland.(111) Jones concludes that where there has been a 
violent secession, the resulting new state "starts with a clean 
slate, and the treaties of the mother country cease to apply to the 
seceding territory 11 .C112) The position is akin to that in the cases 
of annexation and cession above. Jones's statement is however, too 
wide in that treaties "running with the land" would survive the 
separation and continue to bind the new state.(113) 
\ 
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Dismemberment of an existing state or union of states raises 
somewhat different questions. The distinguishing feature in these 
cases would appear to be the agreement between the former mother 
state or the union as a whole and the new state. In fact, whether 
such actions should indeed be regarded as a separate category is 
debatable. If the new state "springs" into being through 
dismemberment, is one not in essence dealing with a cession of 
rights from the mother state to the new entity; and will this not 
generally be accompanied by agreements governing existing treaties? 
Indeed, Jones concedes that the devolution agreements of the 
Commonwealth discussed above are in fact a form of what he terms 
dismemberment. (114) 
In the case of dismemberment where, for example, a state grants a 
certain part of parts of its territory independence, the original 
state will generally, although not necessarily, continue to exist. 
The problems raised above in the case of the Commonwealth apply here 
with equal force, and the crucial determinant of succession in law 
will be the consent of the third party involved in the original 
treaty. This question will be considered more fully when South 
African succession is considered below. 
However, this is not the position adopted within the Vienna 
Succession Convention. Part IV of the Convention deals with the 
unification and separation of states. Article 34 provides that : 
"When a part or parts of the territory of a State separate 
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to form one or more States, whether or not the predecessor 
State continues to exist: 
(a) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of 
States in respect of the entire ter~itory of the 
predecessor state continues in force in respect of each 
successor state so formed; 
(b) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of 
States in respect only of that part of the 
territory of the predecessor state which has become a 
successor State continues in force in respect of that 
successor State alone." 
The provisions above do not apply if the states agree otherwise, or 
application to the successor state would be incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the treaty or would radically alter the 
conditions for the operation of the treaty. (115) 
However, as shoWn above, (116) the application of the Convention is 
at this stage uncertain and its application to the South African 
situation even more questionable. As will emerge presently, the 
position under general public international law will have to be 
taken into account. 
To date the discussion has attempted to sketch in broad principle -
insofar as such theory exists - how a new or successor state may 
come to be bound by treaties in general concluded by its 
predecessor. What is required at this point is an examination of 
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state practice with regard to extradition treaties in particular and 
it is to this practice that we shall now turn. 
3.5 Practice with regard to succession 
to extradition treaties 
From the literature and case law surrounding state succession to 
treaties in general, and to bilateral treaties in particular, it is 
interesting to note that the question of succession to extradition 
treaties plays a prominent role. It is interesting too, that a far 
from consistent picture is presented by state practice in this 
regard. 
Panama which had seceded from Colombia in 1903, refused to be bound 
by an extradition treaty concluded between Colombia and the United 
States. Although it was prepared to hand over the individual 
sought, this was done as an act of comity as in the Panamanian view 
"there exists no extradition treaty between the United States and 
Panama".(117) This was also the view adopted by Britain with regard 
to the extradition treaty existing between itself and Panama.C118) 
In her dealings with Finland too, Britain did not regard the 
extradition treaty concluded between herself and Imperial Russia 
(the former Finnish motherland) as continuing, and a new treaty was 
concluded in 1924.(119) A similar situation arose between 
Czechoslovakia and the United States after the farmer's break with 
the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1919. In 1925 the United States 
negotiated a new extradition treaty with the Czechs, despite an 
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existing treaty with the empire.(120) In the case of the Ivory coast 
after its split with France, there also appears to have been no 
succession to extradition provisions existing between the United 
States and France as the government of the Ivory Coast declared that 
it did "not feel bound by that [extradition] treaty and desire[d] 
that such matters be raised de novo".(121) 
On the other hand, the extradition treaty between the United Kingdom 
and Argentina (122) was regarded as binding between Argentina and 
Pakistan;C123) and the extradition treaty between the United States 
and the United Kingdom was regarded by both the governments of the 
United States and of Ghana as binding between them after the 
latter's break with Britain in 1956.(124) India too agreed to be 
bound by British extradition treaties after its independence.(125) 
The case most often cited in discussions of state succession to 
bilateral treaties and which involved extradition is Re 
Westerling.(126) Westerling, a Dutch national, was accused of having 
committed extraditable offences in Java, Indonesia. He had fled to 
Singapore and his extradition was sought by the Indonesian 
authorities to allow him to stand trial for his offences. The 
application turned on the continued validity of the 1898 
Anglo-Netherlands Extradition treaty. Indonesia claimed to have 
succeeded to Britain's rights and duties under the treaty. 
Westerling attempted to have the application rejected in that he 
claimed that there was no valid extradition treaty between Britain 
and Indonesia, and even if there were such a treaty, the Extradition 
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Act 1870 had never been extended to Singapore. The view of the 
British government was that Indonesia had succeeded to the rights 
and obligations of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the treaty 
and that it applied between Britain and Indonesia. Although Britain 
regarded the treaty as having been succeeded to, extradition was 
refused as there had been no Order in Council incorporating the 
treaty into municipal law. A later request also failed as the 
Netherlands refused to extradite its own nationals.(127) 
The Netherlands was again involved in an extradition dispute 
involving succession in DC v Public Prosecutor.(128) A Rotterdam 
district court had declared DC's extradition to Yugoslavia 
admissible based on an 1896 Extradition Treaty between the 
Netherl~nds and Serbia. DC appealed to the Dutch Supreme Court on 
the ground, inter alia, that the 1896 treaty on which the 
application for his extradition had been based did not govern the 
relationship between the Netherlands and Yugoslavia. The Supreme 
Court rejected his plea. It found on evidence that the Netherlands 
regarded the Kingdom of Yugoslavia which was established at the end 
of the First World War as a continuation of the State of Serbia. No 
separate act of recognition was consequently required of the 
Netherlands government. When in 1923 the Yugoslavian government 
asked officially whether the Netherlands government still regarded 
Serbian treaties as operational, the Netherlands replied in the 
affirmative. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was consequently a valid 
successor to Serbia. However, DC further contended that the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was not the same entity as 
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the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and that the treaty consequently had no 
application with the Netherlands. This too the court rejected, 
citing various Dutch statements (129) to show that although the 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kingdom of Serbia indeed differed as 
regards constitutional make-up, and even extent of territory, the 
extradition treaty continued to apply. 
In R v Director of Public Prosecutions and Another : Ex parte 
Schwartz,(130) the United States requested the extradition of 
Schwartz from Jamaica. She was wanted in the United States to stand 
trial on charges involving conspiracy to import, sell and transport 
dangerous drugs within the USA. On being held in Jamaica pending 
extradition to the US, Schwartz, a Jamaican national, applied for a 
writ of .habeas corpus. One of the grounds raised was that the 1931 
extradition treaty between the United States and Britain - Jamaica 
being a British colony at that time - no longer applied to Jamaica. 
These issues were argued at some length and bear consideration. 
It was argued for Schwartz that when Jamaica became independent "at 
the stroke of midnight" 5 August 1962 all treaties contracted for 
Jamaica by Britain "died". (131) Jamaica was a "new juristic 
creature" which was not bound by what were termed "treaties in 
personam" - a category which it was claimed, included extradition 
treaties. The application of the clean slate approach was 
consequently advocated with the forerunner to article 16 of the 
Succession Convention also being cited in support.(132) The 
devolution agreement concluded between Britain and the new Jamaica, 
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it was argued, could not be said to keep the United States/United 
Kingdom treaty alive as this treaty had died alongside all the 
others at independence, ie before the devolution agreement had been 
concluded. Furthermore, the United States was not a party to the 
devolution agreement and could consequently not be bound by it. Even 
were the agreement found to carry the express or tacit consent of 
the United States, it was argued that this form of consent was 
insufficient to qualify as "the formal actus so as to create treaty 
relations in international law".(133) 
The court found that before Jamaican independence, the 1931 treaty 
was part of the law of Jamaica. Indeed, state practice between the 
United States and Jamaica showed that on at least two occasionsC134) 
there h?d been unchallenged requests for extradition. "That being 
so, the Extradition Acts and the Treaty of 1931 were still in full 
force and effective at the date of this requisition". The court was 
unconvinced that it could yet be said that the clean slate approach 
had "hardened into a 'customary rule' of international law".(135) 
However, even if it had so hardened, the court felt that to 
incorporate it into the Jamaican municipal law would be "flying in 
the face of our statutory provisions".(136) The magistrate's view 
that Jamaica had succeeded to Britain's extradition rights and 
duties embodied in the 1931 treaty was consequently confirmed.(137) 
As indicated above, the 1931 United States I United Kingdom 
extradition treaty and succession by Jamaica were also in issue in R 
v Commissioner of Correctional Services: Ex parte Fitz Henry.(138) 
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In this case Henry was wanted in the United States to stand trial 
for dealing in counterfeit ten dollar notes. He fled to Jamaica 
where he was apprehended in consequence of an extradition request 
from the United States, found to be extraditable, and remanded in 
custody pending his extradition. Henry applied for a writ of habeas 
corpus claiming that the 1931 extradition treaty on which the United 
States' request was founded had not been succeeded to by Jamaica. 
The court had before it a document from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs stating that an extradition treaty existed between the 
United Kingdom and the United States, that the treaty was still in 
force, and that it applied to Jamaica.(139) In terms of a devolution 
agreement between Britain and Jamaica, the latter had agreed : 
"(a) to assume all obligations and responsibilities of the 
Government of the United Kingdom which arose from any valid 
international instrument by virtue of authority vested in 
the United Kingdom Government and made applicable to 
Jamaica; 
(b) to enjoy all rights and benefits heretofore enjoyed by 
the United Kingdom Government in virtue of the application 
of any such international instrument to Jamaica." (140) 
Discussing the demise of British treaties argued for on Henry's 
behalf,(141) the court set out its understanding of the clean slate 
theory. An independent state possesses unlimited treaty-making 
powers. A new state is not bound to maintain or become a party to 
the treaties of its predecessor. However, should the new state 
perceive a treaty concluded by its predecessor as advantageous, 
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"there cannot be anything ..• [in the theory] ... to disentitle the 
newly independent state from becoming a party to it". If the clean 
slate principle were to apply as argued, it would result in "chaos, 
uncertainty and economic debility ••. The newly independent state 
would find it impossible to start its existence ... 11 .(142) The court 
found that the clean slate theory was no more than a basic concept 
which must, in the final analysis, give way to "reality, common 
sense and international utility".(143) It was consequently found 
that Jamaica had succeeded to Britain's extradition rights and 
duties under the 1931 treaty with the United states. 
On the other hand, in McGann v United States Board of Parole,(144) 
this same treaty was applied by the court without question. 
In the case of Lansana and Eleven Others v Reginam (145) the 
question arising was whether Sierra Leone had succeeded to an 
extradition treaty concluded between Britain and Liberia. Lansana 
had been extradited to stand trial for false imprisonment but was 
charged with treason and treason felony, duly convicted and 
sentenced to five years' imprisonment. He claimed that in terms of 
the treaty between Britain and Liberia to which Sierra Leone had 
acceded on the attainment of independence in 1961, his trial should 
be declared null and void on the ground of violation of the 
principle of speciality embodied in the treaty, in that he was tried 
for an offence other than that for which he was extradited.(146) In 
upholding the appeal, the court held that the treaty had been 
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succeeded to by Sierra Leone through an exchange of letters between 
that country and Britain.(147) 
The extradition treaty concluded between Britain and Italy in 1873, 
and its applicability to India on the attainment of independence was 
the question before the Italian Court of Appeal in Re Bottali.(148) 
Bottali, an Italian national, had been convicted in Bombay on 
certain drug related offences. The public prosecutor of the Rome 
Court of Appeal requested that the sentence imposed on Bottali be 
recognised in Italy. Bottali objected, inter alia, on the ground 
that there was no extradition treaty between Italy and India after 
the latter's independence. (149) The court found that no specific 
extradition treaty had been concluded between Italy and India after 
that latter's independence on 15 August 1947. The issue consequently 
turned on whether or not the treaty concluded between Italy and 
Britain on 5 February 1873 now applied between Italy and an 
independent India which the court stated had been "born of 
dismemberment". (150) The court gave a brief but lucid review of the 
possibilities surrounding the emergence of a new state, concluding · 
with the Italian approach to the issue as reflected in a letter to 
O'Higgins in reply to his query as to whether the Italian government 
regarded extradition treaties concluded by Britain binding on an 
independent Eire. The Italian view was that: 
"In this [Italy] follows that general doctrine according to 
which successor States are not held bound by international 
obligations contracted by their predecessors unless they 
make an explicit declaration to the contrary. (151) 
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This the court supported pointing out no customary rule in terms of 
which a successor state succeeded to the treaties concluded by its 
predecessor had yet developed. It found that there was no treaty 
operative between Italy and India and that the judgment against 
Bottali could consequently not be recognised. The fact that there 
was no record of extradition having taken place between the two 
countries was, for the court, further confirmation of its 
finding.(152) 
A similar approach was adopted by Germany in Extradition (Germany 
and Czechoslovakia) case (153) where on a query based on the 
principle of speciality,(154) the court held that states arising on 
the ter;itory of the former Austrian Empire cannot be regarded as 
having succeeded automatically to the treaty rights and duties of 
the Empire. 
In the Extradition (Jurisdiction) case Germany (155) the question 
was whether extradition between Germany and Switzerland was governed 
by a treaty concluded on 24 January 1874. The court held that the 
reorganisation of the German Empire in 1934 by means of which 
Germany became a unitary state, had resulted in the extinction of 
existing extradition treaties with the former German states as they 
had "ceased to exist in their capacity of subjects of international 
law".(156) In N v Public Prosecutor of the Canton of Aargau (157) 
the Swiss authorities, in considering whether the extradition treaty 
between Switzerland and the Austro-Hungarian empire had devolved 
324 
upon Czechoslovakia, held that it could not "without more ado" be 
applied to Czechoslovakia as a successor state. 
The termination of a state and the effect on extradition was also 
involved in the case of Rex v Abdul Hasan (158) where a magistrate 
in Shahjahanpur, India received a warrant from a Bophal court for 
the arrest of three persons. They were duly detained to await their 
extradition to India. However, before they could be extradited, 
Bhopal was merged with the Union of India on 1 June 1949. The 
question of their extradition had consequently become somewhat 
academic. The court held that: 
"In view of the merger of the State of Bhopal in the Union 
of India no question of extradition can arise. By reason of 
this merger the State of Bophal has ceased to exist".(159) 
Finally, in the case of M v Federal Department of Justice and Police 
(160) the question arose whether an extradition treaty concluded 
between Britain and Switzerland in 1880 (161) still applied after 
South African independence. As this is one of the few reported cases 
directly involving South Africa, it will be considered in some 
detail. 
During 1977 M, a South African national, was arrested in Zurich for 
cashing a number of stolen American Express travellers' cheques. 
These cheques, which formed part of a consignment sent to 
Johannesburg from Britain, had been stolen by M in Johannesburg. He 
had also fraudulently acquired a number of passports which he had 
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used freely both in leaving South Africa and for various 
transactions in Switzerland - including the cashing of the 
travellers' cheques. He was convicted of fraud and sentenced to 
three years' imprisonment.C162) 
In the interim the South Africa authorities had requested M's 
extradition to stand trial on various charges.(163) The Anglo-Swiss 
extradition treaty of 1880 was cited as the basis for the request. M 
objected to his extradition claiming that no formal extradition 
treaty had been concluded between South Africa and Switzerland, and 
that the Anglo-Swiss treaty which applied between Britain and 
Switzerland did not continue to apply between Britain's former 
Colony, South Africa, and Switzerland, largely for want of tacit 
consent. 
The court rejected his arguments. It found that the task of the 
court in this case was not merely to decide whether certain acts 
fall within the ambit of the treaty or to interpret the treaty, but 
rather to assess "the very applicability of the Treaty". This the 
court should do by considering not only doctrine and jurisprudence 
but also the opinions of the relevant political authorities which 
are "exclusively competent to conclude or denounce treaties 
and •.. perform acts which, according to the circumstances, constitute 
tacit further application of a treaty and thereby bind Switzerland 
under international law".(164) In dealing with what it termed the 
problem of state succession, the court placed considerable emphasis 
on the Succession Convention. (165) It stressed that the general 
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rule that a state is not automatically bound by the treaties of its 
predecessor, is in many respects impracticable. This does not 
however mean that a customary rule in favour of succession exists. 
"A bilateral treaty between a predecessor State and a third 
State will only be considered as being in force between the 
third State and the newly independent State if those two 
States so agree. Such an agreement may either be express or 
result from their conduct".(166) 
It was shown that between 1949 and 1975 there had been no less than 
five instances of extradition between South Africa and Switzerland. 
In each of these cases the Anglo-Swiss treaty had been invoked 
without questions being raised as to its applicability. Furthermore, 
during 1978-9, in contacts between the Swiss Embassy in Pretoria and 
the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, the question of 
extradition had been raised. Although it was acknowledged that no 
formal treaty had been concluded, the Swiss authorities made it 
clear that the Anglo-Swiss treaty still applied between the two 
states, but suggested that this be formalised by an exchange of 
notes. South Africa, on the other hand, while also acknowledging the 
continued application of the treaty, proposed that a new treaty be 
concluded as the provisions of the 1880 treaty were not in line with 
modern trends. This the court interpreted as indicating tacit 
consent to the continuation of the Anglo-Swiss treaty on the part of 
both states. 
M, however, claimed that the extradition requests delivered and 
entertained by the two states through the years after South African 
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independence,(167) were not performed by organs of state competent 
to bind their respective states internationally. While the court 
conceded that in principle only Heads of State, Heads of Government 
and Ministers of Foreign Affairs may consent to their states' being 
bound by treaty,(168) this principle does not apply to what it 
termed the "tacit further application of a treaty". Consent to this 
process may be effected by "those organs which are normally called 
upon to apply the treaty".(169) In the present case this is what had 
in effect occurred and the treaty between Britain and Switzerland 
had been succeeded to by South Africa and continued to apply between 
the Republic and Switzerland.{170) 
An analysis of this judicial response to the problem of succession 
to extradition treaties, shows that opinion is fairly evenly divided 
between acceptance of succession in the Westerling, DC, Schwartz, 
Fitz Henry, McGann, Lansana and M cases, and rejection of succession 
in the Bottali, Germany & Czechoslovakia case, Extradition 
(Jurisdiction) case, and Abdul Hassan. It is well nigh impossible to 
abstract a single overriding principle from judical decisions 
spanning so varied a collection of "successions in fact". However, 
if some general principle were to be stated, it must surely be that 
the problem of succession is to be resolved in the light of the 
intention of the parties involved as manifested in their consent to 
succession. This consent is the parties' consent to the objectively 
determinable "succession in fact" which opens the way for possible 
"succession in law". 
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Against this background, South African succession to extradition 
treaties will now be considered. The examination will be limited 'to 
the acquisition of treaty rights by the various territories which 
have made up South Africa throughout the history of the country and 
no attempt will at this stage be made to evaluate the current status 
of the treaties so received as this can only be undertaken 
meaningfully once the termination and re-emergence of treaty rights 
and duties have been considered and all three processes can be 
synthesised into a realistic perception of the current position. 
3.6 Succcession to extradition treaties 
in the South African context 
If ever. a society was designed as a prototype for the problems 
surrounding succession, South Africa, through the various stages of 
its development, must be regarded as such a society. Throughout the 
history of the territory, virtually every form of succession which 
could be imagined has arisen at one stage or another. However, in 
considering the various acts constituting "succession in fact" 
within the South African context, it must be emphasised that much 
turns on the interpretation placed on the events giving rise to the 
succession. For example, what one person may regard as annexation, 
another may regard as cession; one man's devolution agreement may be 
another's dismemberment, etcetera. In this regard the interpreter 
faced with a succession problem must decide for himself into which 
category the succession in fact should be classified. The approach 
adopted in this section will, as in the historical section, be 
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chronological, an attempt being made to determine whether the act 
performed indeed gave rise to succession in fact, and then whether 
the potential such a situation holds for succession in law, was 
realised. 
3.6.1 Early history 
3.6.1.1 The First British Occupation 
As emerged from Chapter II, the first instance in which succession 
could have arisen within the South African context was the change in 
sovereign authority resulting from the First British Occupation of 
the Cap~ during the period 1795-1803. 
It is difficult to classify this change in any watertight 
compartment. As pointed out earlier, the animus of the British in 
occupying the territory fell short of that generally demanded for 
either annexation or cession,(171) which are the two most obvious 
"successions in fact" applicable to such a situation. 
If this takeover of the Cape by the British cannot be regarded as a 
true example of annexation - which at that stage resulted in the 
automatic termination of the treaties of the annexed state and the 
application of the treaties of the annexing state (172) - how is it 
to be classified? Discussing succession of states in the case of 
complete annexation, McNair (173) raises the case of Upper Burma 
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which was conquered by the British in 1885. Asked to comment on the 
procedure which would have to be followed to effect a termination of 
the treaties concluded by the former Burmese ruler, the Law Officers 
replied that the Crown had by its conquest of Burma acquired the 
right to extinguish the independent existence of the state of Upper 
Burma. If this were not done, the Law Officers felt that foreign 
powers who had contracted with the King of Burma could claim that 
British action in Burma was "mere military occupation as 
distinguished from a conquest" (174) resulting not in the extinction 
of Burmese sovereignty but in its suspension. This in turn would 
mean that treaties with foreign powers which applied at the time of 
the occupation would, for its duration be suspended or held in 
abeyance to be revived and of full force were Britain to cede the 
territOFY to the King of Burma. 
When occupying the Cape for the first time, the British made it 
clear that their stay was intended to be temporary only. Their 
actions, as in the scenario sketched in the case of Burma, can 
consequently be regarded as military occupation rather than conquest 
and annexation. Such treaties as there may have been between the 
Dutch-East India Company and foreign powers - and whether agreements 
with local potentates are to be regarded as such treaties remains a 
moot point - were consequently in abeyance during the period of 
occupation. It cannot with certainty be said that these treaties 
lapsed or that British treaties found automatic application. No 
succession in fact which could give rise to succession in law 
occurred. 
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In any event, in examining the writings of the period, no provisions 
directly governing treaties could be found and, as was shown in 
Chapter II, extradition was of little practical significance at the 
time. 
3.6.1.2 The Batavian Republic The Dutch return to the cape 
Three years later, however, problems surrounding the First 
Occupation became academic when the second possible instance of 
"succession in fact" arose. At the close of the war with France, 
Britain formally handed the Cape back to the Dutch under the terms 
of the Treaty of Amiens 1802. If it is accepted that the First 
British Occupation was indeed no more than a form of military 
occupation, treaties existing between the Dutch East India Company 
and foreign powers which were in limbo during the occupation would 
have revived automaticaliy on British withdrawal. 
A question arising in this regard is whether the fact that while the 
British were occupying the Cape, the government in the Netherlands 
fell and the Dutch East India company was finally disbanded, (175) 
had any effect on the position. The situation is consequently that 
one of the original parties to any treaty concluded at that stage in 
the Cape - always assuming that meaningful treaties existed - the 
Dutch East India Company responsible to the States General, had 
ceased to exist and been replaced by the government of the Batavian 
Republic. Can one claim that the Batavian government succeeded to 
the treaties of the States General concluded on its behalf by the 
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Dutch East India Company? The question centres on whether or not the 
Batavian Republic was a "new" state in public international law 
terms, or merely a continuation of the Netherlands as it existed 
under the States General. In the case of DC v Public Prosecutor 
(176) a Netherlands court (fittingly enough) was faced with a double 
change of identity where the Kingdom of Serbia changed first to the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia and then to the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. The court found that although Yugoslavia had a 
constitution which differed from that of the former Serbia, and even 
its territory had changed, the state as such had continued to 
exist.(177) A change in the government, government structure, or 
constitution of a state, has no effect on the international 
obligations of the state.(178) 
Consequently, the fact that the Netherlands had changed its name to 
the Batavian Republic and was functioning under a different 
constitution, did not change the existence of the state as a 
separate international entity which was still bound by treaties it 
had concluded but which were in abeyance as a result of the 
temporary British occupation : such obligations as may have existed 
re-emerged when the territory was handed back to the Dutch. 
On the other hand, if the above explanation is not accepted, the 
situation could be typified as a cession following on the close of 
hostilities. It is again firmly established - taking into account 
both the time-frame and the fact that there was then no prohibition 
on the use of force to acquire territory - that in such a situation 
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the treaties of the former sovereign (Britain) are extinguished 
automatically and those of the new sovereign (the Batavian Republic) 
find automatic application. (179) The Cape of Good Hope would 
consequently have succeeded to the treaties of the Batavian Republic 
applicable at that stage. 
Again, however, research into the actual existence of treaties or of 
extradition proceedings in the Cape during this period, proved 
fruitless and the question must also be regarded as academic. 
3.6.2 The Second British Occupation : The Boer Republics 
The third succession scenario within the South African context, is 
considerably more complex and was set in motion by the Second 
British Occupation of the Cape in 1806, and the subsequent 
establishment of the Boer Republics of Natal, the Orange Free State 
and the Transvaal. 
3.6.2.1 Succession in the cape of Good Hope 
In 1806 the Cape of Good Hope was formally annexed for Britain by 
Sir David Baird. It is clear from the terms of the Treaty of 
Capitulation of 1806 that in this case the intention of the British 
government differed radically from that held at the time of the 
First Occupation. The intention was that the territory be occupied 
permanently by the British, a full administration was established, 
and the territory became a British Colony. As was customary in 
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international law at the time, the treaties of the former sovereign 
(the Dutch) terminated automatically and those of the new sovereign 
found automatic application.(180) The extradition treaties which 
Britain had concluded through the years were, as was shown 
above,(181) extended to the Cape and became fully applicable within 
the territory. 
3.6.2.2 Succession in Natal 
As emerged in Chapter II,(182) the territory of Natal offers a 
particularly interesting, if rather confusing, picture when 
succession to treaties is considered. Throughout the territory's 
history' various acts occurred which hold the potential of succession 
problems. 
The area around the present-day port of Durban was purchased by 
Simon van der Stel for the Dutch. By analogy with the other famous 
purchase in international law - the United States' purchase of 
Alaska from Russia - one would expect that at least in theory, Dutch 
extradition provisions would have applied to the territory.(183) 
However, the lack of subsequent interest shown by the Dutch, coupled 
with their failure to establish any sort of administration in the 
territory, leads to the conclusion that the sale was a change in 
sovereignty - a succession in fact - in name only. The cession 
which one would expect to follow on such a purchase must be regarded 
as never having been "perfected", to borrow a term from the law of 
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contract. Consequently there was indeed neither a true succession in 
fact, nor any question of succession in law. For practical purposes, 
the territory was never subject to Dutch authority and it is 
doubtful, to say the least, that Dutch treaties found application 
there. 
The next significant event was that in terms of article 1 of the 
Articles of Capitulation handing the Cape to the British in 1806, 
the territory of the Cape of Good Hope was defined as including the 
territory in Natal purchased by van der Stel. Again in theory, this 
should mean that the Dutch treaties which could have applied to the 
area would terminate automatically and automatically be succeeded by 
those of Britain. However, as in the case of the First Occupation of 
the Cape, the British were not interested in incorporating Natal 
into their territory and did not regard it as a colony. As in the 
case of the Dutch, they established no permanent administration. For 
the reasons advanced above, it can consequently not be said that 
British treaties applied in the territory at this stage. 
A further possibility for succession may be seen in the attempt by 
the emigre Boers to establish the Republic of Natalia. This too, is 
fraught with problems if a traditional classification is attempted. 
Had Natal indeed been British territory at the time, the case could 
have been classified as an attempted secession and failing 
agreement, the clean slate principle would have applied and no 
succession to treaties would have occurred.(184) However, it has 
just been submitted that the territory was in fact no more British 
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than it had been Dutch, and that there were no treaties applicable. 
The question of succession can consequently not be said to arise. 
It is necessary at this stage to consider once again, the nature of 
the entity which was termed the Republic Natalia. From the agreement 
concluded between Dingaan and Potgieter, on which the claims to an 
independent status rest,(185) we would appear to be dealing with the 
purchase of land from an indigenous ruler. The fact that the 
purchase price was cattle and assistance rather than money, should 
in principle not affect the validity of the transaction. It should 
consequently represent a cession of territory with the result that 
any treaties applicable to the "new" sovereign would apply to the 
territory. If, as in this case, the new sovereign purported to be a 
totally.new entity, there would be no treaties and it would start 
with a clean slate. (186) However, as in the case of the First 
British Occupation above, the requirements for a valid cession, and 
in particular the animus required for cession would again appear 
defective. In this case intention to accept the cession was not 
lacking on the part of the Boers, but a true intention to cede on 
the part of the indigenous rulers would not appear to have existed. 
That the Zulu leaders lacked the necessary intent to transfer the 
land - or rather that they failed fully to comprehend the nature of 
the transaction - is the only logical conclusion to be drawn from 
the facts. This is indeed a case where, examining the agreements on 
their merits, they prove to be what Mugambwa terms "scraps of paper" 
rather than valid treaties.(187) The same territory had been annexed 
by the Dutch, transferred to the British, sold to Farewell and King 
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(by the Zulu leader Chaka), and then again given to the Boers by 
Chaka's successor, Dingaan. As was shown above, the Republic Natalia 
was never an independent subject of international law capable of 
concluding valid treaties or meeting international obligations. 
The only extradition treaty concluded during this period which could 
be traced, that between Dingaan and the residents of Port Natal, was 
in point of fact not a valid treaty; was abrogated by the British 
residents; and could in any event not have been succeeded to by the 
Boers as their "republic" cannot be regarded as having enjoyed 
international legal personality. 
The final act in the Natal scenario occurred in 1844 when the 
territory was formally annexed by the British. Again as in the case 
of the Cape of Good Hope, the treaties of the annexing state 
superseded any treaties which may formerly have applied in the 
territory. The British extradition treaties applying in the Cape 
consequently applied with full force to the new British territory of 
Natal. 
3.6.2.3 Succession in Orange Free State 
Although initially the Orange Free State was in much the same 
position as the Cape and Natal in that after 1848 it was a British 
possession and the British extradition provisions which applied at 
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the Cape and in Natal would have applied here too, this situation 
was set to change. 
In 1854, in terms of the Bloemfontein Convention, the Boer 
aspirations were realised and the territory was granted full 
independence by the Crown. There are two ways of interpreting the 
British action giving rise to the "succession in fact". First it 
could be seen as secession of the Free State from the British 
Empire; second it could be seen as a forerunner of the drive for 
independence which was finally realised in South Africa with the 
attainment of Republican status in 1961. 
The question arising is consequently whether the new state of the 
Orange.River Sovereignty succeeded to British extradition treaties 
which had formerly applied by virtue of its being British territory. 
McNair (188) points out that in the case of secession the general 
rule is that the new state starts life with a clean slate with the 
exception of rights or obligations arising from dispositive 
treaties, or rights and obligations to which it expressly consents. 
British extradition treaties are not dispositive and there was 
certainly no wish among the Boers to be bound by British treaties -
on the contrary they wished to be free of British interference. No 
reference could be found to a devolution agreement or similar 
arrangement between the two states having been concluded and it 
would consequently appear safe to assume that no succession to 
British extradition treaties occurred on the independence of the 
Free State. 
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As was shown in Chapter II (189) the new republic was active on the 
extradition front. Extradition arrangements were concluded with 
Britain herself, with Moshesh (on various occasions), and with the 
Transvaal in 1880. What happened to these treaties when the state 
was finally annexed by Britain in 1900? 
McNair (190) deals specifically with the question of the Free State 
annexation and declares that "the British Government regarded 
treaties between them [the Free State] and other States as having 
lapsed by the fact of annexation" - a solution in line with the 
generally accepted international thinking at that time. 
The Law Officers were also called upon to consider the other side of 
the coi~, ie whether treaties applicable to British possessions were 
automatically extended to cover the Free State on its annexation by 
Britain.(191) Asked to give a ruling on whether the Copyright 
Convention of 9 September 1886 applied in the Orange River Colony, 
the Foreign Office replied in 1903 that British accession on behalf 
of her colonies applied to all colonies irrespective of the date of 
their acquisition of that status. The Orange River Colony had 
consequently automatically become a party to the Convention but 
would, should it at some later stage be accorded self-governing 
status, also acquire the right of separate denunciation. 
O'Connell (192) also considers the effect of the annexation of the 
Free State on treaties with foreign powers, and comes to the same 
conclusion as McNair. Of particular interest, in this regard, is a 
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Belgian enquiry addressed to the British Government in 1903 in which 
the Belgians asked whether a treaty concluded with the Orange Free 
State in 1894, still found application and whether extradition 
proceedings between Belgium and the region were governed by the 
Extradition Treaty concluded between Belgium and Britain in 1901. 
The British replied that "treaties of commerce and extradition made 
by the late Republics [Free State and Transvaal] were no longer in 
force, and that the new Colonies were under the British treaties of 
commerce and extradition". (193) 
It would appear, therefore, that like the Cape and Natal, any 
extradition treaties applicable to an independent Free State lapsed 
automatically on the annexation of the territory by Britain, and 
British treaties existing at the time of annexation found automatic 
application within the territory. 
3.6.2.4 Succession in the Transvaal Republic 
The Transvaal Republic, the most controversial of the Boer 
Republics, is certainly the most problematic. From its inception, 
the territory enjoyed a stormy relationship with Britain. Where in 
Natal the Boers had failed to establish an independent state, in the 
Transvaal they succeeded in doing so.(194) This independence was 
confirmed by the terms of the Sand River Convention and was 
internationally recognised, inter alia, by Britain herself. The 
question is consequently whether this independent state succeeded to 
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British treaties operational at the time. Again the general rules 
applicable in the case of secession identified above in the case of 
the Free State, must be seen to apply here. The territory had no 
wish to succeed to British treaties, including extradition treaties, 
and cannot be held to have done so automatically. It would 
consequently appear that the Transvaal, too, started its 
international existence with a clean slate. 
The Transvaal's independence was short lived as in 1877 the area was 
"brought under the Government of the Crown as a dependency acquired 
by cession".(195) One would expect the now familiar scenario of 
cancellation of treaties concluded by the Transvaal Republic between 
1853 and 1877 (which included treaties of Commerce and Friendship 
with Belgium and Portugal) (196) and automatic succession to British 
treaties to have followed. The picture is however, not that simple. 
As was shown in Chapter II, (197) the status of the Transvaal during 
this period is uncertain. While in the eyes of the British the 
territory had been ceded to the Crown, in the eyes of the Boers this 
would not appear to have been the case. The British conquest cannot 
be regarded as sufficiently decisive to ensure successful 
annexation. In fact, hostility between Boer and British continued 
together with negotiations for the resumption of independence and 
culminated in a declaration of war between the parties in 1880. 
Although this was followed by "peace" in terms of the Pretoria 
Convention in 1881, this too was not an unequivocal acceptance by 
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the Boers of British dominance as is borne out by the fact that the 
Boers considered it a temporary or interim solution and the 
Convention was ratified for a trial period only.(198) Further 
negotiations followed culminating in the signature of the London 
Convention in 1884. This too did not last and the Second Boer War 
broke out to be settled finally by the annexation of the Transvaal 
in 1900. 
What was the fate of Transvaal and British treaties during the 
period 1881 - 1900? There are two distinct perceptions which should 
here be borne in mind. First, from the British perspective Transvaal 
treaties should have terminated and been replaced by British 
treaties. In extradition terms this would mean that all the treaties 
identified as applying to the Cape of Good Hope (and subsequently to 
Natal and the Free State) would find automatic application in the 
Transvaal. From the Boer perspective, this would not be the case as 
the "annexation" had not been perfected as a result of the defective 
intent of one of the parties. The situation may from this view be 
regarded as analogous to that applying in the case of the First 
British Occupation, or in the case of early Natal history. 
It would consequently be premature to talk of an automatic 
termination of Transvaal treaties and the application of British 
treaties to the territory. On the other hand, to dismiss the British 
presence as military occupation (resulting in the suspension of Boer 
treaties) also appears somewhat simplistic in the light of the fact 
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that the Boers had consciously accepted that their foreign relations 
would be conducted by Britain or with British approva1.C199) 
Such speculation is, however, academic since it is certain that at 
the close of the Second Boer War the Transvaal was, like the Free 
State, well and truly annexed by Britain. There is no question as to 
the validity of this annexation and the normal consequences 
attendant upon such a succession in fact must be seen to follow .. In 
other words as a result of the annexation the treaties of the Boer 
Republics, including any extradition treaties, lapsed and were 
replaced by British treaties existing at the time. The full range of 
extradition treaties which were seen to apply to the Cape, Natal and 
Orange Free State found automatic application within the annexed 
British territory of the Transvaal. 
A question which arises in regard to the treaties concluded by the 
Transvaal while subject to the terms of the Pretoria and London 
Conventions, is whether the fact that Britain was required to 
approve such treaties,(200) had any effect on the question of 
succession. In response to an enquiry in this regard the British 
Foreign Office replied that 
"The fact that her late Majesty, as Suzerain, assented to 
the completion of a Treaty between the Transvaal Government 
and another Power in no way affects the question of the 
lapse of such Treaty owing to the annexation of the South 
African Republic ... The Treaty was one with the Government of 
the Transvaal as a separate Power ..• and the consent of Her 
Majesty was given merely as Suzerain of the Transvaal. The 
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fact of such assent can •.. in no way affect the question of 
the lapse of the Treaty, when the Transvaal became part of 
His Majesty's dominions".(201) 
Specifically as regards extradition, t~e Law Officers replied in the 
affirmative to a Belgian enquiry as to whether extradition between 
Belgium and the Transvaal was regulated by the 1901 Anglo-Belgian 
treaty. Extradition treaties made by the Transvaal were no longer in 
force and the territory fell under the relevant British treaties. 
In summary, therefore, we can see that by the time of Union of the 
four British colonies in 1910, all British treaties relating to 
extradition applied in each as a separate British territory. 
3.6.3 The formation of the Union of South Africa 
When it became apparent to the British that their four possessions 
in the southernmost part of Africa could better be administered as a 
single unit, it was decided that they should be united to form the 
British Dominion of the Union of South Africa. Was there any 
succession by the Union to first, the treaties of the individual 
colonies, and second to British treaties generally? 
The question of British succession to extradition treaties concluded 
by the independent Republics was raised, but not further considered, 
in Chapter II.(202) The answer appears relatively straightforward. 
It has already been established that after their annexation by 
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Britain any treaties applicable to the territories of Cape, Natal, 
Orange Free State and Transvaal, as independent sovereign nations 
were extinguished and that British treaties applied with full force 
within these territories. The same principle would apply not only to 
treaties concluded between the Republics and foreign states - for 
example the extradition treaty between the Transvaal Republic and 
the Netherlands concluded in 1895 (203) - but also to treaties 
concluded between the Colonies themselves - for example the 
extradition treaty of 1880 between the Free State Republic and the 
Transvaal and that of 1897 between Natal and the Transvaal.(204) 
The only succession issue in regard to Union is consequently whether 
the Union, as a separate British entity, succeeded to British 
treati~s applicable to the four separate colonies, and if so, by 
what form of succession in fact. 
An analogous situation arose in 1900 with the unification of the 
seven separate Australian states to form the Commonwealth of 
Australia.(205) Asked whether a treaty existing between Japan and 
Queensland (one of the seven states) had terminated through the 
incorporation of Queensland into the Commonwealth, the Law Officers 
replied that : 
"The case is not one in which an independent Power has 
become merged by conquest or cession in the territories of 
another Power. The portion of His majesty's dominions known 
as Queensland has combined with other portions of His 
Majesty's dominions to form the Commonwealth of Australia 
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which is itself a part of His Majesty's dominions." (206) 
The position, according to McNair,(207) should be seen as a change 
to the internal administration of the territory, rather than a 
change in the essential nature of the territory itself, and the 
question of succession does not really arise. 
Dealing with the Union of South Africa, O'Connell (208) first 
categorises the union process under the effect on treaties of entry 
into a federation. He however continues his discussion together with 
a consideration of treaty devolution in the older Dominions (209). 
In line with this thinking, section 148 of the South Africa Act 
(210) provides as follows : 
" (I) All rights and obligations under any conventions or 
agreements which were binding on any of the Colonies shall 
devolve upon the Union at its establishment." 
This is the typical devolution provision employed by Commonwealth 
nations at the time. It may be accepted, subject to the limitations 
identified above with regard to succession in the case of devolution 
agreements, that the Union of South Africa succeeded to all British 
extradition treaties operative at that stage. The general 
international sentiment at the time seems to have been towards 
acceptance of succession in the case of former Colonies. 
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3.6.4 The establishment of the Republic of South Africa 
In 1961 South Africa opted for republican status outside of the 
British Commonwealth.(211) The Republic of South Africa Constitution 
Act was adopted on 25 April 1961 and came into effect on 31 May 
1961. Section 112 of the Act provided that: 
"All rights and obligations under conventions, treaties or 
agreements which were binding on any of the Colonies 
incorporated in the Union of South Africa at its 
establishment, and were still binding on the Union 
immediately prior to the commencement of this Act, shall be 
rights and obligations of the Republic, just as all other 
rights and obligations under conventions, treaties or 
agreements which immediately prior to the commencement of 
this Act were binding on the Union." 
Through this legislation South Africa assumed all rights and 
obligations arising from the British extradition treaties which as 
we have seen were binding on all of "the Colonies incorporated in 
the Union of South Africa at its establishment". However as the 
change from Union to Republic involved no change in legal 
personality, the question must be asked whether succession is indeed 
relevant in this context. 
The decisions in DC v Public Prosecutor and Shehadeth et al v 
Commissioner of Prisons JerusalemC212) are immediately called to 
mind. In the case of DC it was found that treaties with Serbia 
survived the transition first from Serbia to Yugoslavia and then to 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. While in Shehadeth it 
was held that a change in government or constitution had no effect 
on the state's international obligations. 
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While this reasoning may indeed acceptably explain the position of 
those treaties which the Union signed independently once its 
treaty-making capacity had evolved sufficiently,(213) it does not 
explain the position with regard to the earlier extradition treaties 
which make up the bulk of of South Africa's extradition commitments. 
In these cases we still have an agreement concluded between Britain 
and a foreign country which, through section 112 of the 1961 
Constitution - which represents the standard form of devolution 
agreement encountered in former British dependencies at the time -
South Africa has unilaterally made applicable to itself. 
It goes without saying that a state which may have been prepared to 
engage in extradition dealings with Britain in the 1800s, was not 
necess~rily willing to engage in extradition dealings with South 
Africa in the 1960s - particularly as even at that stage many states 
were ideologically opposed to South Africa's domestic policies. 
If the two-stage approach to succession advocated above is applied 
here, we find that "half a succession" has taken place in most 
instances. In the case of the Union, succession in fact had evolved 
over a period of time resulting in international personality 
independent of Britain although no specific date or event can be 
identified as the act of succession in fact. The 31st of May 1961, 
the date South Africa became a Republic, is merely the point at 
which the evolutionary process towards full independence came to 
fruition and the status quo as regards succession in fact was 
officially confirmed. 
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However, as was seen above, succession in fact is only the starting 
point which sets the succession process in motion. The consent of 
the "other" states involved in the original treaty - that is the 
states with which Britain concluded the original treaty to which the 
Republic wished to succeed - opens the way to succession in law. 
However, as was pointed out above, whether the devolution agreement 
- that act giving rise to (or in this case confirming) succession in 
fact - i~deed succeeded in effecting a succession in law, depends to 
a large extent on the attitude of the third states involved. As this 
is an issue which can only be determined finally once the grounds 
upon which a treaty may be terminated have been considered, and this 
forms the topic of the next Chapter, the exact position as regards 
individual treaties will not be considered here. When an assessment 
of the current status of South Africa's extradition treaties is 
attempted at the end of Chapter v, these responses will be 
considered, together with other relevant factors, in the case of 
each individual treaty. For present purposes it is accepted that the 
Republic of South Africa succeeded to British extradition treaties 
applicable at that stage. 
3.6.5 Succession and the independent states 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda 
The final question giving rise to succession to treaties within the 
South African context came about as a result of the grant of 
independence by the South African government to the independent 
Homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. 
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In the process of granting independence to these states the South 
African government, as the mother state, and the Homelands, as the 
new states, attempted through their respective legislatures to 
ensure that all treaties applicable in the Republic prior to the 
independence of these states, would remain binding on them after 
independence. 
The first of the Homelands to gain independence, Transkei, will 
serve as a prototype of this attempt at succession. 
The Transkei Status Act 100 of 1976, sets out the position of the 
South ~frican government when it provides in section 4 that : 
"All treaties, conventions and agreements binding on the 
Republic immediately prior to the commencement of this Act 
and capable of being applied to the Transkei shall be 
binding on Transkei, but the government of the Transkei may 
denounce any such treaty, convention or agreement."(214) 
On its part, the position of the new state of Transkei is set out in 
section 68 of the Republic of Transkei Constitution Act 1976 which 
provides that 
"All rights and obligations under conventions, treaties and 
other similar agreements which were binding on the 
government of Transkei immediately prior to the commencement 
of this Act, shall be the rights and obligations of the 
Republic of Transkei." (215) 
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In this way South Africa and the TBVC states attempted to make use 
of the classic devolution agreement which evolved in British 
Commonwealth practice during the anti-Colonial period. These 
provisions have been exhaustively analysed elsewhere and this 
analysis will not be repeated here.(216) Rather, in keeping with the 
pattern adopted throughout the Chapter, before it can be established 
whether these devolution agreements were successful and the treaties 
were succeeded to, it must be established whether the states created 
are in fact entities capable of succeeding to treaties. In other 
words, was the creation of the TBVC states a valid succession in 
fact which could through the consent of the third states involved, 
set the scene for a succession in law through an application of the 
principles governing succession? 
To answer this question some attention will have to be paid to the 
nature of the independent Homelands. In this regard two 
diametrically opposing approaches may be identified the first that 
of South Africa and the Homelands; the second that of the 
international community which constitutes the third parties whose 
consent to the succession is sought. Two recent cases, one in 
Bophuthatswana and one in Britain, may be used to illustrate these 
divergent points of view. 
The status of Bophuthatswana as a state in international law was 
recently considered in the case of The State v Sando Johannes Banda 
and Others (217) in which the accused were charged with treason 
following upon an attempted coup d' etat in the Homeland. Friedman J 
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followed the traditional approach and after applying the general 
requirements for statehood embodied in the Montevideo Convention, 
came to the conclusion that Bophuthatswana satisfied all four 
requirements. The requirement that a state should have the capacity 
to conduct its foreign relations, received considerable attention. 
The court distinguished between a state's capacity to enter into 
foreign relations (for present purposes, the state's capacity to 
succeed to extradition treaties) and whether it has in fact 
successfully done so. It held that "the fact that [a state) has 
capacity to enter into relations with others is not nullified by the 
refusal of other states to enter into relations with it".(218) 
The court's acceptance of Bophuthatswana's capacity in this regard, 
although at first glance wholehearted, is somewhat tempered by the 
fact that it was prepared to take judicial cognisance of the fact 
that the Homeland is recognised by no $tate other than South 
Africa.(219) In fact, the Homeland is recognised not only by South 
Africa, but also by the other three Homelands created by the South 
African government. Not only is it recognised by these states, they 
have at various stages concluded separate extradition agreements and 
are currently parties to a Southern Africa's only multi-lateral 
extradition convention. (220) If the other Homelands, which followed 
precisely the same road to independence and treaty succession as 
Bophuthatswana, are not regarded as states, where does that leave 
the Homeland?(221) This anomaly aside, the view of Bophuthatswana is 
clearly that the grant of independence by South Africa resulted in a 
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valid succession in fact which could be followed by a valid 
succession in law. This view is shared by South Africa.(222) 
The British position, on the other hand, is illustrated in the case 
of GUR Corporation v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd (Government of the 
Repubic of Ciskei, third party) (223) where the British Court of 
Appeals was called upon to consider the status of the Republic of 
Ciskei, one of the independent states created by South Africa within 
her territory. On being approached for a certificate clarifying 
British thinking on the status of the Homeland, the Foreign Office 
replied that : 
"Her Majesty's Government does not recognize the 'Republic 
of.Ciskei' as an independent sovereign state, either de iure 
or de facto, and does not have any dealings with 
the Government of the Republic of Ciskei' 11 .C224) 
In a subsequent certificate the Foreign Office was still more 
explicit stating that the British government "has not recognized as 
sovereign independent states Ciskei or any of the other Homelands 
established in South Africa 11 .C225) 
Consequently, from the British point of view - and this must be 
regarded as a fair reflection of international thinking on the issue 
- the Homelands are not international law subjects.(226) The South 
African action in creating these Homelands is consequently not 
action which can, from the international perspective, be seen to 
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have given rise to succession in fact, and still less, to succession 
in law. 
What, then, is the essential feature which distinguishes the 
devolution process followed by Britain in granting independence to 
the Republic of South Africa - which is generally regarded as having 
effected a successful succession to British treaties applying within 
the Union - and the devolution process followed by the Republic of 
South Africa in her creation of the independent Homelands - which is 
generally regarded as having failed to effect a successful 
succession to South African treaties applying within the Republic? 
In dealing with devolution agreements and dismemberment above, (227) 
it was .. found that irrespective of how one typifies the agreement -
whether it is regarded as an offer to accede to the original treaty, 
an offer to conclude a new treaty, or whatever - the success of such 
agreements will depend upon the attitude of the other states to the 
original treaty. This attitude will determine, first, whether the 
succession in fact - a necessary precedent for succession in law -
has occurred and then, whether the potential for succession in law 
arising from the succession in fact has been concretised through the 
consent of the parties concerned. 
It is here that the difference between succession to British 
treaties by South Africa on the attainment of Republican status in 
1961, and succession to the Republic's treaties by the TBVC states 
on their attainment of independence during the 1970s is to be found. 
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It will be remembered, that mention was earlier made of the fact 
that "trends" in the law of succession are reflections of political 
perceptions prevailing at the time.(228) In the case of the 
transformation of the Union into the Republic the international 
community was, on the whole, positively inclined towards the 
emergence of independent states. South African independence from 
Britain was perceived as a part of the on-going liberation of 
peoples in their drive away from Colonialism and Imperialism. The 
international community at large, was consequently prepared to 
accept treaty continuity on the part of South Africa.(229) South 
Africa's succession in fact was a manifestation of an 
internationally acceptable process, and the consent of the parties 
which had originally contracted with Britain to this process, 
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triggered South African succession in law to Britain as party to the 
international agreements. 
However, when the Republic of South Africa created the independent 
Homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, the 
opposite sentiment prevailed - and still prevails. The Homelands 
were seen as a realisation of the South African policy of apartheid. 
Condemnation was vociferous, culminating in the adoption of United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution calling on all states to refrain 
from granting any form of recognition to the independence of these 
homelands - a call which did not go unheeded!(230) 
What then is the effect of this scenario on the succession process 
identified above? In the first place, a distinction must be drawn 
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between the position with regard to South Africa and the position 
with regard to the rest of the international community. 
As regards South Africa and the Homelands themselves, succession in 
fact has occurred and the way is open to succession in law. However, 
as regards the international community as a whole, there has been no 
succession in fact. The process in terms of which the TBVC states 
were created is perceived by the international community as a 
violation of the principles of international law. The Succession 
Convention expressly prohibits succession where it would not be "in 
conformity with international law and, in particular, the principles 
of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations".(231) Consequently, the possibility of succession in law -
which a~ we have seen above is triggered by the third party's 
consent to an application of the principles of succession - does not 
arise. This is even more true in the case of extradition treaties 
which of necessity demand a measure of confidence in the 
constitutional dispensation of the new state. The TBVC states have 
consequently not succeeded to South Africa's extradition rights and 
duties with third states as far as the international community as a 
whole is concerned. 
The current climate within South Africa has changed dramatically 
since the State President's peace initiatives of February 1990. This 
has not been without effect in the TBVC states. It would appear that 
the "new South Africa" will include the territory currently 
constituting the TBVC states as there is a general acceptance that 
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reincorporation is inevitable. (232) Although at present any such 
moves must be regarded as speculative, an interesting international 
parallel has recently occurred which could bear consideration as a 
pointer of the possible theoretical framework within which to 
consider the effect on treaties of reincorporation of territory 
earlier separated from the metropolitan. 
On 31 August 1990, the German Democratic Republic {East Germany) 
which had for some fifty years been separated from the Federal 
Republic of Germany, ceased to exist and the two Germanies were once 
again united to form a single state. (233) Clearly, the Federal 
Republic of Germany was the dominant of the two and how treaties 
operating between the German Democratic Republic and foreign states 
have been dealt with should prove interesting if we are to be faced 
with the reincorporation of the TBVC states into a unitary South 
Africa. 
Although far apart, both ideologically and geographically, the two 
situations are not without striking parallels. First the 
partitioning of Germany was carried out without the consent of the 
majority of the German population and has long been a thorn in the 
side of the German people. The TBVC states too, although ostensibly 
created as a realisation of the right to self-determination of the 
ethnic groups involved, were in the eyes of many, a 
self-determination imposed externally against the will of the 
majority of South Africans. As in the case of the Germanies, voices 
against the artificial partitioning of the unitary state have never 
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been silenced. Lastly, the government of the German Democratic 
Republic was initially not accorded general recognition, at least 
not by Western states. The governments of the TBVC states, too, are 
not recognised internationally. 
The parallel becomes still more striking if the decision in GUR 
Corporation v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd (Government of the Republic 
of Ciskei, third party) (234) is considered. In this case an attempt 
was made by a British court to secure locus standi for Ciskei (one 
of the Homelands created by the South African government) through 
use of the so-called Carl Zeiss theory. This theory was developed by 
the British courts in the case of Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Keeler and 
Rainer,(235) to explain the relationship between the German 
Democratic Republic, which was unrecognised by Britain, and the USSR 
which was recognised, so allowing British courts to give effect to 
the enactments of the GDR. In GUR Corp this same reasoning was 
applied to allow Ciskei access to the British courts. 
What approach was adopted in the case of the reunification of the 
two Germanies and does this practice hold any lessons for South 
Africa? 
In the Unification Treaty (236) the question of international 
treaties is dealt with in Chapter IV articles 11 and 12. These 
articles provide : 
"Art 11 Vertrage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Die Vertrags-
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parteien gehen davon aus, dass volkerrechtliche Vertrage und 
Vereinbarungen, denen die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als Ver-
tragspartei angehort, einschliesslich solcher Vertrage, die 
Mitgliedschaften in Internationalen Organisationen oder 
Institutionen begriinden, ihre Giiltigkeit behalten und die 
daraus folgenden Rechte und Verpflichtungen sich mit Ausnahme 
der in Anlage I genannten Vertrage auch auf das in Artikel 3 
genannte Gebiet beziehen. Soweit im Einzelfall Anpassungen 
erforderlich werden, wird sich die gesamtdeutsche Regierung mit 
den jeweiligen Vertragspartnern ins Benehmen setzen. 
Art. 12 Vertrage der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.(1) Die 
Vertragsparteien sind sich einig, dass die volkerrechtlichen 
Vertrage der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik im Zuge der 
Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands unter den Gesichtspunkten 
des Vertrauensschutzes, der Interressenlage der beteiligten 
Staaten und der vertraglichen Verpf lichtungen der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland sowie nach den Prinzipien einer 
fr~iheitlichen, demokratischen und rechtsstaatlichen 
Grundordnung und unter Beachtung der zustandigkeiten der 
Europaischen Gemeinschaften mit den Vertragspartnern der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zu erortern sind, um ihre 
Fortgeltung, Anpassung oder ihr Erloschen zu regeln 
beziehungsweise festzustellen. 
(2) Das vereinte Deutschland legt seine Haltung zum Ubergang 
volkerrechtlicher Vertrage der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik nach Konsultationen mit den jeweiligen 
Vertragspartnern und mit den Europaischen Gemeinschaften, 
soweit deren Zustandigkeiten beriihrt sind, fest. 
(3) Beabsichtigt das vereinte Deutschland, in internationale 
Organisationen oder in sonstige mehrseitige Vertrage 
einzutreten, denen die Deutsche Demokratische Republik, nicht 
aber die Bundesrepublik Deutschland angehort, so wird 
Einvernehmen mit denjeweiligen Vertragspartnern und mit den 
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Europaischen Gemeinschaften, soweit deren Zustandigkeiten 
beriihrt sind hergestellt." 
The German approach would consequently appear to be based on a free 
negotiation and agreement between the united Germany and the other 
parties who had contracted with the German Democratic Republic 
without undue regard to the provisions of the Succession Convention. 
Succession in fact has occurred and been acknowledged 
internationally. The question of succession in law has been left for 
negotiation - in other words will be determined by the consent of 
the other parties involved. This solution is in line with what has 
been advocated above. Unfortunately, however, the situation is still 
too new for any practical examples to have arisen. Of course, for 
those states which refused to recognise East Germany as an 
independent international law subject, the question of succession 
does not arise. 
In the case of the TBVC states the same principles hold true, 
although the situation is somewhat simpler in that no state, other 
than South Africa and the Homelands themselves, has recognised the 
independent existence the TBVC states.(237) Consequently the 
original succession in fact was never such that it could give rise 
to valid international claims to succession in law. From the 
international point of view, the re-unification of South Africa 
through the reincorporation of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and 
Ciskei will be no more than a change in the constitutional set-up of 
South Africa. As such, the question of succession will not 
arise.(238) 
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Internally, the problem is not so simple. South Africa and the 
Homelands have throughout maintained that four independent 
international law subjects have existed. Dealings between South 
Africa and the TBVC states have been conducted on the same basis as 
dealings with other sovereign independent states. Extradition 
treaties have been concluded with these "states" and something will 
have to be done with these treaties. At this stage discussion of the 
process by means of which these states will be reincorporated into 
the Republic must of necessity be purely conjectural; indeed, 
whether all the states will be willing to accept reincorporation is 
far from certain.(239) However, if reincorporation is sought, the 
most likely method will be through cession of the territories to 
South Africa. In such an event the treaty question will presumably 
follow .. the general rules identified above with regard to cession. On 
cession, the territory ceded will cease to exist as an international 
entity capable of performing in terms of a treaty, and any treaties 
applying to it will terminate automatically. At the same time South 
African extradition treaties will find full application within the 
re-unified South Africa. The end result will consequently be a 
restoration, within South Africa, of the perception of the situation 
currently prevailing in the international community as a whole. 
3.6.6 South African judicial practice with regard to succession 
to extradition treaties 
Although mention has been made of extradition treaties in the 
consideration of succession in the South African context, no 
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attention has been paid to the approach adopted by South African 
courts. In this section the major cases dealing with succession to 
extradition treaties which have come before South African courts 
will be analysed in the light of the principles applicable to 
succession identified in the preceding pages of this Chapter. (240) 
In S v Eliasov (241) Hiemstra and Colman JJ sitting in the Transvaal 
Supreme Court, heard an appeal from a magistrate's decision ordering 
Eliasov's extradition to Rhodesia (as it then was). Eliasov was 
wanted to face fraud charges totally some R100 000. His extradition 
was sought by Rhodesia on a warrant in terms of sections 9 and 12 of 
the Extradition Act 67 of 1962.(242) The question arising was 
whether the extradition agreement entered into between the Republic 
of Soutp Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (243) 
remained in force after the dissolution of the Federation. In other 
words, had the three individual members of the Federation - Zambia, 
Malawi and Rhodesia - succeeded to the treaty rights and duties of 
the erstwhile Federation? 
The court cited a letter from Mr Winston Field, then Prime Minister 
of Southern Rhodesia, addressed to the South African authorities on 
23 December 1963, in which he proposed that the existing extradition 
treaty "should continue to apply as between the Republic of South 
Africa and Southern Rhodesia" and that if the Republic agreed, its 
':reply reflecting this agreement "should be regarded as constituting 
an agreement between our Governments with effect from the 
dissolution of the Federation ... ". The South African representative 
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replied in the affirmative, agreeing to the proposal in identical 
terms.(244) This agreement was later confirmed by Rhodesia in a 
Proclamation containing the full texts of both letters.(245) 
The court drew a number of conclusions from this exchange of 
letters. In the first place, Hiemstra J concluded that the letters 
showed that the two states felt that the dissolution of the 
Federation would mean the end of the extradition arrangements 
between them. The court considered the question "a simple matter". 
A treaty had been concluded with the Federation as a single state. 
The Federation had disbanded into three territories. When this took 
place, the Federation ceased to exist as a state with treaty-making 
capacity. With this, its treaties also ceased to exist. The court 
conceded that treaties can survive the dissolution of a Federation 
if the parties concerned continue to act under the terms of the 
treaty - consequently by the tacit consent of the parties. In the 
present case the court felt that the opposite had indeed been done. 
By exchanging letters, the parties had made it known that they in 
fact regarded the treaty as having terminated. Were this not so, no 
declarations would have been required. We consequently find the 
somewhat anomalous situation that a treaty may continue to exist on 
the basis of the tacit consent of the parties - a process which is 
difficult to determine and of necessity involves a judgment call -
while an express statement by the parties that the treaty will 
continue to exist, results in its termination! In Hiemstra J's view 
the parties had attempted to conclude a new treaty with the same 
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content as the old, but had failed in this attempt as "something 
essential was missing11 .C246) 
This "essential something" was, according to the court, promulgation 
of the agreement by the South African State President. Section 2(3) 
of the South African Extradition Act 67 of 1962, provides that no 
treaty will be of force or effect until it has been published by the 
State President by Proclamation in the Government Gazette (or will 
no longer be of effect after publication of a like proclamation that 
it is no longer in force). This the court found was "a prerequisite 
to validity of any extradition agreement".(247) The obvious error in 
failing to distinguish between the existence of a treaty - which is 
an international law issue - and the municipal application of the 
treaty.~ which is a question for national law and is governed by 
section 2(3) of the Extradition Act, has been canvassed fully 
elsewhere.(248) Suffice it to say that the court erred in holding 
that promulgation is a prerequisite for the validity of a treaty. A 
treaty may indeed by valid in the international sphere but lack 
municipal application - as was the case here. 
However, a question which requires some further attention is the 
assumption identified above that a treaty may survive through tacit 
consent, but must terminate if the parties expressly state that it 
is to survive. How can the court's approach be explained? It is 
submitted that two basic points must be borne in mind in attempting 
to assess the judge's reasoning in this particular instance. First, 
public international law is a consensual system in which the 
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cardinal consideration must always remain the intention of the 
parties; it is also a permissive system which allows all that is not 
prohibited.(249) Consequently, if the parties consent to a specific 
course of action, and that course of action is not expressly 
prohibited by international law, there is no bar to an international 
agreement embodying that to which the parties have consented coming 
into existence. Second, there are two ways of looking at most 
situations : a negative and a positive. The court's ~easoning turned 
on an interpretation of the letters exchanged by Southern Rhodesia 
and South Africa. In interpreting these letters the court's approach 
was essentially negative. The reasoning was to the effect that if 
the treaty continues to e~ist, there is no need for the states 
involved to say so. If the states declare that the treaty continues 
to exist, what they in fact mean is that the treaty terminates and 
that they are offering to conclude a new treaty on identical terms. 
This is the approach encountered earlier on in this Chapter in an 
attempt to explain how a state, which was not party to the original 
extradition agreement may come - through the actions of the original 
treaty parties - to be bound by that agreement. It was briefly 
indicated there that regarding a devolution agreement as an offer to 
conclude a new, albeit identical, treaty is not without dogmatic 
problems. These problems are of real significance in a legal system 
like the South African where a treaty depends for municipal 
application on a process of incorporation. The role of the court is 
to determine the intention of the parties and give effect to 
366 
it.(250) This may be done in a number of ways. Although the most 
conclusive is probably by requesting an executive certificate,(251) 
there is nothing to preclude the court from determining the 
intention of the parties from statements they have made.(252) If one 
examines the statements made in the present case, notably that the 
existing extradition agreement "should continue to apply as between 
the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia" (253) there 
would indeed appear no bar to the continuation of the treaty. 
Rhodesia may be taken to have succeeded to the extradition treaty 
between the Federation and South Africa. This was clearly the 
intention of both parties and violates no norm of international law. 
The problems inherent in the court's reasoning in this case centre 
around its interpretation of the role of consent within the 
succession process. If a clear picture is maintained of exactly what 
the parties are consenting to, as evidenced by their express 
statements, the confusion surrounding Hiemstra J's reasoning in 
Eliasov may be avoided. The parties consented, not to the conclusion 
of a new treaty, but to the continuation of an existing treaty : 
they were attempting to effect a continuation of existing rights and 
duties arising from an existing treaty, or differently phrased, they 
were attempting to effect a succession, not to conclude a new 
treaty. By adopting the approach he did, Hiemstra J was blinded by 
the fact that he was dealing with a treaty, and lost sight of the 
type of treaty concerned. The parties were facing an imminent 
succession in fact which, both from their statements and from their 
actions, they regarded as valid. This succession in fact opened the 
way to a succession in law. As was seen above, the possibility of a 
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succession in law is activated by the consent of the parties. The 
consent of the parties consequently serves merely as a catalyst 
through which the way is opened for the application of the 
principles of succession to the extradition arrangements already 
existing between them. In this way, the emphasis is shifted from 
consent as a requirement for the conclusion of a treaty, to consent 
to the continuation of existing treaty commitments. The parties are 
in fact ratifying an existing regime and their consent is of no more 
than evidentiary value : it provides evidence of their intention to 
abide by the rights and duties brought into being by their 
substantive consent to the original treaty. 
This approach also places Hiemstra J's "essential something" which 
was in his view lacking, in perspective. If the consent of the 
parties in this instance is seen for what it is, ie as consent to 
succeed to existing extradition rights and obligations, the need for 
re-promulgation of the treaty falls away. The original treaty 
between the Federation and South Africa is succeeded to by the 
parties - it continues to exist with full municipal application and 
there is no need for re-promulgation. 
It is consequently clear, that the conclusion reached by Hiemstra 
and Colman JJ in the Eliasov case cannot be supported. It is 
essentially illogical, confuses principles of public international 
law with those of municipal law, denies the fundamentally consensual 
basis of public international law and is based on a misconception of 
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the nature of succession to treaties as an independent public 
international law process. 
The problems surrounding the Eliasov case, were recognised in S v 
Bu11(254) where the extradition agreement between the Republic and 
the Federation was again in issue. In this case Malawi sought the 
extradition of Bull from South Africa. He was wanted to stand trial 
on charges of having stolen a relatively small amount of money from 
the Malawi government while employed by the Minister of Works at 
Mzuzu. The first question Boshoff J was called upon to decide was 
whether the treaty between South Africa and the Federation had 
survived the demise of the Federation and now applied to Malawi. 
In this.case the court had before it an executive certificate from 
the Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons to the effect that in 
the view of the South African government, the treaty 
continued in force after Malawi's independence. The defence relied 
on the Eliasov decision that the agreement with the Federation had 
terminated with the dissolution of the Federation. Distinguishing 
this case, the court declared : 
"The learned Judge ..• stated a very wide proposition, but I 
do not think that it can in its context be said that he 
intended to lay down a principle which applied in 
international law irrespective of the nature and objects of 
the treaty, the nature of the Federation, the nature of the 
personalities of the constituent States to adopt the treaty 
and the manner in which the Federation was dissolved. The 
proposition concerns matters of great complexity in 
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international law in so far as it relates to the continuity 
of and the succession to treaties, matters upon which there 
is much controversy probably due to the number of factors 
which influence them or have a bearing on them."(255) 
Boshoff J pointed out that past state practice is of little 
assistance in assessing the position of a new state such as Malawi 
as the succession resulting from the independence of Colonial 
territories is "contextually novel". He identified three possible 
attitudes to succession. First that most treaties survive 
independence, but with certain exceptions,(256) are easily "got rid 
of". He added that "[s]carcely any practical political problem 
arises from continuity of commercial extradition and judicial 
assistance treaties, which are the ones most easily denounced 11 .C257) 
Second, a'state selects those treaties which it wishes to continue 
and regards the others as having lapsed. Third, a restricted number 
of treaties survive as a matter of law. The general policy adopted 
by new states appears to be to face problems as they arise. In 
practical terms, this means "continuity of treaty operation". 
In the case of Malawi, that state had taken all the steps necessary 
to ensure municipal continuation. In this way, the court held, 
"continuity was ensured as also succession to the agreement".(258) 
South Africa, as the other party involved, 
"at all times desired such continuity and succession, and 
accepted that there was such continuity and succession to 
the agreement. In the circumstances the conclusion is 
unavoidable that the agreement never lapsed despite the 
f 
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dissolution of the Federation. There is thus no room for the 
contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that a new 
agreement had to be concluded in respect of which the 
formalities of sec. 2(3)(a) had to be complied with before 
the extradition agreement can be revived and brought into 
operation. The extradition agreement must, therefore, be 
regarded as still being of full force and effect".(259) 
In effect, what the court did in this case was to recognise the 
essential nature of succession as an instrument for transferring 
existing rights and duties flowing from an international agreement 
and give effect to the intention of the parties, as, it is 
submitted, should have happened in the first Eliasov case. 
In 1967, Eliasov was again before the courts, this time on appeal to 
the Appellate Division.(260) Here it was confirmed that as of the 
date of independence of Rhodesia, a valid international agreement 
indeed existed between the Republic and Rhodesia, although this 
agreement had no municipal application until proclaimed in the 
Government Gazette by the State President. (261) What the court 
attempted to do was to correct Hiemstra J's misconception that the 
existence of a valid international law treaty is dependent upon its 
municipal promulgation. Botha JA, delivering the judgment of the 
court, consequently concluded that: 
"Though the agreement thus concluded with effect from the 
dissolution of the the Federation on 31st December 1963, 
constituted a valid international agreement with effect from 
that date, it only became of force and effect within the 
Republic as part of its municipal law with effect from the 
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25th June 1965".(262) 
With all due respect, one must ask whether this judgment takes us 
any further in understanding the nature of succession and whether it 
in fact corrects the misconceptions arising from the first Eliasov 
case. The answer would appear to be in the negative for the 
following reasons. 
What the court, quite correctly, stated in the appeal case is that 
the intention of the parties creates a valid international treaty. 
In this sense, the obvious flaw in the initial Eliasov case was 
corrected. However, problems arise when one comes to consider the 
content of this treaty. The judge himself stated that the treaty was 
concluded by the exchange of letters between the Rhodesian and the 
South African authorities. He furthermore expressly quoted the 
content of the Rhodesian letter to the effect that : 
" .•. the existing extradition agreement ... should continue to 
apply as between the Republic of South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia".(263) 
There can surely be no clearer statement of intent than this. The 
parties intended that the existing treaty should continue to operate 
and not that a new treaty should be concluded. Southern Rhodesia was 
thus making a declaration that it had succeeded to the treaty 
between the Federation and the Republic, it was not offering to 
conclude a new treaty. 
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In this light, the court's conclusion that prior to promulgation of 
the "new" treaty, there was no operative extradition agreement in 
force between the Republic and Rhodesia is, at least in theory, 
incorrect if this agreement is - as the court indeed claimed - based 
on the exchange of letters quoted above. As was pointed out above, 
if the parties intended the existing agreement to continue - if 
their intention was to effect a succession - no re-promulgation was 
in fact required. 
In the previous paragraph it was stated that the judgment of the 
court was incorrect in theory. This was done advisedly. In all 
fairness, the intention of the South African authorities, although 
clearly in favour of the continued application of an existing treaty 
when the letters were exchanged and the agreement to succeed 
reached, had become somewhat blurred by the time the Appellate 
Division was faced by Eliasov. In the original Eliasov decision, 
Hiemstra J closed with the following statement 
"The conclusion is that we have at the present moment no 
extradition treaty with Rhodesia. That can be remedied by a 
presidential proclamation and the request for extradition 
can be renewed. The authorities could also act in terms of 
sec. 3(2) of the Act, which provides for the extradition of 
an accused or convicted person in cases where no extradition 
treaty exists. In such a case the State President need 
merely consent in writing".(264) 
373 
Clearly in accordance with the judge's advice, and possibly with the 
maxim "better safe than sorry" in mind, the South African 
authorities did both! (265) 
Consequently, in the second Eliasov case, the appeal court was faced 
with conflicting messages. It had the clear intention of the parties 
in the exchange of letters which points clearly to succession. On 
the other hand, it had a certification from the State President in 
terms of section 3(2) of the Extradition Act which arises only in 
the event of South Africa and the requesting state having no 
extradition arrangements. Lastly, matters were still further 
complicated by the re-promulgation of the extradition agreement 
which points to the intention on the part of South Africa that a new 
treaty .had been concluded. It is to be regretted that, having the 
decision in S v Bull (266) available, no mention was made of Boshoff 
J's dogmatically sound judgment. Although at that stage, the 
confusion in the courts had already spilt over into the actions of 
the South African authorities, a clear ruling on the nature of 
succession would have been helpful. 
The next reported case to deal with extradition was S v 
Pirzenthal.(261) Pirzenthal, a South African national, had been 
convicted of fraud and theft in Beira, Mocambique and sentenced to 
six years' imprisonment. While serving his sentence, Pirzenthal 
escaped and fled to South Africa. Mocambique requested his 
extradition to serve the remainder of his sentence. 
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The governing treaty was the treaty concluded between Britain and 
Portugal in 1892.(268) The question was consequently whether the 
Republic of South Africa had succeeded to the Anglo-Portuguese 
treaty. The question of succession was not considered at all. The 
court merely stated that the treaty was binding upon the Republic 
"under and by virtue of the provisions of sec. 2(4) of the 
Extradition Act 67 of 1962 11 .(269) The appeal against the extradition 
order was dismissed which can be seen as a confirmation of South 
Africa's succession to the 1892 treaty. 
The extradition arrangements between the erstwhile Federation and 
the Republic were before the courts again in the Devoy cases. Malawi 
was again the foreign state involved. In s v Devoy (270) James JP 
(Harcou~t J concurring) delivered judgment in the Natal Provincial 
Division on a decision by a magistrate ordering Devoy's surrender to 
Malawi officials to stand trial on charges of conspiracy to steal 
and theft of copper wire. The court had again to consider the 
continued existence of the treaty between South Africa and the 
Federation. 
The court had before it a certificate from the Malawian Director of 
Public Prosecutions, countersigned by the Attorney-General, stating 
that from Malawi's point of view the treaty continued to exist, and 
a certificate from the South African Minister of Justice declaring 
that as far as South Africa was concerned, the treaty between the 
Republic and the Federation continued as a treaty between Malawi and 
South Africa. On the basis of the first Eliasov case, Devoy 
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contended that the treaty had ceased to exist on the attainment of 
inqependence by Malawi. The court pointed to Hiemstra J's contention 
that the treaty had ceased as "the natural and normal sequel" to the 
dissolution of the Federation. However, James JP found the fact that 
in Eliasov the court had acknowledged that treaties may be continued 
by conduct significant.(271) After due consideration of Boshoff J's 
analysis of the position in Bull's case, the court found itself in 
full agreement with that decision. In other words, Malawi had 
succeeded to the treaty operative between South Africa and the 
Federation. 
It was further argued for Devoy that before it achieved independence 
Malawi did not have the power to recognise an extradition agreement 
made by·the Federation. The court found this unconvincing. The 
certificate from the Minister of Justice showed that the South 
African authorities felt that Malawi had this power and their 
decision must prevail in such an instance. For the court, the 
recognition of Malawi's capacity was: 
"a function of the Executive branch of government; it is a 
political act entailing legal consequences. Once that 
recognition has been granted by the Executive branch of any 
country it is not for the judicial branch to consider 
whether the recognition was competent".(272) 
Finally, the court considered an interesting proposition which of 
necessity arises if the totally divergent approaches towards 
Rhodesia (as reflected in the Eliasov decisions) and Malawi (as 
reflected in the Bull decision) are taken into account. This is that 
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because the South African authorities had decided that in the case 
of Rhodesia a new treaty had been concluded, the same must 
necessarily hold true of Malawi as both dealt with a single treaty. 
The court did not regard this conclusion as axiomatic. In fact it 
questioned - albeit in subtle terms - the reasoning behind the South 
African authorities' decision to conclude a new treaty in the case 
of Rhodesia, in the following terms : 
"I have little doubt that the South African authorities 
agreed to the suggestion of Southern Rhodesia that a new 
agreement should be entered into simply as a matter of 
caution and international courtesy and not because it 
regarded the earlier agreement as no longer binding upon 
Southern Rhodesia".(273) 
The appeal was dismissed. 
This was however, not the end of Devoy and in 1971 the matter came 
before the Appellate Division.(274) Ogilvie-Thompson CJ (Rumpff JA 
and Corbett AJA concurring) delivered the judgment of the court. He 
pointed out that two conflicting decisions exist in the Transvaal: 
Eliasov where the treaty with the Federation was held to have 
terminated; and Bull where the treaty with the Federation was held 
to have continued. After a thorough review of the authorities cited 
in both decisions, the court concluded that no general rule could be 
formulated and that each case should be judged on its particular 
facts. However, specifically in the case of extradition treaties, 
the court felt that "the existence of a general tendency 
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in favour of their continuance" (275) should also be borne in mind. 
In assessing the continuation of a treaty : 
"it is .•• a sound general working rule ..• to ascertain what 
was the intention of the State or States concerned as to the 
continuance or passing of any rights or obligations".(276) 
Against this background, the court considered the continuation of 
the extradition agreement with the Federation yet again. 
The judge found that Malawi had exhibited "a consistent and 
continuous" intention to be bound by the agreement. In the case of 
South Africa, the court had before it an executive certificate 
certifying that the treaty continued after Malawian independence. 
Ogilvie-:Thompson JA found that : 
"[I]n extradition cases a certificate from the Minister is 
an appropriate method of informing the Court of the 
Government's attitude. In the present case the Court 
accordingly accepts the certificate of the Minister as a 
statement of the matters therein mentioned".(277) 
One of the points raised by Devoy was that the views expressed in 
the certificate with regard to Malawi, conflicted with the inten-
tions of the government as reflected in its dealings with Rhodesia. 
Citing the provisions from the letters exchanged, Ogilvie-Thompson 
too found that the exchange of notes constituted "an express, new, 
contract" between South Africa and Rhodesia that as from the date 
of dissolution of the Federation, the extradition agreement would 
continue in force. He also appeared to have considered 
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re-promulgation in the Government Gazette crucial in the case of 
Rhodesia.(278) Again one experiences certain difficulties with these 
statements. The existence of the treaty is premised upon the fact of 
the exchange of letters, and the court was in fact correct in 
stating that it was dealing with a fresh new contract. However, 
problems again arise with the content of this "contract". If the 
content of the new contract was, as the court correctly found, the 
continuation of an existing and promulgated treaty, the need for its 
re-promulgation is somewhat of a mystery. The fact that the South 
African Department of Foreign Affairs would appear, in the confusion 
attendant upon the first Eliasov decision, unnecessarily to have 
decided upon the path of re-negotiation and re-promulgation of the 
treaty, should not affect the fact that, if one is dealing with the 
concept.of succession - as the court in fact acknowledged - the 
treaty continued to exist. If the court was in fact judging the 
issue in the light of subsequent executive action - notably, 
re-promulgation - it should have made this clear. 
It is interesting to note that the judge continued to state 
that : 
"The fact that these notes were exchanged certainly lends 
colour to appellant's submission that, in the absence of any 
such Notes in regard to Nyasaland, the agreement lapsed upon 
the dissolution of the Federation ... ".(279) 
In other words, the absence of the exchange of notes denoted an 
intention to terminate the treaty. This is the exact opposite of 
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Hiemstra J's finding in the first Eliasov case where he held that 
the exchange of notes had indeed resulted in the termination of the 
treaty! However, this approach would appear to cast some doubt upon 
the possibility of tacit consent to succession. 
Ogilvie-Thompson CJ continued by pointing out that an exchange of 
notes between Rhodesia and South Africa, does not necessarily result 
in the termination of a treaty between Malawi and South Africa. Both 
parties had sought to maintain the agreement and as : 
"[w]hat cannot be attained on the level of international 
customary law, can always be achieved by way of 
consent ... [which is] ... the safe road which ... the practice of 
States has chosen",(280) 
he found that the extradition agreement between Malawi and South 
Africa remained in force. In so doing he expressly confirmed the 
decision in Bull and although distinguishing Eliasov, declared that 
any contrary statements in that decision were incorrect. 
What, then, is the conclusion to be drawn from these judgments 
regarding the approach of the South African courts to succession to 
extradition treaties? There are to my mind two distinct lines of 
thought emerging from the decisions. The one, epitomised by the 
decision in Bull's case, is that where the true consensual nature of 
public international law is correctly perceived and borne in mind, 
and the concept of succession is recognised as an independent 
international law phenomenon, the judgment will reflect the true 
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intention of the parties and serve justice both internationally and 
municipally. The other, epitomised by Eliasov, is that where sight 
is lost of the basic precepts of international law and the nature of 
the concept of succession is misunderstood, confusion will follow. 
It is perhaps symptomatic of the complexity of succession that this 
confusion may spread from the courts to the executive as is clearly 
borne out by the latter's over-hasty and ill-conceived reaction to 
Hiemstra J's closing recommendations in the first Eliasov case - a 
judgment clearly based on a misconception, not only of international 
law, but also of the nature of succession. 
Fortunately, the Appellate Division has restored the balance with 
the decision in the Devoy appeal and has again placed the question 
of succession in the correct perspective, viz "the safe road" of the 
intention of the parties involved. Succession in South African 
municipal law, is consequently in line with succession as reflected 
above in courts throughout the world. 
4 SUCCESSION IN THE CASE OF NAMIBIA 
Although Namibia is now an independent state responsible for its own 
international relations, including extradition, no consideration of 
succession in the southern half of the African continent would be 
complete without some mention of the position of Namibia. There are 
two compelling reasons for this. First, until the independence of 
Namibia, South African extradition treaties applied within South 
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West Africa as the territory then was. Second, as the newest member 
of the international community to acquire independence, the approach 
adopted by Namibia to succession to treaties is the latest 
reflection of international practice in this regard.(281) 
Despite vociferous attacks on South Africa's administration of and 
authority to act internationally for the territory through the 
years, there is little doubt that South Africa was the de facto 
authority within the mandated territory (282) and that in _practice 
an application for extradition emanating from one of the treaty-· 
parties, addressed to the administering authorities in South West 
Africa would have resulted (all things being equal) in the factual 
extradition of the offender. 
With the attainment of Namibian independence on 21 March 1990, one 
of the major questions to be answered is what has happened to the 
treaties applicable within the territory before independence. In the 
Namibian Constitution (283) the question of int~rnational agreements 
is dealt with in article 143 titled "Existing International 
Agreements". This article provides : 
"All existing international agreements binding upon Namibia 
shall remain in force, unless and until the National 
Assembly acting under Article 63(2)(d) hereof otherwise 
decides." 
Article 63(2)(d), in turn provides that the National Assembly shall 
have the power, subject to the Constitution, 
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"to consider and decide whether or not to succeed to such 
international agreements as may have been entered into prior 
to independence by administrations within Namibia in which 
the majority of the Namibian people have historically not 
enjoyed democratic representation and participation." 
The question arising is into which of the theoretical approaches to 
succession identified in this Chapter, Namibian practice may be 
slotted. As was pointed out earlier, the prevailing perception in 
the Succession Convention would appear to be the clean slate 
approach.(284) If one examines the few new states which have in fact 
opted for this approach, a pattern can be discerned. In all 
instances the clean slate was adopted by states whose independence 
could be termed "hard earned", in other words their succession in 
fact was preceded by a long and often bloody struggle generating a 
.. 
certain measure of resentment which found expression in the 
rejection of the transactions of the former state. The acrimony 
characterising their successions in fact left no room for succession 
in law. Given the Namibian history, it could well have been expected 
that a similar reaction would have set in. However, at first 
reading, the provisions of the Namibian Constitution appear 
eminently reasonable and restrained. It indeed appears as a textbook 
expression of what was termed provisional succession above.(285) In 
other words, on paper at least, Namibia has succeeded to all 
treaties applicable within the territory of South West Africa but 
retains the right to terminate these treaties after review. 
The actual provisions in the Constitution, however, bear closer 
analysis. As regards section 143, two phrases in particular are 
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crucial. These are the phrase "existing international agreements", 
and the phrase "binding upon Namibia". The questions arising in this 
regard are first, what may be regarded as an existing international 
agreement and second, what may be regarded as an agreement binding 
on Namibia. Our first task is consequently to attempt a 
classification of the treaties purportedly applying within South 
West Africa on the date of its transition to independence as 
Namibia. As Szasz points out, an exhaustive classification has been 
made by the United Nations Institute for Namibia.(286) This body 
classified the treaties in five categories. 
Category A encompasses treaties concluded on Namibia's behalf by the 
United Nations Council for Namibia from its inception in 1967 to 
indepe~dence in 1990,(287) and certain multilateral humanitarian 
treaties entered into by South Africa and extended to Namibia before 
the termination of South Africa's mandate over the territory in 
1966.(288) For our purposes, this category need not be further 
considered as no extradition treaties fall within its ambit. 
Category B consists of treaties extended to Namibia by South Africa 
before 27 October 1966 and in force on that day. Treaties containing 
continuing provisions or which have not been terminated - although 
operations under the treaties may have ceased on the above date -
are also included. It is within this category that most extradition 
treaties may be classed - although such a classification is not 
without problems. Szasz (289) considers whether succession is 
possible in regard to these treaties. One of the consequences of 
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the 1971 Advisory Opinion was that as regards Namibia, states were 
calleQ upon not to deal with South Africa, and in particular, not to 
invoke or apply bilateral treaties involving "active 
intergovernmental cooperation".(290) Clearly extradition treaties 
would fall squarely within this definition. Such treaties should be 
regarded as "terminated on the ground that they are in conflict with 
a peremptory norm of international law".(291) Although it was 
conceded that Namibia could elect to succeed to these treaties, this 
would be "inconsistent with UN policy towards Namibia". (292) Szasz 
points out, however, that a sounder legal argument is that because 
the United Nations resolutions on Namibia after 1966 (interpreted in 
the light of the 1971 Advisory Opinion) call only for the 
suspension, and not the termination of these treaties, they in fact 
remain .. "existing international agreements" binding in Namibia at the 
date of independence. This approach is strengthened by the fact that 
the reason for their suspension - protest at South Africa's illegal 
administration of the territory - fell away on attainment of 
independence. 
Secondly, Szasz points to the argument that because South Africa was 
expressly not regarded as Namibia's predecessor at the 1977 
Conference to the Succession Convention, it should not now be so 
regarded.(293) However, as these are political statements made at a 
time when Namibia was struggling to achieve independence they should 
be assessed in the light of the approach adopted in the Namibian 
Constitution which represents the only Namibian "statement" on 
succession to date.C294) In this light, the concrete approach 
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advocated in the Constitution should take precedence over earlier 
political rhetoric. 
Lastly, the argument is raised that between the dissolution of the 
League of Nations and the termination of the mandate, South Africa 
was claiming to act under the mandate but refusing to act in 
accordance with the mandate. Internationally, its actions were 
consequently illegal and to recognise such acts would be to 
legitimise them ex post facto. However, as Szasz points out, (295) 
this argument does not mean that the treaties did not exist on 
independence. 
Category C encompasses treaties extended to Namibia by South Africa 
before.the termination of the mandate but which had themselves been 
terminated before 27 October 1966. These present few problems as 
they are clearly not treaties applicable within Namibia on 
independence. 
Category D consists of dispositive, localised or territorial 
treaties which are regarded as applicable within Namibia. However, 
as it was established early on in this Chapter that an extradition 
treaty cannot be classed as localised, dispositive or territorial, 
this category too is of no concern for present purposes. 
Category E is the final category and encompasses treaties which 
South Africa extended to Namibia after the termination of the 
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mandate. From the international perspective these treaties are in 
violation of international law and cannot be regarded as valid 
international agreements as envisaged in section 143. 
What conclusions are to be drawn from the above categorisation of 
treaties, particularly with regard to extradition? First it is clear 
that categories A and D find no application as no extradition 
treaties fall within their ambits. Second, as regards category C, 
there are a number of extradition treaties extended to Namibia which 
fall within this category. These are the British extradition 
treaties with, for example, Denmark,(296) Paraguay, (297) and 
Germany.(298) However, as these treaties were terminated before 
Namibian independence, it may safely be assumed that they do not 
qualif~ as treaties applicable within Namibia at the date of 
independence. Third, as regards category B, it is here that the 
majority of the extradition treaties may be classified. However, 
from a technical point of view, it should be noted that the UNIN 
classification provides only for treaties extended to Namibia "by 
South Africa". Certain problems arise with this classification in 
that, specifically as regards extradition, far and away the majority 
of the treaties which may be grouped under this head were in fact 
extended to Namibia by Britain and not by South Africa. Consequently 
the applicability of a number of the arguments reflected by Szasz, 
particularly those premised on the illegality of South African 
actions in respect of the mandated territory, may be open to 
question. It has been pointed out elsewhere that the validity of a 
treaty should be judged within its own time-frame (299) and at the 
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time when the majority of the extradition treaties in question were 
accorded application within South West Africa, there would have been 
no objection to such action - particularly not when such extension 
was common practice in Britain and other Imperialist countries. It 
is consequently submitted that there should be no objection to 
regarding British extradition treaties extended to Namibia as 
existing international agreements binding upon Namibia at the date 
of independence. 
However, within this category one also encounters extradition 
treaties concluded independently by South Africa before it became a 
Republic but after it acquired adequate treaty-making capacity, and 
treaties concluded by South Africa after 1961 and applicable within 
Namibia on termination of the Mandate in 1966. In this regard it 
should be noted that the South African Extradition Act 67 of 1962, 
includes in article 1 under the definition of the Republic "the 
territory of South West Africa". Consequently, treaties concluded by 
South Africa after the adoption of the Extradition Act and while the 
Republic's mandate over South West Africa had not yet been revoked 
also fall within the classification of treaties applicable within 
the territory at date of independence. 
As regards category E, it may be assumed that the extension of any 
extradition provisions to South West Africa between the termination 
of the mandate in 1966 and the attainment of independence in 1990 
was invalid from an international point of view and that these were 
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not "international agreements binding upon Namibia" as required by 
section 143 of the Constitution. 
In light of the above, extradition treaties with the following 
countries may be classified as "existing international agreements" 
to which Namibia may be taken to have succeeded in terms of section 
143 of its independence Constitution. The countries are listed 
chronologically in accordance with the date of extension of the 
relevant treaties to South West Africa/Namibia. 
British extradition treaties with the following countries were 
extended to South West Africa by British action : Netherlands, (300} 
Luxembourg,(301} Spain,(302} Greece,(303} Austria,C304} Yugoslavia 
(Serbi~),C305} Hungary,(306} Norway,(307} Roumania, (308} 
Liberia,C309} Nicaragua,(310} Peru,(311} Chile,(312} Haiti, (313} 
Panama,C314} Siam,C315} Bolivia,(316} Belgium,C317} Guatamala,C318} 
Switzerland,(319} Cuba,(320} El Salvador,C321} Monaco,C322} 
Ecuador,C323} and Portugal. (324) 
Union extradition treaties extended to South West Africa 
United States of America (325) and Israel. (326) 
South African extradition treaties extended to South West Africa 
before termination of the Mandate : Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland (327} amd Southern Rhodesia. (328) 
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Having identified the extradition treaties to which Namibia may be 
said to have succeeded, it must be emphasised, however, that this 
succession must be regarded as provisional. Section 63(2)(d) of the 
Constitution provides the tools by which a review of these treaties 
is to be conducted and their termination effected. In this section 
the phrases "administrations within Namibia" and "the majority of 
the Namibian people have historically not enjoyed democratic 
representation and participation" require closer attention. Although 
we have already established that category A treaties are not 
concerned with extradition, it is interesting to note that a strong 
case can be made out for these treaties not falling within the ambit 
of section 63(2)(d) in that the Council for Namibia was never an 
"administration within Namibia" operating as it did at all times 
outside of the country. In fact, it would appear that only South 
Africa and the various organs created by the South African 
government to administer the territory at various stages qualify as 
such administrations. It is consequently the treaties concluded by 
these bodies which are liable to review and repudiation. What then, 
one may well ask, of the extradition treaties extended to the 
territory by British action? Unless one is to work with agency, or 
some related concept, Britain cannot realistically be regarded as 
ever having established an "administration within Namibia". This is 
borne out to some extent by the UNIN's exclusive mention of South 
Africa in its treaty categorisation. Does this mean that the 
extradition treaties applicable by British action are in a similar 
position as category A treaties concluded by the Council for 
Namibia, in other words that they must be succeeded to? 
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On the other hand, the qualification of these administrations as 
those "in which the majority of the Namibian people have 
historically not enjoyed democratic representation and 
participation", casts the net extremely wide. The clear intention of 
the drafters of the Constitution was that the people of Namibia 
should not be bound by treaties which they find unacceptable and 
which they had no part in making. Furthermore, the general desire of 
Namibia to run its affairs in accordance with international law 
{329) suggests that in the decision as to whether or not a 
particular treaty should be subject to consideration for termination 
should be one acceptable in terms of the "general rules of public 
international law" as enunciated in article 144 of the Constitution. 
It would appear that the prevailing sentiment in international law 
as regards -the succession of new states to treaties is the clean 
slate {330) and consequently that a mere technicality as to who was 
responsible for the extension of a treaty to Namibia should not 
stand in the way of the National Assembly cleaning its slate of 
treaties which it finds unacceptable. Support for this view may be 
found in the first Namibian judgment to deal with succession. In 
Mwandingi v Minister of Defence Namibia,(331) the Acting Judge 
President of Namibia, Justice Strydom, found - although not within 
the context of succession to treaties - that an interpretation of 
the Namibian Constitution called for "a generous interpretation 
avoiding ... the austerity of tabulated legalism".(332) Consequently, 
it is submitted that under the provisions of article 143 of its 
constitution, Namibia has succeeded to the treaties listed above. 
However, under the provisions of article 63{2)(d) these treaties may 
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be reviewed by the National Assembly and either continued or 
terminated. 
To date Namibia has made no general declaration as to which treaties 
it regards as having been succeeded to and which not. As was pointed 
out earlier,(333) extradition is not generally perceived as a matter 
of pressing urgency by newly independent states. However, it is 
interesting to note that Namibia would appear to be somewhat of an 
exception in this regard. An application from the Namibian 
government for the extradition from South Africa to Namibia of three 
men wanted, inter alia, on charges of murder, is currently before 
the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court. As there is no extradition 
treaty between the two states,(334) the matter is being dealt with 
in terms of section 3(2) of the South Africa Extradition Act 67 of 
1962 which empowers the State President of South Africa to certify 
that the person whose extradition is sought, is a person liable to 
be extradited. At the time of writing the extradition hearing has 
again been postponed due to the ill health of the three potential 
extraditees. 
Although there have as yet been no cases before the courts dealing 
with succession to treaties generally, or extradition treaties in 
particular, there has indeed been a case dealing with succession. In 
Mwandingi v Minister of Defence, Namibia (335) the question before 
the court was whether Namibia had succeeded South Africa in 
delictual liability for injuries suffered by Mwandingi at the hands 
of the South African Defence Force prior to Namibian independence. 
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The court found in favour of Namibian succession, despite a general 
perception in international law that the delictual liability of a 
predecessor state is not succeeded to by the new state.(336) 
Although this does not impact directly on treaty succession, and 
succession to extradition in particular, it does show that the 
general willingness to accept succession evident from the Namibian 
constitutional provisions, is carried through in practice. If 
Namibia is to succeed to onerous "duties" which in terms of general 
international law it is under no obligation to do, how much more 
readily will it not be prepared to succeed to extradition provisions 
which place no undue burden on the state? 
In conclusion therefore, the following points should be noted. 
First, Namibia has concluded no specific devolution agreement with 
South Africa as the erstwhile de facto government of the territory. 
The question of treaty succession should consequently be decided on 
the basis of general principles of international law which in terms 
of the Namibian Constitution form part of the law of Namibia.(337) 
Second, Namibia has not acceded to the Succession Convention and the 
principles embodied in that document will consequently find no 
direct application within the Republic. The clean slate approach 
advocated for new states by the convention (338) and encouraged by 
the United Nations Council for Namibia (339) is consequently also 
not necessarily binding on the independent state. Namibia has 
chosen, as its initial reaction to treaties concluded by its 
predecessors or extended by them to the territory, the more 
realistic approach of provisional succession. The Namibian courts, 
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in the only case to date to deal with succession, have adopted a 
view which supports succession. It is consequently submitted that 
Namibia has succeeded to the extradition provisions extended to the 
territory of South West Africa by both Britain and South Africa from 
the inception of the mandate to its termination by the International 
Court of Justice. In fact, in view of the decision in Mwandingi 
Namibia could well be said to have succeeded to South African 
treaties after 1966. Although Namibia retains the right to terminate 
any of these treaties, as far as could be established this has not 
to date been done. Further, it would appear that extradition is a 
topic which is receiving the attention of the new government in that 
a formal extradition treaty with South Africa, drafted along 
traditional lines, is purportedly ready for signature. At present, 
however, the uncertainty surrounding the extradition of the three 
individuals sought by Namibia, would appear to be holding up its 
formal signature. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The acquisition of treaty rights and obligations should be 
approached on two levels : firstly, original acquisition in terms of 
which the state acquires its rights directly from the other 
contracting party or parties; and secondly, derivative acquisition -
which may also be termed state succession - where the party 
acquiring the rights and duties is not a party to the original 
treaty. 
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In the case of South Africa's right or duty to extradite based on 
treaty, both original and derivative acquisition come into play. 
Under original acquisition three distinct "groupings" may be 
identified. These are first, treaties concluded by South Africa 
before it became a Republic but after it had acquired a measure of 
independent treaty-making capacity. Second, are all extradition 
treaties concluded by the Republic after 1961. Third, are the 
extradition treaties concluded between South Africa and the TBVC 
states. These treaties are sui generis in the sense that they are 
premised upon actions not recognised by the international community. 
Consequently, from the international perspective these treaties 
enjoy no international viability, although within the South African 
municipal sphere they are regarded as creating binding international 
rights ~nd duties to extradite. 
Derivative acquisition of the right or duty to extradite within the 
South African context, is highly relevant as it accounts for South 
Africa's claim to be bound by the extradition treaties concluded by 
Britain with virtually all the leading countries of the world. South 
Africa claims to have succeeded to these rights and in order to 
assess these claims a close examination of the concept and process 
of state succession is required. 
An evaluation of succession demands that a number of questions be 
answered. First it must be established whether the treaty in 
question is susceptible to succession. In answering this question in 
the context of extradition, it was found that an extradition treaty 
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is neither dispositive nor truly personal but a hybrid of the two. 
In principle, there would appear to be no inherent characteristic in 
the nature of an extradition treaty which would bar succession by 
one state to an extradition treaty concluded by another. On the 
other hand, there is no inherent characteristic which would render 
succession to extradition treaties automatic. Consequently, 
extradition treaties are open to succession. 
The second question flowing from this answer, is by what action this 
succession may be effected. This is in fact a complex issue which 
must be approached in various stages. First, the act giving rise to 
succession must be characterised. In this process - which is termed 
"succession in fact" - the act giving rise to a change in 
sovereignty must be evaluated to determine whether the resultant 
entity is one which is capable of succeeding to treaties. In this 
phase of the examination, three potential "successions in fact" are 
examined. These are annexation and cession; Commonwealth devolution 
agreements; and dismemberment or partition. 
Although annexation is no longer regarded as a valid means for 
changing sovereign authority, these changes and the resultant 
potential for succession must be judged in terms of the time-frame 
of the event. It was established that a general rule exists that the 
treaties of the annexed or ceded state cease to exist and those of 
the annexing state apply within the territory. The reason for this 
is that the former state ceases to exist and is consequently not in 
a position to act in terms of the treaty. The act which gives rise 
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to the potential of succession, is consequently not a true 
"succession in fact". 
In the case of devolution agreements, the evaluation of the success 
or otherwise of the succession in fact can be judged only by having 
account of the attitudes of the third states involved. The 
touchstone is consequently the consent of the parties. It is here 
that an evaluation of succession as an international law process is 
required. Unless it is recognised that consent within the succession 
scenario is not consent to a new treaty, but rather evidence of the 
intention of the parties, problems arise. A clear vision of what the 
parties to the devolution agreement are consenting to must be 
maintained at all times. The parties are consenting, not to the 
conclusion of an extradition treaty, but to the continuation of an 
existing treaty. This consent, which may be either express or tacit, 
serves as a catalyst which brings the principles of succession into 
operation. Because consent is merely evidence of the intention of 
the parties, no general rule with regard to succession in the case 
of devolution agreements can be established. The existence of a 
valid "succession in fact" depends on the attitude of the parties 
involved. 
In the case of dismemberment and secession, the general rule 
established is that in the case of secession the treaties of the 
mother state apply automatically to the new territory. In the case 
of dismemberment, no general rule can be established and the 
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principles identified with regard to devolution apply with equal 
force. 
Once it has been established that a valid "succession in fact" has 
occurred, the way is open for "succession in law". Whether this 
succession in law is in fact realised, depends again on the consent 
of the parties involved and this can be established only by an 
examination of the facts surrounding the specific problem in issue. 
An examination of state practice and international judgments reveals 
that views are evenly split between succession and non-succession, 
again with consent as the touchstone. 
These p~inciples are then applied to the various possible succession 
scenarios occurring within South Africa throughout its history. The 
point is reached where all the relevant British extradition treaties 
are found to have applied within the individual territories of Cape 
of Good Hope, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal. These in turn 
found application within the Union of South Africa in 1910 and the 
Republic in 1961. 
Succession in the case of the TBVC states requires special 
consideration and the conclusion reached is that there was in these 
cases no valid succession in fact and that internationally, ie as 
far as the international community - the third parties in a 
succession arrangement - is concerned the question of succession in 
law does not arise. 
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In the South African courts, succession has had a chequered history. 
Confusion surrounding succession as an international law process and 
the true role of consent in this regard has led to patently 
incorrect and contradictory judgments. Although in effect, this has 
been remedied, dogmatically the position is not as clear as could be 
wished. 
For the sake of completeness, the position of Namibia, as a 
territory in which all South African extradition treaties applied 
and one of the newest states to gain independence, is also 
considered, and the applicable extradition treaties are identified. 
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ENDNOTES : CHAPTER IV 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 in Brownlie 
(1972) 233ff .. The convention has been in force since British 
accession in 1980 and although South Africa is not a party, 
it adheres to the principles which are generally regarded 
as a codification of customary public international law -
see Booysen (1989) 34 n 11. 
2 As was determined in Chapter II above, in the South African 
context the term "state" should be given a more fluid 
interpretation. The question is rather which entity 
exercises sovereign rights - including the right to conclude 
treaties - over a particular territory. Within the saga of 
Colonial expansionism, certain territories which today form 
part of South Africa, indeed had a measure of treaty 
capacity. After 1961 the problem is purely academic as, 
despite occasional references to the South African "regime", 
the capacity of the South African government to act 
internationally for the territory is not seriously 
questioned. 
3 For signature, see article 12(1)(a) and (b); for exchange of 
instruments, see article 13(a) and (b); for ratification see 
article 14(1)(a) - (d); and for acceptance article 14(2). 
Article 15 deals with accession - see below. 
4 As was pointed out above, South Africa has a strong 
bilateral bias when it comes to extradition treaties. 
However, as was also noted above, the international trend 
would appear to be towards multilateral extradition 
provisions - whether in specific extradition agreements or 
other instruments of international cooperation which merely 
include extradition procedures in their provisions. 
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5 See Chapter II 110 and the authorities cited 
there. 
6 Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals between 
the United Kingdom and Czechoslovakia concluded at London 
11.11.1924. 
7 Treaty between Finland and the United Kingdom for the 
extradition of Criminals concluded at London 30.5.1924. 
8 In the case of Finland by article V GN 1677 Government 
Gazette of 29.9.1925; and in the case of Czechoslovakia by 
GN 26 Government Gazette 6.1.1928. 
9 South Africa here means South Africa as a unitary state - ie 
as Union after 1910 and Republic after 1961. The status of 
the treaties concluded by the Boer Republics during their 
brief periods of independence is essentailly a problem of 
succession and will be dealt with in the following section. 
10 Ratified at Washington 1.3.1951, GN 91 Government Gazette 
20.4.1951. 
11 Ratified at Pretoria 7.1.60 GN R14 Government Gazette 
6362 of 5.2.60. 
12 See the Introduction (Chapter I) where the nature of 
extradition as an international act is examined. 
13 This list represents all the extradition arrangements made 
by the Republic since independence. The interrelation 
between the various treaties and their continued validity will 
be considered in Chapter V. 
14 Extradition Treaty concluded between the governments of the 
Republic of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and 
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Nyasaland on 19.11.1962 Government Gazette 445/1962; SATS 
9/1962. 
15 On 23.12.1962 notes were exchanged between the governments 
of the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to 
ensure the continued operation of the treaty concluded with 
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland - n 14 above -
Government Gazette 1156 of 25.6.1965. 
16 Extradition treaty between the governments of the Republic 
of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland concluded on 
4.9.1968; SATS 2/1969. 
17 Treaty of Extradition concluded between the governments of 
the Republic of South Africa and Botswana on 27.2.1969; SATS 
2/1969. 
18 Treaty of Extradition between the governments of the 
Republic of South Africa and Malawi on 25.2.1972; SATS 
1/1972. 
19 The Extradition treaty concluded between the states on 
18.9.1957 - seen 11 above - was amended on 2.5.1976; SATS 
1/1976. 
20 Extradition treaty concluded between the governments of the 
Republic of South Africa and Transkei on 2.11.1977 -
Government Gazette 5813 of 25.11.1977. This treaty has been 
superceded by the Extradition Treaty concluded between the 
governments of the Republic of South Africa and Transkei of 
1987. 
21 Extradition Treaty between the governments of the Republic 
of South Africa and Bophuthatswana concluded on 15.11.1977 -
GN R375 Government Gazette 5846 of 30.12.1977. This treaty 
has been superceded by the Convention on Extradition 
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concluded between the Republic of South Africa and the 
governments of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda on 
20.11.1986. 
22 Extradition treaty between the governments of the Republic 
of South Africa and the Republic of Venda concluded on 
13.8.1979 - Government Gazette 6652 of 12.9.1979. This 
treaty has also been superceded by the Extradition 
Convention n 21 above. 
23 Extradition treaty between the governments of the Republic 
of South Africa and the Republic of Ciskei concluded on 
4.12.1981 - Government Gazette 8204 of 14.5.1982. This 
treaty has also been superceded by the Extradition 
Convention above. 
24 Convention on Extradition concluded between the governments 
of the Republic of South Africa, the Republic of 
Bophuthatswana, the Republic of Ciskei and the Republic of 
Venda at Pretoria on 20.11.1986 - Government Gazette 7/1988 
of 5.2.1988 (Venda). 
25 Treaty of Extradition concluded between the governments of the 
Republic of South Africa and the Republic of China concluded at 
Taipei 30.12.1987 Proc 83 Government Gazette 11316 24.5.1988. 
26 The term state succession has been surrounded by 
considerable controversy based largely on the equation of 
the public law entity "state" with the private law "natural 
person". See eg, Starke (1989) 321; O'Connell (1967); 
Udokang (1972) 121ff; Poulose (1974) 5ff; Jones (1947) 
360ff. For present purposes, however, semantics will take 
second place and the term will be used. 
27 Poulose (1974) 8. 
28 
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It was established above that there is no international law 
duty to extradite in the absence of a commitment, whether in 
the traditional form of a bilateral treaty, the more recent 
multilateral treaty, or a reciprocal undertaking to 
extradite. The state of course retains the right to 
extradite should it so elect and provided its municipal law 
contains no bar to extradition. When one talks of succession 
with regard to extradition within the South African context 
this can mean only succession to an extradition treaty. 
29 See Chapter III 172 above. 
30 See eg, Poulose (1974) 2 ff; Harvard Research 
1076; De Muralt (1954) where a concise review and assessment 
of various writers' views is given; Udokang (1972) 121; 
Jenks (1952) 119 where it is stated that "In the standard 
books there are abundant traces of uncritical repetition, 
and the doctrine can be attacked as juristically faulty and 
historically inaccurate". 
31 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of 
Treaties adopted by the United Nations Conference on 
Succession of States in respect of Treaties on 22 August 
1978 - UN GA A/Conf 80/31 reproduced in 1978 ILM 1488 -
1517 (hereafter Succession Convention). 
32 Part I, General Provisions, article 1(b). The same 
definition is used in the second document to emerge from the 
United Nations' Conference, viz The Vienna Convention on the 
Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives 
and Debts of 23 August 1978 - art 2. 
33 Article 49, Part VII, Final Provisions, provides that the 
Convention will enter into force thirty days after the 
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deposit of the fifteenth instrument of ratification or 
accession - which has not yet been achieved. 
34 Part I article 7 headed "Temporal application of the present 
Convention". The article however provides further that the 
parties may agree otherwise (art 7(1)). Article 7(2) 
provides that a state may when acceding to the convention or 
thereafter, declare that the provisions of the Convention 
will apply between itself and any other state which makes a 
declaration accepting its declaration. Article 7(3) 
provides for provisional application of the convention 
provisions between a successor state which declares that it 
will apply the convention and a state accepting such a 
declaration. Article 7(4) provides that all the relevant 
declarations shall be made in writing. 
35 See eg, Booysen (1989) 259-260. 
36 Menon (1970) 461. 
37 O'Connell (1967.1) 4. 
38 Udokang (1972) 122ff discusses this theory briefly. 
Notable among its adherents are Grotius (1948) Bk ii chap 9 
and 10; De Vattel (1959) Bk II chap 12. 
39 The attitude of states to extradition is generally somewhat 
laconic as is evidenced by the New Zealand response to South 
African requests for the conclusion of an extradition treaty 
between the countries. New Zealand, while at that stage 
having no objection in principle, did not regard extradition 
proceedings "as a matter of urgency" - JF 1/554/20/48. No 
treaty was concluded and when the matter was again raised 
during 1976, the New Zealand government felt that there was 
"no practical need for such a treaty with South Africa" -
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Letter dd 6.7.1976 JF 9/2/11 (New Zealand). The treaty with 
Sweden lapsed in 1952 when Sweden declared that all her 
treaties would lapse subject to a general review of foreign 
policy. No new treaty was concluded. On the other hand, a 
different approach has been evident from Namibia, the latest 
of the international community's "new" states, in that 
within a short period after independence the Namibian 
authorities raised the need for extradition arrangements 
with the Republic. As far as could be ascertained no such 
relations have yet been established - see The Pretoria News 
4.6.1991 at 2. 
40 O'Connell (1967.1) 4. Algeria, too, when it eventually 
obtained independence in 1962 after a bitter struggle 
lasting some eight years chose not to be bound by any French 
treaties. On 19 April 1962 Upper Volta also declared in a 
letter to the United Nations that it would not be bound by 
treaties concluded by its predecessor, France. 
41 Part III, Newly Independent States, provides "A newly 
independent state is not bound to maintain in force, or to 
become a party to, any treaty by reason only of the fact 
that at the date of the succession of States the treaty was 
in force in respect of the territory to which the succession 
of States relates." 
42 International Law Assoc (1965) 388. This declaration is 
based on the so-called Nyerere Doctrine which became the 
credo for African succession to treaties. For a discussion of 
the doctrine see O'Connell (1967.1) 116ff. 
43 1971 AC 182, an appeal from the Lesotho Court of Appeal. 
44 The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was 
concluded in Geneva on 28 July 1951 and extended to 
Basutoland (as Lesotho then was) as from 9 February 1961. 
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45 Letter dated 22.3.1967 from the Lesotho Prime Minister to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations. At 193 of the 
judgment. 
46 At 194A of the judgment. 
47 At 194C of the judgment. 
48 O'Connell (1967.1) ,1. 
49 O'Connell (1967.1) 5. This statement is, of course, 
contradicted by Union practice as was pointed out above 
(see nn 6-8). However, it must be conceded that the 
position within the older Commonwealth Dominions, was to an 
extent sui generis. 
50 Starke (1989) 328. See too, Verbit (1966) 119. 
51 Hoijer cited by O'Connell (1967.1) 1 n 2. 
52 Bassiouni (1974) 17-18. 
53 Shearer (1971) 45-51. 
54 The term "dispositive or real treaty" has been the subject 
of considerable rhetoric and is a typical example of 
semantics taking up time and energy which could better have 
been spent on principle. First used by Westlake (1904) 60-62, 
it is the term preferred by O'Connell (1967.1) particularly 15 
where he defends his preference. However, see O'Connell (1970) 
191 for his latest views. McNair (1961) 655 prefers the term 
"treaties creating local obligations", while Lester (1963) 489, 
uses the term "localised treaties". See too, Udokang (1972) 325 
ff. 
55 PCIJ Ser A/B No 46 145. 
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56 ICJ Rep 1960 6. 
57 (1967.1) 14. 
58 McNair (1961) 657 cites a report from the Queen's 
Advocate setting out the position with regard to United 
States' succession to a treaty between Britain and Russia 
with regard to the cession of certain Russian territory in 
the United States. He found the the United States succeeded 
to treaty provisions "so far as the geographical limits of 
the ceded territory are concerned." 
59 See O'Connell (1967.1) 17 ff, but see too, the call by 
Udokang (1972) 350 for a careful re-evaluation of the 
position in the light of Afro-Asian practice. See too, 
Booysen (1989) 210-212. 
60 See Oppenheim (1955) 159 where this distinction is 
emphasised. See too O'Connell (1967.1) 1ff; Kelsen (1967) 
418 n 111; and Udokang (1972) 329. 
61 O'Connell (1967.1) 3. See too, Rex v Abdul Hasan India 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
High Court Allahabad 22.12.1949; case no 105 (1951) 18 ILR 
332. 
Hurst (1921-2) 37. 
McNair (1961) 698. 
O'Connell (1967.1) 1. 
Jones (1947) 360. 
Jones (1947) 360. 
Jones (1947) 360. 
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68 Jones (1947) 361. 
69 Jones (1947) 361, for example, categorises these as 
cession, annexation, fusion, federation, dismemberment or 
partition, and separation or secession. O'Connell (1967.1) 
covers much the same ground although he groups the acts 
somewhat differently. See too, McNair (1961) 587ff. 
70 O'Connell (1970) 103. 
71 See Akehurst (1987) 148; Wallace (1986) 85ff; Booysen 
(1989) 195ff; Starke (1989) 166. 
72 Oppenheim (1955) 547; Akehurst (1987) 144; Wallace (1986) 
87; Booysen (1989) 188; Starke (1989) 167. 
73 As the basis of annexation is to be found in force, and 
force is no longer valid in international law, the basis of 
annexation has fallen away. The prohibition on the use of 
force by states is one of the few international principles 
which can be seen to have acquired the status of ius cogens 
as defined in article 53 of the Vienna Treaty Convention. 
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations is the 
best-known embodiment of this principle, but it has of 
course been enunciated on many occasions both before and 
after the adoption of the Charter - notably the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, and article 10 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations. Even an apparently valid 
acquisition based on force - in terms of the self-defence 
provisions of article 51 of the Charter - is no longer 
accepted internationally as is illustrated by the 
condemnation of Israel's annexation of the West Bank - see 
SC Res 242 (XXII) SCOR 22nd Yr of 22.11.1967. 
74 Article 6 of the Succession Convention. As the use of force 
is clearly not "in conformity with international law" and is 
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clearly in violation of article 2(4) of the Charter, such 
"succession in fact" would be invalid. 
75 Akehurst (1987) 152. See too, Wallace (1986) 84 and 
the Island of Palmas 2 RIIA 829 (1928), and Western Sahara 
1975 ICJ Rep cases respectively. 
76 See Jones (1947) 362; McNair (1961) 589; and O'Connell 
(1967.1) 3. 
77 Jones (1947) 362 states that "according to a practice 
which is so consistent and extends over so long a period as 
to raise an irresistible presumption of law" the treaties of 
ceded or annexed states are abrogated automatically. McNair 
(1961) 592 states that "the treaties to which the extinct 
state was a party lapse and come to an end". 
78 Report of the Kings Advocate 14.12.1830 in McNair (1961) 
593. See too, O'Connell (1967.1) 28. 
79 McNair (1961) 593; O'Connell (1967.1) 31. 
80 McNair (1961) 596; O'Connell (1967.1) 31-34. 
81 McNair (1961) 597. 
82 Declaration by the Japanese Government on 29.8.1910 in 
McNair (1961) 599. 
83 McNair (1961) 600. 
84 O'Connell (1962) 85. 
85 O'Connell (1962) 87. Although O'Connell concentrates 
his examination on the practices of Australia, New Zealand 
and Southern Rhodesia, the reason for this should be sought 
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in his Australian background rather than in any principle 
distinction between these Dominions and the Union of South 
Africa's move towards republican status. As was seen in 
Chapter II above, the process within the Union followed the 
same path. 
86 O'Connell (1962) 90ff; O'Connell (1970) 125; Udokang 
(1970) 132-3. 
87 O'Connell (1962) 113. 
88 O'Connell (1962) 118. 
89 McNair (1961) 340. The feature distinguishing novation 
from assignment, is that in the case of the former the 
consent of all three states is required. 
90 McNair (1961) 340-2. 
91 Mann (1953) 475 states that "It is, of course, clear that 
there are many treaties in connection with which it would be 
unthinkable to treat rights arising from them as 
assignable ... [R]ights to the extradition of criminals [are 
an example where] there cannot be any question of an 
assignment." 
92 McNair (1961) 341. Rights arising from dispositive 
treaties, so-called localised rights which "run with the 
land" are the one exception as it is generally agreed that 
they devolve automatically. 
93 McNair (1961) 341-2. 
94 McNair (1961) 341 points out that this is possible only 
in the case of impersonal duties arising from a treaty "so 
that.it could not matter to the other State party to the 
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treaty who performed that duty so long as it was performed". 
This requirement would not appear to apply to extradition 
treaties where the subjective judgment of the states is 
involved. 
95 See SS Lotus 1927 PCIJ Ser A No 10 (2WCR) 20. O'Connell 
(1967.1) 365-6 claims that there "must surely be a 
presumption that the parties intended the treaty to be 
performed by the predecessor state only so long as it was 
territorially able to perform it". Booysen (1989) 263 
applies this principle to succession to extradition in the 
case of the TBVC states. 
96 Reservations to the Genocide Convention 1951 ICJ Rep. 
97 O'Connell (1967.1) 356. 
98 Lansana and Eleven Others v Reginem Sierra Leone Court of 
Appeal 11.5.1971, 70 ILR 2. 
99 At 4 of the judgment. 
100 At 4 of the judgment. 
101 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Treaty Convention. 
102 Jamaica Supreme Court 1.12.1976; 73 ILR 44 48. 
103 See article 25 of the Succession Convention. 
104 See 298 above. 
105 See the Eliasov decisions discussed below. 
106 Jones (1947) 360. 
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107 Lester (1963) 110. 
108 Jones (1947) 366. 
109 Keith (1907) 19; Jones (1947) 366. 
110 Udokang (1972) 413. 
116 Udokang (1972) 414. 
112 Jones (1947) 373. 
113 See the discussion of dispositive treaties in the text 
accompanying nn 54-59 above. 
114 Jones (1947) 373. 
115 Article 34(2)(a) and (b) respectively. Article 35 deals with 
' . 
the position of the predecessor state which continues to 
exist after the separation of the successor state. All 
treaties applicable at the time of succession will continue 
within the remaining territory unless otherwise agreed (art 
35(a)); the treaties applied only to the territory which has 
become independent (art 35(b)); or the continuation of the 
treaty would be incompatible with the object or purpose of 
the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its 
operation (art 35(c)). Article 36 covers treaties not in 
force at the time of succession; and article 37 treaties 
signed by the predecessor subject to ratification, 
acceptance or approval. 
116 See above 281. 
117 O'Connell (1967.1) 97. 
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118 Udokang (1972) 413. 
119 O'Connell (1967.1) 99. 
120 Udokang (1972) 415. 
121 Udokang (1972) 422. 
122 Udokang (1972) 421. 
123 Udokang (1972) 421 and 432. 
124 Udokang (1972) 436. 
125 Udokang (1972) 438. 
126 1887 3 QBD 42. 
127 For a full discussion of the case see Udokang (1972) 
445-7. 
128 Netherlands Supreme Court 31.8.1972; 73 ILR 38ff. 
129 At 40 of the report. 
130 Jamaica Supreme Court 1.12.1976; 73 ILR 44. 
131 At 46 of the report. 
132 At 46 of the report. 
133 At 46 of the report. 
134 At 47. The unreported case of Ex Parte McGann Supreme Court 
M 29/71 , and Ex Parte Fitz Henry 1976 Supreme 
Court M 16/76 - see below. 
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135 At 47 of the report. 
136 At 48. The court cited with approval Lord Atkin's finding in 
Chung Chi Cheung v R 1939 AC 168 where it is clearly stated 
that customary international law could be regarded as part 
of municipal law except where it conflicts with statute law 
or precedent. 
137 See too, Government of the United States of America v Bowe 
1989 3 WLR 1256 where the decision in Schwartz was approved 
on this point although the case was distinguished on another 
point. 
138 Jamaica Supreme Court 1.10.1976; 72 ILR 63. 
139 At 65 of the report. 
140 At 66 of the report. 
141 Notable among these arguments was the claim that at the 
stroke of midnight on the day on which Jamaica attained 
independence, all treaties concluded by the predecessor 
ceased (see the Schwartz case above n 130). The judge was 
exceptionally acerbic in dealing with this viewpoint. 
Declaring that if he had not heard the arguments raised, he 
would have doubted whether they could have been propounded 
at all, the judge found them tainted with "academic 
fragrance" rather than reality. He was unable to accept that 
at the stroke of midnight the treaties "went overboard and 
[were] unceremoniously dumped into Kingston harbour" and 
found it difficult to understand how "by some strange 
ritual ... an agreement is put to sleep by the ushering in of 
independence" at 67. 
142 At 67 of the report. 
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143 At 70 of the report. 
144 Clarence McGann v United States Board of Parole 1976 Court 
of Appeal 3.6.76 (unreported). 
145 Sierra Leone Court of Appeal 11.5.1971; 70 ILR 2. 
146 At 3-4 of the report. 
147 Tambiah JA at 4; Bridges JA at 7-8; and Beccles Davis J 
who stated at 13 that Sierra Leone was bound "as if she had 
been a contracting party to the treaty". 
148 Italian Court of Appeal, Rome 17.10 1980; 78 ILR 105. 
149 Article 674 (1) No 4 of the Italian Code of Penal Procedure 
provides that for a foreign judgment to be enforceable in 
Italy, there must be either a valid extradition treaty 
between Italy and the state whose judgment is to be 
enforced, or a request from the Italian Minister of Justice. 
There had been no such request, and the question 
consequently turned on whether or not a valid extradition 
treaty existed between Italy and India since the latter's 
attainment of independence. 
150 At 108 of the report. 
151 At 109 of the report. 
152 At 111 of the report. 
153 German Reichsgericht in Criminal Matters 4.4.21; case no 182 
1919-22 Annual Digest 259. 
154 The accused was extradited from Czechoslovakia on an ad hoc 
basis to face charges of larceny and habitual criminality. 
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He was convicted of an additional offence of horse theft. 
The prosecutor himself appealled on the basis of a violation 
of the principle of speciality. 
155 Supreme Court of the Reich (in Criminal Matters) 13.8.1936; 
1935-6 Annual Digest Vol 8 348. 
156 See report 349. 
157 Switzerland Cour de Cassation 29.5.1953; 20 ILR 363. 
158 High Court of Allahabad India 22.12.1949; case no 105 18 ILR 
332. 
159 At 332 of the report. 
160 Swiss Federal Tribunal (Criminal Court of Cassation) 
12.10.1979; 75 ILR 107. 
161 Treaty between Great Britain and Switzerland for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Berne 26.11.1880 
ratified at Berne 15.3.1881 : 1880 71 BSP 54-62. 
162 At 108 of the report. As a general rule, where the person 
whose extradition is sought has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment in the requested state for a crime committed 
there, he will only be extradited once he has served out 
this sentence - see Chapter III above. The request for 
extradition can however, still be heard and consent to his 
extradition granted - the execution of the extradition is 
merely suspended until completion of his "local" sentence. 
163 These charges were fraud in connection with obtaining 
passports and visas; theft of a card notifying arrival of 
the parcels containing the travellers' cheques; and 
fraudulently obtaining the parcels by posing as an American 
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Express employee. 
164 At 110 of the report. 
165 The court was at that stage still referring to the Draft 
Succession Convention which it regarded as authoritative as 
reflecting "a considerable level of agreement on. the rules 
of international law governing the matter". As was indicated 
in the introduction to this Chapter, the court would appear 
to have attached a somewhat exaggerated significance to the 
Convention. 
166 At 111 of the report. 
167 Which the court gives as 1931 at 109 of the report. 
168 See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case 1933 PCIJ Rep Ser 
A/B no 53 at 71 and article 7 of the Vienna Treaty 
Convention. 
169 At 112 of the report. 
170 In the case of Dharmarajah v Ministerie Publique Federal and 
Another 22.4.1981, 1982 Annuaire Suisse de droit 
international 128, the court found that Sri Lanka had not 
succeeded to the British extradition treaty with Switzerland 
as it had not "manifested, either expressly or by conclusive 
acts, any intention to assume the obligations arising from 
the Treaty which was therefore not applicable to it." 
171 See eg, Starke (1989) 166-167 where he states that 
subjugation alone does not vest title. See too, Booysen 
(1989) 195. As regards the animus requirement in the case 
of cession, see Booysen (1989) 188-9 and R v Christian 
1924 AD 101 at 109. 
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172 See the text accompanying nn 77-83 above. 
173 McNair (1961) 595. 
174 McNair (1961) 595. The position in this case was somewhat 
novel in that Britain had conquered the territory but was 
apparently then uncertain of exactly what it wanted to do 
with it! The advice of the Law Officers was consequently 
called in. 
175 See Chapter II 57 n 56. 
176 Netherlands Supreme Court 31.8.1972; 73 ILR 38. 
177 At 40 of the report. 
178 Booysen (1989) 228, and specifically as regards 
extradition, see Shehadeth et al v Commissioner of Prisons, 
Jerusalem Palestine Supreme Court (sitting as a High Court) 
31.10.1947; 1947 ILR 42. 
179 See n 172 above and Wallace (1986) 86 where she 
states that "The law applicable when the title was allegedly 
established will be applied". 
180 See 294 above. 
181 See Chapter II 68-101 and 294-297. 
182 See Chapter II 67. 
183 See Wallace (1986) 87 and the effect of cession on 
treaties at 294 above. 
184 McNair (1961) 600 states that as a general rule "newly 
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established states ..• start with a clean slate in the matter 
of treaty obligations". See too, O'Connell (1967.1) 
32-48 who reaches the same conclusion. Examples cited most 
frequently are the formation of the United States from the 
North American Colonies, Belgium's break with Holland in 
1830 and Finland's establishment at the close of the First 
World War. 
185 See Chapter II 77 for the text of this "grant". 
186 McNair (1961) 601. See too, the establishment of Liberia 
which he typifies as a state "established on territory which 
cannot be said to belong to a recognised state." 
187 Mugambwa (1987) 79-83. 
188 McNair (1961) 601. 
189 See Chapter II 83 ff. 
190 McNair (1961) 635. 
191 McNair (1961) 636 where the Law Officers' opinion of 
16.2.1901 is cited. The treaty concerned was the Treaty of 
Friendship and Commerce with Portugal of 1875. 
192 O'Connell (1967.1) 35. 
193 O'Connell (1967.1) 36. A similar answer was given to an Italian 
enquiry - FO z vol 776 (1903). 
194 See Chapter II 87 ff. 
195 McNair (1961) 707. 
196 McNair (1961) 707. See too, O'Connell (1967.1) 35. 
197 
198 
199 
200 
201 
202 
203 
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See Chapter II 95 ff. 
See Chapter II 93 ff and Botha (1926) 107. 
With the exception of relations with the Orange Free State. 
For a discussion of the nature of this approval, see Chapter 
II 97. 
Report of the Law Officers 11.2.1901; O'Connell (1967.1) 
35; McNair (1961) 635-637. 
Chapter II 117 ff. 
Traktaat voor Wederkeerige uitlevering van Voortvluchtige 
Misdadigers van uit Nederland en van uit die 
Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek signed on 9.11.1895 ratified on 
19.6.1896. See too, Hofmeyer (1933) 102. 
204 Traktaat voor Wederkeerige uitlevering van 
Voortvluchtige Misdadigers van uit Natal en van uit die 
Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek signed at Pietermaritzburg 
18.11.1897 and Pretoria 20.11.1897 and operational from this 
latter date. 
205 The term "Commonwealth of Australia" is not to be confused 
with the generic term "Commonwealth of the British Empire". 
In the case of Australia the term is used to describe the 
union of the Australian provinces of New South Wales, 
Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania and Westerm Australia 
which took place in 1901. 
206 McNair (1961) 644-645. 
207 McNair (1961) 645. See too Ex parte O'Dell and Griffen 
.. 19.53 ILR 40 where it was held that the Ashburton Treaty of 
421 
1842 (which it will be remembered marks British entry into 
the extradition scene - see Chapter II) had devolved upon 
Canada. 
208 O'Connell (1967.1) 65. 
209 O'Connell (1967.1) 122. 
210 1909 9 Edward VII c 9. 
211 For a general discussion of the events surrounding this 
decision see Kahn (1962). 
212 73 ILR 38 and 14 ILR 42 respectively. 
213 See Chapter II 118. 
214 Similar provisions are embodied in the legislation governing 
the independence of the other Homelands: the Status of 
Bophuthatswana Act 89 of 1977 - section 4; the Status of 
Venda Act 107 of 1979 - section 4; and the Status of Ciskei 
Act 110 of 1981 - section 4. 
215 The Constitutions of the other Homelands contain similar 
provisions : section 96 of the Republic of Bophuthatswana 
Constitution Act 1977; section 71 of the Republic of Venda 
Constitution Act 1979; and section 3 of the Republic of 
Ciskei Constitution Act 1981. 
216 See eg, Booysen (1989) 262-264; Booysen et al (1976) 1; 
Wiechers & Van Wyk (1977) 85; Carpenter (1979) 40; Carpenter 
(1981) 83; and Booysen (1982) 56. As regards the capacity of 
the Homelands to conclude treaties with South Africa before 
independence which would on the attainment of independence 
become binding international treaties, see Vorster (1978) and 
Floyd (1980) 78. At 81 Floyd discusses two extradition 
422 
agreements falling within this category, viz the agreement 
between the Republic and Bophuthatswana (GN 375 Government 
Gazette 5846 30.12.1977) and b~tween the Republic and Venda 
(Proc 210 Government Gazette 12.9.1979). However, as these have 
both been superceded by other extradition arrangements, they 
are not further considered. 
217 CC 63/88 Bophuthatswana Supreme Court 6.2.1989; 1989 4 SA 519 
(Bop). For a full discussion of this case see Botha (1988-89) 
197. 
218 Botha (1988-89) 202. 
219 Botha (1988-89) 205. 
220 Convention on Extradition concluded between the Government 
of the Republic of South Africa, the Republic of 
Bophuthatswana, the Republic of Ciskei and the Republic of 
Venda at Pretoria on 20.11.1988 Government Gazette 71/1988. 
It will be noted that Transkei was not a party to this 
Convention. However, Transkei concluded a separate treaty 
with Bophuthatswana on 27.9.1989. 
221 See Botha (1988-89) 206. 
222 See eg, S v Marwane 1982 3 SA 717 (A). 
223 1986 3 All ER 449 (CA). For a full discussion of this case 
see Botha (1986-87) 156. 
224 At 453 of the judgment. See the similar answer received in 
the unreported case of Republic of Transkei v Europa 
Publications Ltd 17.1.1979. 
225 At 454a-b of the judgment. 
226 In the light of the universal condemnation of the creation 
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of the Homelands, Britain with its traditionally pro-South 
African views, must be regarded as a moderate voice. 
227 See 312 above. 
228 O'Connell (1970) 103. 
229 O'Connell (1967~1) 122, eg, would appear to accept 
succession as axiomatic in the case of South Africa; first 
in terms of section 148 of the South Africa Act 1909, and 
then in terms of section 112 of the Republic of South Africa 
Act 32 of 1961. 
230 See eg, GA Res 31/6 A of 26.10.76; GA Res 32/105 N of 
14.12.1977; GA Res 34/93 G of 12.12.1979; GA Res 36/172 of 
17.12.1981 and innumerable similar resolutions. 
231 See article 6. 
232 It is interesting to note, however, at the recent initial 
meeting of the Conference for a Democratic South Africa held at 
Kempton Park during December 1991, the President of 
Bophuthatswana made it clear that he was not interested in 
unconditional reincorporation of his state into South Africa. 
233 For the text of the treaty effecting the re-unification of 
the two Germanies see Von Munch (1990) at 48-49. 
234 1986 3 All ER 449. 
235 1966 2 All ER 536 (HL). 
236 Vertrag swischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Uber die Herstellung der 
Einheit Deutschlands 31.8.1990; Von Munch (1990) at 43. 
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237 Whether tacit recognition may be assumed from foreign 
contact with these "states" remains a moot point. Recently 
the press carried reports of a dispute between Austria and 
Transkei being referred to international arbitration. 
However, given the patent inaccuracy of the headline 
concerned "World Court (sic) set to hear R100-m Transkei 
lawsuit", any assumptions from the popular press would be 
suspect. See The Pretoria News 8.8.1991 p 2. 
238 See Shehadeth et al v Commissioner of Prisons, Jerusalem 
(Palestinian Supreme Court) 31.10.1947; 1947 ILR 42. 
239 See n 232 above. 
240 Other cases have been reported subsequent to independence in 
1961 but do not involve questions of succession. In R v De 
Demko 1962 1 SA 28 (WLD) the question involved the 
principle of speciality. The case involved the surrender of 
De Demko by Britain under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 
and is consequently irrelevant for present purposes. 
Similarly in Minister of Justice v Bagattini and Others 1975 
4 SA 252 (T) the court had to consider the application of the 
principle of res iudicata in the treaty between South Africa 
and Swaziland which was concluded after South African 
independence and consequently does not involve succession. 
241 1965 2 SA 770 (T). 
242 Section 9 provides for a person detained under a warrant to 
be brought before a magistrate and that an enquiry be held 
to determine whether he should be extradited. Section 
9(4)(b) provides that where the offence is alleged to have 
been committed in an associated state, section 12 shall 
apply. An associated state is a state in Africa with which 
the Republic has agreed, on a reciprocal basis, that 
warrants issued in the respective territories will be 
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endorsed for execution if the magistrate is satisfied that 
such warrants have been lawfully issued. 
243 Extradition Agreement between the Republic of South Africa 
and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland SATS 9/1962; 
Proc R44/1963 Government Gazette 15.3.1963. 
244 At 772 of the judgment. 
245 Proclamation 4 of 1964. 
246 At 773E of the judgment. 
247 At 773F of the judgment. 
248 See eg, Dugard (1977) 127; Rudolph (1977) 131. 
249 See for example, The SS Lotus 1927 PCIJ Rep Ser A no 10. 
250 See for example, Government of the Republic of Spain v SS 
'~rantzazu Mendi" 1939 AC 256 and for South Africa, Inter 
Science Research and Development Services (Pty) Ltd v 
Republica Popular Da Mocambique 1980 2 SA 111 (T) 117. 
251 Duff Development Co v Government of Kelantan 1924 AC 797; S 
v Oosthuizen 1971 1 SA 823 (N); Gur Corporation v Trust Bank 
of Africa 1986 3 All ER 458. 
252 See Luther v Sagor 1921 3 KB 532 and Sultan of Johore v 
Abubakar 1952 1 All ER 1261 at 1266. For a general 
discussion of this aspect see Lyons (1952) 227. 
253 At 772A of the judgment. 
254 1967 2 SA 636 (T). 
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255 At 638F-H of the judgment. 
256 He mentions boundary and river treaties, but should be taken 
to intend what were termed "dispositive" or "localised" 
treaties above - in other words, treaties which run with the 
land. 
257 At 639H of the judgment. Presumably a comma was intended 
between commercial a~d extradition treaties in this passage. 
258 At 640C of the judgment. 
259 At 6400-E of the judgment. 
260 1967 4 SA 583 (A). 
261 At 591A of the judgment. 
262 At 591 of the judgment; 25.6.1965 was the date of 
repromulgation of the agreement. 
263 At 590G of the judgment (emphasis added). 
264 1965 2 SA 770 Cr> at 773F-G. 
265 See proc R151/1965, Government Gazette 25.6.1965 where the 
repromulgation option was followed. However, on 7.4.1965 the 
State President had declared Eliasov a person liable to be 
extradited under the provisions of section 3(2) of the 
Extradition Act 67 of 1962. 
266 1967 2 SA 636 (T). 
267 1969 2 SA 224 (T). 
268 Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal for the Mutual 
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Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at L~sbon 17.10.1892; 
ratified at Lisbon 13.11.1893 : 1892 - 3 BSP 83-88. 
269 At 224A of the judgment. Section 2(4) of the Extradition Act 
67 of 1962 provides that "any arrangement made with any 
foreign state which ... was in force in respect of the 
Republic immediately prior to the date of commencement of 
this Act, shall be deemed to be an agreement entered into 
and published by the State President .•. ". 
2 7 0 1 9 71 1 SA 3 5 9 ( N) . 
271 At 361G of the judgment. 
272 At 362H of the judgment. 
273 At 3630 of the judgment . 
.. 
274 s v Devoy 1971 3 SA 899 (A). 
275 At 905H of the judgment. 
276 At 906A of the judgment. 
277 At 907A of the judgment. See too, the cases cited in note 
251 above, and R v Bottrill: Ex parte Keuchenmeister 1942 2 
All ER 343 (CA) and Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler 
Ltd 1966 2 All ER 536 (HL) for the role of the certificate. 
278 At 907G-H of the judgment. 
279 At 907H of the judgment. 
280 At 908A of the judgment. 
281 With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the former East 
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Bloc countries, this statement should be treated as somewhat 
provisional. However, events in these regions are still too 
uncertain and the position too volatile for them to offer 
any meaningful points for analysis at this stage. 
282 For the views surrounding the Namibian question see 
Dugard (1973). For a handy synopsis of the various 
approaches see Erasmus (1985-6) 115 and the case,. of 
Binga v Cabinet for South west Africa 1988 3 SA 155 (A); see 
too, Carpenter (1988-9) 157; and Szasz (1989-90) 66. 
283 Constitution of the Republic of Namibia 1 of 1990. 
284 See in particular article 16 of the Succession Convention 
and Szsaz (1989-90) 65. 
285 Szasz (1989-90) 65. Whether one regards the approach 
adopted in Namibia as an "optional clean slate" or as 
"provisional universal succession" depends on the angle from 
which the question is approached. However, the latter does 
tend to stress continuity and succession, while the former 
stresses the negative in that non-succession is the essence 
of the clean slate approach. In effect, however, there is 
little to choose between the two. 
286 Szasz (1989-90) 66 referring to Duggal (1989). 
287 On 19 May 1967 by GA res 2248 (S-V), the General Assembly 
established the United Nations Council for Namibia to 
administer the territory until independence. Szasz (1989-90) 
66 describes the Council as "a unique international 
organ ... [with] certain de iure authority in respect of 
Namibia, and especially in respect of its treaty relations." 
For a view rejecting the validity of the Council's Decrees 
see Booysen & Stephan (1975) 63. 
429 
288 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South west Africa) notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 1971 ICJ Rep 16 at 52 
where humanitarian treaties are expressly excluded. 
289 Szasz (1989-90) 75 ff. 
290 1971 ICJ Rep 16 at 55 par 121. 
291 Szasz (1989-90) 75. As he points out, no mention is made of 
what should be regarded as a peremptory norm within this 
context. This is presumably reference to the ius cogens 
provisions in the Vienna Treaty Convention (notably article 
53). Views, however differ on what may be regarded as ius 
cogens and the phrase remains inexact and uncertain. 
292 Par 9(b) of the UNIN study above. It is interesting to note 
that in its own way the United Nations was as determined to 
advance the policies it had mapped out for Namibia as was 
South Africa to advance its policies. As will be seen 
presently, Namibia embraced neither. 
293 Szasz (1989-90) 75. 
294 Szasz (1989-90) 75. It is interesting to note that this 
and the statement in the previous note were made by 
officials who now hold office in the Namibian independence 
government. By accepting office under a constitution which 
does not propose these extreme views, these officials may 
perhaps be seen to have amended their absolutist approach 
and the arguments are robbed of much of their force. 
295 Szasz (1989-90) 76. 
296 Treaty between Great Britain and Denmark for the Mutual 
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Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Copenhagen 
31.3.1873; ratified at Copenhagen 26.4.1873: 1873 63 
BSP 5-18. Application extended to South West Africa by 
exchange of notes 5.12.1927 and 10.2.1928 : LNTS LXXXIII 135. 
297 Treaty between Great Britain and Paraguay for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Asuncion 12.9.1908; ratified as Asuncion 30.1.1911 
102 BFSP 340-345. Application extended to South West Africa 
by exchange of notes 3.1.1928 and 16.1.1928 : LNTS LXXXIII 
509. 
298 Treaty between Great Britain and Germany for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at London 
14.5.1872; ratified at London 11.6.1872. Application 
extended to South West Africa by exchange of notes 
10.12.1928 : LNTS C 268. 
299 See above "Annexation and Cession" at 294 and the 
authorities cited there. 
300 Treaty (replacing the treaty of 19.6.1874 : see Clarke 
(1888) at cxlvii) between Great Britain and the 
Netherlands for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive 
Criminals signed at London 26.9.1989; ratified at 
London 14.12.1898 90 BFSP 51-58. Application extended to 
South West Africa by exchange of notes 1.12.1927 and 
27.1.1928 : LNTS LXIX 131. 
301 Treaty between Great Britain and Luxemburg for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Luxemburg 24.11.1880; ratified at Brussels 5.1.1881 
1880 71 BSP 45-53. Application extended to South West Africa 
by exchange of notes 1.12.1927 and 28.1.1928: LNTS LXIX 
127. 
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302 Treaty between Great Britain and Spain for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at London 
4.6.1878; ratified at London 21.11.1878 : 1878 69 BSP 
6-13. Application extended to South West Africa by exchange 
of notes 3.12.1927 and 13.2.1928 : LNTS LXXXIII 469. 
303 Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom and Greece 
concluded at Athens 24.9.1910; ratified at Athens 
30.12.1911. Application extended to South West Africa by 
exchange of notes 5.12.1927 and 19.4.1928 LNTS LXXXIII 513. 
304 Treaty between Great Britain and Austria/Hungary for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Vienna 3.12.1873; ratified at Vienna 10.3.1874 : 1873 
63 BSP 213-218. Application extended to South West Africa by 
exchange of notes 8.12.1927 and 25.4.1928 : LNTS LXXXIII 
495. 
305 Treaty between Great Britain and Servia/Yugoslavia for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Belgrade 6.12.1900; ratified at Belgrade 13.3.1901 : 92 
BFSP 41-47. Application extended to South West Africa by 
exchange of notes 7.12.1927 and 27.8.1928 : LNTS LXXXIII 
490. 
306 Treaty between Great Britain and Austria/Hungary for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Vienna 3.12.1873; ratified at Vienna 10.3.1874 : 1873 
63 BSP 213-218. Application extended to South West Africa by 
exchange of notes 8.12.1927 and 25.4.1928 : LNTS LXXXVIII 
400. 
307 Treaty between Great Britain and Sweden and Norway for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Stockholm 26.6.1873; ratified at Stockholm 28.8.1873 
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1873 63 BSP 175-179. Application extended to the Colonies 
18.2.1907 and to South West Africa by exchange of notes 
8.12.1927 and 23.12.1929 : LNTS XCII 427. 
308 Treaty between Great Britain and Roumania for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Bucharest 21.3.1893; ratified at Bucharest 13.3.1894 
1893 85 BSP 69-75. Application extended to South West Africa 
by exchange of notes 14.12.1927 and 11.1.1929 : LNTS LXXXIII 
480. 
309 Treaty between Great Britain and Liberia for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at London 
31.1.1892; ratified at London 31.1.1894 : 1892-3 84 BSP 
103-109. Application extended to South west Africa by 
exchange of notes 19.12.1927 and 16.10.1928 : LNTS LXXXIII 
477; BSP LXXXIV 103. 
310 Treaty between Great Britain and Nicaragua for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Managua 19.4.1905; ratified at London 13.2.1906. Application 
extended to South West Africa by exchange of notes 
19.12.1927 and 12.1.1928 LNTS LXXXVIII 410. 
311 Treaty between Great Britain and Peru for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Lima 
26.1.1904; ratified at Lima 30.11.1906 : 99 BFSP 
963-968. Application extended to South West Africa by 
exchange of notes 26.12.1927 and 16.1.1928 : LNTS LXXXVIII 
500. 
312 Treaty between Great Britain and Chile for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Santiago 
26.1.1897; ratified at Santiago 14.4.1898: 89 BFSP 
20-25. Application extended to South West Africa by exchange 
of notes 29.12.1927 and 13.1.1928 : LNTS LXXXVIII 485. 
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313 Treaty between Great Britain and Hayti for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Port-au-Prince 7.12.1874; ratified at Port-au-Prince 
2.9.1875 : 1874 65 BSP 44-48. Application extended to South 
West Africa by exchange of notes 29.12.1927 and 13.1.1928 : 
LNTS LXXXIII 465. 
314 Treaty between Great Britain and Panama for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Panama 
25.8.1906; ratified at Panama 15.4.1907. Application 
extended to South West Africa by exchange of notes 3.1.1928 
and 24.1.1928: LNTS LXXXIII 505. 
315 Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom and Siam 
concluded at Bankok 4.3.1911; ratified at London 1.8.1911. 
Application extended to South West Africa by exchange of 
notes 5.1.1928 and 27.2.1928 : LNTS LXXXIII 516. 
316 Treaty between Great Britain and Bolivia for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Lima 
22.2.1892; ratified at Lima 7 March 1898 : 1896 88 BSP 
27-33. Application extended to South West Africa 8.1.1928 
and 18.2.1928 : LNTS LXXXIII 473. 
317 Treaty (replacing the treaty of 20.5.1876 :see Clarke 
(1888) at xlii} between Great Britain and Belgium for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Brussels 29.10.1901; ratified at Brussels 6.12.1901. In 
a convention signed at London on 5.3.1907 and ratified 
on 17.4.1907, the parties made special provisions for 
criminals arrested in the Dominions : 100 BFSP 472-473. 
Application extended to South West Africa by exchange of 
notes 28.6.1928 and 2.7.1928 : LNTS LXXXIII 297. 
318 Treaty between Great Britain and Guatamala for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
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Guatamala 4.7.1885; ratified at Guatamala 6.9.1886 : 
1884-5 76 BSP 72-77. Application extended to South West 
Africa by exchange of notes 21.5.1925 and 11.9.1929 : 
LNTS XCII 420. 
319 Treaty between Great Britain and Switzerland for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Berne 
26.11.1880; ratified at Berne 15.3.1881 : 1880 71 BSP 
54-62. The relevant provision (art 18) was amended by a 
convention entered into between Great Britain and 
Switzerland in London on 29 June 1904. The periods 
provided for Colonial possessions in the original 
treaty were amended to 6 weeks under article 3 par 3 
(originally 30 days) and 3 months under article 8 
(originally 2 months} 1904 97 BSP 92-3. Application 
extended to South West Africa by exchange of notes 
30.11.1927 and 19.9.1929 : LNTS CXII 432. 
320 Treaty between Great Britain and Cuba for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Havana 
3.10.1904; ratified at Havana 10.1.1905 : 1904 97 BFSP 
26-31. Application extended to South West Africa by exchange 
of notes 17.4.30 : LNTS CXXVI 202. 
321 Treaty between Great Britain and Salvador for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Paris 
23.6.1881; ratified at London 8.11.1882 : 1881 72 BSP 
13-19. Application extended to South West Africa by exchange 
of notes 17.7.1930, 8.8.1930, 12 and 19.11.1930 : LNTS CXXVI 
557. 
322 Treaty between Great Britain and Monaco for the 
Extradition of Criminals signed at Paris 17.12.1891; 
ratified at Paris 17.3.1892 : 1891-2 83 BSP 66-72. 
Application extended to South West Africa by exchange of 
notes 27.11.1930 : LNTS CXXI 39; UKTS 29/1931. 
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323 Treaty between Great Britain and the Republic of 
Equator for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 
signed at Quinto 20.9.1880; ratified at Quinto 
19.2.1886 : 1881 72 BSP 137-143. Application extended to 
South West Africa by exchange of notes 4.6.1934 : UKTS 
52/1937 ; LNTS CLXXXIV 437; SATS 12/37. 
324 Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Lisbon 
17.10.1892; ratified at Lisbon 13.11.1893 : 1892-3 84 
BSP 83-88. (See the amending convention of 20.1.1932 
signed expressly "on behalf of South Africa" 1932 BSP 
135.) Application extended to South West Africa by exchange 
of notes 16.7.1934 and 14.8.1934 : LNTS CLVI 377. 
325 Extradition Treaty between the Union of South Africa and the 
United States of America, concluded at Washington 
18.12.1947; ratified at Washington 1.3.1951 - GN 91 
Government Gazette 20.4.1951. 
326 Extradition Treaty between the Union of South Africa and the 
State of Israel concluded at Pretoria 18.9.1959; ratified at 
Pretoria 7.1.60 GN R14 Government Gazette 6362 5.2.1960. 
327 Extradition Treaty concluded between the governments of the 
Republic of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland on 19.11.1962 Government Gazette 445/1962; SATS 
9/1962. 
328 On 23.12.1962 notes were exchanged between the governments 
of the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to 
ensure the continued operation of the treaty concluded with 
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland - n 14 above -
Government Gazette 1156 of 25.6.1965. As indicated above, 
since independence the Republic of South Africa has 
concluded extradition treaties with Swaziland (1968); 
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Botswana (1969): Malawi (1972); Israel (1976, amendment of 
the 1959 treaty above); Transkei (1977); Bophuthatswana 
(1977); Venda (1979); Ciskei (1981); Multilateral Convention 
(1986); and The Republic of China (1987) - see nn 16 - 25 
above. However, all these treaties fall within the United 
Nations' category E. 
329 See in particular, article 96(d) which provides that the 
state shall endeavour to ensure respect for international 
law and treaty obligations, and article 144 which provides 
that the general rules of public international law are 
part of the law of Namibia. See in general in this regard, 
Erasmus (1989-90) 81. 
330 See in particular article 16 of the Succession Convention 
and Szsaz (1989-90) 65. 
331 1991 1 SA 851 (High Court of Namibia). For a full discussion 
of this case see Booysen (1991) 204 and Botha (1990-91) 
forthcoming. 
332 At 858A of the judgment. 
333 See Chapter II n 9 - response by New Zealand. 
334 See The Pretoria News 4.6.1991 p 2. 
335 1991 1 SA 851 (High Court of Namibia). 
336 See eg, Robert E Brown claim 1923 6 RIAA 120 and the 
Hawaiian Claims case 1925 6 RIAA 157. For a full discussion 
of this aspect of the case see Booysen (1991) 204. 
337 See article 144 of the Constitution in particular. 
338 See article 16 of the Succession Convention. 
339 See Szasz (1989-90) 65. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
As was established in the previous chapters, in South African law 
there is no duty to extradite in the absence of a treaty commitment 
to do so. On the other hand, the state retains a right to extradite, 
even in the absence of a treaty so stipulating. 
It was shown that within the South African context, the major source 
of the right and/or duty to extradite is bilateral treaty 
commitment. This is also the option favoured by the authorities 
responsible for extradition. What also emerged, however, was that by 
far the majority of the bilateral treaties which South Africa 
regards as giving rise to a binding duty to extradite, or right to 
demand extradition, are not treaties originally concluded by the 
Republic, but were succeeded to from Britain. A glance through the 
treaty list will show that many of the states with whom treaties are 
claimed are strange bedfellows indeed for the current South African 
government. One thinks in particular of a state such as Cuba, which 
has traditionally been regarded an "enemy" of South Africa. 
The final phase of this thesis will consequently be devoted to a 
brief examination of relevant problems surrounding the termination 
of treaty commitments. From this, a realistic assessment of those 
treaties which South Africa regards as binding will be undertaken on 
an individual basis in order to determine from which states we have 
the right to expect extradition of suspected persons to stand trial 
in a South African court, and which states may demand extradition of 
a fugitive from South Africa. 
441 
2 TERMINATION OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
2.1 General 
In Chapter IV the termination of treaties in the case of the 
extinction of one of the parties through annexation or cession was 
considered in some detail. It was also pointed out that the 
continuation of a treaty through the process of succession depends 
to a large extent on the intention of the "third party" to the 
treaty. 
In this Chapter we are no longer concerned with termination which 
may arise through the process of succession - in other words, those 
instances where the third party to the original treaty is not 
prepared to entertain treaty relations with the new state. (1) The 
starting point in the present investigation is that a treaty exists 
- in other words, the third party either expressly or through lack 
of objection, is prima facie in an extradition relationship in terms 
of which it may demand extradition from South Africa and must 
entertain extradition requests directed to it by South Africa. Our 
examination will consequently be directed at the question whether 
anything has arisen which may validly be regarded as having 
terminated this existing treaty relationship. 
Although, as in dealing with the acquisition of treaty rights, so 
too in dealing with their termination, the logical starting point is 
the Vienna Treaty Convention, (2) a few general remarks would not be 
out of place. 
An inherent tension exists between the most basic tenet of 
international law, viz pacta sunt servanda - agreements must be 
honoured - and the unilateral termination of a treaty. (3) McNair 
(4) states that the "normal basis of approach", specifically in the 
United Kingdom, but also universally is that : 
"a treaty .•. is intended to be of perpetual duration and 
incapable of unilateral termination, unless, expressly or by 
implication, it contains a right of unilateral termination 
442 
or some other provision for its coming to an end." 
Although the idea of any human creation being perpetual is 
intrinsically foreign, there is no principle objection to such a 
view. As regards treaties, British courts have reinforced McNair's 
view by holding that treaties dating back some two or more centuries 
were still "unrevoked and in full vigour". (5) The Vienna Treaty 
Convention also perpetuates this idea where it provides in article 
56 that where a treaty makes no provision for termination or 
withdrawal, it is not subject to termination or withdrawal it is 
in other words of indefinite duration - unless it is shown that the 
parties intended such a right to exist or it can be implied by the 
nature of the treaty. 
A tentative, preliminary distinction between treaties which provide 
for their own termination, and the so-called perpetual treaties 
where no provision is made for termination appears in order at this 
stage. This distinction is, however, not one based on principle, but 
relates rather to proof of the existence of a right to terminate and 
the procedure to be followed by a state wishing to free itself from 
unacceptable treaty obligations. If this were not so, the existence 
of a termination clause would tend to suggest that the other 
internationally recognised grounds for termination would be 
subordinate to such a clause and would in the face of specific 
provision for termination in the treaty, find no application. That 
this is not the case is clear from the commentary of the 
International Law Commission on the thorny question of rebus sic 
sta~tibus as embodied in article 62 of the Treaty Convention. Here 
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the Commission, when asked to appraise the view that change of 
circumstances should apply only to perpetual treaties - in other 
words, treaties embodying no termination clause - rejected the 
argument. (6) The result is that termination resulting from changed 
circumstances - and logically the other grounds providing for 
termination in the Treaty Convention - may apply alongside of and 
simultaneously with a termination clause. The various grounds are 
not mutually exclusive. 
However, as pointed out above, for the present day grounds upon 
which a treaty may be terminated, it is to the Vienna Treaty 
Convention that one must turn initially. 
2.2 Termination in terms of the Vienna Convention 
The Convention deals extensively with treaty termination in Part V 
under the heading "Invalidity, Termination and Suspension of the 
Operation of Treaties". (7) 
Article 42 provides specifically that only the treaty itself or the 
Treaty Convention, may be used as a basis for the termination or 
suspension of operation of a treaty. (8) It is further provided that 
a state will lose its right to terminate or suspend operation of a 
treaty if, after becoming aware of the facts, it agrees, either 
expressly or through its conduct, that the treaty is valid, remains 
in force or continues in operation. (9) 
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The termination or suspension of operation of a treaty is dealt with 
in Section 3, articles 54 - 64 of the Treaty Conven.tion. These 
articles will be considered briefly to determine their possible 
application to South Africa's extradition treaties. 
2.2.1 Article 54 : Termination of or withdrawal from a treaty 
under its provisions or by consent of the parties 
This article provides for two instances in which termination or 
withdrawal may take place. First, in terms of the treaty itself,(10) 
and second, at any time by consent of the parties and after 
consultation with the other contracting parties. (11) 
The reason for the inclusion of the first of the above grounds is 
not entirely clear in the light of the provisions of article 42. It 
will be remembered that this article provides that the only valid 
grounds for termination are those in the treaty itself or those in 
the Convention. Consequently, the right to terminate in the case of 
article 54(a), derives not from the Convention but from the original 
treaty and its restatement in this article would appear unnecessary 
to vest the right of termination. The purpose of article 54(a) could 
however, be procedural in that it provides that termination shall be 
"in conformity with the provisions of the treaty". Consequently, 
the procedural requirements for termination provided in Section 4 
articles 65 - 68 of the Convention, will not apply to termination in 
terms of the treaty. The procedure will there be governed by the 
treaty itself. 
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The phrase "in conformity with the provisions of the treaty", covers 
a wide variety of provisions which may be embodied in a treaty. The 
treaty may contain a specific expiry date on which it will 
terminate; (12) it may provide that it will operate for a specific 
period, for example for five years, after the date of conclusion; 
(13) or it may provide for termination on the occurrence of an 
uncertain future event such as the termination of another treaty. 
(14) The treaty may allow for indefinite operation but expressly 
grant the parties the right to terminate at any time subject to 
varying terms of notice. (15) Where a treaty is concluded for the 
execution of a specific object, for example a treaty between two 
states for the delivery of coal, it will terminate once the object 
has been achieved, in other words once coal has been delivered. The 
treaty may contain no express termination provision but reading the 
text as a whole it will emerge clearly that termination will be in 
conformity with the treaty provisions. (16) The conclusion to be 
drawn from all this, is that this seemingly simple provision must be 
approached with caution and the treaty should be studied carefully 
in its entirety to establish the intention of the parties. 
For South African extradition treaties, termination in terms of 
article 54(a) is of considerable importance. All South African 
extradition treaties contain termination clauses which qualify them 
as treaties of "indefinite operation" coupled with a specific period 
. of notice. The standard provision in these treaties reads: 
"Either party may at any time put an end to this treaty 
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which, however, shall remain in force six months after the 
notice for its termination". 
This clause occurs in treaties with the following countries 
Italy; (17) Sweden and Norway; (18) Hungary; (19) Haiti; (20) France 
(21) Spain; (22) Equator; (23) Luxembourg; (24) Switzerland; (25) 
Salvador; (26) Uruguay; (27) Guatamala; (28) Monaco; (29) Portugal; 
(30) Liberia; (31) Roumania; (32) the Netherlands; (33) San Marino; 
(34) Yugoslavia; (35) Belgium; (36) Greece; (37) Siam; (38) 
Rhodesia; (39) Swaziland; (40) Botswana; (41) Malawi; (42) Transkei; 
(43) Bophuthatswana; (44) Venda; (45) Ciskei; (46) Multilateral 
Treaty Convention; (47) Republic of China. (48) 
An alternative provision also allowing for withdrawal at any time 
but providing for continuation of the treaty for a period of not 
less than six months but not more than one year, is contained in the 
treaties principally, though not exclusively, with the South 
American states. The following states are involved. 
Mexico; (49) Colombia; (50) Argentina; (51) Bolivia; (52) Chile; 
(53) Peru; (54) Cuba; (55) Nicaragua; (56) Panama; (57) Paraguay; 
(58) Finland; (59) Czechoslovakia; (60) United States of America; 
(61) and Israel. (62) 
These treaties provide no specific guidance as to what is meant by 
the notice required for termination. Consequently, any form of 
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notification, whether by public declaration or private 
communication, and whether written or oral should suffice to set the 
termination process in motion. After expiry of the period of notice, 
the treaty will be terminated. 
As was pointed out above, the existence of a termination clause does 
not exclude the application of one or more of the other procedures 
provided for in the Treaty Convention. Where a termination clause 
exists, however, it is submitted that a party wishing to terminate 
the treaty relationship should make use of this procedure as a first 
line of "attack". 
The second part of this article, dealing with the consent of the 
parties, will be considered below where the controversy surrounding 
desuetude as an independent ground for treaty termination is 
considered. 
2.2.2 Article 55 : Reduction of the parties to a multilateral 
treaty below the number necessary for its entry into 
force 
This article provides that a multilateral treaty will not terminate 
if the number of parties falls below that required for its entry 
into force. Within the South African extradition context, this 
provision is not of great importance. South Africa is party to only 
one multilateral convention dealing directly with extradition, that 
with the TBVC states, and this treaty contains a termination clause. 
(63) South Africa is however party to a number of multilateral 
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conventions which affect extradition indirectly, but as there has to 
date been no question of these treaties terminating, they will not 
be considered further. (64) 
2.2.3 Article 59 : Termination or suspension of operation of a 
treaty implied by conclusion of a later treaty 
A later treaty will terminate its earlier counterpart if all the 
parties to the original treaty are concerned in the conclusion of 
the new treaty; the two treaties deal with the same subject matter; 
and it appears from the later treaty or is "otherwise established" 
that the parties intended the subject matter to be governed by the 
new treaty. (65) An earlier treaty between the same parties and 
covering the same topic will also be regarded as terminated if the 
provisions of the two treaties are so incompatible that they cannot 
be applied at the same time. (66) The earlier treaty will be 
suspended, rather than terminated, if this intention appears from 
the later treaty or if it is otherwise established that the parties 
intended suspension. 
Although Plender (67) shows that the article is not without 
technical difficulties, (68) in practice few problems should arise 
in that there is no break in continuity of treaty relations between 
the states concerned. In South African extradition practice, 
instances of such termination are afforded by, for example, the 
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treaties with Switzerland, (69) the United States (70) and the 
Extradition Convention. (71) 
2.2.4 Article 60 : Termination or suspension of the operation 
of a treaty as a consequence of its breach 
A material breach by one party to a bilateral treaty entitles the 
other to raise the breach as a ground for terminating or suspending 
the operation of the treaty. A material breach is defined as the 
repudiation of the treaty not permitted by the Convention, or the 
violation of a provision essential for the accomplishment of the 
object or purpose of the treaty. (72) 
Applying the definition of material breach to extradition 
proceed~ngs one finds that the sole object or purpose of an 
extradition treaty is to effect the return of an offender, or 
suspected offender, to the requesting state. The first question 
arising is consequently whether any refusal to extradite could be 
classed as a material breach of the treaty in that it of necessity 
thwarts the purpose of the treaty. However, this argument would hold 
water only if the duty to extradite arising from the treaty were 
absolute. As was seen earlier, in extradition proceedings both 
parties enjoy a wide discretion when it comes to the decision 
whether or not to extradite. Furthermore, reasons for the exercise 
of this discretion need not be furnished. Consequently, a refusal to 
extradite does not necessarily amount to a breach of the treaty. It 
could possibly amount to breach if it were mala fide, but the 
chances of proving improper motive when assessing a discretionary 
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act where no reasons need be furnished, are so remote as to render 
the exercise largely meaningless. 
As was shown earlier, South Africa is keen to maintain and expand 
her extradition relations and is not looking for ways of escaping 
from treaties embodying these provisions. Within the present 
context, therefore, we shall consider only a material breach by 
South Africa subsequent to its succession to or conclusion of 
extradition arrangements which might allow the other party to the 
treaty the right to terminate. 
When functioning on the international plane, a state's position 
within the international community cannot realistically be 
disregarded. Consequently, although South Africa's internal policies 
may in theory be regarded as "domestic affairs" in which no 
interference will be tolerated, this approach runs contrary to 
current international community perceptions. (73) It is within the 
realisation of the generally outlawed apartheid policies, that the 
question should be asked whether South Africa may perhaps be 
regarded as having committed a material breach of the provisions of 
certain of its extradition treaties. (74) 
Article 60(3)(b) of the Convention provides that the violation of a 
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose 
of the treaty will constitute a material breach entitling the other 
party to terminate the treaty. When states either agreed to South 
African succession or concluded extradition treaties with the state, 
I.· ~ ~ 
~ 
t~ 
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it was on the understanding that these treaties would have full 
territorial application. To borrow the words of the Convention, the 
treaties would be "binding upon each party in respect of its entire 
territory". (75) This principle is also embodied in all the 
country's extradition treaties. For example in the treaty between 
Britain and Panama, (76) succeeded to by South Africa, it is 
provided that: 
"The High Contracting Parties engage to deliver up to each 
other ... [persons] ... accused or convicted of 
crimes ... committed in the territory of the one Party [and] 
found within the territory of the other Party", 
while in a more recent treaty concluded directly by South Africa 
with Swaziland after independence, it is provided that: 
"The Contracting Parties undertake to extradite to each 
other ... persons ... who shall be found within the territory of 
the requested state". (77) 
The ability to extradite an offender from anywhere within a state's 
territory consequently qualifies as a provision essential for 
accomplishing the objects of the treaty. For example, the 
extradition treaty between South Africa and Panama, would entitle 
Panama to request the South African authorities to return a fugitive 
criminal finding himself within South African territory. The South 
African authorities would be obliged to return the fugitive. 
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In Chapter IV considerable attention was paid to the creation of the 
TBVC states and their succession to South African extradition 
treaties. It was pointed out there that internationally these states 
simply do not exist. They are perceived as a manifestation of South 
Africa's "unlawful" apartheid policy and where questions as to their 
independent existence have arisen, they have been regarded as still 
constituting part of South African territory. (78) Before the 
creation of the Homelands, a criminal residing in what was then 
Mafeking could be returned to Panama by the South African 
authorities as Mafeking was part of the Republic of South Africa. 
However, after the creation of the independent state of 
Bophuthatswana, this would no longer be the case. Faced with such a 
request, the South African authorities would not be able to comply 
as sovereign acts cannot be performed in the territory of another 
sovereign state. From the Panamanian perception - and indeed from 
the perception of the international community as a whole - South 
Africa's inability to deliver the person sought may be regarded as a 
violation of a provision "essential to the accomplishment of the 
object or purpose of the treaty". 
Booysen (79) would appear to reject this approach arguing that a 
state is obliged to meet its commitments under a treaty only for as 
long as it is territorially able to do so. The fact that the state 
is itself responsible for its territorial incapacity, should, he 
claims with reliance on O'Connell, (80) not be taken into account. 
The practicality of both Booysen's and O'Connell's views cannot be 
denied, and their veracity in general international law terms is 
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without doubt - for example, in the Wimbledon case, (81) the first 
case decided by Permanent Court of International Justice, it was 
held that a direct adjunct of a state's sovereignty is its ability 
to limit that sovereignty. It may alienate part or all of its 
territory, grant certain portions of it independence, unite with 
other territories, or whatever. 
However, a sense of unease is generated when the state in question 
is South Africa and the limitation of sovereignty results from the 
realisation of the South African apartheid policy through the 
creation of the TBVC states. The possibly exceptional position of 
South Africa stems from the fact that unlike the instances cited by 
O'Connell which were a realisation of accepted international 
perceptions at the time, (82) the creation of the TBVC states flew 
directly in the face of such values and perceptions. The strength of 
such perceptions should certainly not be lost on South Africa where 
the spectre of South West Africa/Namibia is there to show that 
South African perceptions are not in line with those of the 
International Court of Justice or of the international community as 
a whole. It will be remembered that in the South West Africa case, 
(83) the court in fact held that South Africa's actions constituted 
a material breach of the treaty and the country's continued presence 
in the territory was outlawed. (84) Technically correct action on 
South Africa's part, was through international perceptions and 
pressure, invalidated to find a material breach of the country's 
treaty commitments. In the light of this precedent, (85) it is 
conceivable that, in theory at least, a case can be made out for 
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Panama having a valid claim to termination of the extradition treaty 
based on South Africa's breach. In practice, however, no such claim 
has been raised and material breach may be disregarded as a ground 
for termination of South Africa's extradition treaties. 
2.2.5 Article 61 : Supervening impossibility of performance 
Impossibility of performance may be invoked to terminate a treaty if 
it results from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an 
object indispensable for the performance of the treaty. The 
distinction between this ground and the previous one is clear. In 
the case of breach, the central idea is the frustration of the aim 
of the treaty - consequently an intangible "thing". In the case of 
impossibility of performance the breach results from the destruction 
of a physical "object" indispensable to the execution of the treaty. 
Clearly this provision in the Convention is inapplicable to 
extradition treaties where the only "object" the destruction of 
which would preclude execution of the treaty would be the 
unfortunate extraditee himself! 
2.2.6 Article 62 : Fundamental change of circumstances 
This article provides that parties to a treaty may not invoke an 
unforeseen fundamental change to the circumstances existing at the 
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time of the conclusion of a treaty, to terminate or withdraw unless 
firstly, the existence of the circumstances constituted an essential 
basis for the parties' consent to the treaty, and secondly, the 
change radically transforms the extent of obligations owed under the 
treaty. Furthermore, changed circumstances may not be invoked in the 
case of treaties establishing a boundary or where the change is the 
result of breach of an obligation under the treaty or any other 
international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty. 
The historical development of fundamental change of circumstance, or 
clausula rebus sic stantibus, in both municipal and international 
law falls outside of the scope of our present study. (86) Suffice it 
to say that since the adoption and coming into force of the Treaty 
Convention, the doctrine must be regarded as part of modern 
international law, and will, in suitable circumstances, be available 
to parties wishing to terminate an extradition treaty. (87) 
Furthermore, the fact that South Africa has not formally ratified 
the Convention should not prevent the treaty provisions applying to 
its dealings with other nations. After all, South Africa has itself 
raised rebus sic stantibus before the International Court of 
Justice, (88) and has acknowledged the Convention as a basis for its 
treaty dealings with other states. (89) As Vamvoukos (90) points 
out : 
"as a formulation of a rule to which a large number of 
states have already subscribed it (rebus sic stantibus as 
formulated in article 62) will influence the practice of 
even those states who may never ratify the Convention". 
456 
What, then, are the circumstances which are so fundamental that 
their change will adequately found a claim for termination of a 
treaty? Although change of circumstances has often been resorted to 
in disputes before the International Court, (91) the first instances 
in which rebus sic stantibus as articulated in the Vienna Treaty 
Convention arose, were the 1973 Fisheries Jurisdiction cases. (92) 
One of the main points to emerge from these cases is that the 
changes must be such that "if we had then known how these matters 
would evolve ... " (93) the treaty would not have been concluded. 
Article 62 does not stress this aspect as a separate requirement 
merely including it through the term "and which was not foreseen by 
the parties" as an introduction to the requirements that the change 
should "imperil the exis_tence or vital development of one of the 
parties" (94) and radically transform the extent of the obligations 
still to be performed. (95) It is, however, the point on which a 
possible claim to termination of an extradition treaty on this 
ground proves ineffective in the case of South Africa. 
It is, of course, difficult to determine with any certainty whether 
or not circumstances were foreseen by the parties when the treaty 
was concluded. However, the test to be applied is not an absolute 
one; the adjudicator should be able to draw a reasonable inference 
from the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the treaty. 
Like the "reasonable man" of municipal law, reliance should be 
placed on what a reasonable state would or should have foreseen at 
the time of conclusion of the treaty.(96) Furthermore, as the aim of 
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article 62 is to limit the instances in which a state may 
successfully resort to changed circumstances, a fairly liberal 
interpretation of what the states envisaged with their agreement 
which will uphold rather than terminate the agreement, should be 
applied. Only once it has been established that the changed 
circumstances were not in fact envisaged - or that their subsequent 
emergence should not have been a reasonable expectation on the part 
of the treaty partners - may the circumstances themselves be 
analysed to establish whether they meet the other requirements set 
in article 62. 
Our task in assessing the applicability of rebus sic stantibus to 
South African extradition treaties is to identify whether there are 
circumstances which have changed so fundamentally that they could 
give rise to a claim for termination on this ground. Clearly, the 
only circumstances which could here come into play are those 
surrounding the South African domestic policy of apartheid and its 
condemnation by the international community as a whole. In other 
words, does the Icelandic plea "if we had known how these matters 
would evolve .•. " apply to the legislative articulation of the 
apartheid policy? 
Can it realistically be claimed that the parties to the erstwhile 
British treaties, or those concluding independent treaties with the 
Republic, were not aware of the South African domestic policies? It 
is submitted not. In the year 1961 the South African apartheid 
ideology was alive and growing. Although it had not yet 
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received "domestic legitimacy" through legislative enactment, it was 
generally known and the "grand plan" which was to culminate in 
ethnic states had been articulated. Consequently, a state agreeing 
to South African succession to extradition treaties, must be taken 
to have been aware of the surrounding circumstances and the South 
African intention of extending its apartheid policy. Far from 
dealing with consequences which changed fundamentally enough to 
justify termination of a treaty, we are in fact faced with no change 
at all. The "reasonable expectations" of the parties were, or should 
have been, that the apartheid policy of the South African government 
would be fully articulated and developed after 1961. The application 
of rebus sic stantibus is consequently stymied right at the outset 
and need be considered no further. 
2.2.7 Article 63 : Severance of diplomatic or consular 
relations 
The article provides that the severance of diplomatic or consular 
relations between the parties will not affect "the legal relations 
established between them by treaty" unless these relations are 
indispensable for the application of the treaty. 
As South Africa's apartheid policies crystallised from the 1960s 
onwards, the general rejection of the country's ideological basis by 
the international community as a whole manifested itself precisely 
through the severance of diplomatic and consular relations. It is 
important from South Africa's perception, to note that in terms of 
the Treaty Convention such severance cannot of itself be regarded as 
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a termination of extradition treaties between South Africa and its 
partners to these treaties. 
The severance of diplomatic relations has, however, on occasion be 
seen as suspending extradition dealings between the states 
concerned. So, during the height of animosity between Cuba and the 
United States between 1962 and 1973, the latter adopted this 
attitude. (97) This is not, however, a logical interpretation of 
article 63 which provides in general terms that "the relations" will 
not be affected. 
Consequently, the fact that diplomatic relations between South 
-Africa and, for example,· Cuba, have been terminated, does not 
automatically mean that extradition proceedings in terms of the 
extradition treaty purportedly existing between the two states can 
no longer take place. This is, of course, subject to the proviso· 
that the existence of diplomatic relations is not essential for 
performance of the treaty. The practice - either for ideological 
reasons, or today often for financial considerations - has arisen of 
third states' diplomatic or consular missions acting on behalf of a 
state which has no direct diplomatic or consular links with the 
state involved. There is no principle objection to a request for 
extradition from a state which has no official representation within 
the requested state, being addressed to such a state by a third, 
neutral party. Consequently, one may accept that the severance of 
diplomatic or consular relations does not, on its own, result in the 
termination of extradition treaties. It may, however, provide 
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evidence of an intention to terminate which may, depending on the 
specific circumstances of each case, be brought under one of the 
other grounds recognised in the Treaty Convention. 
2.2.8 Article 64 : Emergence of a new peremptory norm of 
general international law (jus cogens) 
The last, and perhaps the most problematic ground providing for the 
termination of a treaty is the emergence of a new ius cogens. 
Article 53 of the Convention defines ius cogens as : 
"a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character". 
Article 64 provides, in deceptively simple language 
"If a new peremptory norm of general international law 
emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that 
norm becomes void and terminates" 
It is immediately clear from this definition that identifying an 
international norm of this class is no easy matter. As with rebus 
sic stantibus, ius cogens too, has a long and involved history which 
falls outside the scope of our examination. (98) For present 
purposes, only a few of the most obvious problems surrounding the 
emergence of a new ius cogens, and specifically the condemnation of 
461 
South Africa's domestic policies as constituting such a norm will 
be considered. 
The dominant role of human rights and their protection in the 
twentieth century has not been without an effect on the concept of 
ius cogens. Authors citing examples of what they regard as ius 
cogens include the violation of human rights; (99) prohibition of 
colonialism; (100) fundamental norms of humanitarian nature; (101) 
and recognition of the dignity of man. (102) It may be accepted that 
for the international community as a whole, South Africa's domestic 
policies from 1961 until early in 1990 - and possibly subsequent to 
that date - violate most or all of these norms. The embodiment of 
the international community's rejection of South African violations 
of these·principles is encapsulated in the condemnation of 
apartheid. Although the validity of this action remains a moot 
point, for the sake of argument it will be accepted for present 
purposes that the prohibition on apartheid has indeed achieved the 
status of ius cogens. 
How does this tie in with South Africa's extradition commitments? 
Much turns on the interpretation one places on the term "existing 
treaty" in article 64. This term may be interpreted in two ways. 
First, the treaty itself must by its nature or purpose conflict with 
the new ius cogens - in other words the nature or purpose of an 
extradition treaty must violate the prohibition on racial 
discrimination.(103) Clearly an extradition treaty which is aimed at 
the prosecution of commonly perceived criminal behaviour, does not 
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meet this requirement. Second, the violation of ius cogens is judged 
not by the nature of the treaty, but by performance in terms of the 
treaty.(104) In other words, although the actual treaty may not 
conflict with ius cogens, a state's performance in terms of the 
treaty may bring it into conflict with the new ius cogens. For 
example, South Africa requests a state which professes to support 
the concept of the prohibition of apartheid as ius cogens, to 
extradite a suspected offender for an offence specifically arising 
from apartheid measures or legislation such as the Immorality, Mixed 
Marriages, or Group Areas Acts. (105) If the requested state were 
then to comply with the request it would be actively advancing South 
Africa's apartheid policies. In such an instance a call on the fact 
that the prohibition of the actions criminalised by these Acts was 
so univer~ally condemned that it could be seen as a new ius cogens 
would, in theory at least, justify a claim to termination on the 
basis of conflict with ius cogens. 
It is conceivable in theory only, because extradition treaties 
themselves provide two clear mechanisms which would relieve the 
requested party of the duty to extradite without having recourse to 
the controversial and uncertain ground of ius cogens. In the first 
place, all extradition treaties specify the offences for which 
extradition ~ill be granted and should the offence for which 
extradition is requested not fall within the parameters of such a 
definition, the state may not extradite the person requested. (106) 
Here again a broad distinction must be drawn between two methods 
used for offence specification in extradition treaties. (107) First 
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in older treaties one often encounters what is termed the "list 
method" where the offences for which extradition will be considered 
are listed specifically eo nomine. This approach soon fell into 
disfavour largely because criminal ingenuity fast outstripped 
diplomatic negotiation and the situation was often encountered where 
extradition was frustrated because the list of offences was not up 
to date. The second, and more general method, is where the treaty 
provides for extradition for any offence allowing for a certain 
minimum period of imprisonment on conviction, for example six months 
or a year's imprisonment. In this latter case, the argument above 
may not find application in that the penalty provided for the 
"apartheid" offence may indeed satisfy the requirements of the 
treaty. However, a state faced with this eventuality, has a 
safety-valve at its disposal. 
The political offence exception to extradition allows states a very 
wide discretion - which as an executive act may not be questioned -
to refuse extradition. Clearly, given perceptions of South Africa's 
erstwhile domestic policies, a state called upon to extradite an 
individual for an act constituting an offence solely in light of an 
unacceptable and outlawed political ideology, would refuse to do so 
- all the more so when no reasons for its decision have to be 
furnished. 
In summary therefore, it may be concluded that the use of the 
emergence of a new rule of ius cogens, as a ground for terminating 
an extradition treaty, is unnecessarily involved and is unlikely to 
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be raised where the basic principles of extradition provide more 
suitable and effective options. 
It is interesting to note that although ius cogens has been raised 
in a number of cases before the International Court of Justice, 
(108) it has never been used by that court to invalidate a treaty. 
2.3 Termination outside of the Vienna Treaty Convention 
2.3.1 Introduction 
It was established earlier that particularly since the Vienna Treaty 
Convention came into operation, the procedures listed in the 
Convention are generally regarded as the only valid means by which a 
treaty may be terminated. This is particularly true of states party 
to the Convention, but may if the Convention is recognised as a 
codification of customary international law, extend even further to 
include all states. Certainly, in general terms, South Africa 
adheres to the Treaty Convention. 
However, on reading the Convention one is immediately struck by two 
notable omissions from its provisions. The first is that no mention 
is made of the termination of a treaty through non-use or desuetude. 
The second is the effect of war on a treaty relations between the 
warring parties. Each of these will be considered briefly. 
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2.3.2 The effect of war on extradition treaties 
The effect of war on treaties is not specifically mentioned in the 
Vienna Treaty Convention. This is because the parties intended it to 
be the topic of a separate and intensive study. (109) A detailed 
discussion of the topic falls outside of the scope of this work, but 
certain general observations may be made. 
Two principal approaches may be identified when the effect of war on 
treaties is considered. Initially, in the older literature, states 
claim that war automatically terminates all treaties between the 
warring parties. (110) This absolutist approach showed cracks in 
1823 when in Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v New Haven 
and Wheeler (111) it was stated that: 
"treaties stipulating for permanent rights and general 
arrangements, and professing to aim at perpetuity, and 
to deal with the case of war as well as the case of 
peace, do not cease on the occurrence of war, but are, 
at most, only suspended while it lasts ... ". 
From this quote it is clear that limitation of the drastic effect of 
the absolute approach, is to be sought in the nature of the treaty 
involved. ( 112) 
If the treaty is one which depends on a high measure of trust and 
cooperation between the parties, the outbreak of hostilities between 
them may well lead to the termination of the treaty. So, for 
example, a treaty of friendship, alliance, neutrality or 
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non-aggression between warring states would hardly survive a war 
situation. (113) On the other hand, a treaty governing the treatment 
of persons in times of war, for example, the Geneva Red Cross 
Convention - which is specifically premised on the war situation -
would of necessity survive. (114) 
Between these two extremes, are a number of neutral treaties, the 
continued existence of which which will depend on the intention of 
the parties or the nature of the treaty and an interpretation of the 
situation as a whole. 
The question arising is into which of these categories extradition 
treaties fall. Dealing specifically with extradition treaties, 
McNair (115) states that there is no "considerable judicial or 
diplomatic authority" indicating the effect of war on such treaties. 
As a minimum, he feels that treaties between the warring parties 
would be suspended. McNair finds continued application of an 
extradition treaty "undesirable". (116) Shearer, (117) on the other 
hand, writing some ten years later, concedes that extradition 
treaties fall between the two extremes identified above, and 
concludes that "the only generalization which can be safely made in 
the present state of the law is that the effect of war on treaties 
must be assessed in the light of the nature of the particular treaty 
obligation in question." 
Bassiouni (118) points out that in considering the continuation or 
termination of an extradition treaty in a war situation, the state's 
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conception of the extradition process is crucial. If the state 
regards extradition as a tool of foreign policy to be manipulated in 
the promotion of its national interests, then, of course, friendly 
relations between the states involved are essential and an outbreak 
of hostilities will either terminate or suspend extradition treaties 
between the two. On the other hand, if a state adopts a wider 
conception of the function of extradition as international 
cooperation in the suppression of a general conception of commonly 
perceived criminal action, then: 
"societal interest would prevail over the 
prevailing conditions of bilateral relations and no 
common criminal would benefit from the political 
conditions existing between the respective states at 
the time he is sought by justice". (119) 
While in a Utopian world this latter approach might indeed find 
application, in United States' practice - and it is submitted in 
that of South Africa - this point has not yet been reached. war will 
consequently have an effect on the application of extradition 
treaties between the two states. What exactly this effect will be 
can only be established by an examination of the situation as it 
arises. Past practice may, however, provide some pointers. 
No South African case law dealing directly with the effect of war on 
an extradition treaty could be traced. However, United States' 
practice in this regard may be of interest. Although in Chandler v 
United States (120) a Circuit Court of Appeal doubted whether an 
extradition treaty between the United States and Germany had 
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survived the Second World War, the same approach was not adopted in 
the case of the extradition treaty between Italy and the United 
States. In Argento v Horn (121) a United States court found that 
Argento was liable to be extradited to Italy as a result of his 
conviction (in absentia in 1931) for murder in that country. Argento 
claimed that although the United States regarded the treaty as 
having been revived by article 44 of the 1947 Peace Treaty, war 
between the parties had terminated the treaty and there was 
consequently nothing to revive. Extradition arrangements could be 
reestablished only through the conclusion of an entirely new treaty. 
The court approached the issue pragmatically and, premising its 
answer on the intention of the parties, pointed out that the 
possibility of revival created in the 1947 Peace treaty, together 
with the subsequent conduct of the parties, indicated that the 
extradition treaty between the United States and Italy had merely 
been suspended and not terminated by the state of war between the 
two nations. 
In Re Extradition of D'Amico (122) the same treaty was again before 
an American court this time relating to conviction in Italy for 
robbery and kidnapping. It was found that D'Amico was liable to be 
surrendered. He appealed, claiming that the treaty between Italy and 
the United States had been terminated by the outbreak of war and had 
not been revived by the United States' notification. Furthermore, 
should the treaty be regarded as having been revived, the revival 
did not make it applicable to acts committed while it was in 
abeyance. The court concluded, confirming the finding in Argento, 
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that the treaty had been suspended by hostilities and reemerged on 
the formal cessation of hostilities. 
Again, it is difficult to formulate any specific rules in this 
regard. However, there would appear to be no inherent characteristic 
of an extradition treaty which would lead to automatic termination 
in the event of war. From the cases considered there would appear to 
be a tendency - which conforms to the general principle that 
treaties should be maintained rather than abrogated - that where 
possible, the effect of war should be to suspend rather than 
terminate treaty relations between the states. 
Termination or suspension resulting from "war" has not played an 
important part in South African extradition practice. See, however, 
Germany, Italy and Rumania and Hungary in South African Extradition 
Commitments reconsidered, below. 
2.3.3 Desuetude 
Of considerably greater importance to South Africa is the question 
whether non-use of an extradition treaty can lead to its 
termination. 
Discussing desuetude, vamvoukos (123) distinguishes between the 
concept which he terms desuetude and the concept he terms 
obsoleteness. For him desuetude is : 
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"the effect of lapse of time which, when it covers a 
situation which is radically incompatible with the 
continuance in force of the obligations flowing from a 
treaty, justifies a finding to the effect either that a 
custom contrary to the treaty has been formed or that, 
as between the parties, a tacit agreement has arisen 
for the amendment or abrogation of an earlier treaty." 
Obsoleteness, on the other hand, is 
"a theoretical concept which denotes the effect on the 
obligations emanating from a treaty of an event other 
than the mere lapse of time, which by its nature 
paralyses the execution of a treaty or terminates it". 
( 124) 
Examining these two definitions, it is clear that what Vamvoukos 
defines as "obsoleteness" is not what we are concerned with here. In 
fact there is little to choose between obsoleteness as he sees it, 
and rebus sic stantibus as discussed above. We are here precisely 
concerned with a "mere lapse of time" and to introduce "other 
events" can only confuse the issue. 
His definition of desuetude too, appears unnecessarily complex. One 
must ask whether by introducing the concept of "a situation 
radically incompatible with the continuance in force of the 
obligations flowing from a treaty" he is not in fact here too 
dealing with a change of circumstances in another guise?(125) 
Although he claims that desuetude must be clearly distinguished from 
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what he terms "obsoleteness", no principle feature distinguishing 
the two concepts emerges clearly from his definitions. 
However, two important points do emerge from Vamvoukos's definition 
of desuetude. First, is that lack of use is evidence that a custom 
contrary to the treaty has evolved. Second, is that lack of use may 
constitute a tacit agreement amending or abrogating the earlier 
treaty. This was also the approach adopted by the Law Commission 
while compiling the Vienna Treaty Convention. (126) Consequently, 
separate treatment of desuetude as an independent ground for treaty 
termination was considered unnecessary as it was perceived as a 
sub-species of termination by consent as embodied in article 54 of 
the Convention. 
Both the custom and the tacit amendment approaches, however, are 
fraught with difficulties of proof. Again, much will depend on the 
nature of the treaty concerned. This may be illustrated by a simple 
example. States A and B conclude a trade treaty of indefinite 
duration governing the export of maize between them. The treaty 
provides for a certain procedure to be followed. For a number of 
years the states follow the provisions of the treaty but then find 
it more convenient to adopt a different procedure. This they do, 
without expressly abandoning the treaty but simply by not using its 
provisions, and continue doing so for a number of years. It may be 
assumed that non-use of the original treaty by States A and B can be 
seen either as a manifestation of their tacit consent to amend or 
terminate it, or as evidence of the emergence of a customary rule 
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between them contrary to the provisions of the original treaty. 
However, such a conclusion can be justified only when one is dealing 
with a treaty of the sort posited above - in other words a treaty 
which requires constant application between the parties. Only if the 
parties would normally perform in terms of the treaty on a 
reasonably frequent basis, can their non-use of the treaty 
constitute evidence of their intention to terminate or amend the 
treaty. 
What then of an extradition treaty? If one examines the nature of 
the obligations arising from an extradition treaty it is immediately 
apparent that they differ considerably from those in the case mooted 
above. Although extradition treaties intend an on-going relationship 
between the parties, it is essentially an intermittent relationship. 
The right to request extradition and the duty to grant it, arise 
only when a criminal or suspected criminal places himself within the 
ambit of the treaty. This may occur only once in five years, once in 
fifty years, or never at all. Consequently, any attempt to draw a 
negative inference from non-use of an extradition treaty (which must 
be distinguished from refusal of extradition) over any specific 
period, is doomed at the outset. The nature of an extradition treaty 
is such that its non-use can only with difficulty imply consent to 
termination or amendment. The issue of tacit consent which is in any 
event approached with caution in the international law context, 
should be approached with even greater caution in the case of 
extradition and adverse inferences should not be drawn from what 
will often be purely innocent non-use. 
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As a preliminary conclusion, therefore, non-use of an extradition 
treaty is on its own insufficient to constitute grounds for 
termination of the treaty. In this regard, an obvious analogy may be 
drawn with the abrogation of South African municipal statutes (127) 
by desuetude. The maxim cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex 
is generally employed to explain this process. If the reason for the 
legislation falls away, the law too falls away. This maxim finds no 
direct application in our law as the courts have clearly held that 
legislation stands until it is repealed or amended by a competent 
legislature. (128) It is interesting to note, however, that a 
hybridised form of the cessante rule is applied but, importantly, to 
suspend the operation of legislation, not terminate it. (129) 
Consequently, a statute, like a treaty, is "eternal", continuing in 
force until such time as it is amended in the prescribed manner. 
Although non-use does not in itself terminate a statute, it may, 
together with the other surrounding circumstances, constitute 
sufficiently strong evidence that the operation of the statute may 
be suspended. 
In similar vein, the general rule with regard to treaties is that a 
treaty continues indefinitely unless one of the recognised grounds 
for termination arises. Mere non-use of an extradition treaty cannot 
on its own lead to its termination or suspension. However, non-use 
of an extradition treaty coupled with other actions by the states 
concerned which may be used to interpret the non-use, may in certain 
cases lead to the suspension or termination of the original treaty. 
In such a case however, a finding of suspension will generally be 
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preferred to termination. Where termination is indeed proved, the 
ground of termination will not be non-use but one of the other 
grounds recognised in the treaty, for example breach, changed 
circumstances, or new ius cogens which give a specific meaning to 
the non-use. It is, however, often impossible to pinpoint a specific 
incident indicative of a negative interpretation to be placed on 
non-use. 
3 SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION AN OVERVIEW 
In dealing specifically with extradition treaties we may draw the 
following conclusions. 
Of the grounds provided in the Treaty Convention, the most relevant 
would appear to be that embodied in articles 42 and 54(a) -
termination in accordance with the provisions of the treaty - as all 
South African extradition treaties contain a termination clause. 
Termination by consent as posited in article 54(b), which must on 
general consensus be taken to include desuetude, is set as an 
alternative to the termination clause in the treaty and is of less 
importance. Desuetude, as such, was shown to be largely incompatible 
with the nature of an extradition treaty. However prolonged non-use 
may, together with surrounding circumstances, be evidence of an 
intention between the parties to suspend the operation of the treaty 
or, in exceptional cases to terminate it. 
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Article 55 has not arisen in the case of South Africa's extradition 
obligations, while article 56 is largely academic as no disruption 
in treaty obligations arises in such a case. The possibility of 
South Africa's domestic policy constituting a material breach of her 
extradition obligations llnder article 60 was considered but found 
unconvincing, while a similar conclusion was reached with regard to 
rebus sic stantibus as embodied in article 62. The entire question 
of termination on the emergence of a new ius cogens as provided in 
article 64 is unsuited to application to an extradition treaty -
apart from difficulties inherent in the concept of ius cogens. 
On the other hand, an important point emerging from our examination 
is that in terms of article 63, the termination of diplomatic and 
consular relations cannot of itself be taken to indicate the 
termination of extradition treaties. 
One further point to be considered is whether a distinction should 
be drawn between termination of a treaty and its suspension. The 
Treaty Convention is not particularly helpful in this regard. 
Articles 54, 55 and 56 speak only of termination. Article 57 
provides specifically for suspension in terms identical to those 
governing termination in article 54. Articles 59, 60, 61 and 62 
allow both termination or suspension apparently at the option of the 
parties involved. Article 64 of course, deals only with termination. 
The procedures provided in the Treaty Convention do not differ for 
termination or suspension. (130) As regards procedure generally, it 
should be noted in view of the approach adopted below, that the 
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provision in the Convention calling for termination or suspension to 
be in writing, (131) will not apply in the case of extradition 
I 
treaties which contain a termination clause and lack specific formal 
requirements. 
Whether we are indeed dealing with possible termination or 
suspension must consequently be determined by a consideration of all 
the surrounding circumstances. This will include any declarations -
written or otherwise - made by the parties from which their 
attitudes may be determined; any actions by the parties; etc. In 
short, to establish the likelihood of successful application of an 
extradition treaty - particularly an inherited treaty which has not 
been applied for a number of years - one must examine the full 
international spectrum of dealings between the states concerned and 
seek some pattern in the possibly relevant factors. 
Two further points should be made in this regard. In determining the 
continuing application of an "old, unused" extradition treaty one is 
of necessity negotiating shifting sands. As was seen above, the 
intention of the parties determines whether one is dealing with 
termination or suspension. In either event one will in these cases 
generally be working with an assumed intention. In the light of the 
preamble to the Treaty Convention which provides as one of the goals 
of the Convention : 
"the determination of the peoples of the United Nations 
to establish conditions under which justice and respect 
for the obligations arising from treaties can be 
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maintained", 
it is submitted that failing direct declarations by the parties that 
their intention is to terminate the relevant treaty, suspension 
rather than termination should be assumed. In this way the 
obligations arising from the treaty are in essence maintained, being 
held in abeyance until such time as the reason for discord has been 
removed. Once this has been achieved, the treaty obligations will 
reemerge. On the other hand, if termination is premised, a new 
agreement will have to be concluded. 
That this is particularly relevant in the case of South Africa where 
much of the animosity which has rendered the state a pariah nation 
has an ideological basis, hardly bears mention. As South Africa 
moves towards readmission to the international community, treaties 
which were merely suspended may re emerge with a minimum of 
formalities. 
One final point which was touched upon above, (132) should also be 
borne in mind in an assessment of currently applicable treaties. 
This is the question whether there is any limitation on the 
termination or suspension of treaties outside of the specific 
provisions of the termination clauses in the Convention itself. One 
thinks immediately of article 45 which provides that if a state is 
aware of the existence of a ground of termination or suspension and 
consents either expressly or through its conduct to the maintenance 
of the treaty, it loses the right to claim termination. 
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This would appear to be an embodiment in the Convention of the 
traditional concept of estoppel, the application of which has been 
firmly established in international law. (133) However, it would 
appear that estoppal can apply only to negative a claim for 
termination based on consent of the parties - and notably on 
desuetude. Consequently, although it should be borne in mind, it 
should not be accorded undue weight. 
4 SOUTH AFRICAN EXTRADITION COMMITMENTS RECONSIDERED 
In this section, extradition treaties which appear on a print out of 
treaties in force obtained from the South African Department of 
Foreign Affairs are considered individually. An attempt is made to 
provide a "user friendly" summary of the treaty in question. 
Space does not permit an in-depth discussion of all the possibly 
relevant factors reflecting on termination or suspension in the case 
of each treaty. Although the conclusions reached may appear somewhat 
abrupt, they should be read in the light of the theoretical 
discussion of termination above. For example, when dealing with the 
current status of a treaty, reference is often made to the last 
communication between the two states concerned which is on file with 
the Department of Justice. Were desuetude alone sufficient to effect 
the termination of a treaty, the conclusion could be drawn that 
after some twenty years, or so, of non-use the treaty had 
terminated. However, as indicated above, when dealing with 
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extradition treaties in particular, termination or suspension based 
on desuetude is controversial. 
Where the treaty contains a termination clause, it is assumed that 
unless the clause has been invoked the treaty has not been 
terminated. This does not, however, mean that an application in 
terms of the treaty will be successful. Non-use of a treaty over a 
long period coupled with some extra element indicating a negative. 
attitude with regard to cooperation with South Africa is taken to 
indicate that the treaty has been suspended. Where no specific 
evidence of intention is available, the fact of non-use is merely 
documented. 
It is general knowledge that certain states have been, and many 
still are, hostile towards South Africa. Knowing this is one thing, 
substantiating it another. Voting patterns at the United Nations, 
may indeed provide evidence of the "hostile intention" necessary to 
transform non-use into a will to suspend, in that they reflect - at 
least at a political level - the avowed attitudes of the various 
states. With this in mind, the voting pattern of the most radical of 
the resolutions adopted against South Africa through the years, GA 
Resolution 3069 (XXVIII) of 30.11.1973, the International Convention 
for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, is 
taken as a barometer. Where relevant, the positive vote of the 
country concerned for this resolution is documented alongside the 
non-use. It must, however, be emphasised that the only role which 
Convention on Apartheid plays is to give an indication of the 
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state's generally professed attitude towards South Africa. It is in 
no way implied that by voting for a United Nations' Resolution, a 
state may amend, suspend or terminate an extradition treaty totally 
unrelated to the Convention. 
Furthermore, the conclusions offered here are of necessity 
tentative, based as they are largely on speculation. They are also 
relevant only for the current time-frame. As 1991 draws to a close, 
international law is changing at such a rate that few can predict 
what states will still exist in a matter of weeks - let alone what 
their attitude to South African extradition treaties will be! 
The various aspects are reflected under the headings : Origin and 
Current status. The heading Reference refers to the original source 
where the treaty may be found. Under Practice any practical 
extradition dealings between the states which were found in the 
files of the Department of Justice are mentioned briefly as this 
information is not available elsewhere. Although in many of these 
instances the outcome of the "case" is uncertain and case references 
are mostly unavailable, the mere fact that such contact took place 
may be indicative of the states' attitude towards extradition. Where 
there are fairly regular dealings between the states, only the more 
interesting cases will be discussed. Where the cases have been 
reported elsewhere, they are not mentioned. 
The evaluation of the treaties is approached in two phases. First, 
treaties concluded before republican status was achieved in 1961, in 
481 
other words treaties which contain an element of succession as 
regards the Republic. These are generally the older treaties where 
the issue of validity is most pertinently raised and most difficult 
to determine. Second, the post-1961 treaties are considered 
briefly. As there is little question of the continued application of 
most of these treaties they are not considered in similar detail. 
In a final section, mention is made of countries with which one 
would expect extradition provisions to exist, but which in fact have 
no such arrangements with South Africa. 
Lastly, it will be noted that the style of reference followed in 
this section differs from that in the rest of the work in that 
endnotes are abandoned and references are incorporated in the text. 
This has been done advisedly to facilitate easy reference. 
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4.1 PRE-REPUBLICAN TREATIES 
ARGENTINA 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC FOR THE 
MUTUAL SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1889-90) 81 BSP 1305-1311 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Argentina at 
Buenos Aires on 22.5.1889 and ratified at Buenos Aires on 
15.12.1893. Application was extended to South Africa by article 
XVII. 
Current status The last communication between the two countries on 
JF 1/554/20/2 is dated 1961. However it is not clear whether this 
contact was on the basis of the treaty or of reciprocity. The 
general trend in the South American states is to extradite on 
reciprocity but no clear indication of the treaty having been 
suspended could be found. Although Argentina signed the Apartheid 
Convention on 6.6.1975 (ratified on 7.11.1975) it is submitted that 
the period on non-use, coupled with the fact that the last contact 
was initiated by Argentina, militates against suspension and that 
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the treaty may be regarded as operative. No direct evidence of 
termination could be found. 
Practice The Case of Hisquail Nain Ezra Sassoon JF 1/554/20/2 
involved a request by Argentina to the South African authorities 
that Sassoon be returned to Argentina to face charges of "monopoly". 
It was however uncertain whether this constituted an offence under 
South African law and further particulars were requested on 
5.10.1961. These were apparently not forthcoming and no further 
record could be found of the case. 
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AUSTRIA/HUNGARY 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND AUSTRIA/HUNGARY FOR THE MUTUAL 
SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference 1873 63 BSP 175-179 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Austria/Hungary 
at Vienna on 2.12.1873 and ratified at Vienna on 10.3.1874. 
Application was extended to South Africa by article XVII. 
Current status In reply to enquiries from South Africa on the 
possibility of the conclusion of a new extradition treaty, Austria 
replied in a communication dated 15.12.1976 (JF 9/11/2 (Oostenryk)) 
that the Austrian government was not willing to conclude a new 
treaty with South Africa. However, it was also stated that Austria 
would apparently regard the British treaty as binding on South 
Africa but that no definite answer could be given until a specific 
extradition case arose. 
As regards Hungary, on JF 1/554/20/19A it is recorded that South 
Africa attempted to resurrect an extradition treaty with Hungary 
which had presumably been suspended when South Africa declared war 
on Hungary in 1940, but met with no response - PM10/5 dated 
25.3.1952. 
Practice None 
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BELGIUM 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND BELGIUM FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1900-01) 94 BSP 7-22 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Belgium at 
Brussels on 29.10.1901 and ratified at Brussels on 6.12.1901. 
Application was extended to South Africa by article XIV. An 
additional convention was concluded between the two countries at 
London on 3.3.1911 amending the original convention by the inclusion 
of the principle of speciality (104 BSP 131-132). A further 
convention concluded at London on 15.10.1923 extended the 
application of the original convention to certain Belgian and 
British possessions - notably the Belgian Congo (Zaire), 
Bechuanaland (Botswana), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and 
Swaziland. 
Current status Surprisingly, no file for Belgium as such could be 
traced. However, JF 1/516/2/5 deals with the Belgian Congo to 
which, as was shown above, the original treaty was extended. By 
analogy it may be assumed that the original treaty would also apply. 
In 1952 Pakistan enquired whether this treaty applied between 
Belgium and Pakistan (as it had been extended to India) and the 
Belgian government replied in the affirmative (UNTS vol cxxxiii 
2011). The original convention contains a termination clause in 
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article xv· allowing either party to terminate on six months' notice. 
No such notice could be traced. 
Practice None 
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BOLIVIA 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND BOLIVIA FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1886} 88 BSP 27-33 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Bolivia 
at Lima on 22.2.1892 and ratified at Lima on 7.3.1898. Application 
was extended to South Africa by article XVII. 
Current status No file for Bolivia could be traced. However, the 
treaty contains a specific termination clause in article XVIII 
providing for termination by either party on notice of not less than 
six months and not more than one year, and no such notice could be 
traced. Bolivia signed the Apartheid Convention on 6.10.1983. This, 
together with the lack of evidence of use of the treaty or in .fact 
any contact between the two states with regard to extradition would 
tend to suggest that the treaty has been suspended and that a 
request for extradition would not meet with success at this stage. 
Practice None 
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BRAZIL 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND BRAZIL FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference Clarke (1888) lviii 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Brazil at Rio 
de Janeiro on 13.11.1872 and ratified at Rio de Janeiro on 
28.8.1873. Application was extended to South Africa by article XVI. 
Current status In reply to a query from the South African 
authorities to the Brazilian authorities dated 6.10.1969 as to the 
continued application of this treaty between Brazil and South 
Africa, the Brazilian authorities replied that there is no 
extradition treaty between the two countries - JF 1/554/20/4. 
Brazil in fact denounced all its extradition treaties in 1913 (Evans 
(1964)). The country is however prepared to extradite on a basis of 
reciprocity (Re Milton Gomes 1929-30 Case 177 Ann Dig 280). 
Practice The Case of Mario Guassardo arose from fraud totalling 
some R500 000 committed in South Africa by Guassardo, a director of 
Boerebank Bpk. A warrant was issued for his arrest by a Johannesburg 
magistrate (Marshall Square ROM 143/4/62). It was ascertained that 
he was living in Brazil. Despite the absence of a treaty between the 
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two countries, Brazil was prepared to extradite Guassardo provided 
that South Africa undertook a reciprocal obligation. In a letter 
dated 23.7.1964 the South African authorities indicated that they 
could not give an unconditional commitment to reciprocity. It could 
not be determined whether the case was proceeded with. 
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CHILE 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHILE FOR THE SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE 
CRIMINALS 
Reference (1897) 89 ESP 20-25 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Chile at 
Santiago on 26.1.1897 and ratified at Santiago on 14.4.1898. 
Application was extended to South Africa by article XVII. 
Current .status On JF 1/554/20/7 in reply to a query from the South 
African authorities, Chile replied on 6.10.1969 that the treaty with 
Britain was regarded as valid but that there had been no requests 
for extradition from either side "over the past few years". 
Practice None could be traced. 
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COLOMBIA 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND COLOMBIA FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER 
OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1889-90) 79 BSP 12-18 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Colombia at 
Bogota on 27.10.1888 and ratified at Bogota on 21.8.1889. 
Application was extended to South Africa by article XVII. 
Current .. status Although a file exists for Colombia - JF 1 /554/20/8 
- it contains no correspondence. The treaty contains a termination 
clause in article XVIII allowing either party to terminate by notice 
of not more than one year and not less than six months. No record of 
such notice could be traced and the treaty is consequently assumed 
to be current. 
Practice None 
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CUBA 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CUBA FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1904) 97 BFSP 26-31 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Cuba at Havana 
on 3.10.1904 and ratified at Havana on 10.1.1905. Application 
extended to South Africa by article XVII. 
Current status The last letter appearing on JF 1/554/20/9 is dated 
22.12.1931. There have consequently been no extradition contacts 
between the two states for the past sixty years. However, the treaty 
does contain a termination clause in article XVIII which allows 
either party to terminate on notice of not less than six months but 
not more than one year. No record of such termination could be 
found. Cuba signed the Apartheid Convention on 29.8.1975 (ratified 
on 25.3.1976). This, together with the sixty-year period of non-use 
and Cuba's generally hostile attitude to South Africa, would tend to 
suggest that the treaty has been suspended. 
Practice None 
493 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
TREATY FOR THE EXTRADITION OF CRIMINALS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
Reference 1927 LNTS 270-279 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Czechoslovakia 
at London on 24.11.1924. The treaty was suspended as regards the 
Union of South Africa until it should decide to accede in its own 
right. This was done by article VI of Government Notice 26 of 
6.1.1928 Government Gazette 6.1.1928. 
Current status The last letter on JF 1/554/20/10 is dated 
25.3.1952. The treaty contains a termination clause in article 20 
allowing either party to terminate on notice of not more than one 
year and not less than six months. No record of such termination 
could be traced. Czechoslovakia signed the Apartheid Convention on 
29.8.1975 (ratified on 25.3.1976). In view of the non-use for almost 
forty years and the negative attitude evidenced above, it is 
submitted that the treaty has been suspended. 
Practice None 
494 
DENMARK 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND DENMARK FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1873) 63 BSP 5-18 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Denmark at 
Copenhagen 31.3.1873 and ratified at Copenhagen 26.4.1873. Its 
application was extended to South Africa by article XIII. The treaty 
expressly replaces the treaty of 1862 between the parties. 
current status On JF 1/554/20/21 (Denmark) it is stated that South 
Africa regards this treaty as valid. However, as from 1.5.1968 
Denmark gave formal notice of renunciation of all former treaties. 
Article XIV accords either state the right to terminate the 
extradition treaty by six months' notice of its intention. This 
treaty consequently terminated on 1.11.1968. There is no record of a 
new treaty having been concluded. 
Practice It is recorded on the above file that no application for 
extradition has ever been received from or made to Denmark. 
495 
EQUATOR/EQUADOR 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE REPUBLIC OF EQUATOR FOR THE 
MUTUAL SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1881) 72 BSP 137-143 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Equator at 
Quito on 20.9.1880 and ratified at Quito on 19.2.1886. Application 
was extended to South Africa by article XV. 
Current status Although South Africa sent a letter to the 
Ecuadorian government on 17.11.1969 seeking clarification of the 
status of extradition treaties between the two states, no response 
was forthcoming. Consequently, although South Africa regards this 
treaty as binding, the attitude of Ecuador is uncertain. The treaty 
does however contain a termination clause in article XVI allowing 
for termination on six months' notice. No record could be found of 
such notice having been given. Equador signed the Apartheid 
Convention on 12.3.1975 (ratified 12.5.1975) and this, together 
with the disregard for the South African enquiry would tend to 
suggest that the treaty has been suspended. 
Practice None. 
496 
FINLAND 
TREATY BETWEEN FINLAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR THE EXTRADITION OF 
CRIMINALS 
Reference 1925 LNTS 80-91 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Finland at 
London on 24.5.1924. The treaty was suspended as regards the Union 
of South Africa until it should resolve to accede in its own right. 
This was done by article v of Government Notice 167~ of 29.9.1925 
Government Gazette 2.10.1925. 
Current status No file for this country could be traced. However 
the treaty does contain a termination clause in article 17 allowing 
either party to terminate on notice of not less than six months and 
not more than one year. No record of such termination could be 
traced and the treaty may be regarded as current. 
Practice None 
497 
FRANCE 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1876) 67 BSP 5-19 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and France on 
14.8.1876 at Paris and ratified at Paris 8.4.1878. Application was 
extended to South Africa by means of article XVI. Application was 
extended to Tunis by agreement between Britain and France on 
31.12.1889 - (1889) 81 BSP 55. A further agreement of 13.2.1896 
(1896-97) 88 BSP 6-8, amended certain provisions. 
Current status On JF 1/554/20/13 a letter from the French Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs dated 5.7.1968 responding to enquiry addressed 
to France by South Africa on 11.5.1967 as to whether France would be 
prepared to conclude a new bilateral extradition treaty, France 
stated that there was at that stage "no place" for the conclusion of 
a new treaty. France declared itself bound by the relevant British 
extradition treaties. 
Practice In the Case of Alain Malo (JF 9/11/2 (France)) Malo, 
"kidnapped" his four year old daughter and fled to Cape Town. On 
4.12.1976 the French Embassy sought assistance in tracing Malo for 
possible extradition. As he could not be found, nothing further came 
of the matter. 
498 
GERMANY 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference 100 LNTS 268 
Origin Treaty concluded between Britain and Germany at London 
14.5.1872 and ratified at London 11.6:1872. Application extended to 
South Africa by article XV. 
Current status JF 9/11/2 - At the outset of the Second World War the 
treaty lapsed and has not been renewed. In terms of a letter dated 
16.4.1980 it is confirmed that no new treaty has been concluded with 
Germany and that matters will be dealt with on an ad hoc basis (IF 
Gelderblom pp Secretary for Justice). Germany is prepared to 
extradite on a basis of reciprocity subject to the usual provisions 
including non-extradition of nationals. 
Practice A number of cases appear on JF 9/11/3 and as these are not 
reported elsewhere, they are briefly recorded here. 
(a) The case of Franz Podezin : In response to an application from 
Germany for the extradition of Podezin, the Minister replied in a 
memorandum dated 26.6.1974 that a general undertaking of reciprocity 
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should not be given in terms of section 3(2) of the Extradition Act 
67 of 1962. 
(b) The case of Hans Dieter Gebhardt heard before Magistrate APJ 
Kotze at Windhoek on 15.12.1980. Gebhardt was charged with the rape 
and murder of a Korean nurse in Munich. His accomplice was 
apprehended in Germany and confessed implicating Gebhardt. Gebhardt 
admitted complicity. As there was no treaty operative the State 
President's consent in terms of article 3(2) was sought and granted. 
The extradition order was granted on 15.12.1980, the Minister 
consented to his extradition on 20.1.1981 and he was extradited on 
18.12.1981. 
(c) The case of Franz Johannes Esser case no 8/1356/81 heard 
27.1.1982 (Johannesburg Magistrate's Court). In this case Germany 
requested Esser's extradition to serve a sentence passed by a Munich 
court. Due to various technical problems, the case was eventually 
thrown out of court in terms of section 10(2) of the Extradition Act 
- unreasonable lapse of time. Although questions were later raised 
as to whether the case could be reinstituted, it could not be 
determined whether or not a new case was proceeded with. 
(d) The case of Franz Josef Kraul case no 08/00784/817 heard in 
Johannesburg Magistrate's court on 17.6.1981. Charged with "sexual 
compulsion" and housebreaking in Germany, his extradition was sought 
to stand trial. After a full investigation and on obtaining consent 
from the State President in terms of section 3(2), Kraul was 
eventually extradited. 
500 
GREECE 
EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND GREECE 
Reference 103 BSP 297; Union Gazette 223 of 12.4.1912 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Greece at 
London on 13.2.1912. Application was extended to South Africa by 
article 18. 
Current status In JF 9/11/2 (Greece) the response of the Greek 
authorities in an unofficial opinion (letter dated 22.8.1972) to a 
tentative request for extradition was that the Anglo-Greek 
extradition treaty no longer binds Greece. 
Practice The Case of Vasilos Kambouris. Application was made to 
Greece for the extradition of Kambouris to face charges for fraud on 
the Netherlands Bank totalling some R40 000 and on a paternity suit. 
Kambouris could not be traced in Greece and nothing further came of 
the application. Reference is made to one instance of extradition 
between the two countries on 21.5.1963 but no record of this case, 
or the basis on which extradition occurred, could be found. 
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GUATEMALA 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GUATAMALA FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER 
OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1884-85) 76 BSP 72-77 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Guatamala 
at Guatamala on 4.7.1885 and ratified at Guatamala on 6.9.1886. 
Application was extended to South Africa by article XVII. 
Current status Although a file exists for Guatamala - JF 
1/554/20/16 - there is no correspondence on record. The treaty 
contains a termination clause - article XVIII - allowing for 
termination by either party subject to the treaty continuing in 
operation for six months after such notification. No such notice of 
termination could be traced and consequently the treaty may be 
regarded as still operative. 
Practice None 
502 
HAYTI/HAITI 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND HAYTI FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1874) 65 BSP 44-48 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Hayti on 
17.12.1874 at Port-au-Prince and ratified at Port-au-Prince on 
2.9.1875. Application was extended to South Africa by article XV. 
Current status As far as could be established no contact has ever 
taken place between the two states - no file for Hayti could be 
traced. However, the treaty does contain a termination clause in 
article XVI allowing either party to terminate but providing that 
the treaty will remain in force for six months after notification. 
No record could be traced of use having been made of this provision 
and the continued validity of the treaty, although suspect on 
practical grounds, cannot be ruled out. Hayti acceded to the 
Apartheid Convention on 19.12.1977. This, together with the total 
lack of contact would tend to suggest that the treaty has been 
suspended. 
Practice None 
503 
ISRAEL 
EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE STATE 
OF ISRAEL 
Reference Proclamation R14/1960 Government Gazette 6362 of 
5.2.1960 
Origin The treaty was concluded between the Union of South Africa 
and Israel at Pretoria on 18.9.1959 and ratified at Pretoria on 
7.1.1960. The treaty was amended during 1976 by Government Notice 
R184/197.6 in Government Gazette 5283 of 10.9.1976. 
Current status The treaty remains valid. 
Practice In the Case of Mannie Becker {JF 9/11/3) South Africa 
requested the extradition of Becker, a South African attorney who 
has appropriated some R24 000 from his trust fund, from Israel. In a 
letter dated 22.1.1982 Israel declined to extradite Becker as the 
authorities had waited over ten years to request his extradition, he 
had become a "model citizen" and had repaid a substantial amount of 
the money. They emphasised, however, that this was a finding solely 
on the facts of the case and did not set a precedent. 
504 
ITALY 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND ITALY FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1873) 63 BSP 19 - 30. 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Italy on 
5.2.1873 at Rome and ratified at Rome 18.3.1873. Application of the 
treaty was extended to South Africa by article XVIII. The treaty was 
suspended during the Second World War. South Africa succeeded to the 
treaty An terms of the Republican constitution. 
Current Status Very little information on this treaty is available 
in South Africa. On JF 9/11/2 note 1312 of 23.10.1968 in minute 
10/17/5 it is merely stated that this treaty is an "agreement in 
force". No mention could be found of Italy's attitude in this 
regard. Article XX contains a termination clause which provides that 
the treaty will remain in force for six months after notice of 
termination. No official notice of termination could be traced. 
Practice No cases could be traced. 
505 
LIBERIA 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND LIBERIA FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1892-93) 84 BSP 103-109 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Liberia 
at London 16.12.1892 and ratified at London 31.1.1894. Application 
was extended to South Africa by article XVII. 
Current status No file for Liberia could be traced. However, the 
treaty contains a termination clause in article XVIII providing for 
termination by either party on six months' notice. No such 
termination could be traced. Liberia acceded to the Apartheid 
Convention on 5.11.1976 and this together with the absence of any 
contact whatsoever would imply that operation of the treaty has been 
suspended. 
Practice None 
506 
LUXEMBOURG 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND LUXEMBOURG FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER 
OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1880) 71 BSP 48-53 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Luxembourg at 
Luxembourg on 24.11.1880 and ratified at Brussels 5.1.1881. 
Application was extended to South Africa by article XIV. 
Current .. status In response to a South African enquiry as to the 
status of extradition between the two states dated 17.11.1969, the 
continued existence of British treaties was confirmed. 
Practice None 
507 
MEXICO 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND MEXICO FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1885-6) 77 BSP 1253 - 1258. 
Origin : The treaty was concluded between Britain and the President 
of the United States of Mexico on 7.9.1884 at Mexico City and 
ratified at Mexico City 22.1.1889. Application of the treaty was 
extended to South Africa by article XVII. 
Current status Although a file exists for Mexico - JF 1/554/20/25 
- it contains no correspondence whatsoever. No record could be found 
of extradition dealings having taken place between the countries. 
Article XVIII contains a termination clause providing for notice not 
exceeding one year and not less than six months. No record of such 
notice could be traced. Mexico acceded to the Apartheid Convention 
on 4.3.1980 and this, together with the lack of contact would 
suggest that the treaty has been suspended. 
Practice No cases could be found. 
508 
MONACO 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND MONACO FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1891-2) 83 BSP 66-72 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Monaco 
at Paris on 17.12.1891 and ratified at Paris on 17.3.1892. 
Application was extended to South Africa by article XX. 
Current status The last communication appearing on JF 1/554/20/24 
is notification of the extension of the application of the treaty to 
South West Africa dated 5.7.1931. Article XXI, however contains a 
termination clause allowing termination by either party on six 
months' notice and as no record could be found of such termination 
having taken place, the sixty year non-use cannot on its own justify 
termination. The treaty is consequently regarded as operational. 
Practice None 
509 
NETHERLANDS 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS FOR THE MUTUAL 
SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference 90 BFSP 51-58 
Origin Treaty concluded between Britain and the Netherlands at 
London on 26.9.1898 and ratified at London on 14.12.1898. 
Application extended to South Africa by article XVIII. 
Current. status On JF 1/554/20/23 the continued application of the 
treaty with regard to South Africa is confirmed. 
Practice None 
510 
NICARAGUA 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND NICARAGUA FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER 
OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1905) 98 BSP 65-69 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Nicaragua at 
Managua on 19.4.1905 and ratified at London on 13.2.1906. 
Application was extended to South Africa by article XV. 
Current status On JF 1/554/20/16 dealing with Nicaragua, there is 
no correspondence whatsoever. However, the treaty contains a 
termination clause in article XVI allowing either party to terminate 
on notice of not less than six months but not more than one year. No 
record of such notice could be found. Nicaragua acceded to the 
Apartheid Convention on 28.3.1980 and this, together with the lack 
of contact would suggest that the treaty has been suspended. 
Practice None 
511 
PANAMA 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND PANAMA FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1906) 99 BSP 915-920 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Panama at 
Panama on 25.8.1906 and ratified at Panama on 15.5.1907. Application 
was extended to South Africa by article XVIII. 
Current status Although a file exists for Panama - JF 1/554/20/28 
there is no correspondence whatsoever on record. However, the treaty 
contains a termination clause in article XIX allowing either party 
to terminate on notice of not less than six months and not more ·than 
one year. No record of such termination could be found. Panama 
signed the Apartheid Convention on 7.5.1976 (ratified on 16.3.1977) 
and this, together with the lack of contact suggests that the treaty 
has been suspended. 
Practice None 
512 
PARAGUAY 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND PARAGUAY FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER 
OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference 102 BFSP 340-345 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Paraguay on 
12.9.1908 at Asuncion and ratified at Asuncion on 30.1.1911. 
Application was extended to South Africa by article XVIII. 
Current.~tatus On JF 9/11/2 (Paraguay) in a letter dated 1.2.1978 
it is confirmed by the Paraguayan Foreign Minister that the above 
treaty is regarded as binding between South Africa and Paraguay. 
Practice None 
513 
PERU 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND PERU FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference 99 BSP 963-968 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Peru at Lima on 
26.1.1904 and ratified at Lima on 30.11.1906. Application was 
extended to South Africa by article XVII. 
Current status Although a file exists for Peru - JF 1/554/20/31 -
there is no correspondence on the file. However, the treaty contains 
a termination clause in article XVIII allowing either party the 
right to terminate on notice of not less than six months and not 
more than one year. No record of such notice could be traced. Peru 
acceded to the Apartheid Convention on 1.11.1978 and this together 
with the lack of contact suggests that the treaty has been 
suspended. 
Practice None 
514 
PORTUGAL 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND PORTUGAL FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER 
OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1892-93) 84 BSP 83-88 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Portugal 
at Lisbon on 17.10.1892 and ratified at Lisbon on 13.11.1893. 
Application extended to South Africa by article XVII. A 
supplementary agreement CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 
AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, SOUTH AFRICA AND INDIA AND PORTUGAL 
SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY OF 17 OCTOBER 1892 was 
signed on behalf of South Africa (and the other Dominions) at Lisbon 
on 20.1.1932 and ratified at Lisbon on 29.12.1932. It amends article 
III of the original treaty with regard to the delivery up of 
nationals. 
Current status Although on JF 9/11/2 (Portugal) there are numerous 
reports of negotiations for the conclusion of a new extradition 
treaty spanning the period 1972-1974, to date nothing would appear 
to have come of these. In the interim the British treaty remains 
applicable. In a letter dated 19.8.1963 extradition between the two 
states was acknowledged. 
515 
Practice In the Case of M Kausana v BJ van Zyl en die Minister van 
Bantoe Administrasie JF - 1/13/22/3 - the application of the 
British/Portuguese treaty to South Africa and the Portuguese 
colonies was recognised. 
516 
ROUMANIA/ROMANIA 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND ROUMANIA FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER 
OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1893) 85 BSP 69-75 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Roumania at 
Bucharest on 24.3.1893 and ratified at Bucharest on 13.3.1894. 
Application extended to South Africa by article XVII. 
Current status Although a file exists for Roumania - JF 1/554/20/33 
- there is no correspondence on record. The treaty however contains 
a termination clause in article XVIII allowing either party to 
terminate on six months' notice and as no record of such termination 
could be traced its continued existence could be assumed. However, 
on a different file - JF 1/554/20/19A (Estonia) in a letter PM10/5 
dated 25.3.1953 it is recorded that South Africa attempted to 
resurrect the extradition treaties with Hungary and Roumania but 
received no response. The treaty would consequently appear to have 
been suspended with South Africa's declaration of war against 
Roumania in 1940. 
Practice None 
517 
SALVADOR/EL SALVADOR 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SALVADOR FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER 
OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1881) 72 BSP 13-19 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Great Britain and the 
Republic of Salvador at Paris on 23.6.1881 and ratified at London on 
8.11.1882. Application extended to South Africa by article XVII. 
Current .. status Although a file exists for Salvador - JF 1/554/20/34 
- there is no correspondence on record. The treaty provides for 
termination by either side in article XVIII but remains valid for 
six months after notice of termination. No such notice could be 
traced. El Salvador acceded to the Apartheid Convention on 
30.11.1979 and this together with the lack of contact would suggest 
that the treaty has been suspended. 
Practice None. 
518 
SAN MARINO 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE REPUBLIC OF SAN MARINO FOR THE 
MUTUAL EXTRADITION OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1899) 91 BSP 95-101 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and San Marino at 
Florence on 16.10.1899 and ratified at Rome 5.12.1899. Application 
was extended to South Africa by article XIX. 
Current status No file for San Marino could be traced. However, 
article XX contains a termination clause allowing either party to 
terminate on six months' notice. As no such notice could be traced 
the treaty may be regarded as operational. 
Practice None 
519 
SER.VIA/SERBIA 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SER.VIA FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1900) 92 BSP 41-46 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Servia at 
Belgrade on 23.11.1900 and ratified at Belgrade on 28 February 1901. 
Application was extended to South Africa by article XVII. 
Current status No file for Servia could be traced. The treaty 
contains a termination clause in article XVIII which allows either 
party to terminate the treaty on six months' notice. No such notice 
could be found. However, as a result of the annexation and 
disappearance of Servia this treaty would also have terminated. See 
Chapter VI. 
Practice None 
520 
SIAM/THAILAND 
EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SIAM 
Reference Union Gazette 269 of 23.8.1912. 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Siam at London 
on 10.11.1911. Application was extended to South Africa by article 
17. 
Current status Although a file exists for Siam (now Thailand) - JF 
1/554/20/36 - it contains no correspondence. The treaty does contain 
a termination clause in article 17 allowing either party to 
terminate on six months' notice. No record of such termination could 
be found. The treaty is presumed to be operational. 
Practice None 
521 
SPAIN 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SPAIN FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF 
FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1878) 69 BSP 6-13 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Spain at 
London on 4.6.1878 and ratified at London on 21.11.1878. Application 
was extended to South Africa by article X . 
. Current status In reply to a query by South Africa during 1967 as 
to the state of extradition between the two countries, Spain 
replied that it regarded the British treaties binding on South 
Africa - JF 1/554/20/36 letter dated 6.10.1969. 
Practice No record could be found of extradition having taken place 
between the two states. 
522 
SWEDEN AND NORWAY 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SWEDEN AND NORWAY FOR THE MUTUAL 
SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1873) 63 BSP 175-179 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Sweden and 
Norway at Stockholm on 26.6.1873 and ratified at Stockholm on 
28.8.1873. The treaty was extended to South Africa by article XIV. 
After the separation of Norway and Sweden a further agreement 
between Britain and Norway was signed at Christiana on 18.2.1907 
providing that the 1873 treaty remains in force between Britain and 
Norway - (1907) 100 BSP 552-553. 
Current status Sweden On JF 1/554/20/37 in a letter dated 
9.10.1951 it is stated that the extradition treaty between South 
Africa and Sweden would lapse on 23.3.1952. The treaty contains a 
termination clause providing for its remaining in force for six 
months after the date of notification of termination - article XV. 
Norway : On JF 1/554/20/27 it is recorded that the treaty between 
South Africa and Norway terminated on 20.11.1975. It should however 
be noted that extradition from Norway may take place in the absence 
of a treaty in terms of the Norwegian Extradition Act 39 of 1975 
operative since 1.8.1975. It is further noted in this file that 
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there have never been any extradition dealings between the two 
countries and that it is considered unlikely that there ever will 
be. It is suggested that if the need were to arise, section 3(2) of 
the South African Extradition Act could be utilised. 
Practice No actual cases of extradition between South Africa and 
either Norway or Sweden could be traced. However, in the case of 
Sweden, an extradition question did arise in the case of Robert 
Escalier (alias Evan Francis) who was charged with "instigating 
robbery" during January 1966. He had fled to Lorence Marques 
(Mocambique) and the Swedish authorities requested permission in 
terms of section 21(1) of the South African Extradition Act 67 of 
1962, from South Africa for the plane transporting him from Lorence 
Marques to Lisbon to be allowed to land at Jan Smuts Airport, 
Johannesburg. Permission was granted on 11.9.1968 but the route was 
later changed and use was not made of the right to travel through 
South African territory. 
524 
SWITZERLAND 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND SWITZERLAND FOR THE MUTUAL 
SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1880) 71 BSP 54-62 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Great Britain and 
Switzerland at Berne on 26.11.1880 and ratified at Berne on 
15.3.1881. Application was extended to South Africa by article 
XVIII. A supplementary convention amending certain of the periods 
prescribed in the original treaty was signed at London on 29.6.1904 
- (1904) 97 BSP 92-93 
Current status In a letter dated 4.7.1979 on JF 9/11/2 
(Switzerland) from the Swiss Embassy in Pretoria it is stated that 
the treaty between Britain and Switzerland of 26.11.1880 is regarded 
as binding between Switzerland and the Republic of South Africa. The 
Swiss government is not interested in negotiating a new extradition 
treaty. 
Practice In the Case of Willi and Gertrude Wezel Switzerland 
requested South Africa to extradite the two to face fraud charges 
involving some 150 000 Swiss francs. A Zurich court had issued a 
warrant for their arrest on 23.9.1960. No further reference to the 
case could however be traced. 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference Government Notice 91/1951 Government Gazette 4584 of 
20.4.1951 
Origin Treaty concluded between the King of England acting for the 
Union of South Africa and the United States of America concluded at 
Washington on 18.12.1947 and ratified at Washington on 1.3.1951. 
Current status On JF 9/11/3 (United States) it is confirmed that 
extradition between the two countries is regulated by this treaty. 
Practice (a) In the Case of Frans Jacob Smit Theron wanted to face 
fraud charges totalling some R300 000, South Africa requested his 
extradition during July 1983 and the United States indicated its 
willingness to extradite. However, various procedural problems have 
bedevilled the process. The procedural problems were in the process 
of being resolved during 1983 but as Theron was facing charges in 
the United States as well, his extradition would have to await 
completion of his sentence there. He was returned to South Africa on 
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26.6.1988. 
(b) In the recent case of Re extradition John Robert Graham, case A 
1500/86 (Transvaal Provincial Division Appeal) 23.10.1986 
(unreported), an application for Graham's extradition to the United 
States was considered. In the Pretoria Magistrate's Court Graham's 
extradition to face theft charges was ordered. The case came before 
the Supreme Court on appeal and Graham was released largely on the 
point that the crime had not been committed within the United States 
as required by both the treaty and the Extradition Act 67 of 1962. 
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URUGUAY 
TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE ORIENTAL REPUBLIC OF URUGUAY 
FOR THE MUTUAL SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE CRIMINALS 
Reference (1883-4) 75 BSP 18-24 
Origin The treaty was concluded between Britain and Uruguay at 
Montevideo on 26.3.1884 and ratified at Montevideo on 13.12.1884. 
Application was extended to South Africa by article X. A protocol 
amending certain periods was signed at Montevideo on 20.3.1891 
(1891-92) 83 BSP 22-23. 
Current status Although a file exists for Uruguay - JF 1/554/20/8 
there is no correspondence on record. The treaty provides in article 
XVI for termination by either party on six months' notice. No record 
of such termination could be traced. It is assumed that the treaty 
is operational. 
Practice None 
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4.2 TREATIES CONCLUDED AFTER THE ATTAINMENT OF REPUBLICAN STATUS 
A number of treaties have been ~oncluded by South Africa after the 
attainment of Republican status in 1961. Only certain of these 
treaties require attention, the continued validity of the remainder 
being above question. These treaties are consequently considered in 
two groupings. First, the treaty relations surrounding the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; and second, treaty relations 
surrounding the so-called TBVC states. 
4.2.1 THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND 
On 19.12.1962 South Africa concluded an extradition treaty with the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Government Gazette 445/1962; 
SATS 9/1962). The territory subsequently split into three separate 
entities : Zambia, Malawi and, initially, Rhodesia. Rhodesia 
subsequently attained independence as Zimbabwe. The question is 
consequently what became of the joint extradition treaty and are 
there extradition agreements with each of these states? 
4.2.2 ZAMBIA When Zambia achieved independence, it decided not to 
conclude a devolution agreement with Britain but that succession 
would be governed by customary international law and that treaties 
were to be regarded as valid until contrary notice was given after 
full examination. In 1966 in the case of In re Jere (Columbia 
District Court 1966 unreported) Zambia in fact relied on the 
Anglo-American extradition treaty in a successful application for 
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the return of Jere to Zambia. It consequently regarded itself as 
having succeeded to at least certain of its earlier extradition 
arrangements. However, Zambia terminated the extradition treaty 
between the Republic of South Africa and the Federation by notice 
(O'Connell (1967.1) 177). Zambia recently enacted a new law 
governing extradition (Chapter 161 Laws of Zambia). As regards this 
leg of the Federation, consequently, no extradition treaty exists. 
4.2.3 MALAWI Malawi maintained the treaty between itself and South 
Africa on independence - see s v Devoy. A new extradition treaty was 
concluded between South Africa and Malawi on 25.2.1972 - SATS 
1/1972. 
4.2.4 SOUTHERN RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE Initially the continued 
application of the treaty between the Federation and South Africa 
was confirmed (notes exchanged on 23.12.1962 - Government Gazette 
1156 of 25.6.1965). However, after attainment of independence as 
Zimbabwe this treaty was terminated as is clear from the Extradition 
(Designated Countries) Order 1990 (SI 133 of 1990) in which a list 
is given of countries with which Zimbabwe has extradition 
arrangements and on which South Africa does not feature. 
The spectre of the Extradition Treaty between South Africa and the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has now finally been laid to 
rest. Of the original parties, South Africa has an extradition 
treaty only with Malawi. 
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4.2.5 THE TBVC-STATES 
Much of South Africa's energy has since 1961 been devoted to 
concluding "international" agreements with the states it has itself 
created. Separate extradition treaties were consequently concluded 
with Transkei (on 2.11.1977 Government Gazette 5813 of 25.11.77); 
Bophuthatswana (on 15.11.1977 GN R375 Government Gazette 5846 of 
30.12.1977); Venda (on 13.8. 1979 Government Gazette 6652 of 
12.9.1979); and Ciskei (on 4.12.1981 Government Gazette 8204 of 
14.5.1982). However, the treaties with Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and 
Venda have been superceded by the Convention on Extradition 
concluded between South Africa and these three states at Pretoria on 
20. 11 • 1986. 
Transkei declined to be part of the Convention but concluded a 
separate extradition treaty with the Republic in 1987 which 
supercedes the above treaty. 
South African extradition treaties concluded with Swaziland (on 
4.9.1968 SATS 2/ 1969); Botswana (on 27.2.1969 SATS 2/1968) and The 
Republic of China (on 30.12.1987) remain in force. 
4.3 MISCELLANEOUS 
There are a number of countries with which one would expect 
extradition arrangements to exist, but which because of their status 
as former British possessions in which extradition was arranged by 
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the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881, do not in fact have such 
arrangements. The following clear responses were determined in this 
regard. 
4 • 3 • 1 AUSTRALIA 
In the Case of William Edward Spencer Lewis (JF 1/554/20/47) the 
South African embassy requested the extradition of Lewis in 1967 to 
face fraud charges, a warrant having been issued in Johannesburg on 
30.9.1964. The Australian authorities replied that as no treaty 
existed between South Africa and Australia, the request for his 
extradition could not be considered. 
On the other hand, in what was arguably the most notorious 
extradition case in South African history, that of Gert Rademeyer 
wanted for defrauding the electricity giant ESCOM of millions, 
extradition was in fact granted. This was, however, done on an ad 
hoc basis. 
4.3.2 BRITAIN 
In a letter from the British Ambassador dated 27.6.1972 (JF 9/11/2) 
it is stated that it is unlikely that Britain "would be anxious to 
move in a favourable direction in respect of extradition at least 
for the foreseeable future" • 
........... ---------------~~ 
\ 
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4.3.3 CANADA 
In JF 9/11/2 (Canada) letters dated 23.5.1973 and 6.6.1973 the 
Canadian authorities made it clear that current Canadian opinion is 
that extradition arrangements with South Africa cannot be 
considered. 
In response to a South African request for the extradition in the 
Case of Thomas Clement usher (JF 1/554/20/49) the Canadian 
authorities declared that no extradition treaty existed between 
Canada and South Africa. In a letter from the Canadian 
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs dated 29.7.1965, it is 
stated that "It would appear ..• that there is no means under Canadian 
law whereby Mr Usher could be returned to South Africa". 
4.3.4 EIRE / REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 
In R v Lewis and Mason PM 115/1/32 South Africa applied to Eire 
for the extradition of Raymond Mason under the Fugitive Offenders 
Act 1881. Eire replied that the Fugitive Offenders Act did not apply 
to it as it clashed with section 50(1) of the Eire Constitution. As 
Eire had no extradition treaty with South Africa they were not 
prepared to extradite. It was suggested in a letter dated 16.5.1949 
that the conclusion of such a treaty be considered. This was 
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confirmed in 1960 when in response to a query from Paul O'Higgins, 
the South African authorities declared that they did not regard the 
Fugitive Offenders Act applicable and that there were no treaties 
operative between the countries (letter dated 23.8.1960). In the 
Case of Lionel Stander alias S Lyons (Marshall Square ROM 282/2/62) 
too, when approached with regard to the existence of an extradition 
treaty, South Africa replied that there was no treaty and no way in 
which he could be extradited. To date no such treaty has been 
concluded. In the meantime, however, the Irish Extradition Act 17 of 
1965 was adopted on 19.7.1965 and came into operation on 16.8.1965, 
and allows for extradition without treaty on the basis of 
reciprocity. 
4.3.5 JAPAN 
In the Case of Hisao Gamo (JF 1/70/27) the Japanese authorities 
stated clearly that "no extradition treaty exists between the 
Republic and Japan ... " - nota verbale 74/70 dated 20.10.1970. 
4.3.6 NEW ZEALAND 
When approached about the conclusion of a bilateral extradition 
treaty with South Africa, the New Zealand authorities stated that 
although they had no objection in principle to such a treaty, it was 
not regarded as a matter of urgency. In a subsequent letter - JF 
9/11/2 (New Zealand) dated 6.7.1976 - the attitude would appear to 
have hardened in that it was stated that there was no practical need 
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for an extradition treaty with South Africa. 
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER V 
1 When the individual consideration of the treaties appearing 
on the Treaty List provided by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs is considered, it may well be that certain of the 
treaties were in fact not succeeded to by South Africa as a 
result of the third state concerned finding succession 
unacceptable. However, as the theoretical basis of this 
"termination" was covered in the previous Chapter, it is not 
again considered here. 
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 in 
Brownlie (1972) 233ff. The convention has been in force 
since British accession in 1980 and although South Africa is 
not a party, it adheres to the principles which are 
generally regarded as a codification of customary public 
international law - see Booysen (1989) 34 n 11. 
3 This problem relates solely to unilateral termination by one 
of the parties as where the parties agree to terminate, or 
the treaty itself provides for termination, there is either 
a new "pactum" or a performance of part of the existing 
"pactum". See too, Nahlik (1971) 746. 
4 McNair (1961) Chapter XXX 493ff. Dhokalia (1969) 195 
states, perhaps somewhat strongly, that "A perpetual treaty 
which contains no provision for its revision or termination 
gives rise to injustices". It is perhaps politic to speak 
of a treaty of indefinite duration rather that one of 
perpetual application. 
5 McNair (1961) 517 cites The Franciska 1855 Spinks 287 : 2 
English Prize Cases 371 at 416. See too the cases cited in 
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Chapter IV where succession to Colonial extradition treaties 
is considered. 
6 See Commentary of the International Law Commission as 
reproduced in Harris (1983) 624. 
7 In the Treaty Convention, a distinction is drawn between 
invalidity and termination. As there is no question 
of the extradition treaties to which the Republic lays claim 
having been concluded in any but a regular manner, the 
question of their being invalid does not arise and will not be 
further considered. Termination and suspension of operation 
are relevant and are considered in what follows. 
8 Article 42(2). See too, Dhokalia (1969) 194 and Nahlik 
(1971) 740. 
9 Article 45(a) and (b) for express and tacit consent 
·respectively. This could possibly be regarded as recognition 
of estoppel by the Convention - see below. 
10 Article 54(a). 
11 Article 54(b). 
12 See eg, the 99 year lease to Britain of the New Territories 
on the Chinese mainland adjacent to Hong Kong due to expire in 
1997 90 BFSP 17. 
13 Plender (1986) 135 lists the European Coal and 
Steel Community Treaty concluded at Paris 18 April 1951 
(1952 AJIL 107 article 97) as an example. 
14 The Franco-Russian Agreement of 19.8.1892 which had the same 
currency as the Treaty of Vienna of 20.5.1882 - see Plender 
(1986) 135 nn 18 and 20. 
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15 This is the case with South African extradition provisions -
see below. 
16 Plender (1986) 137 gives the example of an agreement to 
surrender territory which will terminate once the new 
sovereign has acquired sovereignty. He, however, cautions 
that termination must not be easily assumed as it could 
defeat the intentions of the parties and have far reaching 
effects. 
17 Article 20 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Italy for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Rome 
5.2.1873; ratified at Rome 18.3.1873 : 1873 63 BSP 19-30. 
19-30. 
18 Article 15 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Sweden 
and Norway for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 
signed at Stockholm 26.6.1873; ratified at Stockholm 
28.S.1873 : 1873 63 BSP 175-179. 
19 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and 
Austria/Hungary for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive 
Criminals signed at Vienna 3.12.1873; ratified at Vienna 
10.3.1874 : 1873 63 BSP 213-218. 
20 Article 16 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Hayti for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Port-au-Prince 7.12.1874; ratified at Port-au-Prince 
2.9.1875 : 1874 65 BSP 44-48. 
21 Article 17 of the Treaty between Great Britain and France 
for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Paris 14.8.1876; ratified at Paris 8.4.1878 : 1876 67 BSP 
5-19. 
22 Article 17 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Spain for 
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the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at London 
4.6.1878; ratified at London 21.11.1878 : 1878 69 BSP 
6-13. 
23 Article 16 of the Treaty between Great Britain and the 
Republic of Equator for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive 
Criminals signed at Quinto 20.9.1880; ratified at Quinto 
19.2.1886 : 1881 72 BSP 137-143. 
24 Article 15 of the Treaty between Great Britain and 
Luxembourg for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 
signed at Luxembourg 24.11.1880; ratified at Brussels 
5.1.1881 : 1880 71 BSP 45-53. 
25 Article 19 of the Treaty between Great Britain and 
Switzerland for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 
signed at Berne 26.11.1880; ratified at Berne 15.3.1881 : 
1880 71 BSP 54-62. 
26 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Salvador 
for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Paris 23.6.1881; ratified at London 8.11.1882 : 1881 72 BSP 
13-19. 
27 Article 16 of the Treaty between Great Britain and the 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay for the Mutual Surrender of 
Fugitive Criminals signed at Montevideo 26.3.1884; 
ratified at Montevideo 13.12.1884 : 1883-4 75 BSP 
18-24. 
28 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Guatamala 
for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Guatamala 4.7.1885; ratified at Guatamala 6.9.1886 : 
1884-5 76 BSP 72-77. 
29 Article 21 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Monaco 
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for the Extradition of Criminals signed at Paris 17.12.1891; 
ratified at Paris 17.3.1892 : 1891-2 83 BSP 66-72 
30 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal 
for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Lisbon 17.10.1892; ratified at Lisbon 13.11.1893 : 1892-3 84 
BSP 83-88. 
31 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Liberia 
for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
London 31.1.1892; ratified at London 31.1.1894: 1892-3 84 
BSP 103-109. 
32 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Roumania 
for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Bucharest 21.3.1893; ratified at Bucharest 13.3.1894 : 
1893 85 BSP 69-75. 
33 Article 20 of the Treaty (repalcing the treaty of 19.6.1874 
: see Clarke op cit cxlvii) between Great Britain and the 
Netherlands for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive 
Criminals signed at London 26.9.1898; ratified at 
London 14.12.1898 : 90 BFSP 51-58. 
34 Artile 20 of the Treaty between Great Britain and the 
Republic of San Marino for the Mutual Extradition of 
Fugitive Criminals signed at Florence 16.10.1899; ratified 
at Rome 5.12.1899 : 91 BFSP 95-101. 
35 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and 
Servia/Yugoslavia for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive 
Criminals signed at Belgrade 6.12.1900; ratified at Belgrade 
13.3.1901 : 92 BFSP 41-47. 
36 Article 15 of the Treaty (replacing the treaty of 20.5.1876 
: see Clarke (1888) xlii) between Great Britain and Belgium 
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for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Brussels 29.10.1901; ratified at Brussels 6.12.1901. In 
a convention signed at London on 5.3.1907 and ratified 
on 17.4.1907, the parties made special provisions for 
criminals arrested in the Dominions : 100 BFSP 472-473. 
37 Article 19 of the Extradition Treaty between the United 
Kingdom and Greece concluded at Athens 24.9.1910; ratified 
at Athens 30.12.1911. 
38 Article 17 of the Extradition Treaty between the United 
Kingdom and Siam concluded at Bankok 4.3.1911; ratified at 
London 1.8.1911. 
39 Article 18 of the Extradition Treaty concluded between the 
governments of the Republic of South Arf ica and the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 19.11.1962 
Government Gazette 445/1962; BATS 9/1962. 
40 Article 25 of the Extradition treaty between the governments 
of the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland 
concluded on 4.9.1968; BATS 2/1969. 
41 Article 25 of the Treaty of Extradition concluded between 
the governments of the Republic of South Africa and Botswana 
on 27.2.1969; BATS 2/1969. 
42 Article 26 of the Treaty of Extradition between the 
governments of the Republic of South Africa and Malawi on 
25.2.1972; SATS 1/1972. 
43 Article 24 of the Extradition Treaty concluded between the 
governments of the Republic of South Africa and Transkei on 
2.11.1977 - Government Gazette 5813 of 25.11.1977. This 
treaty has been superceded by the Extradition Convention 
concluded between the governemnts of the Republic of South 
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Africa and Transkei of 1987. 
44 Article 24 of the Extradition Treaty between the governments 
of the Republic of South Africa and Bophuthatswana concluded 
on 15.11.1977 - GN R375 Government Gazette 5846 of 
30.12.1977. This treaty has been superseded by the 
Convention on Extradition concluded between the Republic of 
South Africa and the governments of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei 
and Venda on 20.11.1986. 
45 Article 24 of the Extradition treaty between the governments 
of the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Venda 
concluded on 13.8.1979 - Government Gazette 6652 of 
12.9.1979. This treaty has also been superseded by the 
Extradition Convention n 45 above. 
46 Article 24 of the Extradition treaty between the governments 
of the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of Ciskei 
concluded on 4.12.1981 - Government Gazette 8204 of 
14.5.1982. This treaty has also been superseded by the 
Extradition Convention above. 
47 Article 32 of the Convention on Extradition concluded between 
the governments of the Republic of South Africa, the 
Republic of Bophuthatswa, the Republic of Ciskei and the 
Republic of Venda at Pretoria on 20.11.1986 - Government 
Gazette 7/1988 of 5.2.1988 (Venda). 
48 Article 23 of the Treaty of extradition between the governemnts 
of the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of China 
concluded at Taipei 30.12.1987 - Proc 83 Government Gazette 
11316 24.5.1988. 
49 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Mexico 
for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Mexico 7.9.1884; ratified at Mexico 22.1.1889 : 1885-6 77 
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BSP 1253-1258. 
50 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Colombia 
for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Bogota 27.10.1888; ratified at Bogota 21.8.1889. 
51 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and the 
Argentine Republic for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive 
Criminals signed at Beunos Aires 22.5.1889; ratified at 
Beunos Aires 15.12.1893 : 1889-90 81 BSP 1305-1311. 
52 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Bolivia 
for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Lima 22.2.1892; ratified at Lima 7.3.1898 : 1896 88 BSP 
27-33. 
53 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Chile for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Santiago 26.1.1897; ratified at Santiago 14.4.1898 : 89 BFSP 
20-25. 
54 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Peru for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Lima 
26.1.1904; ratified at Lima 30.11.1906 : 99 BFSP 
963-968. 
55 Article 18 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Cuba for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at Havana 
3.10.1904; ratified at Havana 10.1.1905 : 1904 97 BFSP 
26-31. 
56 Article 16 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Nicaragua 
for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Managua 19.4.1905; ratified at London 13.2.1906. 
57 Article 19 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Panama 
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for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Panama 25.8.1906; ratified at Panama 15.4.1907. 
58 Article 20 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Paraguay 
for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals signed at 
Asuncion 12.9.1908; ratified at Asuncion 30.1.1911 : 
102 BFSP 340-345. 
59 Treaty between Finland and the United Kingdom for the 
Extradition of Criminals concluded at London on 24.5.1924. 
Acceded to by the Union of South Africa by article V GN 1677 
29.9.1925, Government Gazette 2.10.1925; 1925 LNTS 80-91. 
60 Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals between the United 
Kingdom and Czechoslovakia concluded as London 24.11.1924. 
Acceded to by the Union of South Africa by article VI GN 26 
of 6.1.1928, Government Gazette 6.1.1928; 1927 LNTS 270-279. 
61 Treaty between the Union of South Africa and the United 
States of America for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive 
Criminals concluded at Washington on 18.12.1947, ratified at 
Washington 1.3.1951; GN 91/1951, Government Gazette 4584 
20.4.1951. 
62 Extradition Treaty between the Union of South Africa and the 
State of Israel concluded at Pretoria on 18.9.1959, ratified 
at Pretoria 7.1.1960. Proclamation R14/1960, Government 
Gazette 6362 of 5.2.1960. 
63 See n 47 above. 
64 See the examples cited in Chapter II, eg, article 16 of the 
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on 
Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention) 704 UNTS 219 which, while 
not providing for compulsory extradition, facilitates the 
process; and article 7 of the Convention for the Suppression 
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of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention) 860 
UNTS I- 12325, which provides for either extradition or 
municipal punishment. 
65 Article 59(1)(a). 
66 Article 59(1)(b). 
67 Plender (1986) 153. 
68 Plender (1986) 153 shows that in essence there is no 
difference between consent as provided for in article 54(b) 
and the intention of the parties in this case. He however 
indicates that the International Law Commission felt that 
this instance - although a manifestation of consent -
required special regulation. See his discussion of Electric 
Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Preliminary Objections) PCIJ 
Ser A/B No 77 (1939) and the domestic case Attorney-General 
v Burgoa 1980 ECR 2787. 
69 See n 27 above. The treaty provides that after the entry into 
force of the treaty, the treaty concluded between the High 
Contracting Parties on 31.3.1874 shall be considered as 
cancelled, save for any proceedings which might already have 
taken place or commenced under that treaty. 
70. Seen 61 above. This treaty offers a variation in that it 
provides for the termination of a single article (article 10 
of the treaty of 9.8.1842) rather than of the treaty as a 
whole. 
71 The classic example from the South African perspective must 
be the replacement of the individual extradition treaties 
with Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda by the Multilateral 
Extradition Convention concluded between South Africa and 
these states. 
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72 Plender (1986) 157ff discusses the distinction between 
termination resulting from any breach of the treaty which 
was earlier regarded as sufficient, and the modern-day 
requirement that the breach should be material. 
73 See Filartiga v Pena Irala 1980 ILM 966 where the court 
pointed out with regard to the prohibition on torture, that 
a time comes when the call to non-interference in domestic 
affairs will no longer be heeded. The history of 
international actions against apartheid is even more 
extensive than that cited by the court in this case to 
support the customary international prohibition on torture. 
For a discussion of this judgment see Botha (1980) at 150 
ff. 
74 Not all of South Africa's extradition treaties fall within 
this classification - clearly those with the TBVC sates 
themselves and the Extradition Convention between South 
Af~ica, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda are excluded. 
75 Article 29. 
76 Article 1 of the Treaty between Great Britain and Panama for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals : signed at 
Panama City 25.8.1906, ratified at Panama City 15.4.1907. 
77 Article 1 of the Extradition Agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland signed at Mbabane 
5.9.1968. 
78 See the discussion of Cur Corp v Trust Bank of Africa 1986 3 
All ER 458 (CA) in Chapter IV. 
79 Booysen (1989) 263. 
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80 O'Connell (1967.1) 365-6. 
81 SS Wimbledon PCIJ Ser A no 1 163. See too, Schwartzenberger 
(1965) at 191. 
82 See Chapter IV above. 
83 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 1971 ICJ 
Reports. 
84 At 46. 
85 The term "precedent" is used here loosely and in full 
knowledge that the decisions of the court bind only the 
parties concerned and only as to the specific issue 
involved. The judgment does however indicate international 
perceptions of South Africa's policies and how these are 
likely to be interpreted by international tribunals 
generally. 
86 Considerable attention is paid to the history and 
development of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine by 
Vamvoulos (1985) Part I. See too, David (1975) and 
Lissitzyn (1967) 895. However, as for reasons given below 
I do not regard this as a valid ground for the termination 
of South African extradition treaties, the theoretical 
aspects will not be considered in any detail. 
87 Vamvoukos (1985) 28-30;' Briggs (1974) 65; and Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland) case 1973 ICJ Rep 
par 36 where article 62 is described as a codification of 
customary public international law. 
88 International Status of South West Africa (Advisory Opinion) 
1950 ICJ Rep 212-214. 
i 
' 
89 
90 
91 
547 
Booysen (1989) 34 n 11. 
Vamvoukos (1985) 151. 
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95 Vamvoukos (1985) 170. 
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seen. Identification of ius cogens was considerably less 
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110 Shearer (1971) 43-5; McNair (1961) 698. In the 1801 
case of The Frau Ilsbe 4 C Rob 64, for example, war 
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case of The Le Louis 1817 2 Dods 210 at 258, it is 
stated that :Treaties ... are perishable things, and 
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896ff. 
126 Vamvoukos (1985) 263 citing 1966 YILC II 237. 
127 See for example, Steyn (1981) 27ff and Du Plessis 
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128 See for example, R v Detody 1926 AD 168. 
129 See for example, R v Nteto 1940 EDL 304; R v Gasmedi 
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suited to extradition as a whole. Extradition invariably 
involves a discretion on the part of the extraditing state with 
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existence of an extradition treaty, it will not be able to be 
compelled to extradite the person sought. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
Before deciding what direction extradition will take in the future, 
it is essential to understand the process both in its historical and 
in its current perspectives. With the Republic of South Africa 
poised on the threshold of far reaching and fundamental change, the 
necessity to stop and take stock of our situation has perhaps never 
been more pressing. For the past three decades, the country has 
experienced ever increasing isolation from the mainstream of public 
international law. Inevitably, this has coloured perceptions of and 
approaches to contact with other states and to public international 
law in general. South Africa's approach to public international law 
has often been both defensive and restrictive. However, the dawning 
of the "new" South Africa will undoubtedly bring with it the dawning 
of a new and more open approach to interstate relations and public 
international law. 
We have seen that where the return of a convicted or suspected 
criminal who has fled to some other state is sought, there is no 
viable alternative to the process of extradition. Although most 
states, and as was shown this includes South Africa, have attempted 
to side-step extradition through kidnapping, deportation and various 
other mechanisms, this has not proved juridically satisfactory. One 
cannot but acknowledge that on the human rights front South Africa's 
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track record is far from exemplary. As we approach a new 
dispensation it is to be expected - in fact it is axiomatic - that 
human rights will play a pivotal role in the new South African 
society. It is consequently particularly gratifying that the 
decision ins v Ebrahim (1) has firmly established a sound moral 
base for the return of fugitives. South Africa, in rejecting the 
male captus bene detentus doctrine and demanding that the state 
approach the court with clean hands, has effectively excluded one of 
the major "alternatives" to extradition and confirmed extradition's 
continuing role in the country's international relations. 
Within an historical perspective, South African society can, through 
its various phases, be seen as a microcosm of the broader 
extradition trends which flowed through Europe during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. As part of the British Empire, South 
Africa was, before independence, party to extradition arrangements 
with those states with which Britain had such agreements. When the 
country officially severed its Colonial ties in 1961, it carried 
with it treaties with all the major nations of the world. However, 
practice and perceptions of extradition within South Africa were 
essentially Anglocentric with a relatively restrictive approach to 
extradition. 
As was shown, the basis for extradition within Britain - and 
consequently the basis which South African practice applied at 
independence - was that extradition takes place only in the presence 
of a treaty commitment to extradite. South Africa, recognising the 
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restrictive nature of such an approach, was quick to ring in the 
changes. Within a year of becoming a Republic, the legislature 
enacted the South African Extradition Act 1962.(2) 
In terms of section 3(2) of this Act the exclusively treaty basis 
upon which extradition was granted under British influence was 
broadened to allow for extradition in the absence of a treaty. An 
analysis of this section shows that the basis upon which it rests is 
comity.(3) This has not always been recognised by the authorities 
with the result that confusion has arisen between extradition in 
terms of section 3(2) of the Extradition Act and extradition based 
on reciprocity. This confusion is based largely on a misconception 
of the true nature of reciprocity within the extradition context.(4) 
If reciprocity is seen for what it is - a treaty commitment 
undertaken by an informal procedure - it will be realised that the 
unwarrantedly restrictive interpretation placed on reciprocity by 
the South African authorities and the concomitant reluctance to 
extradite on this basis, is unrealistic. It is an attitude which may 
be attributed partly to a hangover from the stark British "bilateral 
treaty or nothing" approach, and partly to the South African 
international law psychosis where, faced with isolation, the country 
wished at all costs to be seen to be conducting international 
relations on a formalised basis and demanded official bilateral 
treaty commitments which would not only serve as a measure of 
international recognition, but also facilitate proof in case of 
attack. 
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It is submitted that the need for such extreme caution has fallen 
away. With South Africa becoming daily more internationally 
acceptable, a less formalised process of cooperation may be adopted. 
The South African Extradition Act, one of the best conceived pieces 
of legislation on our Statute Books, allows for extradition based on 
treaty - which should be seen to include reciprocity - and comity. 
The time is now ripe for the authorities to apply these provisions 
realistically. 
It was seen that the acquisition of treaty rights should be 
approached on two levels : original and derivative acquisition. 
South Africa has at various stages "acquired" extradition rights and 
duties through both methods. While original acquisition presents few 
problems, within the extradition context derivative acquisition 
raises the spectre of state succession to bilateral treaties. State 
succession is one of the least understood and most often 
misconstrued structures in public international law. To explain 
succession to extradition treaties - particularly succession through 
devolution agreements which represent the majority of South Africa's 
treaty commitments - a two-pronged approach based on Mervyn Jones's 
distinction between "succession in fact" and "succession in law" (5} 
is advocated. However, this distinction is of little practical 
significance if due consideration is not given to the role of 
consent in succession to treaties. Too often a party's consent to 
succession is mistaken for consent to the conclusion of a new 
treaty. This may lead to considerable problems in a system like the 
South African where treaties depend on transformation for municipal 
555 
/ 
application. Indeed, within the extradition context in South Africa 
a misapprehension of the role of consent has led to confusion both 
on the part of state organs responsible for extradition and in the 
courts.CG) 
Within the context of succession, consent should be seen as a 
catalyst. First, the third party to the treaty to which it i~ hoped 
to succeed must consent to the "succession in fact". In other words 
it must acknowledge that a factual change has occurred - a new state 
has been created, for example. This consent opens the way for 
"succession in law". Succession in law is set in motion when the 
third party consents to the process of succession taking place 
consent is here merely evidence of the intention of the "third 
party" concerned that a treaty existing between itself and another 
state will now operate between itself and a different state. The 
process is completed once the principles of succession governing the 
relevant succession in fact have been applied between the parties. 
Before evaluating the current status of the right or duty to 
extradite in South African law, it was necessary to examine how 
treaty rights and duties can be lost. Here it was determined that 
once acquired, treaty rights and duties are not easily shed. The 
general trend would appear to be that failing an express 
denunciation, acquired treaty rights and duties will in cases of 
doubt be regarded as having been suspended rather than terminated. 
The advantage in such an approach is of course that these rights and 
duties may be revived with the minimum of formalities. 
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As regards South Africa's right or duty either to extradite or to 
demand extradition the current position may be summarised as 
follows, based on the print out of treaties in force received from 
the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
Treaties with the following countries must be regarded as operative: 
Argentina; Austria; Belgium; Bophuthatswana; Botswana; Chile; 
Ciskei; Colombia; Finland; France; Guatemala; Israel; Italy; (7) 
Luxembourg; Malawi; Monaco; Netherlands; Paraguay; Portugal; 
Republic of China; San Marino; Siam (Thailand); Spain; Swaziland; 
Switzerland; Transkei; United States of America; Uruguay; Venda. 
Treaties with the following countries must be regarded as having 
been suspended : 
Hungary; (8) Bolivia; Cuba; Czechoslovakia; Equator. (Equador); Hayti 
(Haiti); Liberia; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Peru; Roumania; El 
Salvador. 
Treaties with the following countries must be regarded as having 
been terminated : 
Brazil; Denmark; Germany; Greece; Servia; (9) Sweden; Norway; 
Zambia; (10) Zimbabwe. (11) 
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This, then, is the current state of the right or duty to extradite 
within South African society. Where, however, are we going? Viewing 
the international scene over the past year or so, even the most sage 
of pundits must blanche slightly. Not only have changes occurred 
within South Africa which two years ago would have been unthinkable, 
but the entire international community as it was known is in a 
process of flux. Communism has disappeared as an official policy and 
with it the Soviet Union has literally come apart at the seams~ 
"New" states are emerging at a rate never before experienced in 
international law. How these changes will eventually effect public 
international law as we know it today is at this stage uncertain. 
What is certain, however, is that for South Africa the doors of the 
international community which have steadily been closing over the 
past few decades are opening fast. Will this have any effect on 
South Africa's extradition commitments as identified and discussed 
in the preceding chapters of this work? 
The answer must surely be in the affirmative. First, in assessing 
the extradition treaties to which South Africa claims to have 
succeeded, many were regarded as having been suspended owing to the 
foreign states' negative attitude towards the Republic. This no 
longer necessarily holds true. Within the p~st three months it has 
been announced that South Africa has restored diplomatic relations 
with Czechoslovakia,(12) and established diplomatic relations with 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.C13) Ties have been established with 
Poland (14) and Finland, (15) while Japan and South Africa are also 
to establish full diplomatic relations.(16) Closer to home it was 
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announced that South Africa and Angola are to have "formal 
relations" for the first time in seventeen years;C17) while Namibia 
too is to establish formal links with the Republic.(18) 
These developments hold the potential that where extradition 
arrangements were merely suspended, for example in the case of 
Czechoslovakia, they may now be reactivated with minimum formality. 
The assessment of the current status of extradition treaties should 
consequently be read against the ever changing tapestry of the "new" 
Europe. 
Since the abandonment by South Africa of the apartheid policy, doors 
in Africa have also been opening. Although at present contacts are 
largely trade-based, as the country moves towards an acceptable 
ideological basis, so too will other fields, including extradition, 
move into the spotlight. Tentative suggestions of a return to the 
Commonwealth have already been heard and although it is far from 
certain that South Africa would wish to rejoin that organisation, 
one thinks immediately of the Commonwealth Extradition Scheme to 
which the country would then presumably subscribe. At this stage, 
however, these matters are purely speculative and only time can tell 
how and indeed if, they will evolve. 
One thing is certain, whether one is in a "new" South Africa or a 
"new" Europe, one will still be faced with "old" criminals. The 
players may change their names and ideological orientation, the 
highwayman of the seventeenth century may have made way for the 
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hi-tech computer thief of today, but the basic need for the return 
of a criminal to answer for his crimes remains. As long as man is 
man, the need for extradition will exist. As long as states are 
states the need to regulate the return of criminals - both in the 
interests of the criminal as a human being with certain inalienable 
rights, and in the interest of his state - will exist. The 
extradition process within South Africa is well developed and holds 
the potential for being one of the most extensive and well regulated 
systems within the international community of states'-
It is all in place, let us use it correctly, effectively, but above 
all, with humanity in reognition of the inalienable right of every 
man - criminal included - to due process of the law. 
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IV and the text accompanying nn 148-152. 
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given. 
The case of Alain Malo 1976 JF 9/11/2 (France) 
The case of Bangile Hontoti 1982 case no 1495/82 East London 
Magistrate's Court 21.9.1982 JF 9/11/3-1 (Transkei) 
The case of Frans Jacob Smit Theron 1983 JF 9/11/3 (USA) 
The case of Franz Josef Johannes Esser Case no 8/1356/81 
(Johannesburg Magistrate's Court 27.1.1982)(Germany) 
The case of Franz Josef Kraul Case no 08/00784/817 (Johannesburg 
Magistrate's Court 17.6.1981 (Germany) 
The case of Franz Podezin 1974 JF 9/11/3 (Germany) 
The case of Hans Dieter Gebhardt 1980 JF 9/11/3 (Germany) 
The case of Lionel Stander alias S Lyons Marshall Square Rom 
282/2/62 (Eire) 
The case of Nkosinathi Sikhondo 1983 JF 9/11/3-1 (Transkei) 
The case of Hisquail Nail Ezra Sasson 1961 JF 1/554/20/2 
(Argentina) 
In re Jere Columbia District Court 1966 
Lewis v Mason PM 115/1/32 (Eire) 
The case of Hisao Gama JF 1/70/27/CB (Japan) 
The case of Mannie Becker 1982 JF 9/11/3 (Israel) 
The case of Mario Guassardo 1964 Marshall Square Rom 143/4/62 JF 
1/554/20/4 
The case of M Kausana JF 1/13/22/3 (Portugal) 
Re Extradition John Robert Graham Case no A 1500/86 (TPD) 
23.10.1986 (United States of America) 
The case of Robert Escalier (alias Evan Francis) 1968 JF 
1/554/20/37 (Sweden) 
The case of Thomas Clement Usher 1965 jf 1/554/20/49 (Canada) 
The case of Vasilos Kambouris 1963 JF 9/11/2 (Greece) 
The case of Willi and Gertrude Wezel 1960 JF 9/11/2 (United 
States of America) 
The case of William Edward Spencer Lewis 1964 JF 1/554/20/47 
(Australia) 
3 TABLE OF TREATIES 
3.1 Extradition treaties 
3.1.1 Multilateral extradition treaties 
1889 Montevideo Convention (1889) 
1902 Mexico Convention (1902) 
1911 Bolivarian Convention (1911) 
1928 Bustamante Code (1928) 
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1933 Second Montevideo Convention (1933) 
1952 Arab League Extradition Agreement of 14.9.1952 
1957 European Convention on Extradition 11.12.1957 359 UNTS 273 
1961 Organisation Communale Africaine et Malgache Convention of 
1961 
1962 Nordic States Scheme of 1962; 
1962 Benelux Extradition Convention of 27.6.1962 
1966 Scheme relating to the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders 
within the Commonwealth of 1966; 
1968 Convention for the Suppression of Crimes upon Aircraft in 
Flight 1968 
1988 Convention on Extradition entered into between the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and the 
Governments of the Republics of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and 
Venda 1988 
3.1.2 Bilateral 
1872 Treaty between Great Britain and Germany for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1872 
1873 Treaty between Great Britain and Brazil for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1873 
Treaty between Great Britain and Italy for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1873 
Treaty between Great Britain and Denmark for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1873 
Treaty between Great Britain and Sweden and Norway for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1873 
Treaty between Great Britain and Austria/Hungary for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1873 
1874 Treaty between Great Britain and Hayti for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1874 
1876 Treaty between Great Britain and France for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1876 
1878 Treaty between Great Britain and Spain for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1878 
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1880 Treaty between Great Britain and the Republic of Equator 
for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1880 
Treaty between Great Britain and Luxemburg for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1880 
Treaty between Great Britain and Switzerland for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1880 
1881 Treaty between Great Britain and Salvador for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1881 
1884 Treaty between Great· Britain and the Continental Republic 
of Uruguay for the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 
1884 
Treaty between Great Britain and Mexico for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1884 
1885 Treaty between Great Britain and Guatamala for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1885 
1888 Treaty between Great Britain and Colombia for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1888 
1889 Treaty between Great Britain and the Argentine Republic for 
the Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1889 
,1891 Treaty between Great Britain and Monaco for the Extradition 
of Criminals 1891 
1892 Treaty between Great Britain and Bolivia for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1892 
Treaty between Great Britain and Portugal for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1892 
Treaty between Great Britain and Liberia for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1892 
1893 Treaty between Great Britain and Roumania for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1893 
1897 Treaty between Great Britain and Chile for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1897 
Traktaat voor de Wederkeerige Uitlevering van 
Voortvluchtige Misdagigers van uit Natal en van uit de 
Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek 1897 
1898 Treaty between Great Britain and the Netherlands for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1898 
1899 Treaty between Great Britain and the Republic of San Marino 
- J 
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for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitive Criminals 1899 
1900 Treaty between Great Britain and Servia/Yugoslavia for the 
Mutual Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1900 
1901 Treaty between Great Britain and Belgium for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1901 
1904 Treaty between Great Britain and Peru for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1904 
Treaty between Great Britain and Cuba for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1904 
1905 Treaty between Great Britain and Nicaragua for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1905 
1906 Treaty between Great Britain and Panama for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1906 
1908 Treaty between Great Britain and Paraguay for the Mutual 
Surrender of Fugitive Criminals 1908 
1910 Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom and Greece 
1910 
1911 Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom and Siam 1911 
1924 Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals between the United 
Kingdom and Czechoslovakia 1924 
Treaty between Finland and the United Kingdom for the 
Extradition of Criminals 1924. 
1932 Convention between the United Kingdom, Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa and India and Portugal supplementary 
to the Extradition Treaty of 1892 of 1932 
1947 Extradition Treaty between the Union of South Africa and 
the United States of America 1947 
1959 Extradition Treaty between the Union of South Africa and 
the State of Israel 1959 
1962 Extradition Treaty between the Republic of South Africa and 
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1962 
1968 Extradition Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Kingdom 
of Swaziland 1968 
1969 Extradition Treaty between the Republic of South Africa and 
the Republic of Botswana 1969 
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1972 Extradition Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Malawi and the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa 1972 
1976 Extradition Treaty (Amendment to the 1957 treaty above) 
between the Republic of South Africa and Israel 1976 
1977 Extradition Treaty between the Republic of South Africa and 
Transkei 1977 
Extradition Treaty betwen the Republic of South Africa and 
Bophuthatswana 1977 
1979 Extradition Treaty between the Republic of South Africa and 
Venda 1979 
1981 Extradition treaty between the Republic of South Africa and 
Ciskei 1981 
1987 Agreement of Extradition between the Government of the 
Republic of Transkei and the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa 1987 
Extradition Treaty between the Republic of South Africa and 
the Republic of China 1987 
3.2 OTHER TREATIES 
1579 Treaty of Utrecht 1579 
1794 Jay Treaty 1794 
1802 Treaty of Amiens 1802 
1806 Articles of Capitulation Britain/Netherlands 1806 
1835 Congella Agreement Dingaan/Gardner 1835 
1842 Webster/Ashburton Treaty 1842 
1852 Sand River Convention 1852 
1854 Bloemfontein Convention 1854 
1858 Convention of Aliwal North 1858 
1864 Geneva Convention for the Treatment of Soldiers Wounded in 
the Field 1864 
1866 Peace Treaty of Thaba Bosigo 1866 
1869 Second Convention of Aliwal North 1869 
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1875 Treaty of Friendship and Commerce (SA Republic /Portugal) 
1875 
1876 Treaty of Friendship and Commerce (SA Republic I Belgium) 
1876 
1879 Treaty of Friendship (Britain /Tonga) 1879 
1881 Pretoria Convention 1881 
1884 London Convention 1884 
1886 Copyright Convention 1886 
1891 Vienna World Postal Convention 1891 
1892 Franco-Russian Agreement 1892 
1896 Belgian Treaty for the Suppression of Slave Trade 1896 
1902 Treaty of Vereeniging 1902 
1910 White Slave Traffic Convention 1910 
1912 Radio Telegraphic Convention 1912 
1919 Treaty of Versailles 1919 
Covenant of the League of Nations 1919 
1921 Supplementary White Slave Traffic Convention 1921 
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928 
1929 International Convention for the Suppression of 
Counterfeiting Currency 1929 
1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 
1933 
1936 International Convention for the Suppression of Illicit 
Trafic in Drugs 1936 
1945 Charter of the United Nations 1945 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty 1951 
1963 Convention on Offences and certain other acts Committed on 
Board Aircraft in Flight 1963 (Tokyo Convention) 
1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees Convention 1967 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
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1970 Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft 16.12.1970 (Hague Convention) 
1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
Civil Aviation 23.9.1971 (Montreal Convention) 
1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in respect of 
Treaties 1978 
Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in respect of 
State Property, Archives and Debts 1978 
1984 Nkomati Accord (South Africa/Mocambique) 16.3.1984 
4. TABLE OF STATUTES 
4.1 South African statutes 
Transvaal 
Wet 5 I 1871 Tot uitlevering van Misdadigers 
Wet I 1873 Voor de Inhechtenisneming en Uitlevering van 
Misdadigers 
Wet 2 I 1881 Tot gemakkelijk maken van het arresteren van zekere 
Misdadigers van die een plaats in het Grondgebied of de 
streken van den Oranje Vrijstaat naar deze Provincie 
ontsnappen 
Wet 14 I 1886 Tot uitlevering van Misdadigers aan de Kolonie de 
Kaap de Goede Hoop 
Wet 9 I 1887 Regelende de algemeene voorwaarden waarop, ten 
aanzien van uitlevering van misdadigers, vrerdragen met 
vreemde Staten of Kolonien kunnen worden gesloten 
Cape 
Plakkaat 24.12.1795 (Cape) 
Pree 1.3.1803 Kaapse Plakkaatboek Vol VI 1803-6 
Cape Proclamation of 12.12.1841 
Cape Proclamation of 2.12.1842 
Cape Proclamation of 21.8.1845 
Cape Proclamation of 15.4.1852 
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Natal 
Natal Law 6 of 1892 
Union and Republic 
1934 Status of the Union Act 69 of 1934 
Royal Functions and Seals Act 70 of 1934 
1948 Treaties of Peace Act 20 of 1948 
1949 Prohibition of Mixed Mariages Act 35 of 1949 
1950 Internal Security Act 44 of 1950 
1957 Immorality Act 23 of 1957 
1961 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961 
1962 Extradition Act 67 of 1962 
1966 Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 
1972 Civil Aviation Offences Act 10 of 1972 
1974 Civil Aviation Offences Amendment Act 29 of 1974 
1976 Status of Transkei Act 100 of 1976 
1977 Status of Bophuthatswana Act 89 of 1977 
1979 Status of Venda Act 107 of 1979 
1981 Status of Ciskei Act 110 of 1981 
1983 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983 
4.2 Foreign statutes 
1858 Caley Tariff Act 1858 22 Viet c 76 (Canada) 
1847 Fugitive Offenders Act 1847 6 & 7 Viet c 34 (Britain) 
1865 Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 28 & 29 Viet c 63 (Britain) 
1881 Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 44 & 45 Viet c 69 (Britain) 
1887 Fugitive Offenders Act 1887 (Canada) 
1892 Federal Law of 22.1.1892 (Switzerland) 
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1909 South Africa Act 1909 9 Edw & c 9 (Britain) 
1931 Statute of Westminster 1931 22 Geo V c 4 (Britain) 
1963 Fugitive Offenders Act 1963 (Britain) 
1965 Extradition Act 17 of 1965 (Eire) 
1966 Extradition (Foreign States) Act 1966 (Australia) 
1970 Decree Law 66.689 of 11.6.1970 (Brazil) 
1971 Hi-Jacking Act (Britain) 1971 c 70 
1974 Extradition (Foreign States) Act 1974 (Australia) 
Statutory Rules 130/1974 under Extradition Act (Foreign 
States) 1974 (Australia) 
1975 Extradition Act 39 of 1975 (Norway) 
1990 Extradition (Designated Countries) Order 1990 (Zimbabwe) 
Statutory Instrument 133 of 1990 (Zimbabwe) 
Chap 61 Laws of Zambia 
5 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE : REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA :OFFICIAL 
FILES ON EXTRADITION 
JF 1/554/20/4 (Brazil) 
Letter dd 23.7.1964 
Letter no 42/37 dd 19.8.1964 
JF 9/11/2 (Britain) 
Letter dd 27.6.1972 
JF 1/554/20/49 (Canada) 
Communication Canadian Under Secretary for State 
Affairs dd 29.7.1965 
JF 9/11/2 (Canada) 
Letter dd 23.5.1973 
Letter dd 6.6.1973 
JF 1/554/20/21 (Denmark) 
JF 1/554/20/13 (France) 
Letter French Ministry of Foreign Affairs dd 15.7.1968 Letter dd 
11.5.1967 
JF 9/11/2 (Republic of Ireland) 
Letter dd 16.5.1949 
JF 9/11/3 (Israel) 
Letter dd 22.1.1983 Director-General Foreign Affairs 
and Information 
JF 1/70/27 (Japan) 
Nota verbale 74/70 dd 20.10.1970 
JF 1/554/20 (Miscellaneous) 
Letter dd 3.6.1963 - Basutoland 
Note 295 of 29.5.1964 
JF 1/554/20/48 (New Zealand) 
JF 9/11/2 (New Zealand) 
Letter dd 6.7.1976 
JF 9/11/2 (Norway) 
JF 9/11/2 (Oostenryk) 
Letter dd 15.12.1976 
JF 9/11/2 (Portugal) 
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JF 1/554/20/46 (Rhodesia & Nyasaland) 
Note Lusaka Assistant Commissioner CID dd 15.8.1964 
JF 9/11/2 (Switzerland) 
Letter dd 4.7.79 
JF 9/1T/3-1 (Transkei) 
JF 9/11/3 (United States of America) 
6 MEDIA REPORTS 
6. 1 Newspapers 
In chronological order of appearance. 
Zimbabwe Sunday Mail 2.6.1985 
Graham's Town Journal April June 1837 
THE PRETORIA NEWS 
18.2.1985 "Escom fugitive a 'victim of politics'" at 1 
20.5.1985 "Extradition hearing starts" at 1 
20.7.1985 "Dutch dilemma over de Jonge" at 1 
26.7.1985 "Rademeyer to be extradited to face music" at 3 
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19.7.1986 "The long wait continues 
de Jonge" at 9 
A day in the life of Klaas 
10.7.1987 "De Jonge nine days to go" at 3 
"Dakar Call for Trial of Apartheid" at 1 
1.6.1989 "SA asks Swiss for Shefer extradition" at 2 
9.5.1990 "SA prepared to, consider extradition" at 4 
14.11.1990 "Botha forging SA links with Europe" at 2 
4.6.1991 "Extradition negotiations" at 2 
8.8.1991 "World court set to hear R100-m Transkei lawsuit" at 4 
29.10.1991 "Formal ties between SA and Angola" at 3 
30.10.1991 "Namibia to establish formal SA link" at 3 
6.11.1991 "Stander gangster returns : UK deports Allan Heyl 
Now he faces SA justice" 
"SA ready to help Lithuania - Botha" at 3 
9.12.1991 "Diplomatic relations : SA, Poland sign pact" at 4 
BEELD ·· 
19.2.1985 "SA in delikate gesprekke oor Rademeyer" at 1 
3.6.1985 "Zimbabwe gee egpaar dalk terug" at 4 
26.7.1985 "Evkom man aan SA uitgelwer" 
27.7.1985 "Platsak, alleen, uitgelewer" at 1 
31.7.1985 "Dr Gert alleen met tassie in hof" 
3.9.1985 "Regslui besluit oor de Jonge" at 5 
1.9.1987 "Amerika seek sakeman in SA" at 1 
27.6.1988 "Borgtog vir Vloog kort na sy tuiskoms" at 6 
7.11.1991 "SA en drie Baltiese state knoop betrekkinge aan" at 4 
RAND DAILY MAIL 
19.7.1983 "Theron to be Extradited" 
21. 7 .1983 "SA exile arrested in us" 
19.2.1985 "No agreement yet to extradite Rademeyer" at 1 
SUNDAY STAR 
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28.7.1985 "De Jonge linked to Pretoria blast" at 1-2 
"Rademeyer flies in to police hands" at 1-2 
SUNDAY TIMES 
28.7.1985 "Escom man returns to face trial" 
18.8.1985 "SA drugs lawyer extradited" at 1 
abduction 18-22 
definition 19 
SUBJECT INDEX 
comparison with extradition 19 
South African practice 20-22 
United States' practice 19 
accession 322 
in terms of Vienna Convention 276, 306 
act of state 5 
annexation 293, 294-298, 333, 342 
definition 294 
effect on treaties 296, 334, 339-40, 334-5 
current validity 295 
assignment of treaty rights 301 
associated state 3, 177-8 
asylum 11-18, 75 
compared to extradition 13 
diplomatic/extraterritorial 15 
humanitarian 11 
political 11 
territorial 12 
backing of warrants 66, 168, 175 
South African practice 176-178 
bail 3 
breach of treaty 
as ground for termination 449-454 
South African domestic policy as 450 
cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex 473 
cession 78, 293, 294-298, 336 
definition 294 
effect on treaties 296, 332-3 
..... 
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change in government 
effect on international obligations 332, 346, 347-348 
clean slate 282, 283, 319-321,335 
advantages 282 
disadvantages 282 
colony 
treaty-making capacity 60, 106-112 
duty of mother state towards 89 
extension of British treaties to 61-65 
comity 188-194 
basis 189 
s3(2) Act 67/1962 191 
custom 
as basis for extradition 208-210 
death penalty 220 
limitation to extradition 220 
provision in treaties 224-225 
de facto extradition - see deportation 
deportation 
comparison with exclusion 24 
comparison with extradition 24 
South African practice 28 
desuetude 
application to extradition 472 
compared to obsoleteness 470 
definition 469 
effect on statute 473 
giving rise to custom 471 
giving rise to tacit amendment 471 
devolution agreement 293, 312, 319, 321, 346, 354 
as offer to conclude treaty 307 
binding on third party 302-7 
definition 299 
role of consent 310 
diplomatic relations 
effect of severance on treaty 458-9 
disguised extradition - see deportation 
dismemberment 294, 312-316, 323 
dispositive treaty 286 288 
definition 288 
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double criminality 221 
drugs see narcotics 
estoppel 
application to extradition 443, 550 
extraditable crime 
classification 463 
extradition 
definition 7-10 
de facto - see deportation 
fiscal offences 
limitation on extradition 219 
Great Trek 59 
hi-jacking see terrorism 
hot pursuit 46 
human rights 19, 49-50, 189-90, 461, 551 
Universal Declaration of 49 
humanitarian considerations 
as limitation on extradition 214-215 
as ground for asylum 15 
immunity 
embassy premises 12, 18 
indigenous rulers 
validity of treaties with 70-74 
informal rendition 22 
comparison with abduction 23 
comparison with extradition 23 
South African practice 24 
inter-temporal law 295, 386 
interpretation 
statutory 6 
treaties 98, 307 
ius cogens 
criteria for application 462 
definition 460 
South African policy as violation of 461 
application to extradition 462-463 
judicial treaty 286, 290-291 
kidnapping - see abduction 
male captus bene detentus 19 
South African practice 20-22 
military 
deserters 44-45, 75 
offence exception 219-220 
occupation 331 
596 
occurrence in treaties 224-225 
Minister of Justice 
decision to extradite 4-5 
ito section 10(1) : foreign state 5 
ito section 15 : political offence 5 
morality 
as basis for extradition 206-208 
municipal law 
relationship with public international law 3, 114, 365 
treaty : application in 4, 318 
Namibia 
administration within 389 
classification of treaties of 383-386 
list of extradition treaties 388 
succession to treaties 380 
succession to delictual liability 390-391 
narcotics 50, 179, 222, 319, 323 
nationals 
non-extradition of 47, 54, 212-214, 318 
occurrence in treaties 224-225 
South African policy 212 
ne bis in idem 221 
nemo plus iuris 288 
non-refoulment 13 
novation of treaty rights 300-301 
Nyerere doctrine 284 
pacta sunt servanda 441 
perpetual treaties 442 
personal treaties 286, 288 
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definition 289 
political offence 5-6, 14-15, 20, 26, 47, 217-218 
occurrence in treaties 224-225 
political treaties 286, 287, 291 
prescription 47, 221 
occurrence in treaties 224-225 
press crimes 54, 221 
purchase of land 334, 336 
rebus sic stantibus 442-443, 454-458 
application of the South African policy 457-458 
requirements 456 
reciprocity 
advantages 201-203 
and s 3(2) Act 67/62 204-206 
as a form of treaty 198-201 
forms of 193-195 
South African approach 203-206 
subject to qualifications 196-198 
re-emergence of treaty rights 332 
recognition 80-81, 90-91 
religious offenc~s 221 
res transit suo onere 288 
secession 
effect on treaties 335, 338 
self-help 20 
speciality 47, 324 
stare decisis 186 
statehood 
requirements for 79 
of Natal 77-81 
of Orange Fee State 
of Transvaal 89-91 
of TBVC states 
state succession 
by evolution 298 
definition 279, 280 
in fact 292, 311, 328,334-5, 338, 348, 356 
definition 292 
------------------------~~ 
in law 292, 311, 328,335,356 
definition 292 
theories of 280-289 
State President 
power to conclude treaties 3 
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certification under s 3(2) Act 67/1962 191 
States General 52-55, 57 
suspension of extradition 215-216 
occurrence in treaties 224-225 
suspension of treaty 
advantages 475 
compared to termination 475 
procedure 476 
tabula rasa - see clean slate 
TBVC states 
multilateral convention 172, 175, 447 
termination clause 442, 445-6 
terra nullius 89 
terrorism 50, 170, 180-81 
universal offences 221-222 
universal succession 282 
disadvantages 283 
vicarious performance 301 
war 
effect on treaties 465 
United States practice 466-469 
role in South Africa 469 
Zulu nation 
agreement with British settlers 70, 337 
status of agreements 71-74 
agreement with beers 77, 337 
